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Abstract 
Syndicated loans are a common debt financing format for large corporations in general. For 
those situated in Germany—with its bank-based financial system—such loans play a vital 
role. Given the multibillion volumes raised annually, the pricing of syndicated loans is 
economically significant, with its levels, structure, and determination having attracted the 
interest of researchers around the world. 
A critical review of the existing worldwide literature of syndicated loan pricing revealed 
notable gaps, including an almost complete absence of studies on the German corporate 
market. The overall research aim was to address this gap by exploring and analysing the 
“hidden drivers” of banks’ pricing of syndicated loans to German corporate borrowers, 
thereby developing an enriched understanding of the elements and determinants of pricing 
and its underlying processes and decisions. 
Adopting a pragmatist research paradigm, I chose a sequential mixed-methods approach, with 
a limited quantitative analysis preceding an extensive qualitative study. The first stage of the 
research was designed to evaluate the availability of reliable quantitative pricing data in the 
public domain—this being the main data source for the clear majority of extant studies. I 
found the availability and quality of pricing data for the German corporate market to be 
extremely limited, particularly in comparison to that available relating to the U.S. market. 
There was clearly much that remained unexplained; hence, primary research was required to 
illuminate syndicated loan pricing and the decision processes that contribute to it.  
The main element of the qualitative study was a series of semi-structured, in-depth interviews 
with a sample of bank lending professionals and key informants. The purpose of these 
interviews was to explore the complex realities of syndicated lending through the eyes and 
experiences of the people involved and to interpret the socially constructed phenomena 
surrounding the pricing of German corporate syndicated loans.  
The study succeeded in revealing and substantiating important and to date hidden phenomena 
concerning numerous dimensions of syndicated lending in general and pricing in particular. 
An explanation was developed for the relative opacity of the German corporate syndicated 
loan market. The study enabled significant enhancements to the understanding of the concept 
of pricing and its complex and interwoven elements. More broadly, a new and richer 
perspective was developed of syndicated lending as a behavioural phenomenon, involving a 
complex interplay of relationships and strategies, and involving individuals and departments 
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within banks, between banks as members of the syndicate, and between lenders and 
borrowers. The insights gained informed the development of a comprehensive model of the 
pricing elements of syndicated lending and their determinants.   
This research is the first to conduct and produce an in-depth study of the internal workings of 
syndicated corporate lending in the German market and a study that does not rely on 
secondary data that are at best incomplete. It has resulted in many rich and original insights 
and a conceptualisation of syndicated lending that differs radically from the classical 
understanding of lender-borrower relationships as founded on theories of asymmetric 
information. The research presented here, therefore, makes significant contributions to the 
literature, in helping to close notable gaps in the banking and financial intermediation 
literature.  
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1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 begins with background for the conceptual context of the research project—
syndicated lending5 as a form of corporate finance—and introduces the project’s scope and 
the definitions of terms that are essential to the discussion. Section 1.2 discusses the origin 
and development of the research topic supported by an explanation of my personal interest in 
the field of syndicated lending both as a practitioner and as a researcher. Section 1.3 then 
presents the context for the research, namely, the German corporate syndicated lending 
market. Drawing on relevant literature, the section discusses the German setting and its 
distinctive features in the context of other comparable markets. Section 1.4, summarises in 
brief the limitations in the literature and introduces the research aim, the research questions 
and the research objectives. Lastly, the thesis structure is explained in 1.5. 
1.1 The research context: syndicated lending 
Syndicated lending, defined as a financial arrangement wherein pools of lenders jointly raise 
large amounts of capital for a borrower, is one of the world’s prevalent financing tools, 
especially for large corporations. Lenders are predominantly banks that constantly interact 
with each other to create syndicates that provide loans under mutually agreed terms and 
conditions governed by the terms of a single contract (Denis & Mullineaux, 2000).  
Primarily, syndicated loans are structured as term loans or as revolving credit facilities. The 
former is typically fully funded at closing and repaid in instalments or fully at the end of its 
term, whereas the latter provides more flexible funding that can continually be drawn, repaid, 
and re-drawn (Fight, 2004; Rhodes, Clark, & Campbell, 2004). Various pecuniary transfers 
from borrowers to lenders that compensate the latter for granting syndicated loans are 
commonly summarised and labelled pricing.  
Following a sequential process, an arranging bank—in practice also referred to as the 
bookrunner or the coordinator, negotiates and structures the syndicated loan and then invites 
other institutions from its business orbit—so-called participants—to build a syndicate. 
                                               
 
5 Note that I have on occasion used italics in the introduction of pivotal terms and locutions. These italics are intended to 
convey the meta-linguistic information (a) that this is an important term or locution in the thesis discourse and (b) this may be 
the first occurrence of the term or locution. In addition, as this is a lengthy and dense narration, I have discretionally marked 
further instances of the same word or locution with italics to reemphasise its importance. I request that readers not expect 
total consistency in the use of italics. My sense of the overall flow of the thesis has influenced my judgement as to whether 
readers might appreciate the assistance afforded by the appearance of the italics. 
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According to Godlewski (2010b), the duration of such a process is approximately eight 
weeks. The resulting consortia can be small, consisting of as few as two lenders, or large, with 
lender groups exceeding 50 banks. 
Figure 1 displays the 2015 worldwide statistics for total syndicated loan volumes, with the 
columns representing loan volume by region (left scale) and the continuous line portraying 
deal numbers (right scale).   
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 1. Overview worldwide syndicated loan volumes for 2015. 
As shown in Figure 1, syndicated loans to U.S. borrowers accounted for almost half of the 
total issued volume, with the European market representing circa 30%.6 In terms of the 
number of newly issued facilities, the U.S. accounted for circa 33% and the European market 
for roughly 23%. Extant literature usually postulates that corporate syndicated loans account 
for roughly one-third of corporate finance activities worldwide. Other activities in the 
corporate context are corporate bond and corporate equity transactions (Gupta, Singh, & 
                                               
 
6 These numbers are not restricted to corporate borrowers but include all possible types of syndicated loan borrowers like 
financial institutions or government entities. This explains the €300 billion gap in the overall worldwide syndicated loan 
volume of €4.3 trillion compared to the corporate one of €4.0 trillion for 2015 (see Figure 2). Going forward, the focus will 
be on corporate syndicated loans. 
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Zebedee, 2008). Figure 2 plots the distribution of funds by type of financing vehicle for 2015. 
Here, even more noticeable proportions are detected with corporate syndicated lending 
volumes accounting for almost 60% of all corporate financing activities and for almost 45% 
of the total transactions.   
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 2. Worldwide corporate financing volumes for 2015.  
Given such numbers, Eichengreen and Mody (2000, p. 6) sensibly described syndicated loans 
as “one of the workhorses of international capital markets”. In a similar vein, Dolvin, Pyles, 
and Woodside (2007, p. 83) reflected that this market is “acknowledged as the largest 
segment of the global capital market”. Wood (2016, p. 19) added, “The syndicated credit 
agreement is one of the most prodigiously useful contracts ever drafted”. 
Related benefits like lender-portfolio risk diversification, a high degree of flexibility, large 
lending amounts, and lower borrowing costs in comparison to financing alternatives such as a 
series of bilateral loans or bond issuances are the main contributors to the attractiveness of 
syndicated lending (Altunbas & Kara, 2011; Denis & Mullineaux, 2000; Simons, 1993; 
Wilson, 1968). Given its pre-eminence as a source of corporate finance, there is a large body 
of scientific literature focusing on syndicated lending. The relatively widespread availability 
of public data concerning aspects of this market that can be collected for research support 
scholars’ interest in syndicated lending. In that vein, Champagne and Kryzanowski (2007, p. 
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3,146) stated, “While most inter-bank relationships are not observable to outsiders, loan 
syndicates represent visible manifestations of bank interactions that can be studied”.  
In this thesis, I focus on syndicated loans to non-private equity owned German corporates 
(henceforth, German corporate syndicated loans), thus reducing the geographical and 
product-width scope in comparison to several other studies and enabling me to conduct a 
comprehensive, in-depth analysis of various pricing-related facets of German corporate 
syndicated lending. I decided to conduct a single-country study, as the cross-country 
integration of this market is found to be less pronounced compared to other financial products 
being grounded and exposed to local specialties (Barbosa & Ribeiro, 2007; Carey & Nini, 
2007; Gaul & Uysal, 2013). Thus, this enabled me to rule out cross-country discrepancies, 
(e.g., in market characteristics and practice). Further, certain excursuses to other markets to 
compare them with respect to different market practices become more evident. 
In this work, I focus on corporate syndicated lending by applying a specification of the 
research focus that differs from extant scholarship by exclusion of leveraged buy-outs (LBOs). 
Although LBOs commonly facilitate corporate acquisitions with private equity investors,7 so-
called sponsors, this distinction is pivotal, because the LBO market is of a different nature 
through its involvement of different parties with dissimilar motivations in comparison with 
the bank-only, relationship-driven corporate market (Conlan, 2011). According to Thomas 
and Wang (2004), highly leveraged loans are priced relative to fully disintermediated 
markets, in other words at arm’s length, in which non-bank, mainly institutional investors 
play essential roles. In that vein, as Schenone (2010) pointed out, LBO-loans on average carry 
70 basis points per annum (bp p.a.)8 higher pricings compared to average non-LBO loans. 
LBOs are less frequently used in the wider European market in general and in the German 
market in particular, compared, for example, to the U.S.  
Further, project finance syndicated loans lie beyond the scope of this work. Like LBOs, 
project financings—where projects or assets are financed off-balance sheet via special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs)—employ different mechanisms from corporate lending (Mcmahon, 
2011; Schniewind, 2012; von Moltke, 2013). German syndicated lending is predominantly 
                                               
 
7 Private equity investors usually provide a minimum equity portion needed to acquire as much debt as possible to buy a 
certain company (“the target”) with the debt in form of inter alia syndicated loans, high-yield bonds, or debt funds being 
secured by the assets of the target company (Pilger, 2012). LBO-investments are usually made by opportunistic equity and 
debt investors with the ultimate goal of maximising their returns (Bobrow, Tech, Redding, Spiro, & Ganz, 2007). 
8 bp = basis points; one basis point is one-hundredth of a percentage point. 
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used by explicit or implicit investment grade9 corporate borrowers with better credit qualities 
on average than corporate borrowers in the U.S. 
A large percentage of the relevant literature studies quantitative, pricing-related phenomena. 
Loan pricings in general are important as they directly influence a company’s cost of capital, 
its individual wealth, and are, more broadly, key ingredients of economic prosperity and 
welfare creation and development (Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2005; Mattes, 
Steffen, & Wahrenburg, 2013). Predominantly based on secondary data that have been 
analysed with quantitative methods, most academic syndicated loan pricing studies have been 
grounded on U.S.-based samples. In comparison, studies on European loan pricing are fewer 
in number with none explicitly focusing on German corporate syndicated loans. This is 
surprising, given the prominent role of banks in the financing of corporate activity in 
Germany’s bank-based financial system (Behr & Schmidt, 2015; Schmidt & Tyrell, 2004). 
Thus, to date, German corporate syndicated lending and its pricing represent relatively 
unexplored terrain.   
1.2 Evolution of the research topic 
The research presented here has its roots in my professional experience and in academic 
familiarity within syndicated lending. Five years of professional experience in German 
corporate syndicated lending, in parallel with two academic courses of which the latter 
concluded with a master’s dissertation10 on syndicated lending, led to the development of this 
research. Due to the two perspectives, I was enabled to develop deep insights into the worlds 
of both practice and academia and into their ways of discussing and interpreting certain 
phenomena. In general, it became progressively clear that the domain of study presents 
complex issues and phenomena that are not satisfactorily addressed in extant research 
literature, especially as it relates to price structures and the way pricings are determined and 
established. Whilst constantly comparing daily practice with scholarly attempts to capture 
pricing-related syndicated loan phenomena, I observed a gap between theory and practice. 
During my professional work, it had become clear to me that publicly available pricing 
information has only limited relevance to the reality of price setting. Moreover, although there 
                                               
 
9 Explicit investment grade loans are those granted to borrowers being externally rated “BBB” or higher by S&P and/or 
“Baa” or higher by Moody’s (Everling & Kreutz, 2012; Ramanthan, 2012). Implicit investment grade loans are those for 
borrowers being not rated externally by S&P and/or Moody’s, whose internal bank rating, however, is equivalent to an 
external investment grade rating. 
10 Master thesis title: “Empirical analysis of syndicated loans and corporate bonds as a form of debt financing from 1998 to 
2012 in Germany”. 
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was a broad movement within the financial markets towards greater transparency and 
efficiency, such was clearly not the case for the German corporate syndicated loan market. 
When I later enrolled in the University of Gloucestershire’s doctoral programme in May 
2014, I had the broad intention of exploring syndicated loan pricing issues in more depth. 
Whilst reviewing extant literature on the topic—which appeared to have solely been 
conducted by means of quantitative analytic methods—I was not convinced, given my 
experience in the field as a practitioner, by the current explanations of loan pricing reality. 
After instructional engagement with research philosophy and methodology, including an 
introduction to the world of qualitative research, I came to understand that these perspectives 
offered a promising methodological tool-box within which to explore loan-pricing 
phenomena. I was encouraged to further consider this direction by my academic advisers, one 
of whom was to become my supervisor. Through reading of related literature and numerous 
in-depth discussions, I became convinced that the world of qualitative research offered a path 
of considerable potential. The research that follows is therefore clearly grounded within the 
qualitative behavioural domain although it furthermore carries some quantitative elements. 
1.3 The German syndicated lending market in context 
The banking sector of the German economy is the largest in Europe (Howcroft, Kara, & 
Marques-Ibanez, 2014), one of the largest in the world (Grunert & Norden, 2012), and 
commonly considered prototypical of a classic, bank-based financial system (Stein, 2014). In 
such systems, banks play the key role of transforming, mobilising, and distributing capital 
from savers to borrowers, whereas in market-based systems—the U.S. or UK—equity markets 
play more pronounced roles in capital allocation processes (F. Allen & Gale, 2001; Behr & 
Schmidt, 2015).  
Figure 3 plots the total corporate syndicated lending volumes and number of transactions of 
the 10 biggest European markets in 2015. 
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 3. Top 10 European corporate syndicated loan markets for 2015. 
With 294 newly issued facilities in 2015 amounting to roughly €140 billion, Germany 
maintains the second largest share of the European corporate syndicated lending market. The 
fact that UK corporations in 2015 and historically have been the biggest borrower group in 
Europe does not contradict the aforementioned comparison of the two countries with respect 
to size and role of banks in those economies. According to Fitzgerald (2011), syndicated loan 
usage in Germany is somewhat lower compared to the UK because corporations located in 
Germany also commonly fund themselves by means of bilateral bank lending, which is not as 
much the case in the UK. This is supported by respective numbers of overall outstanding bank 
loans to non-bank clients of roughly €4,000 versus €2,000 billion in Germany versus the UK 
(BMI, 2016). Overall, the reported numbers underpin the significance of syndicated loans as a 
major financing tool for large German corporations. Thus, the almost complete absence of 
academic research for the German market is noteworthy.   
As summarised by Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010), there exists besides pricing, a 
substantial, steadily growing body of worldwide finance research on various issues related to 
syndicated loans. Without claiming completeness, Table 1 provides an overview. 
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Source: Based on Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010). 
Table 1. Exemplary overview of worldwide syndicated loan literature strands.  
I would make several points: Firstly, a broad base of literature exists regarding the underlying 
rationale and theory for loan syndication in comparison to bilateral lending affiliations. 
Because the size of loans to corporate giants has grown to be gargantuan, because even the 
largest banks have natural capital limitations, and further because the diversification of assets 
is an important measure of bank health, the diversification effect of syndicate of banks 
creating a loan larger than would be healthy for any single one of them (even if possible) 
addresses all three challenges (Chowdhry & Nanda, 1996; Simons, 1993; Wilson, 1968). 
From a borrower’s perspective, loan size, rating, and the presence of collateral have been 
recognised as influencing syndication decisions positively (Denis & Mullineaux, 2000).  
Secondly, information asymmetry issues have been studied both with respect to non-price 
related themes surrounding syndicated lending and with respect to pricing. Concerning the 
former, researchers have studied the structure of syndicates as temporary alliances of 
numerous lenders under the assumption that these are designed in a manner that addresses 
adverse selection and moral hazard issues (Pichler & Wilhelm, 2001), making the role of lead 
banks as delegated monitors in the sense of Diamond (1984) an investigated topic. In this 
regard, Sufi (2007) found the loan share retained by the respective lead arranger in a 
syndicated loan to be the main correcting variable to ameliorate the aforementioned 
asymmetric information problems. 
My third point focuses on the influence of syndicated loan announcements on the borrowers’ 
stock performance. In other words, the related authors test the hypothesis as to whether the 
issuance of syndicated credit produces positive signals to outside investors that lack access to 
private information. Overall, the findings in the literature tend to confirm this hypothesis 
1
Theory of loan syndication and 
determinants of loan syndication 
decision
Wilson (1968); Simons (1993); Bolton and Scharfstein (1996); Chowdhry and 
Nanda (1996); Winton (1997); Schure, Scoones, and Qinghua (2005); 
Mullineaux (1994); Dennis and Mullineaux (2000); Lee and Mullineaux (2004); 
Godlewski and Weill (2008); Mullineaux (1994); Dennis and Mullineaux (2000); 
Lee and Mullineaux (2004); Godlewski and Weill (2008)
2 Information asymmetries
Banerjee and Cadot (1996); Sufi (2007); Pichler and Wilhelm (2001); Lee and 
Mullineaux (2004)
3
Effects of syndication 
announcements on stock 
performance
Lumber and McConnell (1989); Armitage (1995); Mosebach (1999); Gasbarro, 
Le, Schwebach, and Zumwalt (2004); Megginson, Poulsen, and Sinkey (1995); 
Preece and Mullineaux (1996); Aintablian and Roberts (2000)
4 Emerging markets Altunbas and Gadanecz (2004); Nini (2004); Godlewski and Weill (2008)
a
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Strands of syndicated loan related scholarly literature
Pricing, the focus of this study
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(Armitage, 1995; Mikkelson & Partch, 1986; Mosebach, 1999) with these findings said  
(Boot, 2000) to underpin the specialness and certification role of banks. 
Fourthly, a few authors (e.g., Altunbas & Gadanecz, 2004; Godlewski & Weill, 2008) discuss 
syndicated lending to emerging markets borrowers. In particular, the presence of foreign 
banks in those markets that face severe informational frictions vis-a-vis local lenders, has 
been the focus of some work suggesting that the latter possess information advantages vis-à-
vis the former and, hence, can provide larger and longer tenured loans than can foreign banks 
(Nini, 2004). 
With regards to pricing—the focus of this work—the largest number of extant academic 
literature focus on the determination of pricing. Here, issues including borrower- and lender-
related specifics, non-price-related contractual features, macroeconomic themes, syndicate 
structure, lender-borrower relationship and secondary market trading activity are studied as 
possible determinants.  
Various commercial information providers such as Dealogic Loanware or Thomson Reuters’ 
Loan Pricing Connector (LPC) collect accessible, syndicated loan data at the time of 
origination in the primary market and subsequently publicise them (Gadanecz, 2003; Sufi, 
2007). The price-related studies are mostly conducted by means of quantitative analyses of 
U.S.-based secondary data samples sourced from those commercial providers. Studies on 
other borrower regions, such as Europe, appear less widespread with none comprehensively 
focusing on pricing in German corporate syndicated lending. This research disparity might 
well have its roots in the availability and quality of the public domain data of syndicated loans 
and the general information that is available about both borrowers and lenders. Such 
availability appears to vary significantly between comparative financial systems. For instance, 
the quality of information for U.S.-based borrowers is much better than for European 
borrowers in general or for German enterprises in particular. According to F. Allen and Gale 
(1995), the U.S. financial system is characterised by extensive disclosure requirements where, 
in contrast, such requirements in the German market are more limited. 
With view to the secondary data providers as presented afore, even the German market at first 
view seems to be transparent with respect to public syndicated loan related information. 
However, especially in Germany, specific syndicated loan elements, above all regarding 
pricing, are often unpublished, leaving basic and hidden, private information unobservable to 
the public, such as researchers whose work relies on those data. From publicly available data, 
it is impossible to discern prices of syndicated loans granted to German companies. In other 
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words, pricings of syndicated loans to German corporates are often opaque, leaving hidden or 
limited quantified information about determination and processes. Hence, there is much that is 
not yet understood concerning loan pricing, its various elements, its determinants, and the 
practical processes in the German corporate syndicated lending market. A central aim of this 
research is to identify and illuminate these “hidden drivers” of pricing.  
1.4 Research aim, questions and objectives 
 Limitations of worldwide pricing literature 
Quite apart from the absence of research on syndicated loans in the German corporate market, 
a critical review of existing worldwide literature reveals notable gaps. The shortcomings of 
these works that ultimately lead to the derivation of knowledge gaps and the formulation of 
research aim, questions and objectives will be discussed in depth throughout Chapter 2.  
At this place, I attempt to provide a brief preview: I observe that the existing literature 
conflates different syndicated loan asset classes such as corporate, LBO, and project finance 
syndicated loans, each of which is inherently different with respect to the parties involved, 
market practices, pricing transparency, and general product-related features. Hence, the risk of 
presenting diluted results in these studies is most pronounced. Furthermore, the literature 
shows that sample sizes of European versus U.S.-based borrowers are disproportionally small, 
a fact that indicates structural drivers for the respective diverging degrees of availability to be 
at work, which question randomly selected loan samples as supposed by extant literature.  
European data collections frequently completely disregard syndicated loans to German 
corporates (Godlewski & Weill, 2011) or represent them in a comparatively 
disproportionately small number. For instance, Carey and Nini's (2007) in its entirety contains 
only 41 German loan tranches11 in a ten-year analysis horizon from 1992-2002. According to 
Dealogic Loanware, in the same period more than 1,000 tranches have been issued. It is most 
likely that almost 96% of the tranches have not been considered due to missing price 
information, which leaves unfilled the crucial inputs for quantitative regression analyses. With 
respect to price definitions and measures, I discovered major shortcomings due to mixed, 
unclear definitions and labelling across data providers. Nor, moreover, did these measures 
adequately address syndicated loan pricings’ complexity and multidimensionality in the 
                                               
 
11 Syndicated loan contracts are regularly composed of a package of several facilities—so-called tranches—that often appear 
to be structured as different loan types with varying loan characteristics such as pricings, maturity-profiles, or other erratic 
features (Alexandre et al., 2014; Fight, 2004; Maskara). See also section 2.4.4 and 2.8.4. 
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differing illuminations of different loan types and various different elements of pricing. In 
sum, despite an extensive amount of scholarly effort attempting to elucidate syndicated loans’ 
pricing determinants, existing worldwide evidence remains fragmented and sometimes 
contradictory. The result is that studies providing holistic and integrated overview of the 
numerous syndicated loan pricing determinants and their interaction is unavailable.  
 Research aim 
By virtue of the lack of German syndicated loan studies in general and the shortcomings of 
extant worldwide literature, the aim of my work is to explore and analyse the “hidden drivers” 
of banks’ pricing of syndicated loans to German corporate borrowers, thereby developing an 
enriched understanding of the elements and determinants of pricing and its underlying 
processes and decisions. 
To the best of my knowledge—apart from significant enhancements of the understanding of 
the term “pricing”—its complex and interwoven elements given different syndicated loan 
types—this study is the first to undertake a comprehensive analysis and synthesis of the 
pricing determinants of the German corporate syndicated loan market based on an extensive 
qualitative fieldwork, comprising interviews with lending professionals. Furthermore, it is the 
first work dedicated to explaining the relative opacity of the German corporate syndicated 
loan market and revealing the underlying reasons for this. Overall, these discourses provide 
new insights into the nature of syndicated lending in general. Moreover, the work addresses 
several dimensions of syndicated loan related phenomena, such as bank stakeholders, bank 
best practices, and policy and regulation. Thus, the research makes contributes measurably to 
the literature and helps to close notable gaps in the banking and financial intermediation 
literature. In doing so, the research also opens additional opportunities for future research. 
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 Research questions and objectives 
Table 2 sets forth the research questions and objectives that fulfil the aim of this study. 
 
Table 2. Research questions and research objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
What are the limitations of publicly available 
information concerning German corporate 
syndicated loan pricing? 
To assess the limitations of publicly available 
information concerning German corporate 
syndicated loan pricing.
4 & 5.2.2
2
Why are some aspects of corporate syndicated 
loan pricing for German borrowers made 
public and others not?
To explore and explain why some aspects of 
corporate syndicated loan pricing for German 
borrowers are made public and others not.
5.2
3
How can the various German corporate 
syndicated loan pricing elements be classified 
and prioritised from a lending banks’ 
perspective?
To explore the classification and prioritisation 
of the various German corporate syndicated 
loan pricing elements from a lending banks’ 
perspective.
5.3
4
How can the complexity and 
multidimensionality of German corporate 
syndicated loan pricings be summarised and 
explained?
To explore and explain how the complexity and 
multidimensionality of German corporate 
syndicated loan pricings can be summarised 
and explained.
5.4
5
What are the pricing determinants in the 
German market for corporate syndicated loans 
and how do they interact with each other?
To establish what the pricing determinants in 
the German market for corporate syndicated 
loans are and how they interact with each other.
5.5 & 6
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1.5 Thesis structure 
The structure of the thesis follows the natural process of research that M. Saunders, Lewis, 
and Thornhill (2012, p. 166) stated to be “composed of a number of stages summarised as 
conceptualisation (including conceiving the research question, recognising the philosophical 
position, determining the approach and formulating the design), implementation (sampling, 
data collection and data analysis), interpretation and outcomes”. Nuanced in this way, Figure 
4 highlights the organisational conception of the thesis as a work of seven chapters. 
 
Figure 4. Thesis structure. 
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2 Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
The critical literature review serves as groundwork for the remainder of the thesis (Wallace & 
Wray, 2011). Its purpose is to provide the researcher with a knowledge base to progress with 
his or her research and to reveal knowledge gaps by means of a critical review of the most 
relevant and significant worldwide academic literature relevant to the topic: in this research, 
the understanding of German corporate syndicated loan pricing. In other words, such a review 
frames the conceptual universe in which a thesis acquires meaning and contributes to 
knowledge. Specifically, the review assists the scholar to derive and justify research questions 
and objectives and to discuss, compare, and place research findings within the wider body of 
knowledge (Creswell, 2007).  
2.2 Structure and development of the literature review 
 Structure 
Section 2.3 presents an introduction to theoretical financial intermediation assumptions and 
the raison d`être of banks, upon which various discussions herein are grounded—especially 
those on syndicate structure and the lender-borrower relationship.  
Section 2.4 introduces and describes important general concepts of syndicated lending and 
product-related specifics. This introduction is based largely on academic literature (including 
textbooks) covering the domain reflected in the worldwide syndicated lending market. In line 
with the overall research aim, later discussions reveal certain specific and possibly 
contradictory thus-far-hidden real-world phenomena of the German market. 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 are significant in providing a broad context for the academic background 
relevant to my research area and are intended to assist readers in apprehending the theoretical 
and applied knowledge germane to the study. Establishing a setting for pricing-related 
discussions throughout the thesis, I discuss syndicated loan pricing definitions and respective 
measures applied within extant academic literature in 2.5 and I outline the critical debate on 
these topics.  
The core goal of the literature review is to identify gaps in the web of knowledge that defines 
the field through critical review of existing strands of academic literature on syndicated loan 
pricing determinants. Sections 2.6 to 2.12 provide such critical reviews, predominantly 
drawing upon peer-reviewed articles published in reputable finance, business, and economics 
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journals that treat such matter from both empirical and theoretical perspectives. As suggested 
by M. Saunders et al. (2012), I applied a thematic approach by organising the chapters 
essentially based on the relevant primary subjects and primary findings of the publications 
that I reviewed, as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Syndicated loan pricing determinants within extant literature. 
 Key sources 
Via individual summary tables for each of 30 academic papers that appeared both relevant 
and significant and that I identify forthwith as being core papers, I condensed the key 
elements and findings. Furthermore, within the related primary subject sections, I highlighted 
the first mention of the authors of these core papers via a bold typography for the convenience 
of the reader. I support specific discussions with an array of auxiliary bank-lending-related 
literature that is not necessarily based on syndicated credits. Most of the earlier financial 
intermediation research is either purely theoretical or constructed on standard bilateral bank 
loan samples (e.g., Boot, Thakor, & Udell, 1987; Boot & Thakor, 1994; Diamond, 1984; 
Melink & Plaut, 1986). Syndicated loans, according to Hale and Santos (2009) and 
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos (2016)—except for several distinctive features—might partly 
adhere to similar principles or patterns as applied in standard (bilateral) bank loans. It is 
reasonable, therefore, to incorporate this kind of literature cautiously, but at lower levels of 
relevance.   
Modern syndicated loan literature specifically focuses on those pricing determinants that are 
complex and for which respective directional a priori predictions appear challenging. This is 
particularly pronounced in the broad field of information asymmetries and various related 
sub-themes, such as discussions on syndicate structure and relationship lending. Logically and 
with respect to the included core papers, these topics play important roles in my analysis. 
Additionally—mainly by presenting controlling and robustness tests—most empirical articles 
provide important sub-thematic findings besides their core leitmotif. Robustness tests are 
common in quantitative analyses to rule-out different explanations in relation to an 
Section
1 Borrower-related specifics 2.6
2 Lender-related specifics 2.7
3 Syndicated loan contractual features 2.8
4 Macroeconomic environment 2.9
5 Syndicate structure 2.10
6 Lender-borrower relationship 2.11
7 Secondary market trading 2.12
Syndicated loan pricing determinants within extant literature
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established relationship between certain variables (Lu & White, 2014). Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe, and Jackson (2012) defined robustness as the “extent to which a summary measure is 
sensitive to disturbances in data quality” (p. 345). In other words, papers seeking to achieve a 
core goal, such as studying syndicate structures in the light of information asymmetries, might 
also contain some sub-thematic findings, such as regarding borrower or lender characteristics. 
My intention is to share such sub-thematic findings systematically with the reader by means 
of synthesis.  
 Synthesis 
Spanning the broad thematic view by incorporating both—the core literatures’ primary and 
sub-thematic findings regarding the seven determinant classification criteria in Table 3—
enabled me to accomplish a high degree of granularity with an overall extraction of 264 
individual pricing determinant findings.12 I synthesised these into corresponding summary 
views for each determinant group with the Table 4 displaying a respective example.13 
 
Table 4. Core literature synthesis: example and legend. 
Overall, the literature review led to the revelation of knowledge gaps and the subsequent 
derivation of research questions and objectives as will be established in 2.13.  
 
 
                                               
 
12 Based on the 30 defined core papers. 
13 A full list of the literature synthesis is displayed in Appendix A. 
Determinant
P
ri
ci
n
g
 
d
ir
ec
ti
o
n
Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
↑ e.g., AISD e.g., U.S.
e.g., 2000-
2010
e.g., Author 1 (2010) e.g., 3
↑
e.g., Spread over 
reference rate
e.g., U.S.
e.g., 2000-
2011
e.g., Author 2 (2010) e.g., 4
↓ e.g., AISD e.g., U.S.
e.g., 2000-
2012
e.g., Author 3 (2010) e.g., 5
Primary subject (e.g., borrower related specifics)
Sub-parameter of primary subject (e.g., borrower size)
e.g., large
Legend
Consensus within core literature (if more than half of the respective findings match)
Dissension within core literature (if less than half of the respective findings match)
No further evidence provided within core literature
Impasse within core literature (if half of the respective findings match)
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2.3 Introduction to theories of banking and financial intermediation 
In line with the scope of this thesis, I focus on corporate syndicated loans for large German 
enterprises. Excepting the LBO, for example, this industry segment tends to be a bank-only 
market (Conlan, 2011). Hence, bank specific and financial intermediation theoretical 
assumptions in general play pivotal roles during the study and for which I present a brief 
primer.  
After having overcome early assumptions of perfect capital markets, where the design of 
contractual features for corporate attempts to raise funds are irrelevant (Modigliani & Miller, 
1958), modern financial intermediation and corporate finance research draws its inspiration 
mainly from asymmetric information and agency theory (Fulghieri & Goldman, 2008). 
Grounded on early seminal works of scholars like Leland and Pyle (1977) and Diamond 
(1984), banking and financial intermediation research has its origins in extension of banks 
roles in gathering private information about debtors to be used subsequently to ameliorate 
financial contracting problems in relation to adverse selection and moral hazard. From a 
research philosophical point of view, related literature strands can be categorised within the 
classical economic positivist paradigm with an almost complete absence of interpretive 
stances.  
Banks constitute outstanding pillars of financial markets and the allocation of capital by 
acting as intermediaries, for which the main underlying rationale is to ameliorate asymmetric 
information and moral hazard issues (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993; Diamond; Holmström & 
Tirole, 1998). This theoretical model rests on the idea that banks constantly collect 
information about borrowers that is at least partly unavailable to non-banks (Santos & 
Winton, 2008). 
Repeated lending relationships to borrowers with access to private information—which can be 
seen as one of the fundamental roles and advantages of banks (Gonzales, 2014; Sufi, 2007)— 
enable them to mitigate asymmetric information issues (Altunbas, Gadanecz, & Kara, 2006a; 
Gadanecz, Kara, & Molyneux, 2012). This traditional and theoretical understanding of 
banking and financial intermediation suggests that banks are special (Gande & Saunders, 
2012). The smaller, younger, riskier, and opaquer the borrowers are in general, the more 
important is the role of financial intermediation via private debt financing (Eichengreen & 
Mody, 2000; Kaya, 2011; Siegel, 2005). According to Mattes et al. (2013) and Panyagometh 
and Roberts (2010), in information-intense financing arrangements, relationship banks build 
information monopolies that provide a superior ability to predict the future developments in 
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borrowers’ creditworthiness. From a more technical perspective, this debt intermediation 
business in its original role relies on collecting deposits from the public and providing loans to 
the public (Fulghieri & Goldman, 2008; Meller, 2013). In other words, deposit holders 
indirectly delegate investment decisions to the intermediary,14 who enjoys the advantage of 
being able to share risk, to transform assets, to provide liquidity, and to produce private 
information, especially through ongoing monitoring and screening of their clients (Gobbi & 
Lotti, 2004; D. P. Morgan & Samolyk, 2010). Appositely, Diamond (1984) defined banks as 
delegated monitors. Delegated monitoring in the syndicated loan context plays a prominent 
role in subsequent discussions as participant banks within lending syndicates are assumed to 
delegate monitoring to the lead arrangers of a syndicated loan (Sufi, 2007).  
2.4 Introduction to syndicated lending’s institutional characteristics 
The upcoming sections provide brief introductions to syndicated lending’s institutional 
characteristics as some basic understanding of specific product related phenomena will 
enhance the appreciation of the remainder of the thesis. 
 Syndicated lending 
Syndicated loans are large-scale debt instruments where multiple lenders—typically groups of 
banks15—build syndicates to lend funds for numerous purposes (Altunbas, Gadanecz, & Kara, 
2006b; Godlewski, Sanditov, & Burger-Helmchen, 2012). Although each lender maintains its 
own claims to the obligors,16 syndicated loans are built on single loan agreements with mutual 
terms and conditions, based on the principle of an equal legal treatment of all lenders 
(Altunbas et al.; Fight, 2004). These multilateral elements distinguish syndicated from typical 
bilateral, sole-lender transactions. Corporate syndicated loans are usually of highest seniority 
with lender groups having first repayment claims in default or bankruptcy scenarios (L. Allen 
& Gottesmann, 2006; Slaughter & May, 2013). Syndicated loans are negotiated, structured, 
and distributed by one or several “arranging” banks17 that may subsequently invite additional 
institutions, the participants, to join a syndicate (Ball, Bushman, & Vasvari, 2008; Fight, 
2004; Rhodes et al., 2004). Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) described this process as one 
element of modern forms of banking often referred to as the originate-to-distribute-approach. 
                                               
 
14 Depository institution. 
15 At least two institutions. 
16 As well as a pro-rata share of possible losses. 
17 Also referred to as coordinator(s), bookrunner(s), and mandated lead arranger(s). I discuss the numerous syndicated 
lenders’ title structures in section 2.4.6. 
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In that context, Mora (2015) pointed out that the arranging bank(s) on average retain one-third 
of the total amount of the loan after a successful syndication. 
According to Gadanecz (2003, p. 26), “Syndicated credits lie somewhere in between 
relationship loans and public debt. While the lead bank(s) may have some form of relationship 
with the borrower, this is less likely to be the case for the banks participating in the syndicate 
at a more junior level”. Altunbas et al. (2006b, p. 6) defined syndicated loans as “hybrids of 
relationship lending and publicly traded debt”. In other words, syndicated lending “lies on the 
borderline between public and private finance” (Gadanecz, p. 12). According to Jones, Lang, 
and Nigro (2005), syndicated lending shrinks the differences between intermediated bank debt 
and disintermediated public debt such as corporate bonds. 
 Main contract parties in syndicated lending 
2.4.2.1 Borrowers 
The borrower types in Table 5 are the most common in general syndicated lending. 
 
Table 5. Common borrower types in syndicated lending. 
Focusing on German corporates, one observes that respective definitions and classifications—
especially with respect to size—appear vague and untrustworthy. The European Comission 
(2017) provides official quantitative company-clusters, as shown in Table 6. 
 
Source: Adapted from European Comission (2009). 
Table 6. Official company size clusters. 
Corporates The focus of this study; see respective definitions below.
Deal sponsors; private equity funds Mainly active in LBO- and project financings.
Financial institutions
Here, banks or other financial institutions themselves borrow in the 
syndicated loan market.
Sovereign countries/quasi-sovereign/-governmental 
entities 
Mainly common in emerging- or developing markets.
Special purpose vehicles (SPVs) Mainly common in project- and asset financings.
Common borrower types in syndicated lending
not within the scope of this thesis: 
Staff 
headcount
Turnover 
(in € mn)
or
Total balance 
sheet 
(in € mn)
Micro enterprises < 10 < 2 < 2
Small enterprises < 50 < 10 < 10
Medium-sized enterprises < 250 < 50 < 43
> 250 > 50 > 43Large enterprises
Official information based on Eurostat
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
Ceilings
Category
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Here, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are demarcated as either micro-, small- or 
medium-sized firms with staff headcounts of less than 250, yearly turnovers of less/equal than 
50, and total balance sheets of less/equal than €43 million.  
According to these characterisations, all German corporate syndicated loan borrowers adhere 
to the large enterprise cluster. Within this group, however, firm characteristics, such as size, 
differ extensively. A firm qualifies to be labelled a large enterprise when its turnover is 
upwards of €50 million, whereas firms with a couple of billion Euros, such as German DAX-
firms, are labelled in the same way. Rightly, Fitzgerald (2011) pointed out that corporate 
borrowers might range from a relatively small regional manufacturing firm to a large multi-
billion-euro-turnover international corporation.  
Qualitative criteria related to owners and their leadership define the special term Mittelstand, 
which is not used outside of Germany (Goeke, 2008). According to Becker and Ulrich (2009), 
Mittelstand enterprises are characterised by one person or a family, which owns and 
operationally leads the business. This person or family is personally liable for borrowing 
obligations and, hence, bears the related entrepreneurial risks (Becker & Ulrich). Logically, 
Mittelstand enterprises might adhere to the SME-definition, but also to the definition for large 
enterprises, leaving the demarcation with regards to the activity of corporate borrowers in 
syndicated lending relatively unclear. 
Because no official, more granular definitions appropriately clustering large enterprises exist, 
I provide an unofficial definition based on comments of corresponding product specialists 
who assisted me as informants and thankfully acted as anonymous referees. These numbers 
are rough indicators for the companies within the scope of this thesis, but with explicit notice 
that the definitional boundaries are not strict and that borderline cases are likely to differ in 
practice from the numbers presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Unofficial company size clusters in light of capital markets accessability. 
 
Turnover Issuing volume
Syndicated loan capability c. > 250 c. > 25 no
Schuldscheindarlehen capability c. > 350 c. > 50 no
Public bond capability c. > 500 c. > 250 no, but preferred
Commercial paper capability c. > 1,000 c. > 20* no, but preferred
External rating 
requirement
* Here, this single minimum issuing volume is usually only a part of an overall commercial paper programme of several hundred million Euros. 
Ceilings (in € mn)
Unofficial "market standards"
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Large enterprises capable of issuing a syndicated loan are characterised by a minimum 
turnover of €250 million with minimum issuing volumes regularly exceeding €25 million. 
Schuldscheindarlehen18 are regularly issued by borrowers with at least 350 million Euros of 
turnover at a minimum issuing volume of €50 million. Enterprises with turnovers of at least 
0.5 to one billion Euros issue corporate bonds19 where issues tend to exceed €250 million. 
Even larger clients with turnovers of at least one billion Euros commonly use commercial 
paper programmes.20 Indirectly, commercial paper plays an important role in this thesis as 
large revolving credit facilities for clients with commercial paper programmes serve as 
commercial paper back-up lines.21 
2.4.2.2 Lenders 
From a lender or investor perspective, the main “players” in syndicated lending have always 
been and remain the banks. However, at the present time, non-bank financial institutions, such 
as insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds, and investment-funds22 are playing 
increasingly important roles (Lim, Minton, & Weisbach, 2014). These participants, however, 
are primarily active in more risky asset classes, such as LBOs and complex and mainly asset-
based non- or limited-recourse project finance transactions (Gupta et al., 2008; Massoud, 
Nandy, Saunders, & Song, 2011).  
As my work thematises common corporate borrowing activities via syndicated loans, I focus 
solely on the bank’s side of such transactions (i.e., so-called bank-only facilities). Although 
this research emphasises German corporate borrowers, it also concerns global features, given 
                                               
 
18 “The term Schuldscheindarlehen (in the singular) is perhaps best translated as ‘a loan evidenced by a certificate of 
indebtedness’. The product has been in existence for many years with predecessors dating back several centuries. In recent 
years, there has been a marked increase in overall volumes and increased interest in the product, both from a domestic 
German and an international perspective” (LMA, 2016a, p. 4).  
“The term Schuldscheindarlehen is not legally defined. It is a financial instrument with distinct legal characteristics. Under 
German law, Schuldscheindarlehen refers to an underlying loan agreement for which a separate borrower's note 
(Schuldschein) stating the loan receivable is usually, but not necessarily, issued. The borrower's note does not constitute a 
security within the meaning of German civil and commercial law or within the meaning of the German Securities Trading 
Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, ‘WpHG’) or the Securities Prospectus Act (Wertpapierprospektgesetz, ’WpPG’) and generally 
only serves as documentary evidence of a debt. This means that Schuldscheindarlehen are exempted from the obligation to 
publish a prospectus under European prospectus law. It is not possible to use a clearing system for such loans and they may 
not be listed or traded on any stock exchange” (LMA, 2016a, p. 5).  
19 According to Thau (2011), corporate bonds are defined as debt security instruments that are issued by a corporation and 
subsequently sold to investors. Usual, corporate loans are senior unsecured debt instruments, meaning that the payment 
ability of the respective company backs the bond.  
20 According to Feldstein et al. (2012), commercial papers are money market products allowing inter alia large corporations 
to raise funds on a short-term basis regularly ranging from 1 day to 270 days. Commercial paper programmes provide clients 
a contract framework allowing them to tap the commercial paper market repeatedly up to a certain maximum amount. 
21 See section 2.4.4.2. 
22 For example, by investing in collateralised loan obligations (CLOs), collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). 
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the international banking universe that is active in this corporate borrower market (Clarke, 
Cull, Peria, & Sanchez, 2003; Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011).  
Table 8 displays the bookrunner league table of the 25 most active banks for German 
corporate syndicated lending for the period 2000 to 2015. These banks represent more than 
80% of the overall bookrunner volume.23 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Table 8. German corporate syndicated loan bookrunner league table 2000 to 2015. 
 
                                               
 
23 Detailed information on different bank titles like “Bookrunner” can be found in section 2.4.6. Regarding the allocated 
bookrunner volume for each bank (e.g., €61,434.10 million for Commerzbank in Table 8), the related functioning is as 
follows: If a €100 million transaction consisted of two bookrunners and two further non-bookrunners, the former would be 
allocated €50 million bookrunner league table volume (also often referred to as league table credit) each (Dealogic 
Loanware, 2016). 
 
Bookrunner
Deal value 
(€ mn)
No.
%-
share
Registered 
office
Business focus
1 Deutsche Bank 71,869.37 314 12.00 Germany Universalbanking
2 Commerzbank 61,434.10 508 10.26 Germany Universalbanking
3 UniCredit 58,783.43 347 9.82 Italy Universalbanking
4 J.P. Morgan 37,319.76 85 6.23 U.S. Universalbanking
5 BNP Paribas 27,208.15 104 4.54 France Universalbanking
6 LBBW 24,813.25 179 4.14 Germany Wholesalebanking
7 Citi 22,965.89 58 3.84 U.S. Universalbanking
8 HSBC 19,261.53 109 3.22 UK Universalbanking
9 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 19,206.30 47 3.21 U.S. Universalbanking
10 Société Générale Corporate & Investment Banking 17,977.74 56 3.00 France Universalbanking
11 BayernLB 15,156.65 122 2.53 Germany Wholesalebanking
12 Royal Bank of Scotland 15,085.01 70 2.52 UK Universalbanking
13 Barclays 13,952.53 47 2.33 UK Universalbanking
14 Mizuho 9,386.37 24 1.57 Japan Universalbanking
15 ING 8,986.28 57 1.50 Netherlands Universalbanking
16 Morgan Stanley 8,949.42 26 1.49 U.S. Investmentbanking
17 Credit Agricole CIB 8,639.60 50 1.44 France Universalbanking
18 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 8,466.49 31 1.41 Japan Universalbanking
19 Helaba 7,811.19 67 1.30 Germany Wholesalebanking
20 DZ Bank 7,502.69 71 1.25 Germany Wholesalebanking
21 Goldman Sachs 7,244.76 36 1.21 U.S. Investmentbanking
22 SEB 4,826.64 35 0.81 Sweden Universalbanking
23 Credit Suisse 4,718.12 25 0.79 Switzerland Universalbanking
24 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 4,454.49 24 0.74 Japan Universalbanking
25 Santander 3,398.63 19 0.57 Spain Universalbanking
Germany: 
Corporate syndicated loan bookrunner league table 2000 to 2015
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Generally, bank type discussions and respective classifications can be confusing, faddish, and 
subject to ongoing changes in light of numerous pending country-specific regulatory themes 
like separation acts, etc. (Hockmann & Thießen, 2012; LMA, 2015). Many different terms are 
loosely used in practice. To provide an example, commonly labelled U.S. investment banks 
happen to be identified as broker dealers, and, as such, during the financial crisis around 
2008/2009 converted into bank holding companies to gain access to the Federal Reserve 
(FED) Bank’s emergency liquidity. Institutions like J.P. Morgan Chase and Citibank have, 
however, been bank holding companies since the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2016; Oliver Wyman, 2015; Schildbach, 2012). This 
does not necessarily mean, however, that respective business models likewise assimilated. 
Goldman Sachs, for example, remains to primarily conduct investment banking business. In 
the UK, legal entities that have the permission to conduct investment banking business are 
labelled investment firms and are subject to strict prudential regulation by the Bank of 
England (Balluck, 2016). However, these investment firms are commonly subsidiaries of 
large banks that conduct various other types of financial business.  
In line with Hackethal (2004), the German banking system is special in the sense that besides 
privately held and municipality owned savings banks, restricted to serving only local clients, 
exist. Landesbanks act as central banks to these savings banks and are owned by the German 
Federal States. Next, cooperative banks also exist and these are owned by their 
members/clients with DZ- and WGZ-Bank acting as central banks to the local cooperative 
banks. Hence, the German bank market is commonly referred to as the three-pillar-system 
(Behr & Schmidt, 2015). Table 8 shows three Landesbanks (LBBW, BayernLB, and Helaba) 
and DZ-Bank as central banks for cooperative banks. 
The exemplified complexity with respect to concrete regulatory and legally correct labelling 
further increases with respect to pan-European institutions, like large Asian banking 
conglomerates. Further, via subsidiaries, several foreign banks operate under different legal 
frameworks abroad by adhering to respective local regulatory requirements.  
For the purposes of this study, it is more fruitful to consider the respective business foci 
across banks—in other words, how they generally interpret banking—than to debate in depth 
the intricate legal and regulatory definitions, which would become an investigation without 
end. In this vein, three different bank-clusters are important for the market under study: 
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1. Universal banks. Universal banks offer full ranges of banking services, such as 
checking and savings/deposit accounts, loans, credit cards, insurance products and 
lines of credit to individuals (retail and private banking24) and to businesses 
(corporate banking), which overall is commonly labelled commercial banking. 
Additionally, universal banks regularly provide investment banking services. 
2. Wholesale banks. Wholesale banks mainly offer financial services to larger 
businesses, institutional investors, other banks and investment vehicles. These 
institutions commonly conduct large scale business. Commonly, wholesale banks do 
not conduct retail banking or retail-deposit taking activities. They focus on corporate 
and investment banking.  
3. Investment banks. Investment banks are financial institutions that provide numerous 
services; amongst others are underwriting, facilitating transactions, assisting in 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and brokering and trading.25 Investment banks’ 
clients are mostly very large multinational corporations and institutional investors. 
Investment banks do not conduct retail banking or deposit business (Balluck, 2016; 
Hockmann & Thießen, 2012).   
To conclude, universal banks usually conduct retail, corporate and investment banking 
business under one roof, whereas pure wholesale banks focus on a broad range of corporate- 
and investment banking services without conducting retail business. Investment banks appear 
to have the narrowest focus by solely focusing on the business fields described afore. Under 
these definitions, only universal banks have access to retail deposits, which influences their 
individual funding conditions (Craig & Dinger, 2013). Herein, I focus on these three bank 
types, both national (German) and international.  
Pursuant to Table 8, together with UniCredit—the Italian universal bank that acquired the 
German Bayerische Hypo und Vereinsbank AG in 2005—Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank 
have a market share of 32%. Five U.S. banks are present in this table, together accounting for 
an approximately 16% market share. Three banks are headquartered in the UK and France, 
with market shares of 8 and 9% respectively.  
 
                                               
 
24 Meaning: does business with or on behalf of individual, non-professional clients. 
25 Meaning: trades shares, bonds and other financial assets with further market participants (e.g., insurance companies, 
pension funds, or hedge funds) (Balluck, 2016). 
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 Rationale of syndicating loans 
Academic literature identifies various motivations for both lenders and borrowers to engage in 
syndicated lending. 
2.4.3.1 Lender rationale 
 Lenders joining loan syndications diversify their loan portfolios by avoiding excessive 
bulk risk positions and do so in a relatively cost-effective way (L. Allen & 
Gottesmann, 2006; Altunbas et al., 2006a; Godlewski & Weill, 2008; Simons, 1993). 
Thus, syndicated lending enables lenders to avoid major single-name exposures26 that 
may be prohibited by local banking regulators (Denis & Mullineaux, 2000; Ivashina & 
Scharfstein, 2010). Nevertheless, a lending relationship with the borrower can be 
sustained (Godlewski & Weill). 
 Lenders active in syndicated lending can diversify income sources (Godlewski, 2010b) 
since banks acting as lead banks in structuring and placing syndicated loans generate 
various kinds of fee income (Altunbas & Kara, 2011; Godlewski & Weill). Participant 
banks on the other side tend to choose syndicated loans as a means to boost margin 
incomes (Altunbas & Kara) and to strengthen credit portfolio performance and quality 
(Howcroft et al., 2014). 
 Banks seeking to utilise available capital to grow their balance sheets might choose 
syndicated loans to access the debt of large, international firms (Howcroft et al.). 
 Syndicating loans enables capital constraint banks to lift their capital adequacy ratios 
(Alexandre, Bouaiss, & Refait-Alexandre, 2014). Banks facing such constraints and 
need to reduce RWA-exposures might use syndicated lending as a technique to offload 
credit pieces without having to terminate the entire lending relationship (L. Allen & 
Gottesmann). 
 Participating banks have the opportunity to decrease their monitoring as well as 
screening and administrative costs as elements of these functions are performed by a 
facility agent (Altunbas et al.; Mercedes Adamuz & Hernández Cortès, 2015).  
                                               
 
26 So-called bulk-risk-exposures. 
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 Participant banks that “passively” join syndicated loans are enabled to build exposure 
to clients that would otherwise perhaps not be realistic targets27 (Altunbas & Kara, 
2011; Godlewski & Weill, 2008; Howcroft et al., 2014). 
 According to Howcroft et al., being active in the market for syndicated loans might be 
a tool to enhance marketing and advertising in the financial markets in general. 
2.4.3.2 Borrower rationale 
 The characteristics of syndicated loans enable borrowers to raise large amounts that 
would otherwise have required a series of bilateral facilities (Mercedes Adamuz & 
Hernández Cortès, 2015). Furthermore, borrowing from a syndicate might be less 
costly and easier to administer (Dolvin et al., 2007). These multilateral features also 
protect borrowers from the “misbehaviour” of single lenders (Altunbas et al., 2006a). 
 In comparison to bonds, syndicated loans can be placed more quickly and discreetly 
(Godlewski, 2010b; Godlewski & Weill). 
 Syndicated loans can be individually negotiated. For instance, it is common that 
syndicated loan facilities consist of several tranches,28 for example, a term loan for 
capital expenditure, a revolving credit facility for flexible working capital funding 
tool, and a letter of guarantee tranche (Maskara, 2010). 
 Syndicated loans tend to be easier to liquidate or to renegotiate, restructure29 prepaid, 
or cancel in comparison with other debt instruments (Mora, 2015). The general 
reasons for this is bank syndicates are usually relatively small, concentrated, well 
organised, and include a client’s relationship bank (L. Allen & Gottesmann, 2006; 
Altunbas et al.; Gasbarro et al., 2004). Gadanecz (2003, p. 119) described the relative 
ease in restructuring a syndicated loan as effectively an “option to renegotiate”. 
                                               
 
27 For example, as they are too large or resident in a foreign country. 
28 See section 2.4.4 and 2.8.4. 
29 For example, in the case of covenant violations or other financial constraints leading to a deterioration of a borrowers 
creditworthiness. 
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 Syndicated lending allows borrowers to diversify its lender universe, thereby allowing 
them—especially those with lower credit quality30—to depend less on single lenders 
that they would in large bilateral lending relationships (Nigro, Jones, & Aydogdu, 
2010). 
 Loan types 
Syndicated loan contracts are regularly composed of a package of several facilities—so-
termed tranches—that often appear to be structured as different loan types with varying loan 
characteristics such as pricings, maturity-profiles, or other contractual features (Alexandre et 
al., 2014; Fight, 2004; Maskara). According to the literature, three types of syndicated loans 
are common in the field of commercial lending. 
2.4.4.1 Term loan (TL) facility 
Term loans (TLs) are usually fully drawn in a lump sum at or only after a relatively short 
period from loan closing in an agreed drawdown or availability period (Lim et al., 2014). 
Term loans may be repaid in instalments or, quite often, in larger balloon payments or even in 
a 100% bullet repayment at a contractual termination date (Gasbarro et al., 2004). Once 
repayments are made, funds cannot be re-borrowed (Angbazo et al., 1998). From a cash-flow-
perspective, bullet repaying term loans are at best comparable to corporate bonds and can be 
said to be one of such instruments’ main alternatives as a competing debt instrument, as 
pointed out by Godlewski (2010a).  
A widely employed sub-format of term loans are bridge loans, a commonly used tool to 
finance acquisitions discretely within a small banking group (via underwriting31), until the 
acquisition closes and becomes public knowledge. Subsequently, the borrower usually 
refinances the bridge loan via capital markets instruments (so-called take outs) like corporate 
bond issuances and/or an equity offering. In this case, term loans and corporate bonds interact 
and complement rather than compete. 
                                               
 
30 Institutional investors such as insurance companies and funds tend to invest in rather lower-rated syndicated loans (e.g., 
LBOs) as they carry more attractive yields than do relationship-driven corporate investment grade loans (Angbazo, Mei, & 
Saunders, 1998). 
31 See section 2.4.7.1. 
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Often, for non-bank financial institutions, term loan B32 (institutional) tranches are structured 
into facilities. As these are uncommon in corporate syndications, they are beyond the scope of 
this study.  
2.4.4.2 Revolving credit facility (RCF)  
Revolving credit facilities (RCFs) allow borrowers flexibility in drawing, repaying, and 
redrawing amounts—up to a specific maximum commitment—over the lifetime of the facility 
(Fight, 2004). A RCF can thus be defined as having contingent liquidity. A smaller strand of 
banking-theoretical literature (e.g., Shockley & Thakor, 1997) defines revolving loans as 
credit risk derivatives that represent put options on debt claims from a lender’s perspective. 33  
A common sub-format for revolving credit facilities is the standby or backup credit facility. 
Standby facilities usually serve as commercial paper back up lines that rating agencies expect 
from large corporations that frequently tap the commercial paper market to fund their working 
capital to maintain. In other words, such facilities can be described as a special source of 
liquidity insurance (Dolvin et al., 2007).  
2.4.4.3 Letter of guarantee facility (LoC)  
For letter of guarantee facilities (LoCs), banks do not provide liquidity, but rather certain 
guarantees,34 which therewith enhance the borrower’s credit risk in relation to third parties 
(Gadanecz, 2003). This thesis focuses on cash-related syndicated loan facilities. Hence, LoC-
facilities are not a subject of interest. 
 
 
                                               
 
32 Although these tranches are often legally “pari passu”, meaning that they have the same seniority compared to the term 
loan A bank tranches, term loan Bs’ in practice are structurally (e.g., cash-flow-wise) subordinated. They tend to carry bullet 
repayments and thus longer durations (Angbazo et al., 1998). According to Fulghieri and Goldman (2008), short-term debt, 
by virtue of the fact that it is repaid earlier, can be said to be senior to long-term debt. To compensate for this 
structural/indirect subordination, they carry higher pricings (Gupta et al., 2008; Lim et al., 2014). According to Maskara 
(2010), this tranching enables the borrower to create different credit risk structures within one loan to meet the different 
demands of different investor groups. Also subordinated and equity near mezzanine tranches are uncommon in corporate 
syndicated lending. According to Drucker and Puri (2005), in the area of highly leveraged borrowers, debt tends to take 
similar characteristics of equity. 
33 See section 2.5.3. 
34 For example, paying guarantees. 
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 Uses of syndicated loan proceeds 
Whereas bilateral bank loans of smaller amounts are ordinarily used for working capital 
purposes or for limited capital expenditure financings, syndicated loans tend to be the large-
scale financing tool of choice for a diverse set of purposes. Table 9 displays numerous 
possible uses of proceeds that fall within the scope of this thesis. 
 
Source: Based on Fight (2004) and Voisey (2016). 
Table 9. Common uses of syndicated loan proceeds. 
As stressed in Chapter 1, other possible uses of proceeds such as LBO, project, and asset 
finance are beyond the scope of this work.  
 Bank titles and different roles  
Existing academic literature suggests that syndicate members generally fall into two groups, 
namely, active lead arrangers and passive participants (Sufi, 2007). The literature 
predominantly employs “lead arranger” as the term of choice for any bank acting as the active 
structuring institution that inter alia conducts syndication efforts in the origination phase. The 
invited lenders are commonly labelled participants.  
The different roles in syndicated lending have evolved over time. In practice, the lead 
arranger may be termed bookrunner, mandated lead arranger, and/or coordinator. Even pure 
participant banks might be awarded with prestigious titles, especially if they are asked to 
Refinancing The generic term for renewals of already existing facilities.
General corporate purposes
Commonly term- or revolving credit facilities. Unspecified generic term for various "general" 
financing needs a corporate has to manage in order to be able to operationally conduct its business. 
This might inter alia include working capital financing.
Working capital financing
Commonly revolving credit facilities, specifically used by corporations in to complement their cash 
cycles and to finance a business's net investment in current assets. 
(Commercial paper) back-up 
Commonly larger revolving credit facilities used by large corporations to support their issuance in the 
capital markets, commonly commercial paper programmes.
M&A Commonly larger underwritten (bridge) term loans to support the financing of an acquisition. 
Investments/capital 
expenditure
Commonly term loans used for capital expenditure or for payments of a known amount which is
expected to be outstanding for a certain period of time.
Event related financings 
General corporate financings
Common uses of syndicated loan proceeds
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commit to a relatively higher percentage of the funding. As these titles, especially 
“bookrunner”, increase banks’ league table credits,35 they are an important incentive and play 
a marketing role even for participant banks albeit they do not necessarily directly relate to 
factual roles and duties (Ivashina, 2009; Standard & Poor's (S&P), 2011).  
Besides their marketing purposes, title structures are supposed to indicate hierarchies in 
syndicates. According to Godlewski (2010b) the active arranger is the key figure in the 
structuring and placing of a syndicated loan, as it serves as the “privileged agent in the 
relationship with the borrower. The arranger is responsible for crucial characteristics of 
efficient and successful loan syndication: syndicate composition and organisation (p. 52).”  
Administrative tasks within a syndicate are often delegated to other banks, which Francois 
and Missonier-Piera (2007) define as co-agents. These co-agents may act as facility and/or 
collateral agents.36 
 Syndicated loan issuing process 
Analysing a sample of syndicated loans from 59 countries in the period from 1992 to 2006, 
Godlewski found the mean duration of a syndication process to be approximately eight weeks. 
However, the process is variable in its demands and the length of an issuing process varies 
significantly in practice. Kopecky and Xiao (2013) defines syndication processes as 
sequential. According to Godlewski et al. (2012) and Esty (2001), a syndicated loan 
origination and placing process consists of three main phases. 
 
Source: Based on Godlewski et al. (2012) and Esty (2001). 
Figure 5. Common stages of issuing a syndicated loan. 
 
                                               
 
35 See section 2.4.2.2. 
36 See section 2.4.7.3. 
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2.4.7.1 Pre-mandate phase 
Once a borrower has asked one37 or more38 banks to originate a syndicated loan, the lead bank 
together with the borrower jointly agree on the terms and conditions of the syndication (Wu, 
Chang, Suardi, & Chang, 2013). This pre-mandate-phase ends with the signing of a mandate 
letter and a term sheet. With the mandate letter, the lead arranger and borrower officially 
agree on the syndication process. Further, the lead bank usually has already committed a 
certain amount of the loan via this document. The term sheet, usually one of the exhibits 
attached to the mandate letter, incorporates the primary economic elements39 of the transaction 
based on which potential participant banks are invited to become members of the syndicate. 
The content of the term sheet is the basis for the facility agreement, which all members of the 
syndicate must eventually sign (Thomas & Wang, 2004).  
The syndication process may be executed under three different procedures: 
1. Underwriting. The lead bank bindingly commits the entire loan amount before 
inviting potential participants. Thus, the underwriting commitment is larger than the 
intended final hold position of the lead bank (Fight, 2004; LMA, 2013). If the 
syndication process does not meet the expectations of the lead bank and the 
syndication closes undersubscribed, the underwriting is said to be stalled. In this case, 
the lead bank must fully provide the face amount to the borrower. This form of 
syndication provides borrowers certainty of receiving expected funds. Because of this 
“guarantee” feature, underwritings are often used in large scale acquisition financings 
(Rhodes et al., 2004). 
2. Best efforts. In a best efforts syndication process, the lead bank does not guarantee the 
entire loan amount. If an intended amount cannot be reached via syndication—when 
the funds committed by all the invited banks are insufficient to produce the required 
level of funding—the lead bank has no binding obligation to increase its initial 
commitment to produce the required level of funding. According to Rhodes et al., 
roughly one- third of invited institutes accept the invitation and subsequently join the 
syndicate. If a loan is oversubscribed, producing more funds that are required, then the 
loan amount can either be increased or respective commitment levels can be, and 
                                               
 
37 Sole mandate. 
38 Joint mandate. 
39 For example, covenants, pricing, collateral, amount, maturity. 
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usually are proportionally (i.e., pro-rata) scaled back to the initial launch amount 
(Sickel, 2010). 
3. Club deals. According to Gadanecz (2003), club deals are syndicated loans consisting 
of a relatively small group of a client’s existing relationship banks that usually all 
provide the same level of commitment. Thus, under such an arrangement, there is no 
true syndication process, as all participants are active and their interrelations are 
subject to pre-agreement (Gadanecz). In other words, all attending banks treat each 
other as lead banks. 
2.4.7.2 Post-mandate phase 
In this phase, the lead bank syndicates the loan through invitation to other banks to participate 
in the loan (Fight, 2004). The invitation commonly consists of an invitation letter and the term 
sheet. Sometimes, the lead bank drafts an information memorandum and either includes it in 
the invitation package and/or presents it at a roadshow. According to Champagne and 
Kryzanowski (2007), invited banks are usually offered various different amounts for which 
they can subscribe.  
2.4.7.3 Post-signing phase 
Once a syndicated loan has closed, the involvement of the facility agent begins. The facility 
agent is usually the lead arranger (or one of them), who liaises among borrower and lenders 
throughout the life of the facility (Thomas & Wang, 2004). The agent is responsible for loan 
servicing40 and information sharing41 on the syndicate’s behalf (Wasan, Vijayakumar, & 
Daniels, 2013).  
 
 
 
                                               
 
40 For example, handling draw-down requests. 
41 For example, dissemination of financial documents. 
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2.5 Syndicated loan pricing and its measures within extant literature 
Overall, I interpret syndicated loan pricing as all non-amortisation related pecuniary transfers 
from borrowers to lenders which are related to a specific facility. Thus, in this section, I 
provide an overview of common syndicated loan pricing elements and their treatment within 
the current state of academic knowledge.  
In the course of the thesis, I will enhance and develop underlying phenomena by attempting to 
shed more light on pricing complexity and multidimensionality, ultimately leading to a new 
conceptualisation of pricing, which I present in 5.4. 
 Pricing elements covered within extant academic literature 
Broadly, the literature on syndicated loan pricing distinguishes between per annum and 
upfront elements. The most frequently recognised per annum element is the margin, also often 
referred to as the spread, which borrowers pay in addition to a floating rate benchmark42 like 
EURIBOR43 or LIBOR44. In theory, these benchmarks represent banks’ costs at the interbank 
market45 to purchase the liquidity needed to provide the loan. 
Margins are usually not fixed over a loans’ lifetime; they vary, and changes are triggered via 
margin grids, often referred to as performance-based pricings (Asquith, Beatty, & Weber, 
2005). Besides the margin, further per annum elements are common, especially in the area of 
revolving credit facilities, where, for example, commitment fees have to be paid on undrawn 
loan portions and utilisation fees might be added to the margin in relation to certain draw 
percentages (S&P, 2011). Besides these per annum elements, lenders usually charge upfront 
fees, inter alia participation, arrangement or underwriting fees.  
 
 
                                               
 
42 Also often referred to as reference rate. 
43 The rate at which a prime bank is willing to lend funds in euros to another prime bank. The EURIBOR is calculated daily 
for interbank deposits with a maturity of one week and one to 12 months as the average of the daily offer rates of a 
representative panel of prime banks, rounded to three decimal places (European Central Bank, 2017).  
44 London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) is the basic rate of interest used in lending between banks on the London interbank 
market and also used as a reference for setting the interest rate on other loans (Fight, 2004). 
45 According to Deutsche Bundesbank (2016), “The interbank market is the market in which banks trade with each other. 
Important tradeables are central bank money (liquidity), foreign exchange, securities and derivatives. Money trading (i.e., the 
short-term issuance or take-up of short-dated loans in central bank money on the money market) is an important segment of 
the interbank market”. 
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Table 10 specifies the commonly covered pricing elements within the literature. 
 
Source: Based on Altunbas et al. (2006b) and Fight (2004). 
Table 10. Common syndicated loan pricing elements based on extant literature. 
Throughout 5.3 I will pick up all the pricing elements displayed in Table 10, as well as others 
that are so far neglected in the literature, to provide deeper insights into pricing elements 
based on my research. Thus, to avoid extensive duplication and to favour brevity, I will keep 
the pricing element descriptions short here and provide a respective reference to the related 
in-depth discussions in Table 10. 
 Initial margin and all-in-spread-drawn (AISD) as pricing measures 
As mentioned, extant pricing literature tends to take the form of quantitative inquiries that 
often conduct regression analyses. The most frequently used pricing proxies as dependent 
variables are either the pure initial margin or the all-in spread drawn (AISD), also referred to 
as all-in-pricing or all-in-return, calculated based on publicly available information at 
closing. As a side note, the fact that these price measures strive to replicate the price at closing 
is, at first view, a sensible approach, as they ought to reflect the creditworthiness of the 
respective borrower at the time of the credit decision. Further, the closing is practically the 
only point at which the commercial data providers gather respective price information. I 
explain in 5.4 that this ex ante perspective is subject to major misinterpretation risks and that, 
for the product at hand and given its bespoke characteristics, an ex post view would 
significantly enhance the understanding of price-related phenomena.   
 
Pricing element Type Explanation
Deeper discussion 
provided in section
Margin/spread Per annum Risk premium. 5.3.1.1.1
Commitment fee
Per annum, charged on 
the undrawn amount
Paid as long as all or parts of the facility is not used, to compensate a 
lender for tying up the capital corresponding to the commitment.
5.3.1.1.6
Facility fee Per annum
Payable to banks in return for providing the facility, whether it is used 
or not.
5.3.1.1.7
Utilisation fee
Per annum, charged on 
the drawn amount
Paid on top of the margin in the case of drawdown. 5.3.1.1.8
Arrangement fee Upfront
Received and retained by the lead arrangers in return for arranging and 
structuring the deal.
5.3.1.2.3
Underwriting fee Upfront
Received and retained by the lead arrangers in the case of an 
underwritten deal in return for guaranteeing the whole loan amount.
5.3.2.2.1
Participation fee Upfront Received by participants for joining into a deal. 5.3.1.2.1
Agency fee Per annum Remuneration for the agent bank's services. Appendix E
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AISD incorporates various fee elements and, hence, claims to provide an accurate picture of 
the total cost of borrowing (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, & Srinivasan, 2011).  My quantitative 
analyses in Chapter 4 are grounded in a Dealogic Loanware secondary data set with the 
respective AISD-definition being as shown in Table 11 (Dealogic Loanware, 2016). 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware (2016). 
Table 11. Dealogic Loanware definition: AISD/all-in-pricing/return.  
Carey and Nini (2007), who used Dealogic Loanware as their data source, stated,“[The] 
primary measure of loan price is an all-in interest rate spread that includes the contract spread 
over LIBOR on the loan’s outstanding balance plus any annual fee and any46 upfront fee 
prorated over the life of the loan” (p. 2,976). With respect to AISD as reported by Thomson 
Reuters Loan Pricing Connector (LPC), related statements appear somewhat confusing and 
faddish. Whereas a couple of authors define AISD as the all-in-pricing/return that also 
incorporates upfront fees (e.g., Gottesmann & Roberts, 2004; Gaul & Uysal, 2013; Hale & 
Santos, 2009; A. Saunders & Steffen, 2011),47 the official LPC-definition states that AISD 
consists of margin plus certain per annum fees48 without any upfront fees (Loan Pricing 
Corporation, 2016).  
It would be beyond the scope of my work—as well as unfeasible as a practical matter—to 
reveal all possible misinterpretations given such definitional differences. It is possible that 
authors who state that they have incorporated certain pricing elements, have not. At one point 
in their work, Haselmann and Wachtel (2011), for instance, defined LPC’s AISD as “the 
contract spread over LIBOR on the loan’s outstanding balance plus any annual fee and any 
upfront fee prorated over the life of the loan” (p. 2,682). At another point, they remarked, 
“The loan rate (from Dealscan) is the all-in spread drawn down net of upfront fees” (p. 2,683). 
                                               
 
46 With regards to the official Dealogic Loanware definition, arrangement fees are however not included (see Table 11). 
47 A. Saunders and Steffen (2011, p. 4,119) define AISD as “the all-in-spread-drawn, which is the spread plus annualised 
upfront fees above LIBOR”. 
48 Meant, for example, are commitment fees, facility fees, and/or utilisation fees. 
Initial margin in bp p.a.
+ Utilisation fee (fully drawn) in bp p.a.
+ Participation fee in bp / maturity in years
+ Underwriting fee in bp / maturity in years
= AISD in bp p.a.
Dealogic Loanware definition: All-in-spread-drawn ("AISD")/all-in-pricing/return
Arrangement fees are not included in this measure.
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It is reasonable to assume that—due to diverse interpretations and labelling across data 
providers—a general danger of non-comparability might well be an issue. To simplify whilst 
discussing extant literature, I use the term “AISD” irrespective of the data provider that has 
been engaged.  
The functioning and interaction of the pricing elements presented and their incorporation into 
AISD can best be explicated by providing practical examples. Extant literature tends to 
distinguish between revolving credit facilities and term loans or it simply lumps both types 
together. It is common, therefore, that both forms are combined via tranching in a single deal 
(Maskara, 2010). For instance, a €1 billion syndicated loan facility may consist of a €500 
million revolving credit and a €500 million term loan facility. Both tranches may among other 
things carry different pricing, repayment structures, and tenors. 
2.5.2.1 The functioning of AISD in the context of revolving credit facilities 
Revolving credit facilities are flexible contingent credit lines that can be drawn, repaid, and 
re-drawn at discretion of the borrower throughout the facility’s lifetime (Rhodes et al., 2004; 
Sickel, 2010). Assume a borrower signed a five-year revolving credit facility with the pricing 
package shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12. Pricing example: RCF. 
I start the explanatory discussion with the per annum (p.a.) pricing elements. The margin of 
the facility at the time of origination (t0) is 100 basis points (bp) p.a. Logically—in the case a 
statistical analysis would be based on the initial margin as pricing proxy—respective authors 
would stop here. On undrawn portions of the loan, the borrower pays commitment fees of 
35% of the applicable margin. Utilisation fees are staggered based on the drawing percentage 
of the loan as shown in the “Drawn margins 1, 2, and 3” in Table 12.  
 
 
P
e
r
io
d
Margin* 
in bp p.a.
Commitment 
fee 
(35% of margin 
on undrawn 
amount)
Drawn 
margin 1 
(utilisation fee 
of 10 bp p.a. up 
to 1/3 drawing)
Drawn 
margin 2 
(utilisation fee 
of 20 bp p.a. up 
to 2/3 drawing)
Drawn 
margin 3 
(utilisation fee 
of 30 bp p.a. up 
to 3/3 drawing)
Participation 
fee 
(50bp upfront, 
annualised over 
lifetime)
Underwriting 
fee 
(50bp upfront, 
annualised over 
lifetime)
AISD*
in bp p.a.
Arrangement 
fee 
(15bp upfront, 
annualised over 
lifetime)
t0 100 35 110 120 130 10 10 150 3
t1 100 35 110 120 130 10 10 150 3
t2 120 42 130 140 150 10 10 170 3
t3 110 38.5 120 130 140 10 10 160 3
t4 100 35 110 120 130 10 10 150 3
Pricing example: syndicated revolving credit facility (RCF)
M
a
rg
in
 g
ri
d
* Common pricing measures of extant literature; AISD based on Dealogic Loanware definition.
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Let us now assume different rates of drawing: 
 0%: The borrower needs to pay a commitment fee of 35% translating into 35 bp p.a. 
in t0 (35% of 100 bp p.a.). 
 33%: The borrower needs to pay a commitment fee of 35% translating into 35 bp p.a. 
in t0 (35% of 100 bp p.a.) for the undrawn 67% of the facility. Additionally, the 
borrower needs to pay a “drawn margin 1” of 110 bp p.a. (100 bp p.a. margin + 10 bp 
p.a. utilisation fee) on the drawn amount (33% of the facility). 
 66%: The borrower needs to pay a commitment fee of 35% translating into 35 bp p.a. 
in t0 (35% of 100 bp p.a.) for the undrawn 34% of the facility. Additionally, the 
borrower needs to pay 120 bp p.a. “drawn margin 2” (100 bp p.a. margin + 20 bp p.a. 
utilisation fee) on the drawn amount (66% of the facility). 
 100%: Here, the borrower pays no commitment fee, as the facility is fully drawn. P.a. 
paying in that scenario amounts to 130 bp p.a. (100 bp p.a. margin + 30 bp p.a. 
utilisation fee = drawn margin 3).  
Regarding upfront fee payments, the borrower pays a 50 bp participation fee, a 50 bp 
underwriting fee,49 and 15 bp arrangement fee.50  
Thus, on a p.a. basis, another 20 bp p.a. must be added to the other costs to calculate the AISD 
as defined by Dealogic Loanware in the case of a fully drawn loan. Thus, looking at t0, the 
difference between pure margin and AISD amounts to 50% of the initial margin. To be more 
precise in terms of cost calculations, one would also need to include the arrangement fee by 
further adding 3 bp p.a., which, however, is not captured by the Dealogic definition as shown 
in Table 11. 
Another pricing element is the margin grid. Let us assume that the margin in our example is 
either tied to the borrower’s leverage ratio51 or its external rating. If these measures improve 
or deteriorate over contractually defined periods, the margin drops or increases. Looking at t2, 
the fictive borrower would have faced deterioration in leverage and/or rating and would, thus, 
need to pay 20 bp p.a. higher margins compared to t0. In this case, the AISD would increase 
                                               
 
49 Note that underwritings are not common in usual general corporate financings, but are more frequently used in acquisition 
financings. I only included the underwriting fee here to explain the basic functioning and interrelation of the various pricing 
elements in light of the AISD. 
50 Also often referred to as bookrunner/coordination fee in practice. 
51 In the corporate syndicated loan market mostly defined as Net Debt/EBITDA. 
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to 170 bp p.a. Logically, these details as well as respective rates of drawing and factual 
maturity cannot be readily available at signing. 
2.5.2.2 The functioning of AISD in the context of term loans 
Table 13 shows a hypothetical term loan pricing structure. Other than revolving credit 
facilities, term loans are usually fully funded amortising or bullet repayment loans. Once 
funds have been repaid, they cannot be redrawn (LMA, 2013). 
 
Table 13. Pricing example: TL. 
With term loans, commitment and/or utilisation fee concepts are usually not involved as the 
loan is mostly or fully drawn in t0. The p.a. margin needs to be paid as displayed in column 
three. Upfront fees52 are annualised and added to the margin to calculate the AISD. 
The two examples in Tables 12 and 13 introduce the standard pricing elements of corporate 
syndicated lending and introduce related measures that have been used by scholars 
extensively. 
 First attempts to improve the AISD 
Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016)53 in their core study have presented a first step in 
addressing a more accurate portrayal of pricing’s complexity. To this point in the 
presentation, pricing proxies have either been the pure initial margin or the AISD. Arguing 
that these two measures ignore the complexity of pricing, Berg et al. analysed fee structures 
and their underlying rationale with a special view on revolving credit facilities. Their analysis 
resulted in new possible pricing proxy, the so-called TCB (Total-Cost-of-Borrowing).  
                                               
 
52 Except for arrangement fees (see Table 11). 
53 Remember, that I highlight the first mention of the authors of the 30 core papers via a bold typography (see section 2.2.2). 
P
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d
Margin* 
in bp p.a.
Participation fee 
(50bp upfront, 
annualised over lifetime)
Underwriting fee 
(50bp upfront, 
annualised over lifetime)
AISD*
in bp p.a.
Arrangement fee 
(15bp upfront, 
annualised over lifetime)
t0 130 10 10 150 3
t1 130 10 10 150 3
t2 150 10 10 170 3
t3 140 10 10 160 3
t4 130 10 10 150 3
* Common pricing measures of extant literature; AISD based on Dealogic Loanware definition.
Pricing example: syndicated term loan facility (TL)
M
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Berg et al. (2016) based their study on a dataset of stock-listed syndicated loans to U.S. non-
financial borrowers from 1986 to 2011. First, the authors argued that the pricing structures of 
term loans are hardly comparable to those of revolving credits. However, extant literature 
tends to lump the two loan types together without taking structural differences in pricing into 
account.  
Based on the theoretical research of, among others, Boot et al. (1987), Smith, Jr. (1980), 
Thakor, Hai, and Greenbaum (1981), and Shockley and Thakor (1997), Berg et al. defined 
revolving credit facilities as credit risk derivatives, representing insurance against possible 
deteriorations of a borrower’s creditworthiness through access to an embedded option to 
utilise the loan. The price for this option is the so-termed all-in-spread-undrawn (AISU), 
calculated as the sum of commitment and/or facility fee54 plus annualised upfront fees. With 
respect to my RCF pricing example displayed in Table 12, the initial (t0) AISU would amount 
to 55 bp p.a.55 The underlying theoretical assumption is that the client only exercises its option 
to draw if current borrowing costs in the spot market56 would exceed the drawn loan costs. 
Berg et al. stated that term loans do not carry these option-like features as they tend to be fully 
drawn at signing.   
Finally, Berg et al. presented two main findings. First, for revolving loans, in line with their 
theoretical thinking, upfront fees and commitment and/or facility fees57 are the lender’s 
compensation for the granted drawdown option. Logically, borrowers with a higher risk 
profile would need to pay a higher AISU. A second finding of Berg et al. is that revolving 
loan pricing structures can be an indicator of the borrower’s drawing probability. Clients 
paying a relatively low AISU and a relatively high AISD are less likely to draw down their 
loan as compared to an opposite setting. Low AISUs might be reached by implementing 
utilisation fee concepts within the loan that would enable the borrower to reduce their 
undrawn costs (AISU) significantly, but the amount of the reduction in return would be added 
to the margin in a case of drawing and would, thus, increase the AISD. 
                                               
 
54 Facility fees happen to be a U.S. phenomenon and not common in German corporate syndicated lending (see section 
5.3.1.1.7). 
55 Commitment fee (35 bp p.a.) + annualised participation fee (10 bp p.a.) + annualised underwriting fee (10 bp p.a.) = 55 bp 
p.a. = AISU. 
56 Meaning: inter alia the commercial paper market, which is commonly used by large listed firms to finance their working 
capital needs. 
57 In other words, the all-in-spread-undrawn (AISU). 
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As mentioned, the authors presented the new pricing proxy TCB, striving to cope with both 
AISU as well as AISD by accounting for the probability of draw down (PDD) and the 
expected loan maturity. TCB is based on the formula shown in Table 14. 
 
Source: Adapted from Berg et al. (2016). 
Table 14. Total cost of borrowing measure. 
Note that except by Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz (2017),58 this novel formula has not 
yet been applied by further research that relies on initial margin or AISD. Table 15 
summarises the main elements of Berg et al. (2016). 
 
Table 15. Summary table for Berg et al. (2016). 
I share the argumentation of Berg et al. by outlining that syndicated loan pricing packages 
happen to be complex. Simply lumping together term loans and revolving loans and purely 
using initial margin or AISD as pricing measure disregards this complexity. In the course of 
the study, however, I develop reasons to further distinguish between working capital 
revolving loans, which are established with a clear ex ante assumption of being frequently 
                                               
 
58 See section 2.6.2. 
TCB = upfront fee in bp / expected loan maturity
+ (1-PDD) x (facility fee in bp p.a. + commitment fee in bp p.a.)
+ PDD x (facility fee in bp p.a. + initial margin in bp p.a.)
+ PDD x prob (utilisation > utilisation threshold | usage > 0) x utilisation fee in bp p.a.
+ Prob (cancellation) x cancellation fee in bp
= TCB in bp p.a.
Total cost of borrowing measure ("TCB")
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S.
Stock-listed non-
financial 
companies
1986-2011
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
Analyses
AIDS; AISU; 
TCB
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
32,343 tranches
Primary subject findings
> Fees are a compensation for options in loan contracts; fees are used to screen borrowers as to their likelihood of exercising certain options, 
and to alter ex-post incentives to exercise these options.
> There are option-like characteristics of credit lines: firms are more likely to draw on their lines of credit when their economic situation 
deteriorates.
> There are significantly higher drawdowns from borrowers with the lowest returns.
> Upfront fees and the all in spread undrawn (AISU = commitment fee plus facility fee) are larger for high-volatility borrowers as measured by 
either equity volatility or the volatility of borrower profitability.
> Lines of credit with a spread increasing performance pricing schedule have lower upfront fees and a lower AISU, consistent with the view that 
the drawdown option contained in credit lines is worth less if the loan spread increases, as borrowers' creditworthiness deteriorates.
> There is a borrower self selection into contracts based on their private information about the likelihood of exercising the drawdown option. 
Borrowers that pay lower AISU and a higher All in spread drawn (AISD = spread + facility fee) are less likely to draw on their line of credit.
> A low AISU to AISD ratio and the utilisation fee are substitutes.
> Authors suggest a new measure Total Cost of Borrowing (TCB) for future research.
Berg, T., Saunders, A., & Steffen, S. (2016). The total cost of corporate borrowing in the loan market: don`t ignore the fees. Journal of 
Finance , 71, 1357-1392. 
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drawn, and repaid as well as redrawn to finance certain business activities operationally, on 
the one hand, and to those providing pure cash back-up, on the other hand. The latter might 
indeed provide insurance for such a case where commercial paper markets have “dried up” or 
become more expensive compared to drawing against the loan.  
The presented definition inherently assumes that borrowers have access to the spot market or 
to wider capital markets. As already outlined earlier, syndicated loans are also commonly 
used by large companies that are, however, not necessarily large enough or sufficiently 
willing to tap the wider capital markets. Hence, such an options’ raison d’être would be of no 
interest to these borrower types.  
Berg et al.’s (2016) introduction of the new TCB pricing proxy is a move in the right 
direction. For the German market, however, it would be impossible to gather reliable 
historical data on draw-down percentages for working capital revolvers ex ante. Back-up lines 
historically remain to be undrawn in Germany. Berg et al. also asserted that term loans usually 
do not inhabit such multidimensional pricing packages. I agree with that statement with a 
view to general corporate term loan facilities as presented in Table 13.  
To be discussed later,59 in the area of underwritten acquisition term loans—often structured as 
bridge loans—margin and fee concepts are sophisticated to the extent that they usually carry 
even more complex underlying rationales that might likewise be interpreted by applying 
option-theoretical assumptions. Thus, having addressed the relevant literature’s common 
understanding of the term “pricing” and the specific debates around it, I turn in the next 
section to the determinants of pricing. 
2.6 Borrower-related specifics as pricing determinants 
I now focus on the worldwide syndicated loan literatures’ findings regarding certain borrower 
characteristics and their influence on pricing. According to Hainz and Wiegand (2013), the 
creditworthiness and safety of a borrower depend on a set of borrower characteristics that can 
be classified as either hard or soft factors.  
Petersen (2004) described the character of hard factors or in other words hard information as 
those being quantifiable and easily comparable across bank-clients with no need to be 
collected in person. For soft information, Strahan (2008) noted, “The lender relies on 
                                               
 
59 See section 5.3.2. 
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knowledge about the business owner’s integrity or local reputation for reliability. Such 
information is both difficult to compare across borrowers and hard to quantify and is therefore 
difficult or costly to verify by outsiders” (p. 112). 
 General borrower characteristics 
Turning the attention first to some general borrower characteristics, Christodoulakis and 
Olupeka’s (2010) core study confirmed the intuitive findings of the majority of authors by 
stating that firms with higher default risks are charged higher loan prices in comparison to 
firms with lower-risk profiles.  
The furthermost common technique of default prediction is facilitated via ratings,60 which, in 
practice, consist of two major elements. The most important is the examination of the credit 
rating report supported by mathematical models that analyse quantifiable financial data and 
produce hard information. A second part appraises non-quantifiable soft-information,61 whose 
contribution is evaluated by banks, but often not without controversy (Berger & Udell, 1995; 
Grunert et al., 2005; Houston & James, 1996) as its relative importance tends to be more 
prominent in the context of small clients. Other than large clients, which are the focus of this 
work, small clients (e.g., SMEs) do not have sophisticated financial reporting systems in place 
that are pivotal in conducting proper credit analyses. Hence, the assessment of 
creditworthiness for smaller clients is much more based on qualitative data compared to the 
corporate cluster that is the focus of this study (Ortiz-Molina & Penas, 2008).  
As outlined in 2.4.2.2, many foreign banks engage in syndicated lending that are not able to 
utilise and facilitate borrower-related soft information to the same extent as do local lenders, 
according to Haselmann and Wachtel (2011), Berger, Dai, Ongena, and Smith (2003), and 
Houston, Itzkowitz, and Naranjo (2017). Therefore, soft information plays a diminished role 
in default prediction for large, corporate, syndicated loan borrowers. 
Whilst determining default probabilities, banks rely on their own internal rating mechanisms 
and, if they are available, also consider external ratings. Based on individual methodologies, 
banks and rating agencies weigh and consolidate various borrower characteristics and 
ultimately assign a grade to borrowers overall credit risk profile. In other words, a credit 
                                               
 
60 For banks active in German corporate syndicated lending, commonly the senior unsecured debt rating is of interest. 
Specific issue ratings for the debt instrument in its own right are not common in German corporate syndicated lending. 
61 Such as the quality of the management. 
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rating results from the appraisal of the creditworthiness of enterprises. Additional, ratings are 
invoked to determine regulatory capital adequacy (Grunert et al., 2005).  
Table 16 displays the rating scale also often referred to as notch levels of the most commonly 
used external rating agencies—S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch. 
 
Source: Based on Griwers and Poschmann (2012) and Everling and Kreutz (2012). 
Table 16. Rating scales of major rating agencies. 
Scholarly debates provide broad consensus that ratings produce valuable information about 
borrower’s risk-profiles, with better ratings achieving lower pricings, as one might expect. 
Table 17 synthesises the core literature’s findings with respect to rating.  
 
Table 17. Core literature synthesis for rating. 
All findings presented in Table 17 confirm the presumed price-influential directions. The fact 
that the sheer availability of external ratings is associated with lower pricing is likely, since 
mainly large, less risky companies choose to be externally rated. 
The main ingredients of ratings are financial information and the intuitive rationale that better 
financial situations of borrowers lead to more favourable loan pricings ceteris paribus. 
Balance sheet data be they either backward-looking, point-in-time measures or projections are 
the main source of quantitative risk assessments. Jorion, Shi, and Zhang (2009) pointed out 
Credit quality steps 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
S&P AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC, CC, R, SD/D
Moody's Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa, Ca, C
Fitch AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC, CC, C, RD, D
Classification Highly speculative up to default status
Rating scales of major rating agencies
Investment-Grade (IG) Non/Sub-IG
Determinant
P
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n
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ec
ti
o
n
Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
↓ AISD Worldwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↑ AISD Worldwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
↑ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↑ AISD U.S. 1987-1999 Maskara (2010) 44
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1991-2002
Wasan, Vijayakumar, and Daniels 
(2013)
28
Borrower related specifics
Rating
Externally low (weak) rated
Externally rated
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that financial statements are an important source of information for the assessment of clients’ 
risk profiles and, thus, are major ingredients of ratings. Data beyond the balance sheet and 
general accounting information—leverage-ratios, interest coverage ratios, tangibility, sales, 
profitability indicators—are main determinants of a client’s credit risk profile (Haselmann & 
Wachtel, 2011; Santos & Winton, 2008). For example, amongst others, Gaul and Uysal 
(2013), Schenone (2010), Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe (2000), Wasan et al. (2013), and 
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro (2008) confirmed that higher leverage leads to higher loan 
pricings. Similarly, Bharath et al. (2011) and A. Saunders and Steffen (2011) found that 
enterprises with higher profitability and higher current ratios obtain lower loan pricings. 
Further, for banks, as confirmed by Fang, Li, Xin, and Zhang (2016), it is important that these 
financial data and calculations be both reliable and comparable.  
Table 18 synthesises the respective findings of the core literature on financial information. 
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Table 18. Core literature synthesis for borrower’s financial information. 
 
 
Determinant
P
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n
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ti
o
n
Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
High market-to-book-ratio ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
Borrower beta coefficient →
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1990-2011 Gaul and Uysal (2013) 24
↑ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
↑ AISU U.S. 1986-2011 Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016) 15
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↑ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2008 Fang, Li, Xin, and Zhang (2016) 27
High cash flow ↓ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
High current ratio ↓ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
Low interest-coverage-ratio ↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
High EBITDA ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↓ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↓ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↓ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↑ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
↑ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↑ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↑ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1990-2011 Gaul and Uysal (2013) 24
↑ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2008 Fang, Li, Xin, and Zhang (2016) 27
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1991-2002
Wasan, Vijayakumar, and Daniels 
(2013)
28
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↓ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↓ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↓ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
↓ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↓ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
High accrual quality ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1991-2002
Wasan, Vijayakumar, and Daniels 
(2013)
28
High degree of accounting/financial statement 
comparability
↓ AISD U.S. 1992-2008 Fang, Li, Xin, and Zhang (2016) 27
Financial information
High leverage-ratio
High profitability
High stock-return volatility
Borrower related specifics
High degree of tangible assets
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Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010), in accordance with other studies, found borrowers that 
are capable of raising funds via capital markets instruments such as public bonds to obtain 
loan pricing discounts. Accordingly, Rajan (1992) stated that a firm’s option to issue public 
debt is a limiting factor for the monopoly power of relationship-banks. In other words, the 
access of a client to capital markets instruments alternative to loan syndications enhances the 
client’s bargaining power vis-à-vis lenders (Hale & Santos, 2009; Santos & Winton, 2008; A. 
Saunders & Steffen, 2011). The existence of an external rating fosters this capital markets 
access.  
Table 19 synthesises the related findings of the core literature in that respect. 
 
Table 19. Core literature synthesis for capital markets access. 
Size (Table 20) and legal form (Table 21) in addition to the availability of external ratings can 
determine access to capital markets. 
 
Table 20. Core literature synthesis for borrower size. 
 
Determinant
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n
Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↓ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↓ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
Capital markets access (in general) ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
Syndicated loan after equity IPO ↓ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
Capital markets access
Capital markets access (to public bond market)
Borrower related specifics
Determinant
P
ri
ci
n
g
 
d
ir
ec
ti
o
n
Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
↓ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
↓ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↓ AISD U.S. 1988-1999 Gottesmann and Roberts (2004) 39
↓ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↓ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
↓ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↓ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
Market capitalisation →
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
Borrower related specifics
Size
Large 
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As displayed in Table 20, the core literature broadly confirms that pricings, all else being held 
equal, are a declining function of borrower size. Larger borrowers are commonly associated 
with better creditworthiness and greater transparency. According to Graham, Li, and Qiu 
(2008), another argumentation within the literature are economies of scale as loan related 
fixed costs decline per each incremental Euro loaned. 
Table 21 broadly confirms that public companies are charged lower pricings with the 
exception of Alexandre et al. (2014), who found no pricing impact. Stock-listed firms are said 
to be most informationally transparent (Schenone, 2010) and carry lower pricings (Harjoto et 
al., 2006; Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011). 
 
Table 21. Core literature synthesis for legal form and ownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Determinant
P
ri
ci
n
g
 
d
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ec
ti
o
n
Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2008 Fang, Li, Xin, and Zhang (2016) 27
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↓ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↓ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
↓ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↓ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
→
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
Public legal form (but listed on opaque segment) ↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
Private legal form & public bond market access ↓ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
Legal form&ownership
Ownership concentration (high degree)
Borrower related specifics
Public legal form
Opaque
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Table 22 summarises the main elements of the core paper of Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010). 
 
Table 22. Summary table for Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010). 
I criticise the work of Christodoulakis and Olupeka for various reasons. First, the authors—
like most other authors addressing syndicated loan related phenomena—lumped together 
various borrower groups, specifically, corporates, financial institutions, leveraged borrowers, 
and non-leveraged borrowers. As syndicated loans to these borrower groups carry high 
degrees of individuality with respect to market standards, mechanisms, and involved parties, 
they are hardly comparable. Syndicated loans are a financing asset class in general, but serve 
as a financing tool for various borrower groups each with its own market standards. Thus, 
syndicated lending clearly involves numerous sub-asset classes. Moreover, the authors 
focused on rated companies only and, thus, disregarded most borrowers.  
The sample size of 2,102 loans in 23 European countries over a time horizon of 18 years 
appears to be small. Germany, for instance, is represented with only 237 loans accounting for 
roughly 13 loans per annum. As I will outline in Chapter 4, in my 15-year analysis horizon 
(2000 to 2015), according to Dealogic Loanware, 2,724 German syndicated loans have been 
issued overall, including 1,537 corporate loans. One possible explanation for this small 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
23 European 
countries
Rated borrowers 
(all types)
1990-2008
Realism, 
Positivism
> Hedonic 
regression 
analyses
Spread over 
reference rate
Thomson One 
Banker Deals
2,102 loans
> Longer tenured syndicated loans attract higher prices.
> The larger the loan size, the lower the price.
> The number of lenders in a syndicated loan does not have any significant effect on loan pricing.
> Loans for acquisition finance purposes are priced higher than others.
> RCFs are the least priced.
> Higher real GDP growth is associated with lower spreads.
> External debt to GDP does not significantly affect spreads.
> Trade balance does not significantly affect spreads.
> The ratio of reserves to GDP is significant and negatively related to loan prices.
> Inflation has no significant effect on pricing.
> Country aggregate risk is a positive determinant of spreads.
Findings
> Overall, risk, liquidity, solvency and sustainable performance by both borrower and its domicile country are key determinants of syndicated 
loan prices.
> Syndicated loans to leveraged borrowers are more expensive than non-leveraged syndicated loans, which confirms that lenders would 
ordinarily price more risky loans higher.
> The higher the estimated distance to default (the lower the risk), the lower the price of the loan.
> Beta coefficient has no significant impact on pricing.
> Borrowers who can possibly raise capital through issuance of stock at lower cost, secure syndicated loans at relatively cheaper prices.
> Market value has no significant effect on pricing.
> Loans for financial services sector have cheaper prices than other sectors.
> Loans for utilities are the cheapest.
Christodoulakis, G. A., & Olupeka, T. (2010). Pricing and momentum of syndicated credit in Europe. Omega , 38, 325-332. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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sample overall would be a lack of respective pricing information and the subsequent sample 
banish. Interestingly, with 461 deals, the share of UK-based borrowers that found their way 
into of Christodoulakis and Olupeka’s (2010) sample is roughly twice as high as the figure for 
Germany, which cannot be related to equivalent lesser overall issued loans as depicted in 
Figure 3. 
 Borrower nationality (“the pricing puzzle”) 
Pricing differences between borrowers from dissimilar regions attracted the attention of 
numerous researchers. Especially, widely-observed pricing discounts for syndicated loans to 
European borrowers compared to U.S.-based borrowers have fascinated numerous scholars.  
One could argue that differences in legal systems and institutional settings such as 
dissimilarities in bankruptcy regimes drive pricing differences. According to La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), countries shaped by high levels of shareholder 
protection like the U.S. or UK are said to provide firms broader access to capital markets or, 
in other words, (bank)-external financing than do countries where the legal system is more 
designed to protect creditors, as is the case in countries like Germany and France (Gaul & 
Uysal, 2013). The fact that credit spreads on loans appear lower in Europe compared to the 
U.S. supports this argument, whereas the observed fact that bond spreads in both markets are 
ceteris paribus identical contradicts this view, suggesting that institutional and legal theories 
do not provide sufficient explanation for price differences (De Fiore & Uhlig, 2011; Mahajan 
& Fraser, 1986). 
Relatedly, after controlling for borrower characteristics, asymmetric information effects, and 
regulatory subjects, Carey and Nini (2007)—in their core paper—explicated that spreads of 
corporate syndicated loans in Europe tend to be significantly lower compared to equivalent 
spreads in the U.S. Although this pricing difference amounts an average of circa 20% (30bp 
p.a.), borrowers tend to stay in their respective home market, opting not to cross borders to 
obtain cheaper funds. Hence, Carey and Nini found lender portfolios to display home bias. 
Statistically, they were not able to locate robust explanations for the persistent pricing 
difference and, thus, have identified the reported differences as a puzzle that remains to be 
solved. Thus, related literature published after the contribution of Carey and Nini has broadly 
adapted the term “the pricing puzzle”. Table 23 summarises the main elements of this paper. 
Literature review 50 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
 
Table 23. Summary table for Carey and Nini (2007). 
One shortcoming of this work is the sample composition. Carey and Nini (2007) focused on 
LIBOR-based loans for rated borrowers including, for example, LBOs and project financings. 
Besides the fact that several asset classes are conflated causing the risk of diluted results, 
rated borrowers tend to be larger and less risky compared to unrated ones and, further, tend to 
issue larger facilities.62  
Looking at the sample of Carey and Nini as a whole, it contains only 41 German loan tranches 
in the given ten-year analysis horizon. In comparison 408 tranches are included for UK-based 
borrowers. It is thus at least questionable, that no structural underlying forces are at work 
being responsible for the given data situation and that Carey and Nini (p. 2,971) might be 
wrong when declaring that “price differences do not appear to be a data problem”. 
It is possible that the puzzle might at least partially be explained by data quality issues. In that 
context, De Fiore and Uhlig (2011) state that there is a relatively low degree of borrower-
related credit-risk information disclosure in Europe as compared to the U.S. 
                                               
 
62 See section 2.6.1. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
Europe; U.S.
Rated non-
financial 
borrowers
1992-2002
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
AISD 
(only LIBOR-based 
USD-loans)
Dealogic 
Loanware
48,128 tranches
> Collateral leads to higher pricings.
> Appearance of guarantees leads to higher pricings.
> High (good) external ratings lead to lower pricings.
> Loan size is negatively related to pricing.
> Term loans are more expensive than revolver loans.
> M&A loans are associated with higher pricings.
> Purpose Commercial Paper Back-up is associated with lower pricing.
> Larger lending syndicates are associated with higher spreads.
Findings
> Syndicated corporate loan spreads are significantly smaller in Europe than in the US (about 30bp after controlling for risk and other factors), 
suggesting that a market location factor is correlated with economically important components of the intermediation process.
> Levels of difference are larger for riskier borrowers, but spreads in the European market are roughly 20 % less than for comparable loans in 
the US across the risk spectrum.
> Systematic differences across the two markets in loan and borrower characteristics do not appear to account for the pricing difference.
> The pricing differences can be described as a puzzle because its size and persistence is suggestive of an equilibrium - a pure failure of arbitrage 
on this scale by the large, sophisticated participants in the syndicated loan market is difficult to accept.
> Borrowers domiciled in a region that hosts a major syndicated loan market usually issue there. However, borrowers domiciled elsewhere 
generally choose to issue in Europe, where spreads are lower. This suggests that issuing out of the home market is costly, and potentially 
explains why so few US firms issue in Europe (borrowers stay home when they can and they tend to issue in Europe, when they need to issue 
abroad).
> Lender exposures display significant home bias. Substantial pricing differences appear to persist in part because of the home bias. This may 
explain why pricing discrepancies are not eliminated by competition (though their causes remain a puzzle).
Carey, M., & Nini, G. (2007). Is the corporate loan market globally integrated? A pricing puzzle. The Journal of Finance , 62, 2969-3007. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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Several studies following Carey and Nini (2007) picked up the topic to produce deeper 
insights. To be discussed further in 2.10.2, Champagne and Coggins (2012) presented one 
interpretation of the pricing puzzle. Whilst studying syndicate structural issues and their 
influence on syndicated loan pricing, the authors illuminated the puzzle by noting a lesser 
sensitivity to pricing and syndicate structure in Europe compared to the U.S.  
Motivated by Carey and Nini, Gaul and Uysal’s (2013) core paper explores whether equity 
volatility as a measure of firm volatility might explain the pricing differences between U.S. 
and European borrowers. After several robustness tests, the authors finally presented evidence 
that, after controlling for firm volatility with equity volatility, the pricing difference 
disappears. The following table summarises the main elements of their paper. 
 
Table 24. Summary table for Gaul and Uysal (2013). 
The 16,591-tranche sample of Gaul and Uysal consisted of 14,820 U.S. loans and only 1,771 
European ones. In other words, European borrowers account for roughly 10% of the sample. 
According to Dealogic Loanware, in 2015, for instance, overall, 3,544 U.S. syndicated loans 
compare with 2,422 European syndicated loans.63 In other words, the U.S. counts for only 
circa 30% more facilities compared to Europe, whereas with Gaul and Uysal, this ratio 
purports to be circa 90%. This fact might partly be explained by the fact that the authors 
focused on stock-listed companies being more widely spread throughout the U.S. compared to 
Europe, an argument also postulated by Carey and Nini. Another, and likely, supplementary 
rationale might be more pricing information is missing for European loans compared to U.S. 
                                               
 
63 See Figure 1. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
Europe; U.S.
Stock-listed 
corporate firms
1998-2011
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
> Instrumental 
variable methods
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
16,591 tranches
> Higher leverage is related to higher loan spreads.
> Older firms have lower loan spreads.
> Larger loans carry lower spread.
Findings
> A comparison of (after controlling for) firm volatility and equity volatility shows that there is no statistically significant difference between 
U.S. and European loan spreads.
> High equity volatility leads to higher spreads.
Gaul, L., & Uysal, P. (2013). Can equity volatility explain the global loan pricing puzzle? The Review of Financial Studies , 26, 3225-3265. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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borrowers due to several bias issues within samples of at least some European countries, such 
as Germany.  
Picking up on the findings of Carey and Nini (2007) and Gaul and Uysal (2013), core research 
conducted by Berg et al. (2017) offered an innovative perspective on “the pricing puzzle” by 
distinguishing term and revolving debt and by using the only recently presented new pricing 
proxy TCB64 by Berg et al. (2016) instead of relying solely on AISD or initial margin. This 
approach enabled Berg et al. (2017) to investigate if differences in loan contract designs may 
explain the puzzle.  
Looking at European and U.S.-based, S&P-rated non-financial borrowers in the period from 
1992 to 2011, the authors presented a series of findings: For revolving credit facilities, the 
puzzle disappears by using the average draw rate adjusted TCB measure. This finding is 
driven by higher AISU levels of European versus U.S.-based borrowers that counterbalance 
the lower AISD levels in Europe found by Carey and Nini. Thus, for credit lines, the 
differences in pricing structures are said to explain “the pricing puzzle”.  
Secondly, after controlling for borrower risk-related elements such as post-loan-closing 
performance and the borrower’s general creditworthiness and profitability, the pricing gap for 
term loans tends to disappear as well, indicating that European term loan borrowers on 
average exhibit higher credit quality compared to the U.S. One possible explanation of Berg 
et al. is a deeper corporate bond market in the U.S. as compared to Europe, which might 
substitute the syndicated, term-loan demand especially from high creditworthy borrowers. 
Third, the authors stated that the overall spread difference for term loans without taking the 
abovementioned risk controls into account converged in the 2003 to 2007 timeframe. 
According to the authors, this finding is due to an increased term loan supply in the U.S. from 
institutional investors such as CLO`s.  Additionally, Berg et al. were unable to confirm the 
finding of Gaul and Uysal that controlling for equity volatility differences in Europe and in 
the U.S. fully closes the pricing gap. Table 25 summarises the main elements of Berg et al.  
                                               
 
64 See Table 14. 
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Table 25. Summary table for Berg et al. (2017). 
Similar to Gaul and Uysal (2013), the sample consisted of only circa 8% of European loans. 
Hence, my critique regarding the work of Gaul and Uysal also holds for Berg et al. (2017). 
The fact that the authors did not distinguish between the various loan asset classes likewise 
leads to a general problem of diluted results. 
By feeding the TCB equation, which takes average drawing rates into account, the authors 
supposed the European rate to be identical to that of the U.S., where respective data has been 
gathered from Capita IQ.65 For the German market, however, there is no such database and the 
fact that Berg et al. focused on S&P-rated, stock-listed firms should result in a relatively high 
percentage of commercial paper back-up lines, which historically have a close to zero 
percentage draw-rate. Usual working capital lines of credit were likely to be excluded from 
the sample, as these borrowers tended not to fulfil the criteria of being S&P-rated, stock-listed 
and having public pricing information.  
Table 26 displays the synthesised “pricing puzzle” evidence of the core literature. 
                                               
 
65 According to this database, a credit lines draw down rate for rated U.S. firms on average amounts to 25-35%. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
Europe; U.S.
S&P-rated stock-
listed firms
1992-2011
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
AISD; AISU; 
TCB
Thomson Reuters 
LPC
13,796 tranches
> Secured loans are associated with higher pricing.
> Term loans are more expensive than revolving loans.
> Bridge loans are more expensive than term loans.
> Higher facility amounts lead to lower pricings.
Findings
> Paper explicitly distinguishes between term loans and lines of credit and documents that, while European borrowers pay lower spreads 
(AISD) compared to U.S. borrowers, they also pay higher fees for their credit lines (higher AISU). This suggests that the pricing structure for 
credit lines is different in the U.S. compared to Europe, with the overall cost of borrowing being very similar across two markets.
> Equity volatility as a measure of unobserved firm asset volatility cannot explain the pricing difference between U.S. and European borrowers.
> Poorer creditworthy U.S. firms are more likely to use term loans compared to European firms.
> European term loan issuers on average have a significantly better post-issue performance compared to U.S. term loan issuers.
> Term loan issuers are not directly comparable between the two markets (U.S. and Europe).
> There is a substantially lower pricing gap between U.S. and European term loans conditioning on the firms' post-performance, 
creditworthiness and profitability differences.
> Compared to the 1992-2002 period, in the period between 2003 and 2007 term loan spreads between U.S. and Europe have converged.
> The increased supply of syndicated loans by institutional investors reduced the spreads of U.S. vis-a-vis European loans, effectively removing 
the pricing gap.
Berg, T., Saunders, A., Steffen, S., & Streitz, D. (2017). Mind the gap: the difference between U.S. and European loan rates. Review of 
Financial Studies , 30, 948-987. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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Table 26. Core literature synthesis for “the pricing puzzle”. 
It becomes evident, the extant literature widely recognised the price differences as initially 
localised by Carey and Nini (2007), with the respective reasoning remaining to appear 
somewhat contradictory and unsaturated. 
 Financial statement quality and comparability 
In 2.6.1 I asserted that borrowers’ financial information drives syndicated loan pricings, 
especially certain balance sheet ratios, like leverage. Generally, the more information66 about 
a borrower that is available and the more reliable this information is, the more accurate are the 
credit-risk evaluations conducted the lenders and rating agencies (Godlewski & Weill, 2011; 
Gupta et al., 2008; Ortiz-Molina & Penas, 2008). The level of publicity is strongly interrelated 
to the size of the borrower and its legal form. Publicly listed, widely held companies, for 
instance, release more accounting information compared to smaller privately held firms 
(Hainz & Wiegand, 2013). The information availability level is further enhanced via external 
ratings, which are again more common for large, listed companies. 
Extending these intuitive rationales, core research by Fang et al. (2016) explored U.S. stock-
listed firms to determine if financial statement comparability leads to more favourable 
pricings in syndicated lending. Comparability is defined by similar financial statements of 
different firms after certain economic events (De Franco, Kothari, & Verdi, 2001). In line 
with the view that comparability in general improves information quality for lenders, the 
authors found that a high degree of comparability leads to lower AISD, longer maturities and 
less need to pledge collateral. 
                                               
 
66 For example, audited and certified financial statements. 
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↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
↑ AISU U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
→ TCB U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
Europe vs. U.S. (term loan) ↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↓ AISD U.S.; Europe; Asia 1998-2009 Champagne and Coggins (2012) 51
↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
→ AISD U.S.; Europe 1990-2011 Gaul and Uysal (2013) 24
Regional pricing differences
Europe vs. U.S. (revolving credit facilities)
The prizing puzzle
Europe vs. U.S.
Literature review 55 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
Fang et al. (2016) confirmed an earlier work of Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder (2008), who 
found accounting quality to be inversely related to loan pricings. Table 27 summarises the 
main elements of this paper. 
 
Table 27. Summary table for Fang et al. (2016). 
In a more specialised vein, Wasan et al. (2013)—in a core paper—studied the role of accrual 
quality as a possible pricing driver. According to Wasan et al. (p. 47), “Accounting accruals 
represent the non-cash portion of earnings that are adjusted to cash earnings to match 
expenses with revenues to determine the net reported income for a year”. Generally, accruals 
are based on management estimations regarding uncertain future events and, thus, might be 
unintentional or even intentionally wrong. Consequently, the soft factor of management 
trustworthiness plays an important role in this context. Logically, the authors hypothesised 
that weak accrual quality should increase syndicated loan pricings with their respective results 
verifying the hypothesis. Table 28 summarises the main elements of the authors’ paper. 
 
Table 28. Summary table for Wasan et al. (2013). 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
Definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S.
Non-financial 
stock-listed 
firms
1992-2008
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
> Simultaneous 
equation model
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
11,265 tranches
> Leverage and stock return volatility are positively related to pricing, implying that riskier firms borrow at higher costs.
> Opaque borrowers pay higher costs.
Findings
> Comparability is negatively associated with loan spread and with the likelihood of pledging collateral in loan contracts, and positively 
associated with loan maturity. Thus, accounting comparability improves information quality to lenders.
> For a firm with a more comparable financial statement, it takes less time to complete a syndication process, and a greater number of 
participating lenders, including uninformed lenders, are attracted to the loan.
> Lead lenders hold a smaller portion of the syndicated loan when financial statements are comparable.
> All in all Comparable financial statements reduce information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.
Fang, X., Li, Y., Xin, B., & Zhang, W. (2016). Financial statement comparability and debt contracting: evidence from the syndicated loan 
market. Accounting Horizons , 30, 277-303. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S.
Non-financial 
stock-listed 
firms
1991-2002
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
Spread over 
reference rate
Dealogic 
Loanware
2,235 tranches
Findings
> The quality of accruals influences borrowing costs and syndicate structure in the syndicated loan market.
> Lower accrual quality for firms borrowing in the syndicated loan market exacerbates information asymmetry and leads to higher costs.
> Accrual quality is lower for loans with multiple arrangers.
> Firms with poor accrual quality face higher spreads.
> Single-arranger loans have better accrual quality than multiple-arranger.
Wasan, S., Vijayakumar, J., & Daniels, K. N. (2013). Accrual quality and borrowing costs in the syndicated loan market. Journal of Accounting 
and Finance , 13(6), 45-63. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
> Loans for borrowers with greater leverage carry larger spreads.
> Loans with longer maturities carry larger spreads.
> Loans for borrowers with lower ratings carry larger spreads.
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The synthesis of the two papers’ primary subject findings has already been presented in Table 
18. 
 Ethical issues 
Increasingly, companies integrate social, ethical, and environmental principles into their 
business behaviour. Observing this phenomenon, Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014)—in a 
core study—used the syndicated loan market as a laboratory to investigate possible effects of 
borrowers’ ethical behaviour on loan pricing. As a second step, the authors addressed the 
effect of lenders’ ethical standpoint and behaviour on the first mentioned effect. According to 
Trevino, Weaver, and Reynolds (2006), ethical behaviour in business is related to processes 
of decision making, codes of conduct, and efforts to imbue an enterprise’s policies and major 
decisions with a wide-ranging set of values that foster honesty and integrity over 
opportunism.  
Thus, Kim et al. tested whether borrowers are able—within their commitment to behave 
ethically—to signal their trust-worthiness and ultimately reduce information asymmetries and 
pricing. Using data gathered from the “sustainalytics global platform” to proxy ethical 
behaviour, the researchers established that syndicated loans to borrowers who behave 
ethically indeed carry lower pricings. This price benefit can be enhanced where the lead 
lender of the loan maintains a similar ethical position. Table 29 summarises the main elements 
of this paper. 
 
Table 29. Summary table for Kim et al. (2014). 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
Cross-country 
analysis 
(19 countries)
Non-financial 
and non-
governmental 
firms
2003-2007
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
Spread over 
reference rate
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
7,436 tranches
> Borrowers characteristics that increase lenders risk (borrower beta, borrower leverage, borrower growth opportunities, borrower ownership 
concentration) are associated with an increase in syndicated loan spreads.
> Factors decreasing lenders risk (existence of a previous relationship with the borrower, borrowers rating, borrowers size, borrower age, 
borrower reputation, borrower profitability) or those factors that give lenders larger leeway (lender size and lender profitability) are associated 
with a reduction in loan spreads.
> Collateral requirements are considered a signal of bad-quality loans, which has a positive impact on spreads.
> Maturity has a positive effect on loan rates, given the larger risks borne by lenders offering longer loan maturities.
> The number of lenders reduces the risks borne by each lender, which lead to lower loan spreads.
Findings
> Loan spreads decrease with borrowers' ethics, particularly so when lenders are also ethical organisations.
> There is a 24.8 % reduction from the mean loan spread of 78.6 basis points when there is an increase of one standard deviation in the 
borrowers' ethics score from its mean value.
> Spreads are even more favourable for the borrower when borrower and lender exhibit ethical similarity. The initial reduction in the loan 
spread of 24.8 % is further enhanced to 37.6 % of the mean spread.
Kim, M., Surroca, J., & Tribó, J. A. (2014). Impact of ethical behaviour on syndicated loan rates. Journal of Banking & Finance , 38, 122-144.
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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Table 30 displays the related synthesised evidence of the core literature. 
 
Table 30. Core literature synthesis for ethical behaviour. 
It becomes apparent that literature thematising ethical issues in syndicated lending is scarce 
thus far. As weak related confirming literature, the work of Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) can be 
referenced to finding greater cultural differences between borrowers and lenders to lead to a 
higher probability of guarantees needed in loan contracts. 
2.7 Lender-related specifics as pricing determinants 
This section is devoted to worldwide syndicated loan literatures findings about certain 
characteristics of lending institutions and their influence on pricing. As German corporate 
syndicated lending tends to be a bank-only market, I do not focus on non-bank-lenders, which 
appear mainly to be active supporters of project finance or loans for LBOs (Maskara, 2006), 
which lie beyond the scope of this study. 
 General lender characteristics 
Most earlier financial intermediation literature has provided evidence about general lender 
characteristics in line with intuitive a priori predictions, namely, well capitalised and liquid 
banks can provide cheaper loans (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995; Hubbard, Kuttner, & Palia, 
2002). According to De Young, William, and Udell (2004) and Berger and Udell (1996), 
larger and, hence, more diversified banks tend to lend to large businesses and charge lower 
interest rates.  
These findings are in line with the core literatures’ findings regarding key financial 
information as displayed in the related synthesis in Table 31. 
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High degree of ethical behaviour ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
High degree of ethical behaviour by borrower & 
lender
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
Ethical behaviour
Borrower related specifics
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Table 31. Core literature synthesis for lender’s financial information. 
Table 31 shows that the core literature has not put a huge focus on such general 
characteristics, maybe given a relatively saturated base of knowledge being provided by 
mainly non-syndicated lending related, earlier financial intermediation literature as stressed 
above.  
Within the core literature, lender-related specifics and their influence on syndicated loan 
pricing have been studied primarily with a view to type, nationality and reputation, forming 
the focus of the following sections.  
 Lender type 
In a core study, Harjoto et al. (2006) examined whether syndicated loans to U.S. and 
Canadian borrowers in the period of 1996 to 2003 were priced differently by either 
investment banks or by commercial banks. The researchers found that ceteris paribus 
investment banks charge circa 60 bp p.a. higher AISD than do commercial banks. This 
premium declines when investment and commercial banks jointly act as arrangers for 
syndicated loans. The researchers ascribed this finding to better funding conditions67 of 
commercial vis-à-vis investment banks and to the former’s superior ability to exploit 
relationships68 in debt contracting. Table 32 summarises the main elements of Harjoto et al.’s 
findings. 
                                               
 
67 Given their access to retail deposits. 
68 See section 2.11. 
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Large ↓ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
Well diversified credit portfolio ↓ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
Undercapitalised bank as lender for opaque 
borrower
→ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
"Strong" bank as lender for opaque borrower 
(in recession)
→ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
Undercapitalised bank as lender for opaque 
borrower (in a recession)
↑ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
Financial information
Lender related specifics
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Table 32. Summary table for Harjoto et al. (2006). 
Harjoto et al.’s (2006) study provides several insights into lender type debates. Their 2006 
results, however, might have only limited significance in the current banking environment. In 
the course and immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, which peaked in 2008, the U.S. 
banking system was shaped by a wave of consolidation with failed investment banks blending 
into large universal banks69 (Schildbach, 2012). Further, the remaining investment banks—
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley—legally converted into bank-holding companies, 
allowing them to access the Federal Reserves (FED) emergency liquidity. In return, these 
former non-bank institutions became subject to the full scope of banking regulation (Oliver 
Wyman, 2015). Hence, the applied bank type differentiation of Harjoto et al. does not 
adequately reflect current circumstances.  
Table 33 displays related bank type evidence based on the core literature. 
                                               
 
69 For example, Bear Stearns into J.P. Morgan Chase and Merrill Lynch into Bank of America. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S.; Canada
Non-financial 
firms
1996-2003
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
1,361 tranches
> Larger borrowers and public companies pay lower rates on loans.
> Secured loans have significantly higher spreads than unsecured ones.
> Relation between spreads and maturity is non-linear.
> Term loans have higher rates than revolvers.
> Rates for LBO loans are significantly higher.
> Credit spreads decline with borrower assets and profitability, and increase with leverage and equity volatility.
Findings
> Investment banks charge higher spreads than commercial banks, ceteris paribus, on both term and revolving loans.
> Investment bank premiums are higher on revolvers than on term loans.
> In a co-lead scenario, revolvers are still more expensive compared to a sole commercial bank lead scenario. However, term loan prices are not 
significantly different. Since revolvers are often thought of as more relationship-oriented than term loans, this finding could be considered as 
evidence that investment banks suffer from a comprehensive disadvantage in this area.
> Investment banks charge less when co-arranging with commercial banks.
> Investment banks lend to less profitable and more leveraged firms than commercial banks do.
> Investment banks originate/participate in longer term loans and are less likely to provide loan-commitment contracts.
> Investment banks are more focused on transaction than on relationship lending.
> The evidence that investment banks establish higher spreads could be related to the lack of the special funding sources available to commercial 
banks, or to the prospect that commercial banks are able to exploit relationships in debt contracting better.
Harjoto, M., Mullineaux, D. J., & Yi, H. (2006). A comparison of syndicated loan pricing at investment and commercial banks. Financial 
Management , 35(4), 49-70. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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Table 33. Core literature synthesis for lender type. 
Within the core literature, it becomes apparent, that besides the works of Harjoto et al. (2006) 
and Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool (2009)—with the latter putting its primary focus on 
relationship lending—the bank type differentiation and its impact on pricing is quantitatively 
relatively scarcely studied. However, a general trend was being recognised that investment 
banks charge higher pricing vis-à-vis commercial banks or under my definition as presented 
in 2.4.2.2 universal and/or wholesale banks.  
 Lender nationality 
Section 2.6.2 presented some discussion on possible pricing differences for different borrower 
nationalities. Similarly, researchers have also investigated different price policies relative to 
banks’ nationalities. Two common arguments are that if banks decide to lend to foreign 
borrowers or, in other words, to cross borders, they either follow their domestic clients which 
internationalise themselves (Buch & Golder, 2001) or lend to large and transparent firms 
because of the lenders’ lack of local market knowledge and difficulty in gaining and making 
use of soft information (Berger & Udell, 2002; Petersen & Rajan, 2002). A third argument is 
that foreign institutions might have technological advantages compared to local lenders in 
smaller, developing countries. 
By using the European syndicated loan market as a workroom, Haselmann and Wachtel 
(2011)—in a core study—examined the motivations of banks to engage in cross-border-
lending. The authors stated that since 1995 in roughly 70% of new issued loans, at least one 
foreign bank has joined the syndicate. Looking at 25 European countries, Haselmann and 
Wachtel distinguished between small and large countries and found respective motivations of 
banks to cross borders to be different in one category or the other.  
After controlling for borrower and loan specifics, in large countries where a foreign bank acts 
as lead arranger, the researchers observed that pricings tend to be higher, indicating that those 
banks lend to more risky enterprises abroad. In other words, foreign banks are more 
aggressive in terms of their lending targets in such countries. In smaller countries, the 
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↑ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
Investment bank as lender for borrower after 
equity underwriting
↓ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
Lender related specifics
Type
Investment bank
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opposite is found to be the case, a fact which Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) related to the 
rationale that foreign banks fill in for possible shortages in domestic loan supply and, thus, do 
not need to invest in riskier borrowers in contrast to the need of large countries where loan 
supply is supposed to be higher. Table 34 summarises the main elements of Haselmann and 
Wachtel. 
 
Table 34. Summary table for Haselmann and Wachtel (2011). 
Positively, Haselmann and Wachtel represent a rare exception by excluding LBO loans from 
their sample. Further, with 2,819 tranches in a 12-year period, the sample size is bigger 
compared to for example, Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010), whose sample is 2,102 loans 
in an 18-year period. Haselmann and Wachtel likely achieved the higher number by not solely 
focusing on rated companies. 
In a more specific vein, the core study performed by Houston et al. (2017) examined whether 
foreign asset connections between lenders and borrowers lead to more favourable loan 
pricings. The authors hypothesised that if, for example, an American firm was also present in 
Japan, Japanese banks would likely be willing to provide more attractive terms and conditions 
as compared to an otherwise identical firm not having this presence. Houston et al. confirmed 
their hypothesis. Foreign lenders associated with foreign firm assets grant relatively cheaper 
loans as compared to firms lacking these assets. Additionally, the presence of a foreign lender 
accompanied with foreign assets increases loan supply and leads to overall cheaper pricings 
for such companies in general compared to pure national syndicates. In other words, firms 
having assets abroad benefit from international lenders having a local presence in related 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
Europe 
(25 countries)
Non-financial & 
non-LBO firms
1995-2007
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
2,819 tranches
> Spreads increase with the borrowers' leverage ratio and decrease with loan size, firm size, the tangibility ratio and cash flow.
> Spreads are lower for public companies and do not vary with maturity.
Findings
> Finding of different motivations for the large amount of cross-border lending in large developed markets, where foreign banks tend to lend to 
especially risky borrowers and projects.
> In small financial markets, syndicated loans with foreign bank lead arrangers go to larger firms with more tangible assets, which are more 
often publicly listed than the loans with domestic bank lead arrangers. It appears that the foreign banks can exploit their technological advantage 
in these markets and lend to large borrowers that are able to provide hard information to their creditors.
> In large financial systems, foreign banks lend to significantly more leveraged borrowers than domestic banks. 
> In large financial systems, foreign banks tend to take on especially risky projects and to diversify these by international syndication.  After 
having controled for loan and borrower characteristics, foreign bank lead arrangers appear to charge higher spreads in large financial systems, 
as compared to small ones.
> Foreign bank lead arrangers make longer maturity loans to more leveraged firms with fewer tangible assets in large markets than in small 
markets.
> The risk appetite of foreign lenders in large markets is a more important determinant of their activity than the costs of overcoming the 
barriers faced by foreign lenders.
Haselmann, R., & Wachtel, P. (2011). Foreign banks in syndicated loan markets. Journal of Banking & Finance , 35, 2679-2689. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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foreign countries. The authors conclude that foreign lenders of this type confront lessened 
information barriers. Table 35 summarises the main elements of Houston et al. (2017). 
 
Table 35. Summary table for Houston et al. (2017). 
One avenue of critique is the fact that the loan sample consisting of 19,269 tranches contains 
roughly 60% American borrowers, whereas the three major European syndicated loan 
markets70 are represented with less than 6%. For the roughly 11-year investigation period, 
only 209 German loan tranches are included, an average of less than 20 tranches per year. 
Table 36 synthesises the related bank nationality evidence presented in the core literature. 
 
Table 36. Core literature synthesis for lender nationality. 
The core literatures synthesis indicates that lender nationalities’ directional influence on 
syndicated loan pricings remains relatively unclear. 
                                               
 
70 Germany, UK, and France. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
Cross-country 
Stock-listed 
firms
1998-November 
2009
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
19,269 tranches
Findings
> Firm-level foreign assets increase the likelihood of selecting a foreign lead lender and result in better loan pricing terms as a consequence of the 
increased lender access.
> The location of a firms' foreign assets strongly predicts the unique location of the lender, which we measure using both region and country.
> The use of foreign lender associated with the presence of foreign assets results in better loan pricing as a consequence of increased lender 
access.
> In general firms, that used foreign leads during the crisis paid higher spreads suggesting that lenders may be more inclined to protect domestic 
borrowers during crisis periods.
> However, firms with foreign leads paid lower spreads during the crisis of they had foreign assets in the lender's region.
Houston, J. F., Itzkowitz, J., & Naranjo, A. (2017). Borrowing beyond borders: foreign assets, lender choice, and loan pricing in the syndicated bank 
loan market. Journal of Corporate Finance , 42, 315-334. 
Primary subject findings
Determinant
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Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
→
Spread over 
reference rate
France 1992-2006
Godlewski, Sanditov, and Burger-
Helmchen (2012)
52
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑ AISD Cross-country
1998-
November 
Houston, Itzkowitz, and Naranjo 
(2017)
35
Foreign (borrower has assets in lender country) ↓ AISD Cross-country
1998-
November 
Houston, Itzkowitz, and Naranjo 
(2017)
35
Foreign (in large financial system) ↑ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
Foreign (in small financial system) ↓ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
Nationality
Lender related specifics
Lender and borrower of same nationality
Foreign
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 Lender reputation 
The reputation of a syndicated loan lender in general and of the lead lenders in particular, and 
their influence on pricing, has primarily been studied within the wide body of syndicate 
structure (2.10) and relationship lending (2.11) literature.   
The core assumptions in that respect are related to information asymmetrical issues. On the 
one hand, a reputable lead lender might be able to set a pricing relatively low as the invited 
banks positively evaluate this reputation, and, hence, require a lower information asymmetry 
premium. On the other, a premium for the reputation might also be required. The former line 
of argumentation is in line with the one of amongst others Godlewski et al. (2012) as well as 
Ivashina (2009). In contrast several authors found an opposite relationship: According to 
Alexandre et al. (2014), McCahery and Schwienbacher (2010), and Cook, Schellhorn, and 
Spellmann (2003), given its relatively high reputation, a bookrunner might also be enabled to 
charge higher pricings as borrowers have to pay for this reputation.  
The following table synthesises the related lender reputation evidence of the core literature. 
 
Table 37. Core literature synthesis for lender reputation. 
Table 37 establishes that within core literature, the role of reputation and its influence on 
pricing remains ambiguous with no clear directional influences being apparent from the 
reporting. 
 
 
 
Determinant
P
ri
ci
n
g
 
d
ir
ec
ti
o
n
Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
High reputation in general (lead arrangers and 
participants)
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
France 1992-2006
Godlewski, Sanditov, and Burger-
Helmchen (2012)
52
↓ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe; Asia 1998-2009 Champagne and Coggins (2012) 51
↓ AISD Worldwide 1993-2006
Gadanecz, Kara, and Molyneux 
(2012)
56
→ AISD U.S.; Europe; Asia 1998-2009 Champagne and Coggins (2012) 51
→ AISD Worldwide 1993-2006
Gadanecz, Kara, and Molyneux 
(2012)
52
Reputable lead arranger for transparent 
borrower 
Reputable lead arranger for opaque borrower 
Reputation
Lender related specifics
High reputation of lead arranger
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2.8 Syndicated loan contractual features as pricing determinants 
According to Gottesmann and Roberts (2004) and in line with early financial intermediation 
theories, loan contract designs in general aim to overcome information asymmetries among 
the parties involved. Graham et al. (2008) stated that the package of contractual features 
reflect how lenders anticipate borrower performance. 
In an early paper on the U.S. commercial lending market, Melink and Plaut (1986), stated that 
loan contracts in general possess a multidimensional character with various loan related 
variables. Under this view, loan contracts are packages consisting of several different price 
and non-price terms with maturity, amount, and collateralisation being widely considered as 
the main ingredients.  
One strand in the literature assumes a sequential process, where decisions on non-price related 
terms precede the price setting. In other words, these non-price features and pricings are not 
jointly determined (Berger & Udell, 1990; Bharath et al., 2011; Dennis et al., 2000; Fang et 
al., 2016; S&P, 2011). Another strand assumes joint or simultaneous determinations. Under 
this assumption, a borrower is able to trade-off different loan contract features, one against the 
other (Brick & Palia, 2007; Melink & Plaut). 
Some studies have focused predominantly on one of these non-price terms, whereas Barbosa 
and Ribeiro’s (2007) core study covered multiple terms. Hence, I present the summary table 
of this work at the outset of this section and will back-reference the table in subsequent sub-
sections. 
 
Table 38. Summary table for Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007). 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
Euro-area
Non-financial 
firms
1999-October 
2006
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
Spread over 
reference rate
Dealogic 
Loanware
6,040 tranches
> Better Borrower Ratings lead to lower pricing.
> Total foreign bank syndicates are associated with higher pricings, being an indication for home bias issues and an incomplete integration of the 
syndicated loan market.
> Fees complement interest income for banks rather than substituting it.
Findings
> The higher the loan size, the higher the pricing.
> Longer maturity leads to higher spreads.
> Loans for takeover purposes carry higher pricing.
> Term loans in general, and bridge loans especially, carry higher pricings than RCFs do.
> Loans with guarantees carry lower spreads.
> Loans with collateral carry higher spreads.
Barbosa, L., & Ribeiro, N. (2007). Determinants of spreads in syndicated loans to euro area corporates. Economic Bulletin; Banco de Portugal , 
65-74. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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 Maturity 
A key contractual feature is the loan maturity. Thus, relations between pricing and the 
respective maturity naturally merit study, especially considering two contradictory 
hypotheses, the named trade-off hypothesis and the credit quality hypothesis.  
The former predicts that pricings will rise with increasing maturity whereas the latter forecasts 
the opposite. Advocates of the trade-off hypothesis, such as Coleman, Esho, and Sharpe 
(2002), argue that borrowers who intended to issue a short maturity loan would face the 
danger of an “early” and costly liquidation at maturity or, in other words, that the loan would 
not be prolonged by its lender(s). Thus, relatively risky borrowers seek long-term financing to 
moderate this risk. Lenders face higher risks in engaging in long-term loans for risky 
borrowers and are only willing to offer long-tenured loans to risky borrowers at a price 
premium.  
The credit quality hypothesis suggests negative maturity-price relationships as lenders strive 
to limit their risk-exposures by forcing high-risk borrowers into short-term debt (Berger & 
Udell, 1990; Dennis et al., 2000; Strahan, 1999) and offer long term loans only to the highest 
quality borrowers. According to Flannery (1986), this direction accelerates further as these 
highest quality borrowers tend to seek short-term loans to signal their high creditworthiness as 
well as their low liquidation risk at maturity.  
Building on these early, mostly theoretical and non-syndicated loan related works, the core 
study conducted by Gottesmann and Roberts (2004) investigated the price-maturity 
relationship founded on a syndicated loan sample of U.S.-based enterprises. Using a matched 
pair analysis, the authors attempted to isolate trade-off effects of the credit qualities’ impact. 
A matched pair is syndicated loan consisting of multiple tranches. Each might carry a 
different AISD, a different maturity, etc., and might either be a term or a revolving loan. 
Thus, the borrower-quality is said to be the same for each tranche. With regard to this 
matched pair analysis and only for term loans, Gottesmann and Roberts found a positive 
relation between pricing and maturity supporting the trade-off theory. For Euro-area corporate 
borrowers, Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) provided supporting evidence stating that pricings do 
monotonically increase with loan maturity.  
By replacing the matching technique with pooled regression analyses Gottesmann and 
Roberts found support for the credit-quality hypothesis, meaning that longer maturity loans 
are associated with lower spreads.  
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Gottesmann and Roberts (2004) logically argue that both phenomena co-exist. For a single 
firm, there might be a willingness of lenders to trade-off pricing and maturity as shown in the 
matched pair’s analysis. With an overall bank portfolio view, however, banks strive to limit 
long-term risk exposure to riskier clients, in line with the credit quality theory, for which 
evidence was found via pooled regressions. Table 39 summarises the main elements of 
Gottesmann and Roberts. 
 
Table 39. Summary table for Gottesmann and Roberts (2004). 
One possible criticism regarding the work of Gottesmann and Roberts is the fact that the 
authors lumped together LBO-loans with non-LBO-loans. This is particularly problematic for 
this study as the matched pairs analysis strives at isolating the trade-off- from the credit 
quality hypothesis. It is likely that most of the matching pairs are LBOs as multiple tranches 
are most common in this market. In the speculative LBO-world, via tranching and the creation 
of structural/indirect subordination,71 different credit qualities are created by means of 
tranching (Maskara, 2010) to meet various interests of different investor types inter alia those 
of CLO-funds.72 In other words, isolating trade-off effects from the credit qualities’ effects is 
not a reasonable assumption for LBOs. This motivation for tranching is less common, 
however, in the corporate syndicated loan world.73  
The following Table 40 displays the related evidence of the core literature. 
                                               
 
71 See section 2.4.4.1. 
72 See section 2.4.4.1. 
73 See section 2.8.4. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S.
Non-financial 
firms
1988-1999
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
> Matched paired 
analyses
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
3,944 tranches
Findings
> Longer term loans carry higher AISD compared to shorter ones (matched paired analysis).
> Longer syndicated loans carry lower AISD (pooled regression).
Gottesmann, A. A., & Roberts, G. S. (2004). Maturity and corporate loan pricing. The Financial Review , 39, 55-77. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
> Credit spreads decrease with borrower size.
> Credit spreads increase with collateralisation.
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Table 40. Core literature synthesis for maturity. 
The table shows that a positive relation of pricing and maturity has predominantly been 
located. However, also a couple of authors found either no or a negative relationship. 
 Loan size 
As explicated in 2.6.1, Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010) studied pricing determinants of 
syndicated loans issued by borrowers located in 23 European countries. With respect to loan 
characteristics and in line with Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) for example, the authors found 
larger loans to carry lower spreads. The authors argued that this might be related to the fact 
that large loans are indicators for large borrower sizes, which the market in turn generally 
associates with lower risk. In other words, loan sizes are highly correlated with borrowers’ 
size and their creditworthiness, in line with Carey and Nini (2007). Confirmatively, Mattes et 
al. (2013) stated that smaller firms tend to be more highly leveraged then larger ones, with 
leverage being one of the core proxies for borrower-risk. 
As a second argument, as stressed by Barbosa and Ribeiro, these lower prices for a larger loan 
might also be driven by economies of scale. Per Graham et al. (2008) and Godlewski et al. 
(2012), there might be some kind of bank fixed costs being diluted via issuing large scale 
facilities.  
Determinant
P
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g
 
d
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ec
ti
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n
Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1991-2002
Wasan, Vijayakumar, and Daniels 
(2013)
28
↑ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
France 1992-2006
Godlewski, Sanditov, and Burger-
Helmchen (2012)
52
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↓ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↓ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↓ AISD U.S. 1988-1999 Gottesmann and Roberts (2004) 39
→ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
→
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
Long (revolving credit facilities) → AISD U.S. 1988-1999 Gottesmann and Roberts (2004) 39
Long (term loans) ↑ AISD U.S. 1988-1999 Gottesmann and Roberts (2004) 39
Long
Syndicated loan contractual features
Maturity
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Table 41 displays the related evidence of the core literature for loan size. 
 
Table 41. Core literature synthesis for loan size. 
Table 41 shows that the majority of core literature authors found a negative relation between 
loan size and pricing with only Godlewski and Weill (2011) and Calomiris and 
Pornrojnangkool (2009) presenting opposite directional influences. 
 Lender protection mechanisms 
This subsection thematises the role of collateralisation as well as the appearance of covenants 
and guarantees and their directional influence on syndicated loan pricing. When a syndicated 
loan is secured, the debt or certain portions of it is backed—in other words, pledged—by 
specified assets.74 In an event of default, banks are able to sell/use these assets to repay the 
loan or a part of it (Rhodes et al., 2004; Sickel, 2010). 
Generally, the appearance of collateral reduces potential loan losses in an event of default 
compared to unsecured facilities. This leads to the assumption that collateral should lower a 
loan’s risk premium ceteris paribus. Further, by providing collateral, an enterprise might 
signal its high-quality, thereby reducing ex ante information asymmetries, and, in return, 
                                               
 
74 Such as real estate, machinery, shares or revenues. 
Determinant
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under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
↓ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
↓ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↓ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
France 1992-2006
Godlewski, Sanditov, and Burger-
Helmchen (2012)
52
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↓ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1990-2011 Gaul and Uysal (2013) 24
↓ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
Loan size
Large
Syndicated loan contractual features
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might be able to negotiate lower pricings (Besanko & Thakor, 1987; Bester, 1985). This 
theoretical view is commonly defined as the adverse selection hypothesis, for which, 
however, there exists little empirical evidence. One exception is the Degryse and Van 
Cayseele (2000) finding of a negative linkage of collateral and spreads.75  
Extant academic literature predominantly stresses a positive relationship between collateral 
and loan pricing and elucidates this with the observed-risk hypothesis, stating lenders to 
require collateral from riskier borrowers who are also being charged higher spreads (Berger & 
Udell, 1990; Dennis et al., 2000; Jiminez & Saurina, 2004).  
Based on the above-presented underlying assumptions—in a cross-country analysis— 
Godlewski and Weill (2011) produced core research that sought to determine whether 
adverse selection and the observed-risk-hypothesis might coexist. In line with Barbosa and 
Ribeiro (2007) among others, the authors found a positive relationship between collateral and 
loan spread for their overall sample for each individual country. This is in line with a broad 
base of empirical literature propagating the observed-risk-hypothesis.  
However, Godlewski and Weill, whilst controlling for different levels of information 
asymmetries between lenders vis-à-vis borrowers a higher (lower) degree of such frictions 
decreases (increases) the positive relationship. This is interpreted by the authors in a way that 
besides the obvious observed-risk also the adverse selection hypothesis might coexist. Table 
42 summarises the main elements of Godlewski and Weill. 
                                               
 
75 The authors focused on Belgian loans for small businesses. 
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Table 42. Summary table for Godlewski and Weill (2011). 
It is important to note that major European countries such as France, UK, Spain and 
Switzerland are represented in the authors’ sample, whereas Germany is not. I assume this to 
be related to data availability issues. 
Next, I turn my attention to financial covenants, which are common elements of syndicated 
loan contracts (Nini, Smith, & Sufi, 2012). According to Roberts and Sufi (2009), covenants 
are an option for lenders to terminate or renegotiate a loan agreement in the event such a 
covenant is violated. In other words, covenant violations trigger events of default and serve as 
a kind of ex ante monitoring device to mitigate moral hazard issues (Ivashina, 2009).  
Fight (2004) distinguishes between non-financial and financial covenants, with the latter most 
frequently being a maximum leverage ratio or minimum interest rate coverage ratio. Common 
examples for non-financial covenants are restrictions on capital spending, financial 
indebtedness, asset disposals, mergers, and acquisitions (Slaughter & May, 2013). Berlin and 
Mester (1992) pointed out that covenants play a major role in alleviating moral hazard issues 
by aligning the interests of borrowers and lenders over the lifetime of the loan. This should 
lead to a lowering of spreads. However, the introduced observed-risk hypothesis might trigger 
an opposite relationship. 
Table 43 displays the related evidence of the core literature as it concerns covenants and 
collateral.  
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
31 Countries 
worldwide (excl., 
e.g., U.S., Germany
Non-financial 
sector and non-
public sector 
firms
1991-August 
2006
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
Spread over 
reference rate
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
4,940 tranches
> A greater number of lenders is associated with lower spreads.
> Maturity does not impact spreads.
> Presence of covenants leads to higher spreads.
> Term loans are charged with higher spreads.
> The purpose debt repayment is associated with lower spreads.
> Larger loans are charged with higher spreads.
Findings
> Overall, the loan spread increases when a loan is secured. This does not support the theoretical argument, according to which collateral helps to 
solve the problem of adverse selection.
> The finding corroborates the observed-risk hypothesis, according to which banks ask for more collateral from riskier companies who are already 
charged with higher loan rates.
> However, observed-risk hypothesis and adverse selection hypothesis coexist to a certain degree, as lower levels of information asymmetries 
increase the positive relationship between collateralisation and spreads.
> All else being equal, the loan spread increases by 50bp when the loan has collateral.
Godlewski, C. J., & Weill, L. (2011). Does collateral help mitigate adverse selection? A cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Services 
Research , 40, 49-78. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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The table also includes the core literatures’ findings with respect to the appearance of 
guarantees, which Fight (2004, p. 176) defines as “undertakings in writing by one person76 
given to another, usually a bank77 to be answerable for the debt of a third person78 to the 
creditor, upon default of the debtor”. 
 
Table 43. Core literature synthesis for lender protection mechanisms. 
In respect of collateral, Table 43 shows that the core literature strongly confirms the positive 
impact of collateral on pricing, whereas the appearance of covenants and guarantees is more 
subject to controversial discussion. 
                                               
 
76 The guarantor. 
77 The creditor. 
78 The debtor. 
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definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↑ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
↑ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↑ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↓ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↑ AISD U.S. 1988-1999 Gottesmann and Roberts (2004) 39
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
↑ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
↑ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↑ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
↑ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
↑ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
Protection mechanisms
Syndicated loan contractual features
Appearance of guarantee(s)
Appearance of covenant(s)
Appearance of collateral
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 Tranching and loan type 
Section 2.4.4 introduced the different loan types that are common in syndicated lending. Via 
tranching, different loan types inter alia term and revolving credit facilities can be 
incorporated into a single transaction. It is possible and not unusual in corporate lending that 
all creditors provide pro rata shares across tranches. However, also, different allocations are 
possible, where a commercial bank may act as lender under the revolving and, for example, a 
loan fund under the term loan tranche.79  
In that vein, Maskara (2010)—in a core study—assumed that lenders80 carry different 
degrees of risk appetite as well as different funding opportunities and that dividing loans into 
multiple tranches might address these differences. In other words, via tranching, different 
credit risk structures can be integrated into one syndicated loan and, thus, meet different 
investor preferences.81  
Based on a set of data on the U.S. syndicated loan market, the author found deals consisting 
of multiple tranches—for example, of revolving and term loans—to be priced below single 
tranche deals holding everything else equal. Maskara stated that tranching is a tool, which is 
predominantly used by more risky borrowers. Thus, multi-tranche-loans on average are circa 
70 bp p.a. more expensive than single tranche loans, taking different levels of risk into 
account. Tranching is a valuable instrument for exchanging reduced borrowing costs for more 
speculative credit risk. Tranching is accomplished by lenders creating new assets with varying 
risk-return-profiles that create additional loan supply for different investor groups with 
interests in differing profiles. Table 44 summarises the main elements of the Maskara paper. 
                                               
 
79 This is common for LBO-financings. 
80 Bank- and non-bank lenders. 
81 For example, via different seniority levels, different collateralisation levels, different maturities etc. 
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Table 44. Summary table for Maskara (2010). 
An interesting avenue for further research would be to conduct a similar study that separates 
corporate and LBO loans. The German corporate market is predominantly a pro rata bank-
only market, where tranching is usually not being conducted to create different credit risk 
profile loans for bank and non-bank investors. Tranching is common, however, for LBOs and 
project financings, where institutional investor tranches, often term loan Bs,82 are structured 
into syndicated loans.  
Table 45 displays the evidence from the core studies regarding different loan types in general. 
                                               
 
82 See section 2.4.4.1. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S.
Non-government, 
non-financial 
institution firms
1987-1999
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
23,721 tranches
> Higher (better) ratings lead to lower pricing.
> Revolving loans carry lower spreads than do term loans.
Findings
> Riskier firms are more likely to take loans with multiple tranches.
> The average credit spread on a syndicated loan with multiple tranches is higher than that on non-tranched loans.
> After the risk characteristics of a tranched loan has been accounted for, it is shown that borrowers that are part of a tranched loan have lower 
spreads than in the case of non-tranched loans.
> Benefits of tranching accrue primarily to riskier borrowers.
Maskara, P. K. (2010). Economic value in tranching of syndicated loans. Journal of Banking & Finance , 34, 946-955. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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Table 45. Core literature synthesis for tranching and loan types. 
As found by Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) among others, RCFs are predominantly associated 
with lower spreads compared to term loans. Bridge loans as a sub-format of term loans are 
found to be most expensive, which is because these loans are usually used in takeover 
financings and serve as a kind of short-term interim financing that is issued with the intention 
of a refinancing (also often referred to as take-out) with a capital markets instrument such as a 
corporate bond. Bridge loans thus carry the inherent risk that anticipated refinancings may not 
materialise (Barbosa & Ribeiro). 
 
 
 
 
Determinant
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n
Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
Tranched syndicated loan for average borrower ↑ AISD U.S. 1987-1999 Maskara (2010) 44
Tranched syndicated loan for risky borrower ↓ AISD U.S. 1987-1999 Maskara (2010) 44
High number of tranches ↑ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 44
↓ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↓ AISD U.S. 1987-1999 Maskara (2010) 44
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↓ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
↑ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↑ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↑ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
↑ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
↑ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
Tranching&loan types
Revolving credit facility
Syndicated term loan
Syndicated loan contractual features
Syndicated bridge term loan
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 Uses of proceeds 
Acquisition financings in general are broadly found to be more expensive as compared to 
working capital financings.  
Table 46 synthesises the core literatures findings regarding the different uses of proceeds for 
syndicated loans.  
 
Table 46. Core literature synthesis for uses of proceeds. 
Also, with regards to further possible uses of proceeds, extant literature tends to find similar 
patterns. The purposes “working capital”, “commercial paper back-up”, and “refinancing” are 
commonly associated with lower pricing. 
2.9 Macroeconomic environment as pricing determinant 
Syndicated lending has its roots in the 1960s and 70s, when it served as major tool for the 
financing of sovereign debt, mainly in emerging markets (Gadanecz, 2003). Hence, large 
strands of the early literature focused on macroeconomic factors influencing the functioning 
of the overall market. Today, the market for syndicated loans is mainly driven by corporate 
demand from industrialised countries, where such macroeconomic issues are likely to be less 
pronounced in comparison to emerging markets. However, a smaller segment of modern 
syndicated loan literature thematises macroeconomic issues. Such research prominently 
focuses on country-specific legal protection and on enforcement characteristics and it 
generally has concluded that the better these elements are from a lenders’ point of view, the 
Determinant
P
ri
ci
n
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d
ir
ec
ti
o
n
Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
↓ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↓ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
Commercial paper back-up ↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
↓ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
Repayment ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
↑ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
→
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
Uses of proceeds
Refinancing
Working capital
Acquisitions
Syndicated loan contractual features
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lower loan pricings can be ceteris paribus (Bae & Goyal, 2009; Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; 
Chava, Livdan, & Purnanamdam, 2009).  
In a cross-country core inquiry, Anagnostopoulou and Drakos (2016) recently extended the 
perspective of the afore-cited studies by looking at macroeconomic factors of borrowers’ 
home countries and how these possibly affect loan terms and conditions. In other words, 
country specific macroeconomic fundamentals like GDP-growth are examined additionally to 
the aforementioned institutional effects like legal protection and law enforcement. 
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos hypothesised that loan terms and conditions in general as well 
as pricings in particular differ with diverse macroeconomic conditions and they indeed found 
that macroeconomic performance does significantly drive syndicated loan terms and 
conditions. Borrowers located in countries with a relatively higher GDP-growth rate and/or 
lower unemployment rates are found to obtain lower loan pricings and more favourable non-
price terms. Anagnostopoulou and Drakos thereby were able to confirm broadly the earlier 
findings of Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010) covering the European Market. Table 47 
summarises the main elements of Anagnostopoulou and Drakos’s paper. 
 
Table 47. Summary table for Anagnostopoulou and Drakos (2016). 
 
 
 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
Worldwide
Non-financial 
firms
1990-2011
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
AISD
Thomson Reuters 
LPC
69,920 tranches
> Spreads are higher for firms with higher debt.
> Spreads are higher for firms with higher risk, measured by their daily return standard deviation.
> Spreads are higher for firms with more intangible capital.
> Spreads are lower for firms with more tangible capital.
> Spreads are lower for larger firms.
> Spreads are lower for more profitable firms.
> Rated firms have lower spreads than unrated ones.
> Among rated firms, better rated firms carry lower spreads.
Findings
> Overall findings indicate that (1) cross-country variation is a significant determinant of loan T&C; (2) traditionally employed firm-specific and 
loan-specific variables significantly explain  loan T&C; and (3) year and country variation in macroeconomic variables significantly explains the 
package of loan T&S, an effect that is distinct or incremental to any influence that T&C receive from firm-specific factors and most importantly, 
country-specific institutional factors, with repercussions for creditor protection and contract enforcement.
> Loan spreads are lower for borrowers from countries exhibiting a higher GDP growth rate.
> Loan spreads are lower for borrowers from countries with lower unemployment rates.
> Inflation in the borrowers home country has no impact on spread.
> Countries external deficit and government debt have no impact on spread.
Anagnostopoulou, S. C., & Drakos, K. (2016). Bank loan terms and conditions: is there a macro effect? Research in International Business and 
Finance , 37, 269-282. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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The following Table 48 displays the related evidence of the core literature. 
 
Table 48. Core literature synthesis for macroeconomic environment. 
Overall the findings in relation to macroeconomic environment are in line with common a 
priori beliefs. Related indicators of strength like good solvency and high GDP-growth rates 
are commonly associated with lower, whereas inter alia high aggregate risk is associated with 
higher pricing. 
2.10 Syndicate structure as pricing determinant 
 General syndicate structural thoughts considering information asymmetries  
Before focusing on syndicate structural elements and their influence on pricing, I provide 
some theoretical background information. As discussed earlier (2.4.3), numerous possible 
motivations and benefits exist to induce both lenders and borrowers to engage in syndicated 
loan transactions. Godlewski and Weill (2008, p. 207) however postulated the need for 
respective advantages to be “put into perspective with potential agency problems generated by 
syndicated loans”. Sufi (2007) stated these agency problems to be ameliorated by the structure 
of the lending syndicates. 
Agency costs result from the fact that various parties of lending syndicates must deal with 
different degrees of information quality and quantity (Godlewski, 2010a, 2010b; Mora, 2015). 
These costs addressed through possibly higher pricings might be harmful for the client’s 
wealth (Godlewski et al., 2012). In bilateral lending relationships, informational frictions 
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Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
↑ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
Good solvency ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
↓ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
→ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
→
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
Trade balance →
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
High reserves to GDP ratio ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
High aggregate risk ↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
Low unemployment rate ↓ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
→ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
→
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
Degree of inflation 
High debt to GDP ratio 
Macroeconomic environment
Economic cycle
Financial information of borrower country
Recession in borrower country
High degree of GDP growth 
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solely occur between borrower and lender and, hence, can be mitigated more easily as 
compared to multilateral lending affiliations. In bilateral lending scenarios, banks originate 
and subsequently hold the entire loan on their balance sheet, exposing banks to the whole face 
value risk, but also incentivising the institution to conduct thorough ex post screening and 
monitoring (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010). In syndicated lending, however, agency problems 
are more prominent, as third parties, namely, additional participating lenders with varying 
degrees of seniority and information about the borrower83—join the contract (Sufi, 2007). 
Informational frictions are even more severe with loans to smaller, opaque firms who do not 
have access to capital markets funding, where the role of financial intermediation in general 
becomes particularly important (Godlewski, 2010a; Kopecky & Xiao, 2013; Lee & 
Mullineaux, 2004; Mora, 2015). 
As finance theory researchers in general did, various ones have thus focused on hidden 
information via adverse selection and hidden action via moral hazard in effort (Mora) in the 
syndicated loan market that Sufi (p. 630) labels a “promising empirical laboratory” for 
studying agency problems.  
2.10.1.1 Adverse selection 
Adverse selection issues arise ex ante because of information asymmetries between lead 
arranger(s) and participants (Chaudhry & Kleimeier, 2015; Lee & Mullineaux). According to 
Gadanecz et al. (2012), lead banks are likely to have proprietary information about borrowers, 
often because of a high degree of experience and/or a relationship bank status that produces 
proprietary information over time. In other words, long standing lending relationships with 
borrowers produce private information, which is pivotal when syndicates deal with opaque84 
borrowers. Hence, the lead bank might be motivated to use its “monopolistic” information 
advantage by syndicating larger portions of “bad” loans and “cherry-picking” larger portions 
of “good” loans as a benefit of its unique position (Bosch & Steffen, 2011; Chaudhry & 
Kleimeier; Godlewski & Weill, 2008; Ivashina, 2009). In other words, “lemons problems” 
might occur, situations when lead banks could behave opportunistically by deliberately 
exploiting participant banks (Gadanecz et al.). 
 
                                               
 
83 Therefore often referred to as being uninformed lenders. 
84 For example, small, unlisted, unrated clients. 
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2.10.1.2 Moral hazard 
Besides general moral hazard issues in debt contracts between borrowers and lenders, where 
the latter might be incentivised to divert cash flows for private advantage or to engage in 
disproportionate risk taking (borrower moral hazard), in syndicated lending another form, the 
syndicate moral hazard is an issue (Bharath et al., 2011). As the participants delegate 
monitoring activities to the lead bank(s), moral hazard issues are conceivable (Bharath et al.; 
Mora, 2015).  
The lead arranger or, theoretically, the delegated monitor—whose efforts are unobservable— 
might be less motivated to monitor and screen the borrower properly, because, unlike in 
bilateral loan transactions, he only lends a fraction of the loan amount, a behaviour which can 
be defined as shirking (Godlewski, 2010a; Godlewski & Weill, 2008; Holmstrom & Tirole, 
1997; Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010). Dolvin et al. (2007) stated that a further syndicate moral 
hazard issue might be a so-termed free-riding behaviour of participant banks on the 
monitoring efforts of other syndicate members. According to Ivashina and Scharfstein the 
former phenomenon is related to possible wrongdoing in behaving opportunistically by the 
lead arranger(s), which could be anticipated by participant banks that in return claim higher 
loan pricings.  
This type of behaviour would put a lead arranger’s reputation at risk. Lead arrangers usually 
strive to keeping repeated, sustainable relationships with both borrowers and participant banks 
(Chaudhry & Kleimeier, 2015; Jones et al., 2005). Not surprisingly, lead-bank behaviour in 
the information asymmetry context raises empirical questions with a clear distinction between 
adverse selection and moral hazard being challenging as both effects might push pricing 
higher. Thus, Ivashina (2009) and others set moral hazard and adverse selection as similar 
whilst discussing information asymmetrical issues in the context of syndicate structure.  
The majority of researchers find no evidence of opportunistic behaviour in general as 
syndicates tend to be structured in a manner that moderates informational frictions (Chaudhry 
& Kleimeier; Sufi, 2007). The composition of the lending syndicate—predominantly the 
retained share of the lead arranger—and its various aspects, repeated lending interactions, as 
well as the financial contract structures, are usually found being able to successfully address 
within-syndicate agency issues (Ball et al., 2008; Diamond, 1984; Francois & Missonier-
Piera, 2007; Godlewski, 2010a, 2010b; Kopecky & Xiao, 2013; Sufi).  
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In that vein, if credit risk is high, Lee and Mullineaux (2004) and Sufi (2007) found that lead 
arrangers keep lending syndicates small to minimise adverse selection issues and to enhance 
their own monitoring incentives. Chaudhry and Kleimeier (2015) pointed out that syndicates 
for opaque and monitoring-intense borrowers tend to be more concentrated than others. This 
is consistent with the evidence found by Lee and Mullineaux to the effect that less risky 
borrowers on average have larger as well as more diffuse syndicates. These findings generally 
underline the certification role of banks (Boot, 2000; Casolaro, Focarelli, & Pozzolo, 2008; 
Focarelli et al., 2008).  
Having discussed this necessary theoretical underpinning, I now focus on structural issues of 
syndicates and their influence on pricing. 
 Syndicate structure, information asymmetry, and pricing 
In theory, the influence of the syndicate structure on loan pricing manifests either by a 
diversification premium required by a lead arranger for a relatively large retained loan share 
or by an information asymmetry premium, which participants require especially whilst lending 
to opaque borrowers (Champagne & Coggins, 2012). According to Ivashina (2009), in a 
market equilibrium, these effects should offset each other.  
Based on that theoretical assumption, led by early asymmetric information literature such as 
the one of Leland and Pyle (1977), Focarelli et al.’s core study measured the influence of the 
lead bank share in syndicated loans on its pricing. In other words and based on the theory of 
delegated monitoring of Diamond (1984), the researchers tested the hypothesis that 
syndicated loan pricings are a decreasing function of the retained lead arranger share.  
Based on a cross-country study for the period 1990 to 2001, Focarelli et al. confirmed this 
hypothesis. The negative relation between retained lead share and pricing is more pronounced 
for opaque borrowers. More theoretically, the researchers defined a certification effect by 
stating that lead arrangers, acting as delegated monitors, have the ability to mitigate 
information problems by contributing higher amounts to the overall funding. Table 49 
summarises the findings of Focarelli et al. 
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Table 49. Summary table for Focarelli et al. (2008). 
Because of various missing loan information, the initial syndicated loan sample in Focarelli et 
al. (2008) consisted of 14,121 loans that, without a borrower-type distinction, needed to be 
reduced by almost 80% to 2,951 loans initially. To control for borrower characteristics, the 
researchers were forced to reduce the sample further by 1,879 to 1,072, for which financial 
statement data was available via the “Worldscope” database.   
Confirmatively, Ivashina’s (2009) core study found informational frictions within a lending 
syndicate to have an economic impact on pricing in the sense that higher lead bank lending 
amounts reduced the cost of borrowing on average by 4%. In other words, in line with 
theoretical predictions, uninformed participant banks require a premium for the potential 
wrongdoing of the lead bank. Table 50 summarises the main considerations of Ivashina’s 
paper. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
Cross-country
All borrower 
types
1990-2001
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
Spread over 
reference rate
Dealogic 
Loanware
2,951 loans
> Larger loans carry lower rates.
> Borrowers whose financial condition is more solid (lower leverage and higher EBITDA) and whose stock price volatility is lower are less risky 
and are therefore charged lower spreads.
> Spreads are an increasing function of duration.
> Privately placed facilities (club deals) have lower interest rates.
> Facilities in which the subscribers are allowed to transfer part of the loan in the secondary market have relatively lower spreads.
> The existence of an option to extend size or maturity, which favours the borrower and should therefore increase the cost of the loan, is instead 
found to lower the interest rate significantly, presumably because these options are made available to prime borrowers.
> Interest  rates on unsecured loans carry lower spreads.
Findings
> Banks have a unique ability to mitigate information asymmetries by verifying that syndicated loans in which a larger share of the facility is 
retained by the arranger are judged as less risky by finance providers, and therefore carry lower interest rates.
> The effect of certification is greater when the agency problems are more severe, for example if the borrower is more opaque or the loan requires 
stricter monitoring and due diligence.
Focarelli, D., Pozzolo, A. F., & Casolaro, L. (2008). The pricing effect of certification on syndicated loans. Journal of Monetary Economics , 55, 
335-349. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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Table 50. Summary table for Ivashina (2009). 
Usually the syndicate structure is modelled using the size of the syndicate and the retained 
lead arranger share as proxies. For the U.S., the European, and the Asian syndicated loan 
market, the core study conducted by Champagne and Coggins (2012) first identified the 
main constituents of a syndicate’s structural composition. They did so using a principal 
component analysis and subsequently measured the respective influence of these elements on 
AISD. In other words, the authors affirmed that studies solely relying on syndicate size and 
retained lead share overlook numerous further determinants. They identified six principal 
elements85 as being directly or indirectly driving AISD:86 
1. Syndicate quality 
2. Syndicate heterogeneity/lender-share concentration 
3. Lead arranger quality 
4. Syndicate geography 
5. Relationship (lender-borrower; lender-lender) 
6. Bank type 
 
                                               
 
85 Detailed definitions of these six elements can be found on page 1,140 in Champagne and Coggins (2012). 
86 Based on whole sample for U.S., Europe and Asia. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
Definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S.
Non-regulated 
and non-financial 
firms
1993-2004
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
AISD
Thomson Reuters 
LPC
23,087 loans
> Banks with larger and more diversified portfolios have a competitive advantage, as they can offer lower financing costs to the borrower.
> An increase in the default probability of the borrower leads to higher spreads.
> The presence of performance-based pricings reduces spread.
> Presence of collateral and financial covenants leads to higher spreads.
> Repeated borrowers receive lower spreads.
> High lead arranger reputation leads to lower spreads.
> High facility amount leads to lower spreads.
> Number of tranches positively affects pricings.
Findings
> An information asymmetry problem within a syndicate has an important economic impact on loan spread.
> A 9% increase in the share retained by the lead bank reduces the spread required by participants by approximately 29bp (4% of the total 
cost).
Ivashina, V. (2009). Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads. Journal of Banking & Finance , 92, 300-319. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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Champagne and Coggins (2012) found that higher-quality syndicates can diminish the 
information asymmetry premium and that less concentrated syndicates can be associated with 
lower loan-costs, consistent with the diversification premium theory. For transparent 
borrowers, reputable lead arrangers can earn a spread premium. Interestingly for the European 
market, Champagne and Coggins found a lesser sensitivity of pricing and syndicate structure. 
They took this as a possible explanation for “the pricing puzzle” discussed in 2.6.2. European 
syndicates tend to be more diffuse and consist of lower quality lead arrangers leading to lower 
concentration and subsequently to lower required information asymmetry premiums. Table 51 
summarises the main elements of the Champagne and Coggins article. 
 
Table 51. Summary table for Champagne and Coggins (2012). 
The findings of Champagne and Coggins, especially with respect to the reported differences 
of European versus U.S. syndicates, becomes important in connection with the qualitative 
fieldwork to be described herein. However, likewise to my reported critique regarding other 
studies relying on disproportionally small European samples, I warn not to over-interpret 
respective findings, especially with regard to pricing, a comment that also holds for a core 
study conducted by Godlewski et al. (2012). Applying network theoretical methods, 
Godlewski et al. studied the network structure of the French syndicated lending market and 
concluded this market to be a “small world” with large local density and short social distances 
between lenders allowing an efficient information flow amongst lenders. In other words, 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S.; Europe; 
Asia
unspecified 1998-2009
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
> Principal 
component analyses
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
20,336 loans
> European borrowers are associated with lower pricings.
Findings
> Identification of 6 principal components of syndicate structure that account for more than 60 % of the variability in international syndicate 
structures.
> All 6 components are significant determinants of loan spread, either directly or indirectly through their impact on other components.
> Lead share retention, previous lender-borrower relationships and syndicate quality are shown to be bilaterally related to loan spread.
> Opaque or emerging countries borrowers have lower quality syndicates and leads, weaker previous relationships with the lenders and more 
homogeneous or concentrated syndicates.
> Higher quality syndicates with stronger cohesion can diminish the information asymmetry premium.
> Heterogeneous or less concentrated syndicates are related to lower spreads, which is consistent with a reduction of the diversification 
premium.
> Lead quality is a significant and positive determinant of spread only for transparent borrowers.
> For opaque borrowers the benefits of a higher-quality lead offset the certification premium.
> Structure components differ regionally.
> US borrowers are associated with syndicates and leads of higher quality than European or Asian borrowers.
> Syndicates of European borrowers are based on weaker lender-borrower relationships and are the most heterogeneous and diffuse.
> Loan spreads are less sensitive to syndicate structure on the European market than on the American market.
> Pricing discount in Europe observed in the literature can be explained by different syndicate structures (more diffuse, lower quality syndicates 
and leads) --> lower concentration and certification premiums.
Champagne, C., & Coggins, F. (2012). Common information asymmetry factors in syndicated loan structures. Journal of Banking & Finance , 
36, 1437-1451. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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information asymmetries are less severe in such a small world, a factor that benefits 
borrowers. Further, the authors found that lender experience and reputation reduces 
syndicated loan pricings in France. There is some controversy reported in the literature 
concerning the influence of reputation on borrower cost, with McCahery and Schwienbacher 
(2010) stating that opaque borrowers need to pay a reputation premium, which contradicts the 
finding of Champagne and Coggins (2012) that only transparent borrowers need to pay a 
premium for reputable lead arrangers.87 Table 52 summarises the main elements of the 
Godlewski et al. (2012) article. 
 
Table 52. Summary table for Godlewski et al. (2012). 
In line with the “small world” argumentation of Godlewski et al., Wu et al. (2013)—in 
another core study—established longer relational distances between lenders leading to higher 
AISD, but, on the other hand, to minimise the risk of syndication failure. The authors stated 
that in short relational distances between lenders, borrowers freely share information with 
each other and that, thus, lead banks might be less-strict in their price setting, leading to a 
tendency to under-price loans. This, however, is not satisfying all lenders’ “price-needs”, 
which can lead to increased risks of failed syndications.  
If relational distances appear considerable, cascade-effects are triggered, characterised by 
imperfect communication between related parties. Here, banks might rely on actions of fellow 
syndicate banks without being fully informed about the borrower. In other words, if one bank 
agrees to participate in a syndicated loan, a second bank and a third bank are likely to follow, 
sometimes triggering a positive cascade. This positive cascade is only possible, however, if 
                                               
 
87 See section 2.7.4. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
France 
Non-financial 
firms
1992-2006
Realism, 
Positivism
> Social network 
analyses
> Regression 
analyses
Spread over 
reference rate
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
924 loans
> Loan size has a negative impact on spread.
> Maturity has a positive impact on spread.
Findings
> A syndication network becomes "small-worldish" with time.
> A central syndicate reduces loan spread.
> The presence of local lenders or a concentrated syndicate does not have any significant influence on loan spread.
> The presence of league table lenders and local league table lenders has a significantly negative effect on loan spread.
> League table reputation is an important syndicate feature to reduce loan spread.
Godlewski, C. J., Sanditov, B., & Burger-Helmchen, T. (2012). Bank lending networks, experience, reputation, and borrowing costs: empirical 
evidence from the French syndicated loan market. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting , 39(1), 113-140. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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pricings are set relatively expensively and the likelihood of bank commitments is high. 
Otherwise, negative cascades might be triggered. Logically, if positive cascade effects are at 
work, pricings are higher, but syndication failures of a lower probability. Table 53 
summarises the main elements of the article by Wu et al. (2013). 
 
Table 53. Summary table for Wu et al. (2013). 
As stressed in my earlier critiques of certain papers, a distinction of several syndicated loan 
asset classes would be needed to ensure non-diluted results. This is particularly important 
with respect to the work of Wu et al., who base their analyses on underlying assumptions of 
risk-neutral lead banks and rational borrowers, which might hold for LBOs or project 
financings, but are at least to be questioned in general syndicated corporate financing 
arrangements. 
 
 
 
 
 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S. unspecified
1990-August 
2010
Realism, 
Positivism
> Social network 
analyses
> Regression 
analyses
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
65,390 tranches
> Loan spreads are negatively related to loan amount.
> Loan spreads are negatively related to maturity.
> Loan spreads for secured / guaranteed loans are significantly higher.
> Loan spreads for loans with financial covenants are lower.
> Larger syndicates lead to lower spreads.
> Larger borrowers pay lower spreads.
> More profitable borrowers pay lower spreads.
Main Findings
> Ex post  observed interest rate is higher and the probability of syndication failure is lower, when potential lenders can only observe the decisions 
of their predecessors instead of being able to freely communicate with each other.
> Evidence that there is a cascade effect in lending conditions.
> Relational distance is positively related to loan spread and the requirements for collateral and guarantees, but negatively related to the probability 
of syndication failure.
> If potential lenders can freely share the borrowers' information with each other, then the probability of syndication failure is always positive. This 
is because the loan spread, as proposed by the lead bank, may not fully reflect the information held by all potential lenders. The probability that the 
lead bank underestimates the loan spread is always positive.
Wu, W., Chang, H., Suardi, S., & Chang, Y. (2013). The cascade effect on lending conditions: evidence from the syndicated loan market. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting , 40, 1247-1275.
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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 Synthesis: syndicate structure, information asymmetry and pricing 
Table 54 displays the synthesised findings with respect to syndicate structural issues.  
 
Table 54. Core literature synthesis for syndicate structure. 
Table 54 indicates that syndicates are likely to be affected by information asymmetries that 
can be mitigated by the syndicate structure, especially by the retained lead share as well as by 
certain pricing premiums required by participants. Interestingly, in comparison to the U.S., the 
syndicate structural issues in light of assymetric information and its impact on pricing seem to 
be less severe in Europe as found by Champagne and Coggins (2012). Table 54 also 
underpins that syndicate structural discussions given their influence on pricing are 
controversial with partially contradicting and/or understudied phenomena. It is reasonable to 
assume that besides the information-asymmetrical theories, other forces might be at work that 
influence a syndicate’s structure and its interrelation with pricing. 
Determinant
P
ri
ci
n
g
 
d
ir
ec
ti
o
n
Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
Club deal ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
↓ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
↓ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
→
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
→
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
Information asymmetries within in syndicate ↑ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
Relational distance (low degree of information 
flow between lenders)
↑ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
Participant lender facing information 
asymmetries to borrower
↑ AISD Worldwide 1993-2006
Gadanecz, Kara, and Molyneux 
(2012)
56
High for transparent borrower ↓ AISD Worldwide 1993-2006
Gadanecz, Kara, and Molyneux 
(2012)
56
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↑ AISD Worldwide 1993-2006
Gadanecz, Kara, and Molyneux 
(2012)
56
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↓ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
Central ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
France 1992-2006
Godlewski, Sanditov, and Burger-
Helmchen (2012)
52
High ↓ AISD U.S.; Europe; Asia 1998-2009 Champagne and Coggins (2012) 51
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe; Asia 1998-2009 Champagne and Coggins (2012) 51
→
Spread over 
reference rate
France 1992-2006
Godlewski, Sanditov, and Burger-
Helmchen (2012)
52
Existence of identical previous syndicate whilst 
lending during 2008 financial crisis
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
Quality
Concentration
Syndicated loan history
Syndicate structure
Syndication mode
Number of lenders
Information asymmetries
High for opaque borrower
Retained lead share
Position within network
High
High in general 
High
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2.11 Lender-borrower relationship as pricing determinant 
 General relationship lending thoughts considering information asymmetries 
Similar to syndicate structural discussions, relationship lending in general has been a widely 
studied topic that had led to mixed intellectual approaches and has produced diverse 
conclusions. Relationship lending theory and research is essentially grounded on assumptions 
regarding informational frictions in the sense that lending relationships might be beneficial for 
financiers due to their unique ability to mitigate those asymmetries.88 Extant literature 
measures a lender-borrower-relationship-deepness by the history of previous interactions,89 
distance (proximity), exclusivity, and cross-product synergies. As early, information-based, 
financial intermediation theory suggests, banks produce private information via due diligence 
efforts to mitigate adverse selection prior to making loan decisions (Boot & Thakor, 2000). 
Further, financiers constantly monitor borrowers to be protected against borrower moral 
hazard (Diamond, 1984). Aided by repeated interactions with the borrower and the deepening 
of the lender-borrower relationship, a relationship lender constantly produces reusable, 
proprietary information leading to an ex post information monopoly, which de novo 
uninformed outside lenders not share. According to Diamond (1991), a bank’s costs to 
conduct due diligence are a decreasing function of relationship length. This leads to an 
adverse selection issue for these non-lenders and might deter competition (Sharpe, 1990), as 
Figure 6 exemplifies. 
 
Figure 6. Information-based relationship lending model. 
                                               
 
88 See sections 2.3 and 2.10.1. 
89 For example, via the number of previous loan transactions, length of relationship, total amounts loaned to a client over 
time. 
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Logically, as relationships deepen over time, information asymmetries shrink and the costs of 
information production drops (Hainz & Wiegand, 2013). In other words, relationship lending 
leads to scope economies or so-called information rents in mainly soft and private information 
production.  
According to Udell (2008), relationship lending can be defined as a lending technique that 
predominantly depends on non-quantifiable soft information. In contrast, transaction-based 
techniques, such as financial statement lending or asset-based lending, mostly rely on hard 
and quantifiable information, such as financial data. Hence, relationship lending only creates 
value if severe information asymmetries exist. 
Thus, a huge strand of literature builds on these theoretical ideas and wonders if the presented 
cost-savings are (partly) shared with borrowers and result in more favourable loan contract 
terms in general and lower pricings in particular. In other words, loan pricing can either be 
relatively high or low if relationships were deep.90 This empirical question is of interest 
especially regarding bilateral lending relationships in the small business context, where (soft) 
information production is generally more costly and valuable (Berger & Udell, 1995; Grunert 
& Norden, 2012; Udell). It is also of interest for large syndicated loans, where participant 
banks91 expect a relationship lead lender to perform a superior ex ante due diligence and an ex 
post monitoring compared to a possible non-relationship lead lender. Hence, participants 
might subsequently accept lower pricings.  
In that context, it important to recall the original definition of syndicated lending, according to 
which only lead arrangers maintain relationships with borrowers, whereas participant lenders 
are uninformed, arm’s length investors. Under this theoretical constellation, the lead arranger 
monitors the borrower on behalf of these participants (Sufi, 2007). In that vein, Hale and 
Santos (2009) stated that syndicated loans in which only one bank acts as lead arranger carry 
similar financing patterns to bilateral lending agreements. 
Extant literature provides competing evidence with some researchers reporting lending 
relationships to be beneficial (Boot & Thakor, 1994; Bris & Welch, 2005) for borrowers and 
others not. Findings favouring the latter are asserted to be so-called lock-in- or hold-up-effects 
leading to high switching costs. Here, relationship lenders do not pass on the benefits to the 
                                               
 
90 See Figure 6. 
91 Uniformed outside lenders. 
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borrower—being informationally captured92—and, thus, extract rents (Houston & James, 
1996; Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990). In other words, “If the borrower seeks to switch to a new 
funding source, it is pegged as a lemon regardless of its true financial condition” (Santos & 
Winton, 2008, p. 1,315). Logically, Mattes et al. (2013) stated that these switching costs are a 
sufficient condition for banks to extract rents. In that context, Kim, Kliger, and Vale (2003) 
interpreted switching as the related costs of asymmetric information. In summary, one can 
state, that the overall scholarly debate is about relationship benefits versus possible lock-in-
effects under theoretical information asymmetry assumptions. 
 Relationship lending, information asymmetry, and pricing 
Largely, relationship lending literature focuses on small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
which tend to be opaque by nature and tend to issue external funding by means of bilateral 
bank loans.93 Here, banks need to rely overwhelmingly on soft information by evaluating 
borrowers creditworthiness as scale and scope of hard information are limited compared to 
large companies (Grunert & Norden, 2012; Ortiz-Molina & Penas, 2008).  
2.11.2.1 Syndicated relationship lending and pricing in context of general 
theoretical thoughts 
A smaller number of inquiries focused on syndicated lending—the heart of my study—
whereas others simply lumped bilateral and syndicated loans together, thus risking the 
dilution of results. One strand of this literature focused on the general discussion of 
relationship lending’s benefits versus related costs from a borrower’s perspective.  
By screening large enterprises, Bharath et al.’s (2011) core research examined the effects of 
prior lending-relationships on pricing and other non-price-related terms based on a loan set to 
publicly listed U.S. non-financial firms. Following Boot and Thakor (1994), Bharath et al. (p. 
1,195) found that relationship lending leads to lower AISD, thus confirming the hypothesis, 
“Economies in information production due to the repeated interaction between the same 
lender and borrower are at least partly reflected in the price of loans”.  
                                               
 
92 According to Rajan (1992), relationship banks know whether a firm is going to succeed or not, whereas outside de novo 
lenders only anticipate this, leading to a demand of higher spreads, resulting in switching costs. In other words, the 
relationship bank is fully informed and the non-relationship bank completely uniformed. 
93 Among others, Stein (2014), by examining firms of annual sales levels of €50 million to €150 million, found evidence for 
both hold-up and relationship benefit hypothesis. Borrowing costs tend to fall with relationship strength but tend to rise with 
its duration. 
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Further, the authors found that informationally opaque borrowers benefit more from 
relationships, disproving the lock-in hypothesis of, for example, Sharpe (1990) and Rajan 
(1992), under which opaque borrowers especially should either experience no benefit or, at 
least, less benefit from relationship lending. Next, in line with Boot and Thakor (2000), 
Bharath et al. (2011) found that very large borrowers94 mark a point at which pricings of 
relationship and non-relationship facilities become indistinguishable. As these very large 
borrowers are likely to be the most informationally transparent, this finding underlines the 
assumption that relationship lending is valuable tool for mitigating information frictions like 
ex ante adverse selection and ex post moral hazard and loses its value creation potential in 
“full” transparency situations. Table 55 summarises the main elements of the Bharath et al. 
article. 
 
Table 55. Summary table for Bharath et al. (2011). 
One might offer the critique that Bharath et al. only focused on stock-listed U.S. firms, for 
which a high degree of transparency can be expected across the size spectrum. Studying 
relationship lending phenomena given information asymmetrical assumptions is likely to be 
more valuable if privately held companies with the potential for severe opacity were included. 
 
                                               
 
94 The top 30% ranked by asset size. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S.
Non-financial 
publicly listed 
firms
1986-2003
Realism, 
Positivism
Regression 
analyses
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
21,632 tranches
> Larger borrowers pay lower spreads.
> Lower leverage, higher profitability and higher current ratio are associated with lower spreads.
> Longer maturity loans carry lower spreads.
> Secured loans carry higher spreads.
> Loans with covenants carry higher spreads.
Findings
> Relationship loans are marked by better spreads and lower collateral, they also tend to be associated with greater debt availability.
> Repeated borrowing from the same lender translates into a 10 - 17 bp p.a. lowering of loan spreads.
> This provides evidence that hypothesized economies in information production  due to repeated interaction between the same lender and 
borrower, are at least partly reflected in the price of loans.
> When information opacity of a borrower increases, the observed reduction in the cost of borrowing due to a relationship becomes greater.
> Spreads charged for relationship loans and nonrelationship loans become indistinguishable if the borrower was in the top 30 when ranked by 
asset size. Similar dissipation of relationship benefits occurs if the borrower has a rated public debt or is part of the S&P 500 index.
> Past relationships can mitigate syndicate moral hazard issues by serving as a commitment to monitor.
> Relationship loans are less likely to be secured.
Bharath, S. T., Dahiya, S., Saunders, A., & Srinivasan, A. (2011). Lending relationships and loan contract terms. The Review of Financial 
Studies , 24, 1141-1203. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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Using indicators such as lending frequency and duration between borrowers, lead arrangers, 
and participant banks, Gadanecz et al.’s (2012) core study found that participant lenders—
especially once borrower opacity becomes more pronounced—require a pricing premium. 
This is at first view contradictory to the results of Bharath et al. (2011), but is, however, likely 
to be explained by the fact that Bharath et al. studied large stock-listed firms whereas 
Gadanecz et al.—in line with my critical remark—did not restrict their sample to stock-listed 
companies. By counterbalancing these information asymmetries, the subsistence of an 
external rating makes the pricing premium disappear. Further, even for opaque95 borrowers, 
the authors found that repeat lending-relationships of participant banks with the borrower 
make them graduate from uninformed to informed lenders willing to accept lower pricings 
given the diminished degree information asymmetries. These cost benefits resulting from 
repeated interactions between borrower and participants are not found to be significant for 
rated borrowers. Table 56 highlights the main elements of Gadanecz et al. 
 
Table 56. Summary table for Gadanecz et al. (2012). 
Gadanecz et al. other than Bharath et al. used direct measures of information asymmetries, 
namely, the number of previous relationships, and did not solely look at the lead arrangers’ 
relationship with a borrower, but measured the influence of repeated interactions between 
participants and borrower. Furthermore, their sample is likely to be more eligible to deliver 
incremental inside into the debate, as Gadanecz et al. did not solely focus on listed companies. 
On the other hand, a possible drawback to the sample is that the authors used a worldwide and 
                                               
 
95 Meaning here: non-listed and non-rated. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
Worldwide
Non-financial 
firms
1993-2006
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
AISD
Dealogic 
Loanware
5,867 loans
Findings
> If participant banks have information inferiority in the syndicate, they demand a higher spread due to information asymmetries between them 
and the borrower.
> Results demonstrate the bargaining power of participant banks on the pricing of syndicated loans; they have the ability to influence pricing 
depending on their own information set about the borrower.
> For less opaque borrowers, an experienced and well-known arranger has an impact on the pricing and lowers spread.
> Reputation effects on pricing are not significant for opaque borrowers.
> There is a negative relationship between share retained by the lead and the spread (only rated).
> For opaque borrowers, there is a positive relationship between retained lead share and the spread.
> Arrangers retain a higher share of risky loans, which is more likely for opaque borrowers.
> The certification effect of the credit rating together with the arrangers' reputation is strong enough to lower spreads, whereas the arrangers' 
reputation by itself does not guarantee lower spreads.
Gadanecz, B., Kara, A., & Molyneux, P. (2012). Asymmetric information among lending syndicate members and the value of repeat lending. 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money , 22, 913-935. 
Primary Subject Findings
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rather small sample,96 which might lead to diluted results, an issue that is only cursorily 
acknowledged in the robustness checks. 
2.11.2.2 Syndicated relationship lending and pricing in context of economic 
cycles 
Another body of literature focused on relationship lending and its impact on credit supply and 
its terms and conditions in times of financial crises, when banks are supposed to face higher 
degrees of information asymmetry. In other words, in times of crises, information matters 
even more that it does during “normal” cycles, and the role of relationship lending is hence 
likely to become more important in that context as well. Thus, this literature strand somewhat 
extends my discussion of 2.9, where general macroeconomic conditions and their impact on 
pricing were thematised. 
As enterprises carry higher bankruptcy risks during times of recession and economic turmoil, 
banks enjoying information advantages might be enabled to then exploit clients even more by 
setting loan pricings higher than justified by the increased risk of failure alone. Based on 
survey data for 1,139 firms from the manufacturing sector, Hainz and Wiegand (2013) found 
that firms using relationship lending were less negatively influenced by the financial crisis 
around 2008/2009 in general, without finding, however, clear directions regarding the impact 
on loan pricing specifically.  
In their core research, Santos and Winton (2008) compared bank loan pricings for 
enterprises with access to public debt markets with those that were dependent on banks, 
especially in a recession context. In line with the hold-up hypothesis, the authors found that 
raising loan pricings is more pronounced for bank-dependent borrowers than for bank-
independent borrowers97 during recessions. In other words, borrowing from a relationship 
lender is less attractive in recessions than in non-recessions if the firms in question happened 
to be relatively opaque. Table 57 summarises the main elements of the Santos and Winton 
article. 
                                               
 
96 The loan sample of Gadanecz et al. (2012) is composed as follows: U.S.: 3,762 loans; Asia/Pacific: 1,041 loans; Europe: 
844 loans; Latin America/Caribbean: 132 loans; Africa/Middle East: 88 loans. 
97 That are firms with access to the public bond market. 
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Table 57. Summary table for Santos and Winton (2008). 
Because macroeconomic shocks increase adverse selection and likewise the lock-in risk for 
opaque borrowers, Mattes et al. (2013)—in their core study—found that undercapitalised 
banks exploited their information advantage over “captured” opaque firms, which face high 
switching costs. This effect is only observed in times of economic recession. Well-capitalised 
banks in contrast are not-found to extract such rents. Table 58 summarises the principle 
elements of Mattes et al. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S.
Stock-listed non-
financial firms
1987-2002
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
Spread over 
reference rate
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
13,846 tranches
> Spreads are higher for bank-dependent firms than for firms with access to public bond markets.
> Older firms, larger firms with more tangible assets pay significantly lower spreads.
> A greater market to book ratio leads to lower spreads.
> Most of the proxies for default risk, profit margin, interest coverage, leverage and Z score have positive impact on spreads.
> Term loans have lower spreads than RCFs.
> Bridge loans carry higher spreads than normal term loans.
> Takeover purpose has no impact on spreads.
> Guarantees and collateral lead to higher spreads.
> Longer maturities lead to lower spreads.
> Number of lenders in the syndicate have no impact on spread.
> Larger loans have lower spreads.
> Renewals have lower spreads.
> Firms with high leverage that are bank-dependent pay higher spreads than firms with high leverage that have market access.
> Stock market volatility leads to higher spreads.
Findings
> Spreads rise in recessions.
> Spreads in recessions rise by a greater degree for bank-dependent firms.
> Evidence suggests that informational hold-up effects do exist.
> Firms that have issued any bond, pay 75bp less than other firms; firms that have issued public bonds, pay 90 bp less than other firms; firms whose 
most recent bond was publicly issued, pay 102 bp less than other firms.
> During recessions, spreads are on average 20 bp higher than during expansions. Firms that have issued public bonds experience only a 6 bp rise in 
spreads during a recession, unlike other borrowers who face an increase of 31bp.
Santos, J. A. C., & Winton, A. (2008). Bank loans, bonds, and information monopolies across the business cycle. The Journal of Finance , 63, 1315-
1359. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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Table 58. Summary table for Mattes et al. (2013). 
Like several other studies, Mattes et al. (2013) revealed issues regarding public data 
availability. The authors started with a sample of 5,063 tranches and, after excluding those 
with missing information, they were left with only 988 tranches, i.e., roughly 20% of the 
overall sample.  
Relatedly, the core study conducted by Alexandre et al. (2014) analysed whether past 
relationships and borrower experience in the market for syndicated loans are mitigating 
elements for deteriorating terms in times of economic turmoil.98 The authors found that 
frequent syndicated loan borrowings per se did not mitigate term deteriorations in crises. 
Banks might perceive an overuse of loans as higher risk.99 However, a previous relationship 
with the lead arranger in particular and with the other syndicate members in general leads to 
more favourable pricings in such an environment. This beneficial tendency is even stronger, 
when pre- and post-crisis syndicates are identical. Logically, during the financial crisis around 
2008/2009, borrower-benefits resulting from relationship lending tend to outweigh possible 
lock-up effects, which is a finding that contradicts the argumentation of Santos and Winton 
(2008). Table 59 summarises the main elements of Alexandre et al. 
                                               
 
98 Here the 2008/2009 financial crisis. 
99 Due to the higher indebtedness; higher leverage. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
UK
Non-financial 
firms
1996-2005
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
988 tranches
> The smallest borrowers pay the largest spreads.
> Largest borrowers pay lowest spreads.
> Collateralised loans have higher spreads.
> Inclusion of covenants increases loan spreads.
> Term loans carry higher spreads.
Findings
> Capital-constraint banks exploit their information monopolies over borrowers with high costs for switching lenders by charging higher loan 
spreads than their well-capitalized peers (weak bank effect) (only in recessions).
> There are information monopolies that enable weak banks to charge higher spreads to borrowers with high switching costs.
> These are mainly driven by external events, such as a recession.
> These shocks affect at least some banks who increase their bad debt ratios: thus they charge higher spreads from borrowers with high 
switching costs.
> Strong banks tend not to exploit borrowers during such times and want to strengthen their relationships in expectation of higher future 
income.
Mattes, J. A., Steffen, S., & Wahrenburg, M. (2013). Do information rents in loan spreads persist over the business cycles? Journal of 
Financial Services Research , 43, 175-195. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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Table 59. Summary table for Alexandre et al. (2014). 
Like several studies that I have discussed in the course of the literature review, Alexandre et 
al. (2014) did not differentiate between the various syndicated loan asset classes and further 
faced similar issues with their sample100 compared to other works that (partly) cover Europe. 
2.11.2.3 Syndicated relationship lending and pricing in context of other 
financing products and sources 
Conducting meta-analyses, Kysucky and Norden (2016) recently provided a comprehensive 
overview of outstanding relationship lending studies101 for the U.S., Europe, Asia, and Latin 
America for the period 1970 to 2010. The authors found that deep lender borrower 
relationships are generally beneficial for borrowers with “length”, “exclusivity”, and “cross-
product synergies” as core drivers. The researchers found that relationships especially 
borrower-beneficial when bank competition is high and that benefits tend to be more 
pronounced in the U.S. as compared to Europe, where relationship lending does not 
necessarily make such benefits available.  
                                               
 
100 The sample of Alexandre et al. (2014) consists of 4,044 tranches of which 3,143 are related to U.S. and Canadian 
borrowers, whereas 901 were issued to European firms. 
101 Without distinguishing between syndicated and bilateral lending relationships and hence not recognised as being a core 
study. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
Definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S.; Canada; 
Europe
No 
differentiation 
2003-2008
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
Spread over 
reference rate
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
4,044 tranches
> A longer maturity is linked to a higher spread.
> Higher amounts are linked to lower spreads.
> Better Ratings lead to lower spreads.
> The fact that a firm is listed enables it to borrow higher amounts, but the spread and the maturity are unaffected by the listing.
> Inclusion of financial covenants reduces spread, makes maturities longer but also lowers amounts.
> A high reputation of Lead Arrangers leads to higher spreads.
> M&A purpose leads to higher spreads.
> Larger Syndicates lead to higher spreads.
> Higher Lead shares lead to higher spreads.
> North American firms are charged higher spreads than European firms and their maturities are shorter but their sizes are larger.
> Past relationships between the syndicate have a negative impact on spread.
> Temporal stability of the syndicate reduces the loan spread as does past relationship with the lead bank.
Findings
> Firms with a previously developed relationship with a lead bank obtained lower spread and a longer maturity during the financial crisis but did 
not benefit from longer maturities.
> If the lead bank of a syndicate in 2008 was a Bookrunner for a previous syndicated loan to the firm, this helps to decrease the spread by 14bps.
> Moreover, if the syndicate is the same as before, the spread decreases by 57 bps and the maturity increases by more than half a year.
> Indebtedness in the syndicated loan market has drawbacks: each past deal increases the spread by 8bp and decreases the maturity by 1.8 
months.
> The total amount borrowed from 2003-2007 has a positive effect on spread.
Alexandre, H., Bouaiss, K., & Refait-Alexandre, C. (2014). Banking relationships and syndicated loans during the 2008 financial crisis. Journal 
of Financial Services Research , 46, 99-113. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematical findings
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In an earlier core contribution, Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool (2009) focused on cross-
product synergies and studied how bundling of financial services—or in other words the 
offering of concurrent financial services—in the U.S. affects loan pricings and the costs for 
the underwriting of debt and equity securities. The theoretical foundation of such bundling-
benefits is grounded on information economies of scale that allow lenders to pass on such cost 
savings to clients. 
This empirical questions surrounding product bundling was emphasised with the repeal of the 
1933 Glass-Stegall Act in 1999 via the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Until this repeal, 
commercial banks had been prohibited from offering security underwritings (Oliver Wyman, 
2015; Schildbach, 2012). Thus, from 1999 onwards, commercial banks began to engage in the 
underwriting business as well, and began to provide competition for the investment bank 
community. Due to better portfolio diversification effects, scale-related economies of scope in 
product delivery, lower operating costs, and relationship-related economies of scale in light of 
information reusability, one can assume bundling to be beneficial for clients and banks 
(Benston, 1990).  
The counter-argument for possible borrower-benefits again are hold-up issues. The work of 
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool was motivated by an earlier analysis conducted by Drucker 
and Puri (2005). This was an analysis of U.S. stock-listed firms from the industrial sector and 
with seasoned equity offerings being underwritten by a bank that concurrently acted as a 
lender within a time window of plus/minus six months. Drucker and Puri found that, in line 
with the supposition of efficiency gains due to informational economies of scope, concurrent 
deals for highly leveraged and non-investment grade enterprises inhabit substantial benefits 
from such concurrent deals. Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool critiqued the work of Drucker 
and Puri in several stances, foremost with a view to the small sample102 and the pure focus on 
seasoned equity offerings.  
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool found that, over a 10-year period, banks in general103 tended 
to over-price loans preceding equity underwritings. Also, equity and debt underwriting costs 
                                               
 
102 Drucker and Puri (2005) had only been able to construct a sample of 201 loans and equity-underwritings with such 
concurrent deal pairings in the period 1996 to end of May 2001. 
103 Across any bank type differentiation. 
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are associated with a premium when they come along with a loan financing within a certain 
period104 irrespective of whether the loan precedes or follows the underwriting.  
Confirming Harjoto et al. (2006), Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool (2009) found that 
investment banks usually price financial services higher than do commercial banks.105 
However, investment banks tend to grant loans with a certain rebate, once they follow an 
equity underwriting. Universal banks, they observed, do not follow this practice.  
Overall, the evidence provided by Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool suggests that banks serving 
large listed U.S. clients are able to extract rents from their client relationships and price 
financial services strategically. Table 60 summarises the main elements of their article. 
 
Table 60. Summary table for Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool (2009). 
 
                                               
 
104 Mainly a window of less than two years. 
105 Note that this debate needs to generally be critically evaluated in light of the bank type discussions of 2.4.2.2 and 2.7.2. 
Region/Country Borrower Type Time Frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
Definition
Syndicated Loan 
Data Provider
Sample Size
U.S.
Stock-listed non-
financial, non-
regulated, non-
governmental 
companies
1992-2002
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
AISD
Thomson Reuters 
LPC
17,577 tranches
> Larger and more diversified lenders lead to lower pricings.
> Investment banks are associated with higher prices.
> Secured loans lead to higher spreads.
> Larger loans lead to higher pricings.
> Larger syndicates lead to lower pricing.
Findings
> Finding of evidence of strategic pricing: banks use relationships to over-price loans that precede equity underwritings (by 37 bp).
> There are pricing premiums for both debt and equity underwritings that are relationship bundled with loans within the same financing 
windows.
> In general, investment banks tend to price loans and underwriting services higher than universal banks.
> Investment banks compete with universal banks in the loan market by providing loan pricing discounts as "rebates" to borrowers who had 
employed them in preceding equity underwriting transactions.
> Banks appear to be able to extract quasi rents from their relationships. That does, however, not imply that relationships are harmful to bank 
customers. There may be offsetting gains to borrowers from relationships.
> One borrower benefit is a reduction in Loan Demand associated with relationship bundling (indicating an implicit free credit line) --> Real-
option value in the form of greater access to credit as result of stronger banking relationships.
Calomiris, C. W., & Pornrojnangkool, T. (2009). Relationship banking and the pricing of financial services. Journal of Financial Services 
Research , 35, 189-224. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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2.11.2.4 Syndicated relationship lending and pricing in context of public 
offerings 
In another U.S.-based core study, Schenone (2010) likewise provided evidence for the 
existence of hold-up issues. According to the author, banks can exploit informational 
advantages and extract rents when firms are locked-in and switching costs tend to be high. An 
equity-IPO, however, which is a major information releasing event that leads to information 
spill-over effects to outside lenders, leads to lower switching costs thereby preventing 
relationship banks from extracting rents. In other words, such an information releasing event 
enables the detection of rents and increases a firm’s credit competition position with the pre-
IPO severely asymmetrically informed outside lenders. Thus, banks must adjust their loan 
pricings downwards after the IPO.  
Schenone underpinned the classical relationship lending theory with lenders appearing to 
exploit information monopolies and extracting rents from locked-in clients even for large 
borrowers in the syndicated loan market. According to the author, bundling of financial 
services as presented in 2.11.2.3 do not drive pricings. Table 61 summarises the main 
elements of Schenone’s work. 
 
Table 61. Summary table for Schenone (2010). 
 
 
 
Region/country Borrower type
Time 
frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S.
S&P-rated non-
financial firms
1998-2003
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses 
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
981 loans
> Spreads increase with maturity.
> RCFs are lower-priced than termloans.
> Loans used for LBO/MBO are associated with an interest premium of more than 70 bp and loans applied to acquisitions involve a premium 
of 30 bp.
> Working capital loans are associated with lower pricings.
> Better-rated borrowers pay lower pricings.
> Firms with higher leverage ratios pay higher prices.
Findings
> Banks exploit their information advantage and extract rents while the firm faces high switching costs and is locked into the relationship. 
However, once switching costs drop, then relationship banks lower the interest rate that they charge their clients.
> Pre-IPO-lenders exploit their information-based monopoly, extracting rents from their locked-in client firm.
> Mean interest rates drop after an IPO.
Schenone, C. (2010). Lending relationships and information rents: do banks exploit their information advantages? The Review of Financial 
Studies , 23, 1149-1199. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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A similar approach was applied by Hale and Santos (2009) in a core study that analysed 
whether bond IPOs of U.S. firms likewise serve as information revealing events that 
subsequently lead to lower loan rates. Indeed, the authors found that pricings decline after an 
initial bond issuance, especially for safer firms and for those firms for which the bond IPO 
comes along with an initial106 credit rating.  
These findings complement the findings of Santos and Winton (2008), who found that all else 
being held equal, bank-dependent firms pay higher loan spreads compared to bank-
independent107 enterprises, especially in time of recession. The findings are in line with the 
lock-in hypothesis, according to which banks price their information monopoly, confirming 
findings of Schenone (2010), Gadanecz et al. (2012), and Santos and Winton. Table 62 
summarises the main elements of Hale and Santos. 
 
Table 62. Summary table for Hale and Santos (2009). 
Like the study of Santos and Winton, I criticise this study because it is based on stock-listed 
companies. According to the findings of Schenone, equity IPOs already serve as major 
information releasing events. I argue that it is thus at least questionable whether an already 
                                               
 
106 The first credit rating can be interpreted as particularly informative regarding the creditworthiness of a firm. 
107 Measured via public bond market access. 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
U.S.
Stock-listed non- 
financial firms
1987-2002
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
anaylses
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
367 loans
> Larger loans have lower spreads.
> Corporate purpose loans and working capital loans as well as refinancing loans carry lower spreads.
> RCFs have lower spreads then term loans and they have lower spreads than bridge loans.
> Dividend restrictions, security, sponsors lead to higher spreads.
> Relationship loans carry lower spreads.
> Spreads in recessions are higher.
Findings
> Firms pay lower spreads on their bank loans after having undertaken their bond IPO.
> These interest rate savings are more pronounced for firms that have been identified (via rating) to be more creditworthy at the time of the 
bond IPO.
> Everything else equal, firms that enter the public bond market with a bond that is rated investment-grade, benefit from a reduction of 35 to 50 
bp in the credit spreads they pay on their loans, depending on specification and the sample.
> In contrast, firms that enter the bond market with a bond that is rated below investment grade, benefit from a reduction of only 5 to 20 bp on 
their loan spreads.
> Among safe firms, those that get their first rating at the time of the bond IPO, benefit from a larger decline in loan interest rates than those 
that had already been rated when they entered the bond market.
> The decline in loan spreads that we identified after the firms' bond IPO, especially for those firms that enter the public bond market with a 
bond rated investment-grade, provides strong support for our hypothesis that the release of new information about the firm’s creditworthiness 
at the time of its bond IPO reduces the informational rents of incumbent banks.
Hale, G., & Santos, J. A. (2009). Do banks price their informational monopoly? Journal of Financial Economics , 93, 185-206. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
Literature review 100 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
stock-listed firm still enables banks to extract information rents and whether a subsequent 
bond IPO reveals further valuable information to outside lenders. This is especially 
questionable for U.S. clients, where the level of transparency for listed firms is said to be very 
good. It is likely that one IPO event in its own right is already likely to reduce costs of 
information production along with the bargaining power of relationship lenders and their 
ability to extract rents.  
Inter alia the earlier-presented works of Schenone (2010), Hale and Santos (2009) and Santos 
and Winton (2008) set the ground for a later core study conducted by A. Saunders and 
Steffen (2011), who screened UK-based public and private firms with the goal of carving out 
the channels through which public firms might have price advantages in syndicated lending 
vis-à-vis private enterprises.  
The authors found that private firms pay on average 27bp p.a. higher AISD compared to 
public firms. A. Saunders and Steffen stated that public bond market access reduces spreads, 
especially for private firms and therewith extends the works of Santos and Winton and Hale 
and Santos, who only looked at already listed firms in that respect.  
A. Saunders and Steffen interpreted this finding as evidence for the lock-up hypothesis 
regarding information-captured private firms. Here, the bond market access increases the 
bargaining power of the private borrower vis-à-vis its relationship lender, who is congruously 
not enabled to exploit information advantages any longer. In other words, these results 
suggest that relationship lending is costly for private firms without having tapped public 
funding markets yet. Next, the authors extended the work of Schenone by stating that being 
stock-listed only eliminates loan-pricing disadvantages in the case where such a listing is in a 
big major index.  
Further, in line with the monitoring incentive linked to the share held in a syndicated loan,108 
A. Saunders and Steffen found that secondary market traded loans of private firms are 
associated with higher AISD. Table 63 summarises the main elements of Saunders and 
Steffen. 
                                               
 
108 See also section 2.12 for further explanation. Following the argumentation of A. Saunders and Steffen (2011), trading 
increases the scope of risk-shifting and subsequently decreases the monitoring incentive, especially of the lead arranger. 
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Table 63. Summary table for A. Saunders and Steffen (2011). 
The work of A. Saunders and Steffen (2011) again underpins the importance of including 
listed- as well as non-listed firms in an analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region/country Borrower type Time frame
Research 
philosophy
Methods applied
Pricing 
definition
Syndicated loan 
data provider
Sample size
UK 
Non-financial 
firms
1989-2007
Realism, 
Positivism
> Regression 
analyses
AISD
Thomson 
Reuters LPC
15,519 tranches
> There are significantly higher loan spreads for firms with more concentrated ownership. 
> Loan deals with private equity firm participation (public to private transaction, LBO, MBO, acquisitions and recapitalisation) have significantly 
higher spreads. Loan spread differences are reduced and even disappear if deals by public firms involve private equity.
> In terms of future investment opportunities, there are no significant differences in spreads for private vs. public borrowers (Hypothesis was that 
loans to private firms have higher loan spreads, as public firms are less risky than private firms or they differ in terms of their future investment 
opportunities).
> There are 45 bp higher loan spreads for traded private firm loans, in relation to not-traded loans, which is consistent with the monitoring effect. 
However, this effect does not extend to public firms. For such firms there are no statistically significant loan cost differences between traded and 
non-traded loans.
> More profitable firms - i.e. firms with more tangible assets - and investment-grade-rated firms pay lower spreads.
> Unrated firms also pay lower spreads relative to noninvestment grade-rated firms.
> Smaller loans as well as loans with covenants and loans with longer maturities are associated with higher spreads.
> Loans that are originated for acquisition purposes exhibit significantly larger spreads.
Findings
> Private firms pay on average 27 bp. Higher loan spreads as compared with publicly traded firms.
> Access to public bond markets is particularly valuable for private firms because such access shifts bargaining power from the lender to the 
borrower.
> Private firms with public bonds do not pay significantly higher spreads when compared to public firms.
> Public firms that are listed on opaque segments of the stock market do not pay significantly lower spreads compared with private firms.
> IPO's resulting in a relatively small secondary market listing does not reduce a firm's borrowing costs.
Saunders, A., & Steffen, S. (2011). The costs of being private: evidence from the loan market. The Review of Financial Studies , 24, 4091-4122. 
Primary subject findings
Important sub-thematic findings
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 Synthesis: relationship lending, information asymmetry, and pricing 
Table 64 synthesises the findings of the core literature with respect to relationship lending. 
 
Table 64. Core literature synthesis for lender-borrower relationship. 
Synthesising efforts regarding relationship lending reveal that discussions continue to be 
controversial, with studies finding both negative and positive influences of relationship 
lending on syndicated loan pricings. It is thus likely that other forces and underlying 
rationales in this context are at work to influence syndicated loan pricing. Alexandre et al. 
(2014, p. 100) stated, “The role of lending relationships in syndicated loans remains virtually 
unexplored”. Strahan (2008) remarked that the role of relationship lending, especially outside 
the U.S., remains unclear.  
2.12 Secondary market trading as pricing determinant 
Although this thesis focuses on syndicated loan pricings in the primary market, I provide a 
brief introduction to secondary market trading, because some authors assume that anticipated 
ex post trading activity may possibly influence ex ante primary market pricing.  
According to Ivashina (2009) and others, fractions of syndicated loans can be traded in the 
secondary syndicated loan market. This enables lenders to share loan risks with a wide group 
of banks and other investors as well as to rebalance portfolios by transferring risk (Burak 
Determinant
P
ri
ci
n
g
 
d
ir
ec
ti
o
n
Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
Borrower has past relationships with 
participants
↓ AISD Worldwide 1993-2006
Gadanecz, Kara, and Molyneux 
(2012)
56
Borrower has past relationships with entire 
syndicate
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
As lead bank (2008 financial crisis) ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
For bank dependent borrower in recession 
(undercapitalised bank)
↑ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
For bank dependent borrower in recession 
("healthy" bank)
→ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
For bank dependent borrower in recession ↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
For borrower after bond IPO ↓ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
For borrower after equity IPO ↓ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↑ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↓ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
For very large borrowers → AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↓ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↓ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
For borrower near equity or debt underwriting ↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
Lender-borrower relationship
Syndicated loan history
Appearance of relationship lender
For opaque borrowers
In general
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Güner, 2008; Gande & Saunders, 2012; Gupta et al., 2008). From an historical point of view, 
the secondary market for syndicated loans began to evolve in the 1990s (Christodoulakis & 
Olupeka, 2010). Although this market grew immensely and relatively steadily over the last 
two decades, secondary trading volumes are small relative to the overall size of the market 
(Boehmer & Megginson, 1990; Sufi, 2007). Further, this market is much less developed 
compared to the secondary market for bonds and equities as trading activities are solely 
handled on an over-the-counter basis (L. Allen, Gottesmann, & Peng, 2012). Along with L. 
Allen and Gottesmann (2006), Gadanecz (2003), Bushman, Smith, and Wittenberg-Moerman 
(2010), and Sufi, I concur that secondary market activity is dominated by LBO and distressed 
debt trading activity by institutional investors, thus limiting their importance in this study. 
LBOs are not within the scope of this study. Further, especially within corporate investment 
grade lending, syndicated loans tend to be booked and held to maturity (Lee & Mullineaux, 
2004; Thomas & Wang, 2004). This finding is in line with Gupta et al. and Carey and Nini 
(2007), namely, there is a rather low degree of trading activity in loans to high grade 
borrowers. Figure 7 supports these findings. 
 
Source: Based on LPC109 secondary data. 
Figure 7. Western European trading volumes for corporate loans versus LBOs. 
                                               
 
109 Here, I used LPC data as information on secondary trading is not readily available from Dealogic Loanware, which serves 
as the main source of secondary data in this study. 
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A few authors have examined the impact of secondary market liquidity on syndicated loan 
pricings in the primary market. As briefly noted in 2.11.2.4 and consistent with an early 
contribution of Pennacchi (1988), A. Saunders and Steffen (2011) found that secondary 
market tradability of syndicated loans to UK private borrowers leads to higher loan spreads, 
most likely due to the shrinking of monitoring efforts accelerated via anticipated liquidity in 
the secondary market and by subsequent loan sales. Further, a loan sale might be interpreted 
as negative sign about a borrower’s creditworthiness (Dahiya, Puri, & Saunders, 2003). 
However, a counter-argument would be that a liquid secondary market leads to liquidity-
related cost advantages for banks, which could be (partly) passed on to the borrowers in the 
primary market. Thus, Gupta et al. (2008) examined whether expected secondary market 
liquidity affects syndicated loan pricings in the primary market. For the U.S. term loan 
market, the authors indeed found that the degree of expected liquidity has negative effects on 
primary market pricings. According to Gupta et al., this finding is mainly attributable to 
institutional loan tranches in the LBO asset class. Table 65 synthesises the findings of the core 
literature with respect to secondary trading. 
 
Table 65. Core literature synthesis for secondary market trading. 
As discussed, the literature synthesis provides a relatively unclear view on the topic. Further, 
the research are seems not to be studied in depth given the relatively low number of related 
findings.  
 
 
 
 
Determinant
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Pricing 
definition
Borrower region 
under study
Time 
frame
Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
Secondary market trading for private legal 
form borrower
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
Secondary market trading for public legal form 
borrower
→ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
Secondary market trading contractually 
permitted 
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
Trading activity
Secondary market trading
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2.13 Conclusion and derivation of research questions and objectives 
 Overview 
Section 1.4.3 introduced research questions and objectives which have mainly been derived 
whilst critically reviewing related worldwide academic literature as presented throughout this 
chapter. This derivation was supported by my personal experience in syndicated lending as 
well as by taking into consideration the outcomes of some exploratory interviews with loan 
specialists held at the outset of the research project. 
To the best of my knowledge no other study has focused on German corporate syndicated 
loan pricings. This appears surprising, given the important role of the German economy both 
worldwide, as well as within Europe. Furthermore, Germany is a classic example of a bank-
based financial system with even larger companies predominantly relying on banks as 
external financing sources (De Fiore & Uhlig, 2011; Gorton & Schmid, 2000), a fact that 
underpins the significance of this research. Beyond the Germany-specific level, however, a 
large body of research on syndicated lending does exist and this has been carefully screened 
and critically reviewed in preparation for this study. 
With the exception of a small number of studies such as that of Haselmann and Wachtel 
(2011), previous studies tend to lump together various different syndicated loan asset classes 
like corporate loans, LBOs, project financings etc. Hence, the risk of diluted results is a 
significant issue that has led me to focus only on corporate syndicated loans based on the 
respective somewhat tightened definition as presented in 1.1. LBOs, for instance, usually 
carry sponsor-driven high-risk financing structures based on individual market practices and 
different underlying motivations of the parties involved (S&P, 2011). Whereas the German 
corporate syndicated lending market is commonly understood to be a relationship-driven 
bank-only market, opportunistic LBO-investors are diverse, consisting of, besides banks, 
CLOs and other non-bank institutional investors (Pilger, 2012; Voisey, 2016). 
Given these considerations it would appear inappropriate to simply transfer the findings of 
extant worldwide research to the German market. Sensibly, German corporate syndicated 
lending in general and its pricing in particular merit independent study. 
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 Research methodologies and contexts 
Concerning research methodology, the extant literature predominantly uses regression 
analyses grounded on secondary syndicated loan datasets mostly sourced from Dealogic 
Loanware or LPC. In the context of philosophical considerations, these studies are built on 
strong positivist research paradigms110 with the availability of reliable quantitative data being 
the crucial ingredient of a powerful inquiry (Patton, 2002; Remenyi, Williams, Money, & 
Swartz, 1998). Whilst reviewing the literature, I noted a complete absence of studies that 
would possibly exhibit more interpretive stances. A remarkable example underpinning this 
observation is the work of Kim et al. (2014)—presented in 2.6.4—who used a quantitative 
proxy for ethical behaviour of borrowers and lenders.111 
Geographically, most empirical studies have been conducted by using U.S. or worldwide data 
samples, whereas a much lesser number have focused on the European market. Throughout 
the literature review, I especially criticised European samples as disproportionately small in 
comparison to U.S. samples. Also, for Europe, I revealed differences in data availability 
across countries. One example is the work of Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010). For a time 
horizon of 18 years, their sample overall contains 2,102 loans of borrowers located in 23 
different European countries. German borrowers are represented with 237 loans accounting 
for roughly 13 per year. However, with 461 transactions, the share of UK-based borrowers 
finding their way into the sample appeared to be roughly twice as high. The work of 
Godlewski and Weill (2011) is another example. By conducting a study of 31 countries, major 
European nations, such as France, UK, Spain, and Switzerland are represented in the sample, 
whereas Germany not, assumed to be due to pricing-data availability issues. 
Besides rare exceptions, the data quality of syndicated loan secondary data sets is not 
adequately taken into consideration by related authors. A couple of scholars mentioned the 
issue and viewed it as a problem, but, in the end, possibly induced through their research 
philosophical foundation—these authors exclusively relied on the imperfect datasets.  
In a cross-country study, with an overall sample of 19,269 syndicated loan tranches, Houston 
et al. (2017, p. 318) remarked, “Deals to the top 3 European countries, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and France account for just under 6% of deals,” whereas American firms account 
                                               
 
110 See section 3.2.4.1. 
111 Using data gathered from the so-called Sustainalytics Global Platform as proxy for ethical behaviour, Kim et al. (2014) 
established that syndicated loans to borrowers who behave ethically carry lower pricings. 
Literature review 107 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
for 58%. Carey and Nini (2007, p. 2,994) reported, “[Our] ability to test some of the 
explanations is limited by the limitations of available data,” and Godlewski and Weill (2011, 
p. 56) in their analyses pointed out, “[We] do not consider borrower characteristics due to data 
limitations”. However, Carey and Nini (p. 2,971) concluded. “Price differences do not appear 
to be a data problem”.112 Simply put, if there is no quantitative data readily available there is 
no study, and there is a study if at least some data is available.  
 RQ 1: What are the limitations of publicly available information concerning 
German corporate syndicated loan pricing? 
My observations whilst reviewing the literature, in conjunction with several exploratory 
interviews with loan specialists held at the outset of the research project indicated that an 
analysis for the German market based on such publicly available data would present 
challenges. Logically, a first step would be to perform critical analyses as to whether public 
German pricing data would be suitable for an analysis in the manner of recent scholars. This 
consideration led to RQ 1 and its related objective. 
The outcome of this analysis was crucial for the thesis’ remainder. As studying RQ 1 revealed 
the data situation in the German market to be critical and public data was unsuited for 
quantitative analyses, the continuation strategy carried powerful research philosophical as 
well as methodological implications. Proceeding under a strong positivist paradigm, I would 
have needed to stop the inquiry after having concluded that the German corporate syndicated 
loan sample does not represent the population adequately, being affected by bias. A pragmatic 
research philosophical stance113 however allowed access to a broader methodological tool-box 
enabling me to continue the investigation based on an extensive piece of qualitative 
fieldwork. 
 RQ 2: Why are some aspects of corporate syndicated loan pricing for 
German borrowers made public and others not? 
As it is likely that structural underlying forces are at work being responsible for the given data 
gaps especially in Germany vis-à-vis other relevant markets I attempted to shed light on the 
reasons for the reported shortcomings with respect to publicly available data in Germany. 
This attempt is addressed by the second research question and objective. 
                                               
 
112 Looking at Carey and Nini’s (2007) sample as a whole, it contains only 41 German loan tranches in the given 10-year 
analysis horizon. In comparison, 408 tranches are included for UK-based borrowers. 
113 See section 3.2.4.3. 
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 RQ 3: How can the various German corporate syndicated loan pricing 
elements be classified and prioritised from a lending banks’ perspective? 
In 2.5, I presented the syndicated loan pricing measures and definitions that had 
predominantly been applied in existing studies. These happen to be mainly the initial margin 
or the AISD with the latter being subject to mixed interpretations and labelling across data 
providers, a fact that carries the general risk of non-comparability. As noted previously, some 
scholars advocated the use of AISD, which, besides per annum elements, should also 
incorporate upfront fees, whereas others opined that AISD should not to cover upfront 
elements. Even if Bharath et al. (2011, p. 1,158) stating that AISD is “the most 
comprehensive measure of the borrowing cost” was correct, an in-depth knowledge and 
prioritisation of the various pricing elements that feed the AISD equation remains an 
empirical goal. In other words, the raison d'être and the relative importance of the various 
pricing elements remain relatively unclear, a drawback I attempt to address via RQ 3 and its 
interrelated objective. 
 RQ 4: How can the complexity and multidimensionality of German corporate 
syndicated loan pricings be summarised and explained? 
The investigations in relation to RQ 3 revealed that existing measures’ equations are based on 
incomplete sets of pricing elements and largely neglect the question of why pricing structures 
are sometimes complex and multifaceted given different loan types. Extant pricing literature 
in general tends to distinguish between revolving credit facilities and term loans or simply 
lumps both types together, thereby failing to consider their pricing structural differences 
appropriately. 
Berg et al. (2016) argued that pricing structures of term loans are hardly comparable to those 
of revolving credits. Hence, the authors presented the new pricing proxy “TCB”, striving to 
cope with structural differences of revolving and term loans. Primarily, the discussion in 
relation to research RQ 3 reveals that the distinction between revolving and term loans needs 
to be even more granular. I advocate to distinguish between common (e.g., working capital) 
revolving loans, established with a clear ex ante motivation of being frequently drawn, repaid 
as well as redrawn, for example, to finance certain business activities operationally on the one 
hand, and pure back-up loans, on the other hand. Regarding term loans, a distinction between 
common term and acquisition term loans is needed because the latter reveals highly complex 
pricing structures that cannot adequately be addressed by existing definitions. Further, all 
pricing designations used within extant literature are based on information available at signing 
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or, in other words, ex ante. However, pricings of syndicated loans are subject to ongoing 
change throughout the lifetime114 of a loan, making it impossible to predict accurately the pay-
off structures ex ante. 
In other words, the established pricing definitions used within extant literature do not cover 
the various elements of syndicated loan pricing comprehensively and they as well neglect 
complex price-mechanisms that happen to vary extensively between the four common loan 
types RCF, back-up RCF, TL and acquisition TL. 
It is hence reasonable to conclude that the existing pricing measures need to be revised and 
expanded to provide appropriate pricing profiles for different corporate syndicated loan 
structures for each of which different underlying rationales and forces are at work. Given the 
predominantly qualitative nature of the thesis, these novel definitions attempt to explain and 
enhance the understanding of those different pricing mechanisms. Nonetheless, I also present 
a quantitative alternative for flexible use by academics or bank practitioners based on the 
idiosyncratic sets of information that may be available.  
 RQ 5: What are the pricing determinants in the German market for 
corporate syndicated loans and how do they interact with each other? 
Answering research questions one through four and meeting the interrelated objectives finally 
set the intellectual foundation for the exploration of German corporate syndicated loan pricing 
determinants from a banks’ perspective.  
Sections 2.6 to 2.12 presented seven determinant groups upon which extant worldwide 
literature placed emphasis. These seven determinant groups are “borrower-related specifics”, 
“lender-related specifics”, “syndicated loan contractual features”, “macroeconomic 
environment”, “syndicate structure”, “lender-borrower relationship”, and “secondary market 
trading”. 
Comprehensive listings of the core literature’s findings from 30 selected scientific journal 
articles can be found in the tables throughout this chapter that either explicate the elements of 
these findings for each core paper individually or that synthesise these findings across the 
                                               
 
114 Also the lifetime of a syndicated loan is relatively unpredictable, as refinancing or repayments commonly occur long 
before the final maturity date. 
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core papers.115 In conclusion of this critical review, I briefly summarise the most important 
discoveries. 
A relatively broad consensus and largely saturated view within the worldwide literature has 
been detected with regards to general borrower characteristics such as the appearance of 
external ratings that drive pricing downwards (e.g., Anagnostopoulou & Drakos, 2016; Kim et 
al., 2014) as does a public legal form (e.g., Schenone, 2010; Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011) 
and with numerous sets of financial information that determine pricing in manner that 
intuition would suggest. For instance, large borrowers were commonly found to be able to 
obtain lower pricings (e.g., Mattes et al., 2013; Gottesmann & Roberts, 2004; Wu et al.. 2013) 
whereas borrowers with a high leverage obtain higher pricings (e.g., Gaul & Uysal, 2013; 
Fang et al., 2016; Bharath et al., 2011). 
With view to differences in loan pricings across markets, especially between Europe and the 
U.S., which are commonly labelled “the pricing puzzle" in the scientific community, extant 
research (e.g., Carey & Nini, 2007; Gaul & Uysal; Berg et al., 2017) does not fully reveal 
respective reasoning. I have therefore added commentaries throughout the discussion to shed 
light onto the issue. 
With regards to lender-related specifics the literature does not demonstrate a clear influence of 
lender nationality on pricing. Inter alia, Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) found a positive influence 
of foreign banks on syndicated loan pricing, whereas Houston et al. (2017) found a negative 
relationship if the respective borrower has assets in the foreign home country of the lender. A 
relative consensus was detected with respect to bank type discussions. Investment banks were 
found to charge higher pricings than do commercial banks (Calomiris & Pornrojnangkool, 
2009). Harjoto et al. (2006) related this finding to better funding conditions of commercial- 
vis-à-vis investment banks as well as the former’s superior ability to exploit relationships in 
debt contracting.  
Debate on funding conditions, arguably a major lender characteristic in extant syndicated 
lending literature, appears scarce, likely induced by authors’ underlying assumption of a 
frictionless interbank market with funding costs equalling the respective reference rate values 
such as EURIBOR. Next, the role of reputation and its influence on pricing remains 
ambiguous with no clear directional influences being reported. By investigating the French 
                                               
 
115 Further, a full list of the core literature synthesis is displayed in Appendix A. 
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syndicated loan market, Godlewski et al. (2012) found a general negative price influence of 
high reputation by both lead and participant lenders. Ivashina (2009) confirmed this view for 
U.S.-based borrowers but only for lead banks, whereas Alexandre et al. (2014) found a 
respective positive relationship in a cross-country study that covers North America and 
Europe. 
With respect to non-price related contractual features, a broad consensus postulating negative 
relationships between pricing and loan size was found with loan sizes being said to carry high 
correlation with both borrower size and creditworthiness (e.g., Carey & Nini, 2007; Barbosa 
& Ribeiro, 2007; Santos & Winton, 2008). Loan maturity and its influence on pricing was 
found to be relatively unclear with one strand reporting a positive influence (e.g., Focarelli et 
al. (2008); A. Saunders and Steffen (2011) and another, slightly smaller, strand a negative one 
(e.g., Wu et al., 2013; Santos & Winton, 2008) or a non-influential relationship (e.g., 
Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011; Godlewski & Weill, 2011).  
Certain protection mechanisms like covenants and security were broadly found to be 
associated with higher pricing, a finding being mostly related to the widely accepted observed 
risk hypothesis (e.g., Hale & Santos, 2009; Ivashina). In terms of loan types, RCFs are 
commonly found to be the cheaper compared to term loans in general and bridge term loans in 
special which appear to be most expensive (e.g., Barbosa & Ribeiro; Mattes et al., 2013). 
The macroeconomic environment of the borrowers’ home country was found to influence 
pricing in an expected manner. According to Hale and Santos (2009) and other authors, 
recessions lead to higher pricing whereas solid solvency and high degrees of GDP growth are 
associated with lower pricing (e.g., Anagnostopoulou & Drakos, 2016; Christodoulakis & 
Olupeka, 2010).  
Syndicate structural issues have predominantly been investigated based on the assumption 
that the syndicates represent constructs aiming at mitigating asymmetric information 
problems between lead and participant lenders (Sufi, 2007). The syndicate structure has 
mostly been measured by its concentration, the number of lenders and the retained lead bank 
share. A broad consensus has been detected in the sense that high degrees of information 
asymmetries within syndicates lead to higher pricing (e.g., Ivashina; Gadanecz et al., 2012), 
whereas the general influence of the number of lenders remains relatively unclear. 
Interestingly the influence of syndication mode on pricing, being either a best efforts, an 
underwritten or a club deal process, has largely been neglected, with the exception of 
Focarelli et al. (2008) reporting club deal loans to carry lower pricing.  
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Interestingly, Champagne and Coggins (2012) found a lesser sensitivity of pricing and 
syndicate structure for the European market in comparison to others such as the U.S. In 
summary, discussions on syndicate structure and its directional influence on pricing appear to 
remain relatively incomplete thus far, with the topic seeming to merit an enhanced in-depth 
understanding. 
A similar picture emerged for the determinant theme of lender-borrower relationship, which 
has also been studied widely based on underlying assumptions grounded in information 
asymmetry theory. A large body of literature investigates whether cost savings regarding 
creditworthiness evaluations induced by repeated interactions and long-lasting relationships 
are (partly) shared with borrowers, resulting in lower pricings, or whether relationship lenders 
rather happen to exploit these information advantages by charging higher pricings. With a 
view to the core literature, the findings in relation to the influence of relationship lending on 
pricing are controversial, with some studies reporting negative influences (e.g., Hale & 
Santos, 2009; Bharath et al., 2011) and others positive influences of relationship on 
syndicated loan pricings (e.g., Schenone, 2010; A. Saunders & Steffen, 2011). Given the 
diverse findings and different intellectual approaches of extant scholarly attempts to study 
relationship lending related phenomena, it appears sensible to assume that much is not yet 
fully understood and that additional forces and underlying phenomena in this context might 
well be at work in influencing syndicated loan pricing. Sensibly, Alexandre et al. (2014, p. 
100) stated that “the role of lending relationships in syndicated loans remains virtually 
unexplored”. In a similar vein, Strahan (2008) remarked that the role of relationship lending 
remains unclear, especially outside the U.S. 
Lastly, the influence of secondary market activity on pricing has been addressed by two core 
papers, reporting diverse findings. A. Saunders and Steffen found secondary market trading 
activity of loans for borrowers with a private legal form to carry higher pricing whereas 
Focarelli et al. found a generally opposite directional influence. 
Besides numerous unanswered questions and unsaturated knowledge bases on a worldwide 
level with respect to single determinant groups, especially with regards to syndicate structure 
and lender-borrower relationship, studies providing a holistic and integrated overview of the 
various syndicated loan pricing determinants and their interaction do not exist.  
Further, the extant literature draws predominantly on anecdotal banking theoretical 
assumptions whilst studying pricing determinants. It is reasonable to assume that over time 
other thus far undiscovered forces emerged, that play a role in determining pricing in one 
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direction or the other. In other words, a holistic, multi-factor picture addressing the German 
market and its idiosyncrasies with a view toward pricing determinants has not yet been 
developed, which led to RQ 5. 
 Summary 
To summarise, the overall aim of the research is to explore and analyse the “hidden drivers” 
of banks’ pricing of syndicated loans to German corporate borrowers, thereby developing an 
enriched understanding of the elements and determinants of pricing and its underlying 
processes and decisions. 
In broad terms, there has been surprisingly little research into syndicated lending to German 
corporate borrowers, particularly given its important role in one of the world’s largest 
economies. While there is a substantial body of research into syndicated lending to borrowers 
being located in other countries, it presents an incomplete picture, with much contrary 
evidence. This is even more true of the treatment of pricing and its determinants. Moreover, 
the vast majority of research has been based on the analysis of secondary data, which is at 
best incomplete and at worst may include bias. 
There is clearly a strong case for more research into syndicated loan pricing, particularly 
within the German market. One reason for this is the important role of relationship lending, of 
which the influence on pricing is both complex and poorly understood in the literature. 
Another is the very limited availability of pricing data in the public domain.  
These substantial gaps in knowledge will be addressed by the research questions and 
objectives with the related outcomes to be presented within this thesis. 
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3 Research philosophy and methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 locates the research project and its phenomena under study into a wider research 
philosophical perspective (3.2) followed by extensive discussions on research methodology 
(3.3) and the related methods applied (3.4 and 3.5).  
3.2 Research philosophy 
Research is always driven by philosophical assumptions. Hence, the choice of adopting a 
certain research philosophical position significantly affects research strategy and the nature of 
respective findings and outcomes and must therefore be carefully thought through and 
reflected upon (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). According to Scotland (2012), any researcher 
should be able to know how research philosophical conventions transmit into the scholar’s 
chosen methodology and methods as well as how these assumptions connect to his or her 
findings. 
However, discussing different research philosophical positions comes with challenges, as the 
literature does not provide clear and unequivocal definitions of pivotal terms and their 
interrelationships (Grix, 2002; Killam, 2013). This is not surprising as the “birth” of the 
philosophy of science dates at least back to the early 1600s and has steadily developed since 
then (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). Debates about the nature of reality and knowledge have 
constantly changed and still are ongoing subjects of controversial discussions (Patton, 2002; 
Scotland). According to Killam, this has led to different interpretations, meanings, and 
numerous philosophical subfields. It has also led to at times contradictory use of respective 
terms by different academics in different disciplines of science. 
However, for this work, it is important to provide a kind of “working definition” and basic 
understanding regarding the interrelationship of the basic terms of research philosophy with 
research philosophy constituting the term embracing all related sub-themes. According to 
among others Miles and Huberman (1994) the key elements of research philosophy are the 
researchers’ ontological and epistemological assumptions and methodology. In other words, 
researchers have personal beliefs about the nature of knowledge and ways of building it, 
which influence their views about how to conduct research. Easterby-Smith et al. (p. 18) 
provide the definitions as displayed in Table 66. 
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Source: Adapted from Easterby-Smith et al. (2012, p. 18). 
Table 66. Key elements of research philosophy. 
Ontology can be defined as the starting point of all research, logically followed by 
epistemology and methodology. The reason for this is that researchers must first be clear 
about the nature of the phenomena that are the focus of his or her research and what 
constitutes reality (Crotty, 1998). Then, it is to be considered how knowledge can be created, 
acquired, and communicated (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Different forms and the nature of 
knowledge are addressed by a researchers’ epistemological assumptions (Cohen, Manion, & 
Morrison, 2007).  
These issues must, therefore, be clarified before one can confidently proceed with formulating 
an appropriate research methodology which Crotty (p. 3) defines as “the strategy or plan of 
action which lies behind the choice of particular methods”. In other words, methodology deals 
with the question “how can the inquirer go about finding out whatever they believe can be 
known” (Guba & Lincoln, p. 108).  
As Figure 8 displays, research paradigms conjoin ontology, epistemology, and methodology 
by constituting the foundation of what researchers do or, in other words, a basic set of 
scholarly assumptions and beliefs that scientists share (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Kuhn, 1962). 
 
Source: Based on Grix (2002) and Guba and Lincoln (1994). 
Figure 8. Core research philosophical terms. 
Methods are the specific tools, techniques, and procedures used to source and analyse data, 
with the latter being either quantitative or qualitative (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010).  
1 Ontology "Philosophical assumptions about the nature of reality."
2 Epistemology “A general set of assumptions about ways of inquiring into the nature of the world.”
3 Methodology “A combination of techniques used to inquire into a specific situation.”
4 Methods and techniques “Individual techniques for data collection, analysis, etc.“
Key elements of research philosophy
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Although chosen methods and sources are generally said to be independent of a specific 
paradigm (Grix, 2002; Howell, 2013), researchers commonly use them to justify the way they 
conduct research in general and how methods and sources are selected and applied in 
particular (Corbin & Strauss, 1996). Hence, different ontological as well as epistemological 
standpoints commonly lead to different approaches towards the same phenomena (Grix, 
2004).  
One further element that is schematised in 3.5.7 is axiology, meaning the influence of values 
and ethical issues on the research project. The need for properly addressing these issues is 
especially pronounced in qualitative studies, where interactions of the researcher with other 
human beings are a key ingredient (M. Saunders et al., 2012).  
The flow of the following sections will mirror these hierarchical elements of research 
philosophy. Before proceeding to this discussion, it is important to clarify the phenomena that 
are the focus of this research. 
 The phenomena under study 
The phenomena under study are defined by the research questions (Patton, 2002). The first 
research question has a different focus from the others, in that it is a “what” question that 
focuses on published data that exist in the public domain, mostly in numeric form. As such, 
these data may be readily accessed as secondary data. Research questions two to four are 
inherently different, being “how” and “why” questions, which are not satisfactorily 
answerable by the literature review and, thus, would seem to require primary research to find 
answers. RQ 5 requires answers to these questions before an answer can be formulated.  
These differences must be recognised in the following discussion of philosophical issues. The 
published numerical data that must be accessed to answer RQ 1 raise different philosophical 
issues and research challenges from those of RQ 2, RQ 3, RQ 4, and RQ 5, which address 
policy and behavioural issues within the banks that participate in German corporate 
syndicated lending. 
 Ontological perspectives 
Ontology deals with the question of how reality can be defined or, in other words, what 
people think constitutes reality (Blaikie, 2000). The researchers’ personal beliefs about reality 
are key determinants of what can be known at all (Scotland, 2012). 
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3.2.2.1 Realism 
According to Phillips (1987, p. 205), realism is “the view that entities exist independently of 
being perceived, or independently of our theories about them”. Realism is often referred to as 
the traditional ontological position of natural scientists, assuming the world to be concrete and 
external. Here, objects have an existence independent from the human mind and its 
interrogation (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). The reality or the static truth is separate from the 
behaviour of human beings and can be analysed by means of experimental methods primarily 
through the collection and understanding of objective, quantitative data (A. M. Clark, 1998; 
Killam, 2013). The static truth can be measured and generalised objectively. In relation to 
extant scholarly syndicated lending literature, the research has overwhelmingly been 
conducted based on realist ontology. 
Besides the archetypal form of realism presented earlier, which is also often referred to as 
direct realism, a prominent sub-form is critical realism (Bhaskar, 1989). Critical realists agree 
with direct realists that reality exists independently of humanity. The difference is that critical 
realists state this independent reality not to be perfectly apprehended by people (Howell, 
2013). In the light of these philosophical enhancements, direct realism is also often referred to 
as naïve realism. 
3.2.2.2 Relativism 
The extreme underlying ontological position that opposes realism is relativism. According to 
Guba and Lincoln (1994, p. 110), “Relativism is the view that reality is subjective and differs 
from person to person”. In other words, objective and universal truths do not exist. Hence, in 
contrast to realists, relativists do not believe knowledge to be fully external, objective, and 
observable in a value-free manner. Reality or truth is always contextual, meaning that 
multiple truths and realities exist that depend on individual viewpoints. All processes are not 
only driven by complexity, but are also seen as unique (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Thus, 
realities are not objective, static, and measurable, as stated by the realist, but are instead 
subjective, dynamic, as well as context-driven (Bilgrami, 2002). Logically, under relativist 
ontological perspectives, research would be of a different nature and likely to rely on 
qualitative rather than quantitative data. 
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3.2.2.3 Social Constructionism  
Social constructionism is strongly related to the ideas of relativism and, hence, often 
discussed as a relativist epistemology (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). However, I place it under 
the ontology heading, because I interpret it as high-level theoretical perspective on the nature 
of reality.  
Social constructionism holds that meaning is dependent on human cognition, which is 
individuals’ interpretation of happenings that surround them. It emphasises the idea that 
society is actively and creatively produced by human beings. The world is made or invented, 
rather than merely given or taken for granted. Social worlds are interpretive nets woven by 
individuals and groups. The key question social constructionists ask is how the world is 
accomplished and, per Charmaz (2006, p. 189), “[They] study what people at a particular time 
and place take as real, how they construct their views and actions, when different 
constructions arise, whose constructions become taken as definite, and how that process 
ensues”.  
Practically, people construct reality by discussions, collaboration, or other forms of social 
interaction within a specific environment such as a company or some other form of 
community. Hence, the research is on how people interact. According to Haug (2004), the 
entire knowledge of reality is constructed. According to Pouliot (2007, p. 361), these core 
elements make constructionism “conceived as a metatheoretical commitment”. 
3.2.2.4 Towards an ontological perspective  
There are several ontological implications to my research field that need to be addressed 
carefully with reference to the grounds and the nature of knowledge as well as to its 
limitations and its validity. 
With view to the phenomena that are the focus of this work, a twofold picture can be painted. 
On the one hand, publicly available data appear to be real in the sense that it is made available 
in numerical- and by as correct expected means. This information is hard, quantifiable, and 
can be taken forward for quantitative research. However, the pool of data appears to be 
incomplete as it insufficiently reflects real pricings. In other words, based on published data, it 
is likely to be impossible to conclude what the real pricing of a German corporate syndicated 
loan was. Hence, even a direct realist could not process these data with a clear conscience.    
Besides, the data of the studied phenomena are more complex than what even complete data 
would potentially reveal. By talking to key actors involved in the market, I recognised the 
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importance of interaction between lenders and borrowers in addition to complex bank-internal 
sometimes countervailing forces being at work. More theoretically, the German syndicated 
lending market for corporates and its pricing is based on complex social interactions or 
collective processes that constitute market practice and standards that are subject to ongoing 
development and change.  
The subject of my study can hence be said to be complex with an enhanced understanding of 
the phenomena being necessary. This is true for both existing knowledge as well as the 
intended contributions of this study. I am not striving to generate absolute or general physical 
judgements but am rather striving to enhance the understanding of these complex phenomena. 
It is reasonable to state that large parts of the phenomena under study are socially constructed. 
There is no such thing as an absolute component. Hence, I have applied a social 
constructionist ontological perspective. 
 Epistemological perspectives 
As discussed above, epistemological considerations are related to the discussion of how we 
gain knowledge about the world (Patton, 2002). 
3.2.3.1 Positivist epistemology 
A positivist epistemology is linked to natural scientific approaches regarding the development 
of knowledge and, hence, is closely linked to the ontological position of realism. According to 
A. M. Clark (1998), phenomena are real, certain, and precise. According to Guba and Lincoln 
(1994), an ascertainable objective reality is assumed. 
Positivists strive to discover absolute knowledge about an objective reality with researchers 
and the subjects of research being independent (Scotland, 2012). Knowledge is said to be free 
of values as well as absolute in nature. Thus, House (1991) pointed out that under positivist 
epistemological assumptions scientific propositions are to be built on quantitative data and 
facts.  
3.2.3.2 Interpretivism 
Interpretivist epistemology is linked to social scientific approaches regarding the development 
of knowledge being closely linked to the ontological position of relativism. Whilst positivism 
focuses on measuring certain phenomena, interpretivism intends to understand human 
behaviour grounded in individual perspectives (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Grix, 2004).  
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Interpretivism seeks to explore social phenomena to gain interpretative understandings 
(Crotty, 1998). Hence, interpretivists argue that the world is complex and research involving 
people is needed to make sense of that complexity. Reducing the world entirely to law-like 
generalisations—as positivist epistemology tends to proclaim—neglects the importance of 
understanding differences between individuals (M. Saunders et al., 2012). Cohen et al. (2007, 
p. 19) remarked, “The social world can only be understood from the standpoint of individuals 
who are participating in it”.  
3.2.3.3 Phenomenological enquiry 
Phenomenological enquiry is a body of thought closely associated with social constructionism 
as well as interpretivism. According to Cohen and Manion (1987), it advocates the study of 
experience with human behaviour being determined by experienced phenomena rather than by 
external and objective reality as the positivist might argue.  
Phenomenology concerns peoples’ personal thoughts, feelings, and how they make sense of a 
world that they cannot directly access. The inner world of people is complex. There are many 
subsurface things going on that we can only access by means of in-depth discussions 
(Charmaz, 2006; Howell, 2013).  
It is thus crucial to develop relationships with research participants such as interviewees as 
there is a lot to be discovered within their minds. In other words, researchers explore and try 
to understand their meanings, attitudes, and feelings. Phenomenology is often associated with 
relatively loosely structured interviews as one cannot simply ask someone, “What is in your 
mind?” Much interpretation is needed to be able to shed light on complex phenomena. 
Researchers have to conduct lengthy processes of interpretation and reflection to reveal what 
research participants have actually said and meant (Howell). A complex and typically 
inductive process of interpretation in developing findings is necessary.  
3.2.3.4 Grounded theory 
Grounded theory can be interpreted as a specific method or an entire epistemological 
perspective that constitutes a widely accepted means of conducting phenomenological 
enquiry. It was initially developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). There are numerous different 
streams and developments of grounded theory (Charmaz; Corbin & Strauss, 1996; Glaser & 
Strauss), a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this thesis. According to M. 
Saunders et al. (p. 185), “[Grounded theory] is used to develop theoretical explanations of 
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social interactions and processes in a wide range of contexts including business and 
management”. 
Grounded theory research is designed to explore fields of knowledge where there is only 
scarce prior research or none at all, with the aim of establishing a new body of theory solely 
grounded in and inductively developed from qualitative data (Goulding, 2002). With the 
research topic at hand, I am not attempting to build theory from “nothing”, as large bodies of 
knowledge and established theoretical frameworks already exist. Further, to ensure complete 
impartiality, grounded theory commonly requires that no literature review should be 
conducted before the fieldwork (Cutcliffe, 2000). 
My core aim is not to necessarily produce a new theory, but generally to enhance the 
understanding in my chosen research field. In this work, I therefore take a neutral stance 
towards existing and emerging theories in my topic field. However, certain carefully selected 
elements of grounded theory methods such as constant comparison or theoretical saturation 
have been applied in the research reported here. 
3.2.3.5 Epistemological issues surrounding this research 
Similar to the ontological issues as discussed in 3.2.2.4, there are many powerful 
epistemological implications in my research field that need to be addressed carefully and 
thoroughly. In the light of discussed considerations, I adopt a phenomenological perspective. 
This is because the phenomena that I want to research in the world of German corporate 
syndicated lending are essentially socially constructed, being the outcomes of social 
interactions between professionals within specific banks, between banks within syndicates, 
and between lenders and borrowers. Moreover, the lending policies and practices are 
reflections of corporate cultures and professional norms. As discussed above, the phenomena 
are rooted in the experiences, beliefs, values, and attitudes of individual lenders, which may 
only be accessed indirectly. As suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), I adopt a form of 
phenomenological enquiry to access these phenomena and comprehend meaning based on the 
statements made by individual actors. 
 Paradigms 
Paradigms constitute the integration of ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
perspectives. Paradigms are consensual patterns being derived from specific worldviews or 
belief systems regarding the nature of existence as well as knowledge (Crotty, 1998; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Paradigms are commonly shared by scientific communities by 
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guiding how inquiry is approached (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Before presenting pragmatism as 
the underlying paradigm for this work, I proceed with a discussion of two common and 
classically opposing paradigms and my reasons for refraining from using them. 
3.2.4.1 Positivist paradigm 
The positivist paradigm is commonly associated with realist ontological and positivist 
epistemological perspectives that conducts quantitative research. Regarding the analysis of 
pricing of syndicated loans, researchers acting in a positivist manner would argue that the 
market for syndicated loans exists independently from social interactions. This view 
accentuates that the structural aspects of syndicated loan pricings are similar and measurable 
from the different perspectives of all involved parties. 
As discussed whilst reviewing the literature—in such a positivist manner—recent studies 
were conducted by using “objective”, quantitative data about the “observable” syndicated 
loan market, by searching for regularities and causal relationships in their secondary data sets. 
In other words, extant literature on syndicated lending draws from that positivist paradigm. As 
the data sources are secondary providers and not elated by the researchers themselves, the 
methodology can be said to be quasi-experimental, relying on certain statistical methods 
(Moses & Knutsen, 2012). Consequently, the researchers have to trust the secondary data set 
to be objective and “hard-fact”.  
A positivist scholar would state that only hard-fact data that can be analysed in a value- and 
context-free way is acceptable—from the outside—without the risk of a high degree of bias 
(Bilgrami, 2002). In other words, the “only” truth that can be analysed is independent from 
the respective research process and is not influenced through beliefs and interests of the 
scholar. The testing of certain hypotheses at the end will at best lead to law-like 
generalisations helping to develop theory further and to create new theoretical knowledge (M. 
Saunders et al., 2012). As Kornmeier (2007) reminds, this means of conducting research is 
called deduction.  
I argue, however, that the positivist paradigm is at least partly inappropriate to cover the 
complex and multi-layered research topic in depth. It restricts the choice of methods in a way 
that makes it impossible to uncover various elements of hidden structures in syndicated 
lending, for example, because published pricing data of German corporate syndicated loans is 
likely to be not comprehensive and, thus, not represent the population appropriately, and 
because positivist approaches tend to reject studies of human behaviour in depth. In my view, 
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however, human behaviour affects reality or even multiple realities of syndicated lending 
(Scotland, 2012).  
3.2.4.2 Interpretivist paradigm 
The interpretivist paradigm in general is commonly understood as the foundation of 
qualitative research. This paradigm is based on an ontology of relativism or social 
constructionism and on an interpretive epistemology. Interpretivists strive at revealing hidden 
social structures and powers (Scotland). 
Here, one usually starts with an appropriate means of observation in which the researcher is 
actively involved. Subsequently, the researcher tries to move forward to more generalised 
theories116 (Pouliot, 2007; M. Saunders et al., 2012). Other than the realist choosing deductive 
ways of understanding certain phenomena, the interpretivist usually goes the other way 
around, by inductively addressing certain phenomena. The researcher would state that starting 
with theorisation could destroy meaning from the beginning (Pouliot).  
Hence, in view of the research topic—the analysis of syndicated loan pricing—an 
interpretivist would emphasise qualitative data (Scotland). For instance, by talking to a small 
number of consciously chosen individuals, a scholar acting under this paradigm would try to 
find meaning in their behaviour (Killam, 2013). According to Pouliot, interpretation and the 
search for meaning are the main methodological tasks with which an interpretivist must cope. 
With regard to methodological questions, the interaction between and among the researcher 
and the participants is central (Kornmeier, 2007). The researcher aims to collect a deep and 
rich set of qualitative data that can be interpreted subsequently (Scotland). This set of 
subjective data can be interpreted to discover meaning in experiences, to build theory, and to 
describe phenomena (Killam; Pouliot). The previously articulated philosophical position and 
the research designs that follow from it are widely accepted as highly effective for the 
understanding of individual processes. 
Generally, the interpretivist paradigm has increasingly been adopted by scholars of various 
disciplines to overcome certain shortcomings of positivism. However, in the field of banking 
and financial intermediation literature in general regarding syndicated loan-related research in 
special non-positivistic research is scarce. In a broader sense, accounting research can be 
                                               
 
116 Induction: from the local to the general. 
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noted as an exception, where both positivist and interpretive approaches have more and more 
been adapted, most typically in the field of interpretive accounting research (Ahrens, 2008).   
To be discussed in the methodology section as well as in my presentation of the findings of 
my qualitative fieldwork, major parts of my thesis might well adhere to the interpretivist 
paradigm. From my standpoint, however, this would be too narrowly defined as also would 
the pure positivist way of conducting research. 
For instance, the clear detection of the unreliability of public data at all is only possible whilst 
testing a respective dataset in that vein. Further, quantitative data—even if unsuited for 
revealing certain real-world phenomena of German corporate syndicated loan pricings— 
might be important pieces of the puzzle that complement qualitative data and contribute to 
higher overall quality of the study. In other words, the data is available, it is of value, and it 
should, therefore, be used in some way to the applicable extent. 
3.2.4.3 Pragmatist paradigm 
The pragmatist research paradigm is commonly associated with mixed-methods research 
approaches that do not request a researcher to waive certain strengths of one vis-a-vis another 
approach based only on fundamental philosophical assumptions. According to Peirce (1975), 
pragmatism clears away the difficulties with which philosophers have extensively concerned 
themselves that happened to hinder inquiry to a certain extent. Based on this foundation, this 
research project was conducted within the pragmatist paradigm. Thus, I agree with Denzin 
(1978, p. 28), who pointed out, “No single method ever adequately solves the problem of rival 
causal factors”.  
A strong positivist research paradigm upon which extant literature is predominantly grounded 
hinders the consideration of qualitative analyses. In other words, if no quantitative data is 
available, there is basically no study, as is the case for pricing in the German corporate 
syndicated loan market.  
The application of the pragmatist research philosophy, however, allows for flexible 
application methods driven in combination by data availability and suitability to gain insights 
into the phenomena under study. According to Bacon (2012, p. 1), pragmatists address 
philosophical questions “by drawing upon the resources offered by our practices”. 
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Having discussed the direct realist as well as strong relativist positions, showing that they are 
not fully suitable for analysing the research topic with the best possible results, I situate my 
research paradigm within the domain of pragmatism. 
Generally, there are many controversial discussions between followers of the pure/theoretical 
and applied science regarding the creation of knowledge. The two main general perceptions in 
this respect are (Kornmeier, 2007, p. 22): 
1. “Science as an end itself”  
2. “Science as means to an end” 
As a follower of the second perception, the applied science, I see myself as a kind of an 
unprejudiced “outsider” who chooses the best suitable methodological approaches and 
methods to answer a research question (Patton, 2002; Schubert, 2010). For me it is of minor 
importance whether a certain approach has its roots either in “extreme” realism, “extreme” 
relativism, or in some approach that falls somewhere in between (D. L. Morgan, 2007; M. 
Saunders et al., 2012). In this vein, Patton (p. 71) pointed out, “Adherence to a 
methodological paradigm can lock researchers into unconscious patterns of perception and 
behaviour that disguise the biased, predetermined nature of their methods decisions”.  
According to D. L. Morgan, pragmatism can be defined as:  
1. A general belief system with the view that a real world exists to a certain extent as 
well as reality being partially constructed 
2. A specific justification for the combination of different methods 
As reality seldom resembles theoretical ideals, pragmatists choose qualitative and/or 
quantitative methods and procedures as being likely to advance research independent of single 
philosophical stances (Kelemen & Rumens, 2008; Patton). My applied research design, 
discussed in the upcoming sections, is grounded in the pragmatic paradigm—interpreting 
inquiry as semi-open-ended—and enabled me to choose and combine methods freely that 
address the complex and multi-faceted sets of research problems that are reflected in the 
research questions and objectives. 
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3.3 Overall research design 
Research designs constitute general plans on how to answer research questions and meet 
research objectives. Bryman and Bell (2015) observed that research designs are frameworks 
on the basis of which data collection methods and related analyses are applied. 
Methodologically, research might be structured as mono- or mixed-methods designs. The 
nature of those designs is either exploratory, descriptive, explanatory, or some mixture of 
these (Yin, 2014). Further, inductive, deductive or triangulated reasoning might be applied.  
In the following sections, I consider alternative research designs in terms of their 
appropriateness for answering the research questions. Further, I discuss my chosen research 
design and the rationale for choosing it.  
 Quantitative design 
Quantitative research designs are commonly associated with a positivist research paradigm, 
where, by means of structured data collection and analysis techniques, numerical data is 
deductively approached to test theory (Patton, 2002). Deductive reasoning starts with a 
general understanding about certain phenomena and subsequently transits to increasingly 
specific data. Hence, quantitative research rather tests certain hypotheses compared to 
exploring research questions. Experimental statistical methods are likely to serve as tools that 
facilitate certain measuring, probability sampling, and validation techniques to produce 
evidence that can be generalised (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). In other words, from a 
methodological point of view, quantitative research happens to be predominantly of an 
experimental nature and involve questionnaires or other measurable testing. Quantitative 
designs are commonly located in the explanatory area and use numbers usually in the form of 
counts or measurements by striving to provide exactness to sets of observations (Remenyi et 
al., 1998).   
In this context, researchers take an outside, distanced, and objective perspective. To avoid 
bias, samples need to be large as well as randomly selected (A. M. Clark, 1998). In that vein, 
Killam (2013, p. 27) remarked, “A randomized control trial is the “gold standard” within 
quantitative research. It is used for proving cause and effect relationships among variables 
under study”. One possible way of approaching the research aim for this study would be via a 
quantitative research design that adopted the approach of extant literature by solely relying on 
secondary syndicated loan data provided by respective providers such as Dealogic Loanware. 
Another possible route would be to gather primary data by means of a questionnaire. From 
this discussion, it is reasonable to state that quantitative studies are more valuable than 
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qualitative studies in verifying existing theories. The research aim at hand, however, is to 
provide richer understandings of complex and multidimensional phenomena that might lead to 
new theory that can subsequently be tested if suitable data were found to be available.  
 Qualitative design 
Qualitative research designs are commonly grounded in interpretivist research paradigms. 
Here, scholars strive to make sense of subjective as well as socially constructed meanings 
regarding the phenomena under study. As opposed to attempting to produce objective, static, 
and general evidence, qualitative inquiry aims at accessing meaning and in-depth 
understanding. The researcher in that context interacts with the research participants by taking 
an emic or insider’s perspective of the insider’s experience.   
Qualitative designs are commonly grounded in non-numerical data gathered from 
purposefully selected, small samples. Data is inductively analysed to enhance existing bodies 
of knowledge by providing richer theoretical perspectives. Inductive reasoning starts with in-
depth observations and proceeds to the consideration of generalised theory or hopefully new 
understandings of phenomena. According to Wakefield (1995), qualitative inquiry looks for, 
reconstructs, and interprets subjective meaning instead of searching an objective truth. 
Various possible ways of approaching the research at hand via qualitative designs are subjects 
of discussion in the following sections. 
 Case study design 
Generally, case studies can be viewed as a research design or a methodology that constitutes a 
superordinate concept for various methods of data collection or as a method for collecting 
data in its own right (Howell, 2013). Here, I discuss it at the higher level, namely, as a 
research design unto itself. According to Creswell (2007, p. 73), in case studies, researchers, 
investigate “a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, 
through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g., 
observations, interviews, audio-visual material, and documents and reports), and reports a 
case description and case-based themes”.  
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) stressed that case studies constitute an appropriate design if 
the researcher strives to gain rich understandings of phenomena under study and their 
interrelated processes. Case Study designs might consist of quantitative and qualitative 
elements of data collection and analysis with most involving a mixed-methods approach 
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(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Further, Yin (2014) pointed to privacy as well as confidentiality 
as being crucial to the successful conduct of case studies.  
Regarding my research aim, one could indeed look at a single or multiple syndicated loan 
transactions and pricing-processes as case(s). I highlight this to be a possible avenue of future 
research in 7.5.  
My work intends, however, to provide rich understanding of the related phenomena based on 
a broader sample by conducting interviews with representatives from various banks. Due to 
compliance and confidentiality issues, this would not be feasible. In other words, I would be 
limited to my own organisation. 
 Action research design 
According to Remenyi et al. (1998, p. 280), “[Action research] usually involves a small-scale 
intervention on the part of the researcher in the phenomenon being studied”. I did not pursue 
an action research design given that I do not intend to promote change. In other words, my 
research was non-interventionist and I was acting in the capacity of an independent 
researcher, even though I am a professional in the industry.   
 Mixed-methods design 
Mixed-methods are designs where both qualitative and quantitative research is combined in 
various possible means and is commonly associated with the pragmatist paradigm. The idea 
of mixed-method designs is that multiple approaches to a specific research question might be 
more likely to lead to rich results than single-method approaches would (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994). A mixed-methods design is likely to combine deductive and inductive reasoning. The 
ways of conducting mixed-methods research might vary from very complex fully integrated 
to less complex partially integrated approaches (Kuckartz, 2014). Also, in terms of data 
analysis and sequencing, hugely different approaches exist in practice. Mixed-method-
research allows scholars to see research designs as not being mutually exclusive by 
individually combining different strategies in ways that enable the answering of research 
questions at a reasonable level of coherence (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009).   
One way of approaching the research aim at hand via a mixed methods design would be to 
start with exploratory interviews followed by an explanatory survey that would be structured 
as guided by the outcomes of the preceding interview fieldwork. However, for various 
reasons, I decided on a different design, which I present in the next section. 
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 Chosen research design 
I chose a sequential, mostly exploratory, mixed-methods research design where an extensive 
piece of qualitative fieldwork would succeed a brief descriptive and explanatory quantitative 
analysis. In other words, I conducted a two-stage, mixed-methods design with an initial 
quantitative element followed by a series of qualitative in-depth interviews. 
My first task was to test the level of transparency in published data about German corporate 
syndicated loans. Because of the general obtainability of quantitative data through secondary 
data providers, it was appropriate to source a secondary set which had subsequently been 
analysed by means of suitable statistical methods. This quantitative component was mostly 
descriptive by nature as explanatory elements that would have naturally followed description 
were found to be inappropriate given the impossibility of constructing powerful dependent 
variables (Bulmer, 1979; Freedman, Pisani, & Purves, 2009). Hence, the explanatory part of 
the analysis rather dealt with a derivation on why the data set at hand was likely to be affected 
by bias.  
Given that, I chose a qualitative approach the most appropriate design to answer the second 
and subsequent research questions. The explorative and mostly deductive qualitative 
fieldwork constituted the prevailing role in this study, whereas the quantitative took on a more 
supporting role. Two sets of reasons led me to the conclusion that the distinctive 
characteristics of qualitative methods adequately addressed the research aim at hand: 
1. Research questions two to five required complex answers to “why” and “how” 
questions, or general issues, concerning the behaviour of lending decision-makers. 
More broadly, the research subject is highly complex and multifaceted in nature with 
underlying phenomena being hard to apprehend by means of quantitative data in 
general. 
2. My practical experience in the field, some exploratory research as well as the 
conducted pilot interviews, had confirmed that phenomena around complex pricing 
elements and its determinants were often privately held and unobservable to outsiders. 
In other words, “hidden drivers” existed which were only quantifiable to a limited 
degree. 
Besides inductive reasoning based on the qualitative data analyses, my chosen design 
furthermore exhibited some features of what Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) defined as an 
embedded design. This is because selective quantitative findings supported the presentation 
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and discussion of qualitative findings. The use of a mixed-methods approach grounded in the 
pragmatist research paradigm allowed meanings and findings to be elaborated, enhanced, 
clarified, confirmed, illustrated, and linked (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). Another beauty 
of the chosen design was a much greater diversity of views that enrich the overall 
understanding of the work.  
In 2.3, I stressed that financial intermediation and corporate finance research intellectually 
mainly draws its inspiration from asymmetric information and agency theory. Given the 
overwhelmingly inductive nature of my qualitative fieldwork with the aim of gaining an in-
depth understanding of context and the views of the interviewees, I refrained from 
formulating a predetermined theoretical basis for my research.  
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005), the discussion on the overall research design 
naturally leads to the choice of an appropriate research strategy—meaning the sources and 
methods to approach the data—that links the chosen philosophy (paradigm) and its 
subsequently defined methodological concept (research design). I address these 
considerations in the next section. 
3.4 Quantitative research  
This section provides methodological background information and the introduction of the data 
sample for which I present a quantitative analysis in Chapter 4. The quantitative analyses 
serve to answer RQ 1 and to provide supporting insights into the debate throughout the 
qualitative discussion that follows. Further, some background information on bias-issues will 
be presented. 
 Quantitative syndicated loan pricing analyses 
In an ideal and information frictionless environment, one could use a secondary data set, 
containing a complete or at least a completely randomly selected history of German corporate 
syndicated loan pricing elements as the foundation of an extensive quantitative inquiry 
(Calomiris & Pornrojnangkool, 2009). Further, complete information about inter alia 
borrower-specific, lender-specific, and macroeconomic characteristics—serving as 
explanatory variables in regression analyses—would be available in a comprehensive or at 
least unbiased form. According to Remenyi et al. (1998, p. 280), bias is defined as a “net 
systematic error that creeps into the research process usually due to the coconscious views of 
the researcher”. 
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In such a “perfect” laboratory, one could conduct a quantitative study under realistic 
conditions. Certain statistical analyses like univariate and multivariate regressions, followed 
by appropriate robustness tests, would at the end be likely to produce sufficient explanatory 
power to lead to precise as well as practical and useful evidence (Bleymüller, Gehlert, & 
Gülicher, 2008).  
Being grounded in a positivist philosophical research paradigm, existing worldwide empirical 
syndicated loan pricing literature tends to follow the abovementioned assumptions and tends 
to employ, explicitly or implicitly, the exemplified research strategy, outlined in Table 67.  
 
Table 67. Common quantitative analysis procedure. 
Each step builds on the other. Thus, I have to evaluate data quality and availability regarding 
the stage “sample purchase” first to decide if quantitative analyses regarding pricing of the 
German corporate syndicated loan market were valuable exercises.  
If it proved to be impossible to source a sufficiently comprehensive or unbiased data sample 
regarding relevant market from a data provider (Stage 1 in Table 67), then all subsequent 
1
Download comprehensive or unbiased data sample regarding relevant syndicated loan market 
from data provider.
2 Download comprehensive or unbiased data sample regarding relevant borrower information (e.g., financial data).
3 Download comprehensive or unbiased data sample regarding relevant lender information (e.g., financial data).
4
Download comprehensive or unbiased data sample regarding relevant macroeconomic information of borrower 
country (e.g., GDP data, legal environment).
5
Download comprehensive or unbiased data sample regarding relevant macroeconomic information of lender country 
(e.g., GDP data, legal environment).
6 Match/align and arrange data samples appropriately.
7 Create dummy variables e.g., to capture qualitative information.
Descriptive 
statistics
8
Provide descriptive statistical overview regarding whole sample (e.g., certain averages (mean and median) and standard 
deviations of relevant variables).
9
Conduct univariate regression analyses (depended variable(s): AISD as well as all single pricing elements separately; 
explanatory variables: comprehensive set of available variables (e.g., borrower characteristics, lender characteristics, 
macroeconomic characteristics, etc.)).
10 Conduct multivariate analyses.
Robustness 
checks
11 Perform robustness checks (e.g., to address heteroscedasticity).
Evidence 12 Formulate final evidence.
Interpretation 13 Interpret&discuss (new) evidence.
Sample 
purchase
Sample 
arrangement
Regression 
analyses
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phases of the analysis would become impractical since the main dependent pricing variables 
of interest—the margin and various fee elements—would not be available in a randomly 
selected manner. In other words, in this case, due to substantial bias issues, generalising from 
the sample to the population would not be appropriate, since the predictive power of possible 
regression analyses would be limited (Heckman, 1979; Philippe, 1980; Remenyi, Money, & 
Twite, 1991). In this vein, Remenyi et al. (1998, p. 79) stated, “It is necessary to ensure that 
the sample has been randomly selected from the whole population or from satisfied 
subsamples of the population”.  
To summarise, the focus of my quantitative analyses was predominantly on testing the 
suitability of publicly available German corporate syndicated loan data for a serious 
explanatory study. Moreover, an array of non-price related descriptive statistics will be 
provided to describe and compare certain variables like deal volumes, uses of proceeds, etc.  
 Constructing the secondary data sample 
In constructing the secondary data sample, I downloaded all available data on the German 
syndicated lending market between 2000 and 2015 from the Dealogic Loanware database. 
Dealogic strives to cover common syndicated loan elements such as volume, tenor, pricing, 
and rating at the time of origination. Dealogic is the most frequently used data source by 
practitioners in the market for German corporate syndicated loans. I am not the first 
researcher to utilise Dealogic Loanware,117 and, in fact, most extant syndicated loan studies 
have used Thomson Reuters LPC as the main source of data due to the fact that these studies 
have often focused on Anglo-Saxon markets, which is said to be the main focus of this 
provider (Carey & Nini, 2007).   
Spanning a 15-year analysis horizon is longer than the horizon of most of the outstanding 
studies. Further, I interpret the year 2000 as an ideal starting point for the analysis, as 
European capital markets have significantly changed since the advent118 and full integration of 
the Euro at that time. According to R. Clark (2001, p. 21), the Euro has “important 
consequences for business strategies and structure of European banking”, and I suspect this to 
be the case for German corporate syndicated lending as well. If the data happened to be 
adequate, spanning a time horizon incorporating the available data since the operationally 
                                               
 
117 For example, Carey and Nini (2007) and Focarelli et al. (2008) also used Dealogic Loanware. 
118 January 1999. 
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established Euro-system was, hence, likely to provide an appropriate frame from a time-series 
perspective. Further, this period incorporated several economic cycles, like the burst of the 
dot.com bubble around 2000, the credit boom of 2005 to 2008, the sharp decline during and 
immediately after the financial crisis, and the subsequent European debt crises and subsequent 
recovery in a historically low interest rate environment (Haas, 2016). 
Technically, I excluded loans provided to non-corporate borrowers such as financial 
institutions, LBOs, project financings, and non-cash-related guarantee facilities, as these were 
not within the scope of this work. The focus of this study is German corporate syndicated 
loans, which are predominantly used for various general corporate and/or acquisition 
purposes. My final German corporate syndicated loan data sample was sourced from Dealogic 
Loanware and became the sample that I analysed and for which I present results in Chapter 4. 
 Background thoughts on bias 
Because I am especially interested in locating possible bias issues within my sample, I 
provide some background information on bias hereunder. This is essential to apprehend the 
related discussions throughout Chapter 4. 
In general, the influence of missing data on a quantitative analysis depends on the nature of 
the data and the reasons for its absence (Remenyi et al., 1991). In an ideal and information 
frictionless world, no data would be lacking at all or data would be missing on a completely 
random basis. Whether certain data were available would then be the result of a “coin toss” 
(Freedman et al., 2009). Here, the effects of missing data would be an increased variance, 
meaning that the model coefficients would remain identical but that the coefficient estimates 
would “only” be less precise. In line with Heckman (1979), any deviation from this is likely 
to weaken and distort the explanatory power and hence, the practical usefulness of any 
statistical analysis. 
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3.4.3.1 Missing completely randomly 
Figure 9 plots 100 normally distributed data points. 
 
Figure 9. Complete random bias illustration. 
For the blue line, all data points have been used for a linear model. For the red line, one-third 
of all points have been randomly selected and marked missing. While the exact regression 
results vary—as it is the nature of randomness—the two graphs generally provide very similar 
results by being close to the “truth” (black line). In other words, the population (all data 
points) would be adequately represented by the sample (non-missing data points).  
3.4.3.2 Missing according to x-values 
If the probability of a certain data point not to be available depends on the explanatory 
variables (“x-values”) such as deal size or maturity, for example, extrapolating from available 
data to the base population becomes more critical, with Figure 10 providing a theoretical 
example. 
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Figure 10. X-value bias illustration 1. 
The black line again displays a linear model, estimated only based on the available data. The 
data points in this case are not completely randomly missing but available if x < 0.5 and 
absent if x > 0.5. Here, magnified deviations in the coefficient estimates constitute a bias 
potential. The grey band plots a confidence interval for the parameter estimates. However, a 
more serious danger is grounded in model misspecification.  
In the following plot (Figure 11), the same extrapolation infinitely undershoots the “true” 
values (blue line). The reason is that here the true model is exponential and not linear. Thus, 
the estimate cannot correctly capture the nature of the data. One must note that a linear 
estimate on the full set of data would have provided a more reasonable estimate of the overall 
growth and would—at first glance—not have appeared to be wrong. It is what would result if 
data were missing completely at random despite a wrongly specified model.  
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Figure 11. X-value bias illustration 2. 
In the x-range from 0 to 0.5, the data points from the linear and exponential models are well 
mixed. Only as “x” increases, the two generating functions (black and blue lines) deviate from 
each other. Further, note that it can be difficult, if not impossible, to discern linear and 
exponential models if only a small window of data is available, illustrated by Figure 12. 
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Figure 12. X-Value bias illustration 3. 
3.4.3.3 Missing through bias 
In the previous cases, data was either missing completely randomly, or due to the absence of 
explanatory variables. Hence, there was no inherent bias. In a worse situation, data is missing 
based on the value of response, for example, the loan margin or the AISD. In the previous 
settings, missing data introduced new uncertainty and the danger of errors, but this danger 
was not systematic. There was “only” a danger of concluding that the coefficients of interest 
were higher/lower than in reality. If values are missing driven by the variable of interest (e.g., 
margin, AISD), then there is a systematic or inherent bias in the results. If it is not possible to 
estimate the bias accurately, then any quantitative results based on such data is wrong by 
nature. In the previous settings, it was possible to reach reliable results if an infinite number 
of data points were available (consistency). With a systematic bias, such consistency cannot 
be reached and is unlikely to be recoverable as exemplified by Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Inherent bias illustration. 
All data is assumed to be missing if it does not reach a y-threshold of one. As can be seen, the 
real influence of “x” on “y” (the slope of the black line) is far away from the estimate (blue 
line) and even far outside the confidence interval around the estimate (blue ribbon).  
To summarise, regressions based on inherent biased data samples fail in providing realistic 
and practical useful results as a fact of which a thorough screening of a quantitative data 
sample in this regards, is pivotal.  
3.5 Qualitative research 
Hereunder, I discuss the applied data gathering procedures and the chosen analysis methods 
and techniques. I establish that secondary data in form of the Dealogic dataset is unsuited to 
answer RQ 2 to RQ 5 because this data is affected by bias in the manner of 3.4.3.3. I hence 
need to collect qualitative primary data with specific possible and chosen gathering 
techniques being presented hereunder.  
Generally, other than in quantitative analyses, qualitative data is commonly defined as natural 
language data being used to discover views, perceptions, and opinions of individuals (Patton, 
2002). Within my interview-driven fieldwork, these individuals are the research participants 
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as introduced in the section on sampling. Before that, however, I briefly present some 
alternative data collection approaches and discuss their appropriateness for this study. 
 Alternative approaches to data collection 
3.5.1.1 Observation 
Observation research can be conducted by various means depending on whether the inquirer 
is an active participant in the specific setting or a non-participant observer (O'Brian, 2001). In 
observation research, scholars commonly record or take field notes on behaviours and 
activities of specific individuals at the site of the research. These records are then being taken 
forward for analysis by similar means to be discussed further in this presentation. Given the 
research questions, which required an exploration of subjective personal experiences and 
opinions, observation as a possible data gathering technique was not appropriate for the study 
at hand. 
3.5.1.2 Focus groups 
Focus groups are dynamic discussions of groups from which researchers extract data to 
provide in-depth, thick sets of information. Creswell (2009) states, that six to eight 
participants for each group is ideal. According to Remenyi et al. (1998, p. 53), focus group 
research defines an approach “for collecting a highly specialised group of individuals. It is 
usually considered necessary to have a group of more than four individuals to constitute a 
focus group that will debate an issue of interest to the researcher.”  
A commonly discussed disadvantage of focus groups is that certain group dynamics might 
hinder individuals in sharing freely and honestly their personal views, which are a key 
ingredient for qualitative research to be successful (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Given the 
confidentiality issues, focus groups did not appear an appropriate data gathering tool for this 
study. 
3.5.1.3 Interviews 
Interviews are discussions (commonly one-on-one) between a researcher and an individual 
interviewee (research participant) from which the researcher draws information on a given 
topic field (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Interviews in general are the most commonly applied 
method of data gathering in qualitative studies and are generally considered an effective 
means of collecting rich data (Charmaz, 2006; Remenyi et al.). Through the interaction of 
researcher and research participant, interviews can produce rich data because they are based 
on the interviewees’ personal experiences expressed in the interviewee’s own words (Patton, 
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2002). By means of specific analysis procedures, such as coding, sets of raw data can be 
interpreted to produce knowledge (Saldana, 2013). Interview types vary in relation to the 
imposed level of structure and can hence be conducted in a highly structured, a completely 
unstructured, or in a semi-structured way (Wengraf, 2001).  
 Chosen data collection approach: semi-structured in depth interviews 
To combine the strengths of highly structured and completely unstructured interview 
techniques and to simultaneously mitigate their individual shortcomings, I conducted a series 
of face-to-face, semi-structured in-depth interviews that enabled me to obtain rich information 
to be taken forward to analytic procedures that would allow me to achieve the research aim. 
Other than multilateral data gathering techniques, such as focus groups, the bilateral nature of 
interviewing in general is likely to enhance the willingness of the research participants to 
share what they know honestly and completely. 
According to Wengraf, semi-structured interviewing is characterised by flexibility in the 
sense that the interviewer prepares a set of questions in advance but does not strictly adhere to 
them. Given this freedom, the interviewer can sequence and modify questions based on the 
idiosyncratic route taken by the conversation. The interviewer can adjust the sequencing to 
address and go back over certain themes that emerge as being of interest or can ignore certain 
questions altogether depending on individual circumstances (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; M. 
Saunders et al., 2012). Further, new questions can be created to follow emerging themes that 
might not have been considered beforehand (Patton, 2002).  
For these reasons, I judged semi-structured, in-depth interviews to be well suited to producing 
rich data that would enable me to “understand the constructs that the respondent uses as a 
basis for his or her opinions and beliefs about a particular matter or situation” (Easterby-
Smith et al., p. 132). 
 Sampling strategy 
To reiterate, the aim of my research is to explore and analyse the “hidden drivers” of banks’ 
pricing of syndicated loans to German corporate borrowers, thereby developing an enriched 
understanding of the elements and determinants of pricing and its underlying processes and 
decisions. I therefore needed to select a purposeful sample by locating and recruiting 
interviewees who would most likely be able to contribute deep insights. This sampling 
strategy is called purposeful or judgemental sampling which has a different logic from the 
random sampling that is commonly applied in quantitative studies (Patton).  
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Explaining this, Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 27) stated, “Qualitative researchers  usually 
work with small samples of people, nested in their context and studied in-depth—unlike 
quantitative researchers, who aim for larger numbers of context-stripped cases and seek 
statistical significance”.  
Following this rationale, I approached experienced syndicated lending professionals being 
employed by the most active and reputable banks in the German corporate syndicated loan 
market. In other words, I defined the sample population and selected the interviewees based 
on the anticipated degree of their experience regarding the phenomena under investigation. 
3.5.3.1 Definition of sample population 
Practically, I defined the first 25 banks in a Dealogic Loanware league table covering the 
corporate syndicated loan bookrunner activity-levels in Germany as my target group.  
According to Gupta et al. (2008), Godlewski (2010b) and Focarelli et al. (2008) league tables 
provide promising indications of arranger quality and reputation, with my sampling strategy 
informed by this assumption. Higher league table positions indicate a better reputation and 
higher experience of the respective bank (Gadanecz, 2003). The logic of this approach was 
that interviewing representatives of banks with the highest reputation in the business would 
contribute to the richness and quality of data.   
Table 68 plots the lender population active in the German corporate syndicated loan market.  
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Table 68. German corporate syndicated loan bookrunner league table 2000 to 2015. 
The, 25 banks displayed in Table 68 represent more than 80% of the bookrunner volume of 
newly issued syndicated loans in the given period, indicating a sufficient coverage of the 
population.119 
3.5.3.2 Sample selection and recruitment 
The interviewees were selected and recruited either directly, by drawing from my network of 
respective syndicated loan professionals, or by the helpful support of the head of the global 
syndicated loan department of my own employer. A key selection criterion was that potential 
research participants needed to have extensive experience in the German corporate syndicated 
lending market. To ensure this, approaches were made to the respective department heads of 
the 25 banks shown in Table 68. This achieved a satisfactory outcome, whereby 10 of the 
                                               
 
119 See section 2.4.2.2. 
Bookrunner
Deal value 
(€ mn)
No.
%-
share
Registered 
office
Business focus
1 Deutsche Bank 71,869.37 314 12.00 Germany Universalbanking
2 Commerzbank 61,434.10 508 10.26 Germany Universalbanking
3 UniCredit 58,783.43 347 9.82 Italy Universalbanking
4 J.P. Morgan 37,319.76 85 6.23 U.S. Universalbanking
5 BNP Paribas 27,208.15 104 4.54 France Universalbanking
6 LBBW 24,813.25 179 4.14 Germany Wholesalebanking
7 Citi 22,965.89 58 3.84 U.S. Universalbanking
8 HSBC 19,261.53 109 3.22 UK Universalbanking
9 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 19,206.30 47 3.21 U.S. Universalbanking
10 Société Générale Corporate & Investment Banking 17,977.74 56 3.00 France Universalbanking
11 BayernLB 15,156.65 122 2.53 Germany Wholesalebanking
12 Royal Bank of Scotland 15,085.01 70 2.52 UK Universalbanking
13 Barclays 13,952.53 47 2.33 UK Universalbanking
14 Mizuho 9,386.37 24 1.57 Japan Universalbanking
15 ING 8,986.28 57 1.50 Netherlands Universalbanking
16 Morgan Stanley 8,949.42 26 1.49 U.S. Investmentbanking
17 Credit Agricole CIB 8,639.60 50 1.44 France Universalbanking
18 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 8,466.49 31 1.41 Japan Universalbanking
19 Helaba 7,811.19 67 1.30 Germany Wholesalebanking
20 DZ Bank 7,502.69 71 1.25 Germany Wholesalebanking
21 Goldman Sachs 7,244.76 36 1.21 U.S. Investmentbanking
22 SEB 4,826.64 35 0.81 Sweden Universalbanking
23 Credit Suisse 4,718.12 25 0.79 Switzerland Universalbanking
24 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 4,454.49 24 0.74 Japan Universalbanking
25 Santander 3,398.63 19 0.57 Spain Universalbanking
Germany: 
Corporate syndicated loan bookrunner league table 2000 to 2015
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department heads agreed to act as research participants themselves, while nine delegated the 
task to an experienced member of the department. 
3.5.3.3 Sample profile 
As an outcome of the sample recruitment, I was able to conduct 19 interviews with lending 
professionals who belonged to the defined population. The sample was shaped by a high level 
of diversity with several national banks with different ownership structures and business 
foci120 as well as a broad base of international institutions with likewise varying business 
models and lending strategies. Furthermore, the ways in which syndicated loan departments 
were incorporated into the operational bank set up could vary from one institution to another. 
As derived from Figure 14,121 the mean experience in syndicated lending of the interviewees 
within the sample was 12.7 years. 
 
Figure 14. Years of experience of syndicated loan professionals. 
                                               
 
120 See sections 2.4.2.2. 
121 Please note that this figure shows 21 interviewees because besides 19 bank professionals, 2 additional key informant 
interviews were conducted as discussed in 3.5.3.4. 
Research philosophy and methodology 144 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
Overall, the 19 research participants came from 17 different organisations of which 5 were 
German, 3 U.S., 2 British, 2 French, 2 Japanese, and 3 other European banks. To ensure 
confidentiality with respect to the latter, I refrained from disclosing the respective registered 
office countries as these was only present once in the sample population. In terms of the 
banks’ overall business focus, 13 were classified as universal, 3 as wholesale, and 1 as 
investment banking. Overall, the 17 different organisations had acted as bookrunner in 2,097 
transactions (from 2000 to 2015), representing a bookrunner-related deal value of circa €425 
billion.  
3.5.3.4 Key informant interviews 
In addition to the sample of lending professionals, I held two key informant interviews with 
representatives from the syndicated loan secondary data providers—Dealogic Loanware and 
Thomson Reuters LPC. As these are the two most commonly used data providers within 
extant academic works, these interviews enabled me to better understand the underlying data 
gathering processes, being important for the study. Further, these two interviewees happened 
to be also experienced lending professionals in general who were therefore readily available 
to answer the entire set of questions. To ensure their anonymity, I did not separately label 
them in the data analysis. 
 Planning and managing the data collection 
3.5.4.1 Interview challenges 
Conducting interviews is challenging. Among other issues, the interviewers’ skill-set as well 
as the interviewees’ willingness to share knowledge and in-depth insights are crucial for high-
quality outcomes (Creswell, 2007). Given the discreet nature of banking, the latter issue 
appears particularly pronounced within this study with the subject matter being commercially 
sensitive (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). However, to ensure the generation of truthful in-depth 
insights, respective ethical considerations and interlinked mitigation strategies have been 
carefully addressed.122 Further, it is important to ask the right questions, which are likely to 
make interviewees revealing useful insights needed to meet the research aim (Gläser & 
Laudel, 2010). 
                                               
 
122 See section 3.5.7. 
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With regards to the required skills of interviewers and as supposed by Easterby-Smith et al., 
Maxwell (2005), and M. Saunders et al. (2012), I have conducted the following strategies to 
ensure successful processes: 
1. Consultation of relevant literature on interview techniques 
2. Conducting explorative interviews prior to the research 
3. Conducting pilot interviews 
4. Avoiding power-asymmetries 
5. Obtaining trust 
6. Using probes and prompts whilst interviewing 
7. Using of self-reflections throughout the fieldwork 
8. Asking each interviewee for feedback 
3.5.4.2 Interview guide 
During the interviews, I used an interview guide that is displayed in Table 69. Throughout the 
phases of reviewing the literature, of holding some explorative interviews as well as 
conducting two pilot interviews, I constantly developed this guide. It is likely that this 
sequential process led to the need for relatively few changes whilst conducting the “official” 
fieldwork. Considering the applied constant comparison technique,123 only the red-framed 
questions were subsequently included or, in the case of number six, were slightly rephrased. 
The nature of such an interview guide aligns well to the chosen data gathering technique of 
semi-structured, in-depth interviews. It serves as a broad topic guide that simultaneously 
provides flexibility within the interview situations to follow spontaneously possible emerging 
ideas or themes from the interviewees (Wengraf, 2001).  
                                               
 
123 See section 3.5.5.5. 
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Table 69. Interview guide. 
3.5.4.3 Interview process 
Via email, I officially invited the 27 potential interviewees124 and attached information as 
displayed in Appendix B referred to as interview invitation material. This material consists of 
a quite extensive interview invitation letter that provides some background on the research 
topic and the related interview processes and an informed consent form, as suggested by 
Creswell (2007).   
                                               
 
124 Twenty-five banks according to the respective league table as displayed via Table 68 in addition to the two representatives 
of the secondary data providers acting as key informants. 
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Interview guide Ph.D.: Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany: an Exploration of the Hidden Drivers                  
Questions to syndicated loan professionals
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n
ts
How do you describe quantity and quality of publicly available data for the German 
corporate syndicated loan market?
How and why did quantity and quality of public data availability change over time 
(especially with view to the 2000-2015 period)? 
How do you prioritise these pricing elements form your banks’ point of view? 
Considering all related costs (pricing elements) for a borrower: How do you estimate the 
share of each of the different pricing elements in light of the whole pricing package over 
the lifetime of the loan? 
How do quantity and quality of publicly available data for the German corporate syndicated 
loan market affect the work of respective loan originators?
Who is driving the decision on making certain loan parameters public or not?
How do you calculate and publish the AISD and what are its components?
D
a
ta
 b
a
se
 -
 p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a (full) transparent market?
What are the pricing elements of a “common” corporate syndicated loan to a German 
borrower? For what specifically does each of these compensate the lender?
Specific questions to representatives of data providers
How do you describe the process of gathering syndicated loan data which then flows into 
your database? 
How is pricing data availability different between various different markets and countries? 
What are ALL the pricing elements of a “common” corporate syndicated loan to a German 
borrower? For what specifically does each of these compensate the lender?
P
r
ic
in
g
 
d
e
te
r
m
in
a
n
ts What are the determinants of the various pricing elements from a lenders’ point of view? In 
other words, what is responsible for a particular pricing element to be high or low?
How do you prioritise the various determinants of pricing from your banks’ point of view?
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As previously confirmed, 21 of the approached target groups agreed to an interview. Due to 
legal and compliance-related issues, two targeted individuals refrained from providing an 
interview, whereas three did not reply to the invitation email.  
The interviews were all conducted face-to-face and one-to-one within the period of May 2016 
to December 2016. All were conducted in a quiet and convenient location chosen by the 
interviewee, which in each case was their own office. Fourteen interviews were conducted in 
Germany and seven in London. All 21 interviews were conducted in the English language, 
audio-recorded, and fully transcribed directly thereafter by myself. Prior to each interview, 
each respondent was asked for personal consent via the consent form to record the interview. 
The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and two hours with an average duration of 
approximately one hour. The transcribed interviews were sent to the respective interviewee 
for a review and final sign-off. 
 Data analysis 
As there is no single, rigid and fully standardised tool that defines how to conduct and process 
qualitative data analyses, I will outline below in depth the complex, individual procedures that 
I applied in this study. This ambiguity is inherently related to the character of qualitative data 
in general. As opposed to numbers, words are fatter and usually have multiple meanings 
that—by means of a series of interactive processes—somehow need to be disentangled and 
revealed (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
Many qualitative approaches appear to be relatively rigidly structured, such as grounded 
theory method or template analysis, where exact procedures need to be followed. In line with 
my chosen research paradigm and as supported by Dey (1993), Creswell (2007), and Robson 
(2011), I facilitated a more universal and pragmatic approach to analyse my interview 
material, an approach that enabled me to draw flexibly from a series of more specific 
approaches. For example, certain elements of grounded theory-related techniques like 
constant comparison and theoretical saturation have carefully been applied, whereas others, 
especially coding and categorising procedures were built on rather more flexible procedures.  
Relying on intuition and interpretation by “attaching data from disparate sources to 
appropriate categories or codes to integrate these data” supported me in locating major 
concepts and their interrelationships (M. Saunders et al., 2012, p. 557). Corbin and Strauss 
(2015) also promoted this flexibility by stating that research methods should rather be applied 
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flexibly as well as creatively rather than dogmatically. In that vein, Miles and Huberman 
(1994, p. 7) stated “The researcher is essentially the main measurement device in the study”. 
Overall, I happened to conduct a mostly inductive approach with a mid-level of structure by 
relying on both certain common elements of data analysis as well as on interpretation and 
intuition.  
 
Source: Adapted from M. Saunders et al. (2012, p. 556). 
Figure 15. Approaches to qualitative data analyses. 
To be discussed hereunder, my data analysis techniques incorporated the natural key 
ingredients of qualitative studies, namely, data reduction, data display, conclusion drawing, 
and verification. 
3.5.5.1 Coding and the development of concepts 
Each interview transcript was analysed subsequent to each and prior to each succeeding 
interview allowing constant comparison as well as theoretical saturation.  
One paramount element of qualitative data analysis is coding. In that context, Miles and 
Huberman (p. 56) stated, “Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the 
descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study”. For the particular pieces of 
the interview transcripts, I drew from both concept driven, and data driven codes, to 
disaggregate the material. This mostly exploratory coding approach enabled me to gain richer 
perspectives on the data with respect to the complex phenomena under investigation (Saldana, 
2013). 
This flexibility and analytical openness is particularly important for the research topic at hand 
as a couple of related sub-fields have extensively been addressed and saturated by extant 
worldwide literature, whereas others have not or have been based on dissimilar underlying 
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assumptions. Hence, codes derived from existing literature125 as well as from data126 supported 
the piecewise establishment of structured analytical frameworks. 
Technically, by means of line-by-line coding, supported by the qualitative data analysis 
software127 “f4 analysis”, the transcriptions were segmented and categorised followed by a 
respective labelling of the emerged segments (Charmaz, 2006). Via various cycles of coding 
and the constantly growing quantity of material, I incrementally defined higher- and lower-
level concepts based on the definition of Corbin and Strauss (1996), stating that concepts vary 
in respect of their degree of abstraction. In that context, lower-level concepts are said to point 
to and provide the detail for the corresponding higher-level ones.  
The ongoing coding activities and related attachment of interview-segments to the codes also 
led to reduction and rearrangement of the data, a process which M. Saunders et al. (2012, p. 
558) defined as “unitising data”. This process was managed with the aid of CAQDAS.  
As intuition suggests, these processes are iterative in nature and subject to ongoing change 
and development (Dey, 1993). Through the various coding-cycles accompanied by the fact 
that data analysis was constantly conducted alongside further data collection assisted by 
various further analytical tools, these concepts constantly developed from essentially 
descriptive to more analytical concepts that explained relationships between concepts and data 
and led to an enhanced understanding of the phenomena under study. In other words, key 
themes, patterns, hierarchies, relationships, and understandings were established that 
ultimately led to saturated answers to the research questions. 
As suggested by M. Saunders et al., respective findings were reported by presenting my own 
contextualised discussions, which are routinely accompanied with selected supporting 
quotations from the research participants. Appendix C presents an example of a full 
transcribed interview and, in Appendix D, coding examples are provided. 
 
                                               
 
125 Concept-driven. 
126 Derived from data or “in vivo” codes. According to Saldana (2013, p. 91) in vivo codes refer “to a word or short phrase 
from the actual language found in the qualitative data record”. 
127 Also often referred to as CAQDAS meaning qualitative data analysis software (M. Saunders et al., 2012).  
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3.5.5.2 Memoing 
According to Corbin and Strauss (1990) the use of memos enhances qualitative analysis 
procedures and, thus, the overall quality of the research. In that context, Charmaz (2006, p. 
72) pointed out, “Writing successive memos throughout the research process keeps you 
involved in the analysis and helps you to increase the level of abstraction of your ideas. 
Certain codes stand out and take form as theoretical categories as you write successive 
memos.” 
Following this recommendation, I wrote memos throughout the research enabling me to 
develop and deepen new ideas and concepts. Constantly writing memos provided an 
important means to step back from concrete data coding procedures to make deeper and more 
conceptually coherent sense of the phenomena under study (Charmaz). Further, via the 
persistent use of memos I was enabled to “test” certain emerging thoughts in following 
interviews. 
These supporting devices were particularly useful with respect to very complex themes like 
information asymmetrical issues and their interconnection with relationship lending and 
syndicate structure, where well-established theories appeared to deviate extensively from my 
research findings.  
3.5.5.3 Diagramming 
To display and contextualise data as well as to conduct analysis, I constantly used 
diagramming, which supported me in interpreting and finding meaning within the data. 
Charmaz (p. 117) pointed out, “Diagrams can offer concrete images of our ideas. The 
advantage of diagrams is that they provide a visual representation of categories and their 
relationships.” As suggested by Corbin and Strauss (1996), these visual images of emerging 
ideas and the relationship of concepts was a key technique in my data analysis and in the 
establishment of the integrated framework. This was particularly true for more complex issues 
and interrelationships where an “analytic device for thinking about macro and micro 
relationships that might shape the situations the researcher studies” was needed (Charmaz, p. 
118).  
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3.5.5.4 Quantifying and counting 
Numerous elements and emerging concepts of my study needed to be prioritised. Many 
pricing determinants needed to be linked and prioritised to distinguish between respective 
influential magnitudes. As suggested by Easterby-Smith et al. (2012), I used counting or, in 
other words, quantifying specific statements as a supplement to the data’s core analysis. In 
other words, counting enabled me to establish a first indication especially with respect to 
prioritisation issues. Further, as qualitative research is to a large extent driven by subjective 
judgement, counting is an important tool to protect a researcher against extensive bias (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994).  
3.5.5.5 Constant comparison 
Throughout the qualitative fieldwork, I used the constant comparative method, which 
Charmaz (2006) and Glaser and Strauss (1967) defined as a process of constantly comparing 
sets of data with other sets of data and concepts and categories with other concepts and 
categories. This analytic tool enhances the inductive creation of concepts and categories and 
further mitigates bias (Charmaz). The technique again underpins the importance of collecting 
and analysing data simultaneously (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). Further, it enabled me to 
facilitate the abductive reasoning technique that Charmaz (p. 186) defined as “a type of 
reasoning that begins by examining data and after scrutiny of these data, entertains all 
possible explanations for the observed data, and then forms hypotheses to confirm or 
disconfirm until the researcher arrives at the most plausible interpretation of the observed 
data”. 
3.5.5.6 Theoretical saturation 
I did not apply any theoretical sampling in the sense that I was ex ante open to the question of 
how many interviews I intended to conduct. This means that, from the beginning, I targeted 
the 27 possible interviewees and would have conducted 27 interviews if no one had refused to 
participate. However, theoretical saturation was applied in a way that whilst the fieldwork 
carried on, I put different foci on specific topics which appeared to demand more time and 
deeper discussion.  
Charmaz (p. 189) defined theoretical saturation as “the point at which gathering more data 
about a category reveals no new properties nor yields any further theoretical insights”. 
I refrained from leaving out complete themes which had already been saturated and instead 
focused on putting more emphasis on the less saturated ones in later interviews. As 
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quantifying and counting was one supporting strategy whilst presenting findings in general 
and by prioritising efforts of certain phenomena in particular, it was important to thematise all 
core research themes in each setting.  
3.5.5.7 Triangulation 
Triangulation can be defined as a method used to confirm findings (Howell, 2013). The key 
underlying rationale of triangulation is to “replicate the finding in a place where, if valid, it 
should be reoccur” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 267).  
According to Denzin (1978) triangulation can be conducted by: 
1. Data source and type 
2. Method 
3. Researcher 
4. Theory 
I facilitated triangulation by various means. First, the descriptive statistics that resulted from 
my quantitative analyses served, where appropriate, as useful bases for comparison with the 
statements of the research participants, as well as providing valuable context. Triangulation 
was also applied within the qualitative fieldwork. If an interview for instance generated an 
unexpected finding, I attempted to explore this in more depth by using a different form of 
words with the same respondent, and also followed up such emerging concepts with other 
research participants. 
Overall, triangulation provided an essential means of enhancing trustworthiness and rigour 
whilst collecting my data, as well as during the analysis. Especially, it was very helpful in 
ensuring that I did not allow my perspectives on the phenomena under study to narrow, and 
rigorously followed up new insights when they arose. 
3.5.5.8 Respondent validation  
Besides constant comparison and abductive reasoning during the fieldwork, which can also be 
interpreted as some means of triangulation, the interviewees were readily available after 
having taken part in an interview. Hence, I could share emerging ideas as well as 
spontaneously occurring questions with a wide group of specialists, which helped to increase 
the overall quality of the work. This technique, which is also often referred to as member 
checking is commonly classified as a source of phenomenological validity (Bronfenbrenner, 
1976).  
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3.5.5.9 Reflective and creative thinking 
I had been actively involved in the research. According to Gould (1988, p. 22), “The most 
creative theories are often imaginative visions imposed upon facts”. In other words, “Intuitive 
notions about phenomena often form part of the practice of researchers” (Remenyi et al., 
1998, p. 105). 
Other than in quantitative analytic methods, which are said to be well established and can 
hence be relatively routinely applied, this does not hold for qualitative research, where great 
degrees of creativity are needed. My pragmatic approach in structuring the overall research 
design gave me the flexibility to makes use of my intuitive notions albeit ensuring sufficient 
scientific rigour.  
 Researcher values and reflexivity 
Qualitative research by nature is value laden. According to Mason (2002), an inextricable 
linkage between the researcher and the research participants is prevalent. Other than in 
quantitative studies, maintaining distance from data is usually not possible. One can state that 
the researcher is the research instrument and the researcher’s values and behaviour influence 
the data gathered. In other words, it is impossible that two different researchers conducting 
interviews with same questions and same respondents would obtain exactly the same data. 
The whole research is, hence, driven by the researcher’s assumptions, personal and 
professional background, and by the researcher’s interlinked research motivations. 
 Ethical considerations 
According to Remenyi et al. (p. 282), ethics can be defined as “a sense of understanding of 
what is right and wrong”. As the interaction with human beings is key in any kind of 
qualitative research, ethical issues have to be taken into consideration carefully (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2012; M. Saunders et al., 2012). Killam (2013, p. 3), for instance, stated, “The 
purpose of the inquiry needs to be balanced with what the researcher values as well as other 
ethical considerations in the conduct of research”. 
It is critical for a successful outcome of the inquiry that the researcher be able to encourage 
human beings to tell their comprehensive and “true” views on the respective topic. Even if 
they want to do this, conflicts of interests128 are likely to influence the research participant in 
                                               
 
128 For example, with the employer. 
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the way the participant tells the “story” (M. Saunders et al., 2012). In accordance with The 
University of Gloucestershire Handbook of Research Ethics, I anticipated specific ethical 
issues in my research, as shown in Table 70.  
 
Source: Based on University of Gloucestershire (2008) and Easterby-Smith et al. (2012). 
Table 70. Ethical issues in qualitative studies. 
For each of the above, an appropriate mitigating approach was adopted as discussed below. 
3.5.7.1 Ensuring of anonymity and confidentiality 
To mitigate point one, aliases were assigned to the respective interviewees and their real 
names are not being published. Further, as already stated, this aspect was of utmost 
importance for the research participants. Therefore anonymity was even more secured by 
refraining from characterising the aliases with certain lender-specific elements. 
3.5.7.2 Ensuring of informed consent 
Point two was mitigated by providing the respective interviewees with comprehensive 
information before the interviews were conducted.129 This information included an invitation 
email, an interview agenda, an interview protocol structure, and an informed consent form to 
be signed by each interviewee. With respect to the latter, every interviewee was assured of 
having the right to decline to answer specific questions or to withdraw completely from the 
interview at any time. 
3.5.7.3 Invasion of privacy 
Upon the explicit request of six interviewees, I refrained from explicitly assigning130 certain 
key variables like business focus, nationality and lending philosophy to the respective 
interviewees and their employers. This request rests on the fact that experienced German 
syndicated loan market professionals might easily identify the respective respondents. 
Further, given the average 12.7-year experience of the research participants, it is reasonable to 
                                               
 
129 See Appendix B. 
130 Besides year of experience. 
1 The ensuring of anonymity as well as confidentiality.
2 The ensuring of informed consent.
3 The risk of invasion of privacy.
4 Affiliation and conflicts of interest.
5 Destruction of data and safe storage.
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assume that a high degree of interconnection via joint-transactions and repeated personal 
meetings might cause reluctance with respect to openness, honesty, and richness of data if the 
highest degree of anonymity was not assured. On the one hand, this might be interpreted as a 
drawback as I am somewhat limited in explicitly discussing the diversity of answers being 
based on individual characteristics. However, the assurance given to these interviewees 
facilitated deeper and more open discussion, a fact that at least counterbalanced this 
drawback. This was particularly the case for certain highly sensitive topics like discussions 
with respect to competition law or ethical issues. In order not to undo the research 
participants’ anonymity, I needed to select respective quotations carefully whilst reporting the 
findings. 
3.5.7.4 Conflicts of interest 
Conflicts of interest or concerns about possible such conflicts were successfully moderated by 
the fact that the thesis and research project is completely self-funded and neither influenced 
by my employer nor by any other organisation or individual. I clarified this to the research 
participants both via the interview invitation material as well as by orally introducing the 
research topic and its backgrounds before each interview. 
3.5.7.5 Data security 
During the fieldwork and the drafting of the thesis, I took care to store the interview data in a 
secure and confidential manner. For instance, when dealing with sensitive interview material, 
I only used one computer, which was equipped with adequate firewall and antivirus software. 
Once the thesis was finally approved, the data will be destroyed to ensure respondent privacy 
beyond the research project (the fifth issue in Table 70). 
3.6 Summary 
In Chapter 3, I located the research in a wider philosophical context and established that I 
would conduct the research within a pragmatist paradigm grounded in social constructionist 
ontology, a phenomenological epistemology, and a mixed-methodological approach with a 
strong focus on a qualitative fieldwork.  
In terms of methods used I have provided detailed discussions on sampling, data gathering, 
and analysis for both the quantitative and qualitative elements of the study. Furthermore, 
throughout the chapter, I have discussed and evaluated alternatives to the chosen approach. 
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4 Research findings and discussion: quantitative analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 presents the findings of my quantitative analyses relative to RQ 1 and to achieving 
its related research objective. The findings are based on the data gathered as discussed in 
3.4.2. 
4.2 General descriptive statistics 
As an initial overview of the sample and its main characteristics, I offer an array of 
descriptive statistics and then focus on the pricing variables of interest in this study. Further, I 
subsequently pick up several of these discussions throughout my qualitative fieldwork to 
highlight certain phenomena. In other words, besides the concrete answer for RQ 1, I use the 
content of Chapter 4 to provide some contextual background and to understand better and 
underpin subsequent research (M. Saunders et al., 2012). I begin by plotting in Figure 16 the 
total deal volumes of syndicated loans131 in Germany from 2000 to 2015. 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 16. Total German syndicated loan volumes. 
                                               
 
131 Full sample, without any restrictions. 
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Syndicated lending has witnessed rapid growth with the introduction of the Euro in 
1999/2000. However, this growth was temporarily interrupted by various macroeconomic 
events like “9/11132” and the burst of the dot.com bubble. Driven by a high degree of activity 
in inter alia M&A-related financings, an all-time peak of €254.9 billion was reached in 2006 
(Haas, 2016). During the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, a strong market deceleration led to 
a decrease to €104.9 billion of newly issued syndicated loans in 2008. Since the financial 
crisis, volumes have not recovered to the 2006 and 2007 heights, but they have, however, 
significantly recovered, especially in the period 2013 to 2015 (Ellemann, 2011). Figure 17 
displays these developments in terms of the number of deals. 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 17. Total German syndicated loan number of deals. 
Especially worthy of note is that number of deals—other than volume levels—not only 
recovered in the aftermath of the crisis-period but currently even exceeds the deal numbers of 
the record volume years. Hence, the average deal volume has declined from roughly €966 
million in 2006 to €470 million in 2015. This is mainly caused by a growing penetration of 
                                               
 
132 Reference to 11 September 2001. 
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the market for more “medium-sized133” corporates, which—in earlier years—generally raised 
their bank financing through bilateral bank loans (Barbosa & Ribeiro, 2007; Carey & Nini, 
2007). 
Figure 18 segregates the total deal values in the period 2000 to 2015 of syndicated loans to 
German corporate borrowers (“included”’) vis-à-vis the excluded134 observations. 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 18. Included versus excluded transactions. 
Overall, the most of the syndicated loan issuing volume has been included in the final sample, 
indicating that main volume drivers have been corporate lending during the 15-year period. 
Excluded facilities such as LBOs, loans to financial institutions, or project financings 
historically tended to play rather subordinated roles in Germany. Thus, Voisey and Slocombe 
(2011) have pointed out that the backbone of the European syndicated loan market has always 
been corporate investment grade lending. 
                                               
 
133 Not in relation to the official definition provided in section 2.4.2.1. Meant are rather smaller- and medium sized corporates 
within the official large-corporate-cluster. 
134 In line with the scope of the thesis, for example, LBO-loans or loans to non-corporate borrowers and guarantee facilities 
as discussed in section 3.4.2. 
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In some years, a relatively high share of excluded transactions was predominantly driven by a 
few “jumbo” transactions. In 2008 and 2009, for instance, facilities granted to “Hypo Real 
Estate” of €52 billion each, guaranteed by the German government, almost single-handedly 
drove the high excluded volumes in those years.  
As syndicated loans usually consist of multiple tranches that might differ in loan volume, 
type, maturity, pricing, etc., going forward, I conduct most of the analyses—especially with 
respect to pricing information availability—on the tranche level. In other words, in these 
cases, I treat each tranche as a separate observation, being aligned thereby with most 
academic studies on syndicated lending, for example, Anagnostopoulou and Drakos (2016), 
Gaul and Uysal (2013), A. Saunders and Steffen (2011), and Schenone (2010).  
For the investigation period, 1,537 deals are included into the restricted final sample, 
consisting of 2,578 tranches and amounting to an overall volume of €1,431 billion. The 
following analyses are based on this final restricted sample. Table 71 displays distribution 
statistics on some main loan characteristics. 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Table 71. Distribution statistics for resticted sample. 
The average number of tranches per syndicated loan transaction is 1.68 (mean). The average 
total deal value is €931.21 million, but volumes show significant deviations ranging from €5 
to €37.1 billion. Correspondingly, the standard deviation of approximately €2.5 billion is 
large. The mean tranche value amounts to €529.33 million also reveals a large standard 
deviation. The average lifetime of a syndicated loan is 4.39 years and average syndicates 
consist of 9.45 lenders of which 2.4 act as bookrunner.  
Figure 19 plots the weighted average number of lenders or, in other words, the syndicate size 
weighted by deal size. By using deal sizes as weights, this effectively shows the average 
number of lenders per Euro loaned—albeit on a different scale. 
M SD Min Mdn Max
Total deal value € mn per deal 931.21 2,530.84 5.00 243.50 37,100.00
Tranche value € mn 529.33 1461.92 0.50 100.00 24,733.33
Maturity (years) per tranche 4.39 2.29 1.00 5.00 25.00
Number of lenders per deal 9.45 8.61 2.00 6.00 52.00
Number of bookrunners per deal 2.40 3.05 0.00 2.00 30.00
Number of tranches per deal 1.68 1.01 1.00 1.00 8.00
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 19. Deal size weighted average number of lenders. 
With a weighted average of 10.45 lenders, 2015 marks the all-time-low within the period 
under investigation. Looking at different deal size groups (Figure 20), it appears that this 
declining trend is especially driven by smaller lending groups for deals exceeding €1 billion. 
In other words, banks’ loan commitments tend to have increased towards the end of the 
investigation period.  
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 20. Average number of lenders (grouped by deal size). 
Next, Figure 21 illustrates the loan type distribution. As guarantee facilities are not within the 
scope of the thesis, I focus on revolving credit as well as term loan facilities. Term loan 
facilities also include bridge loans, which are almost exclusively found in underwritten 
acquisition financings.  
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 21. Loan types: term loans versus RCFs. 
The appearance of revolving credits and term loans is relatively balanced. The overall share of 
revolving credit facilities of the total number of tranches is roughly 51%. This share varies 
somewhat over time with a lower number of RCFs, especially in crisis years such as 2001 and 
2009, but predominantly remains to value at a range of 50 plus or minus 10%. 
This is different in the case of the unrestricted sample, including LBOs, project financings, 
guarantee facilities, etc. Here, the average share of RCFs amounts to 33.5%135 and is, thus, 
significantly lower, related to the fact that project financings and LBOs especially usually 
consist of fully drawn term debt.  
 
 
 
                                               
 
135 For the sake of brevity, I omit these statistics. 
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With respect to syndicated loan uses of proceeds Figures 22 and 23 provide the corresponding 
proportionalities. 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 22. Syndicated loan uses of proceeds (2000-2015). 
Most syndicated loans are granted for acquisitions, refinancing, or general corporate purposes, 
accounting for about 90%136 of the entire volume level on average.  
                                               
 
136 With only 2012 falling below 80% at 77%. 
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 23. Syndicated loan uses of proceeds per year. 
Concerning “event-driven”, M&A financings in light of economic cycles and sentiment, 
Figure 23 reveals some temporary lulls in activity between 2001 and 2003/2004 and after the 
financial crisis years from 2010 to 2015. 
Figures 24 and 25 plot the senior unsecured S&P and Moody`s rating distribution of the 
respective borrowers. In 249 (199) deals, the borrowers are rated by S&P (Moody’s), 
representing a roughly 16% (13%) share of the deal number of included transactions. Roughly 
63% (91%) are rated investment grade with S&P (Moody’s). In 164 deals (10.7%), the 
respective borrowers are rated by both S&P and Moody’s. 
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 24. Syndicated loans for S&P-rated borrowers (2000-2015). 
 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 25. Syndicated loans for Moody’s-rated borrowers (2000-2015). 
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For loans to S&P’s and Moody’s rated borrowers, the average tranche number is 1.55 and 
1.37 respectively, both lower than the average of 1.68 for the entire data set. The tranche 
instrument type is in 59% and 68% of tranches an RCF, indicating that the rated deals are 
more often one-tranche back-up lines for large, rated, and, most likely, listed multinational 
companies. As indicated by extant literature, a strong correlation between borrower size, 
safeness, and appearance of an external rating exists (Focarelli et al., 2008).  
4.3 Pricing element availability  
Now that a general overview on the data sample has been provided, I present an analysis of 
the degree of pricing-element availability within the sample. I do this by outlining the 
respective shares of missing data of the various pricing elements in comparison to the entire 
sample.  
 Per annum elements 
Figure 26 outlines the respective share of missing tranche margin137 information. 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 26. Tranche margin: missing development. 
                                               
 
137 Tranche margin = initial margin of the respective tranche. 
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In 2000, 29.2% of the included tranches had no public margin information. In other words, in 
70.8% tranche margin information was available at the time of origination. In 2015, 89.4% of 
tranches lacked publicly available margin information. From a low in 2004 at approximately 
one fourth of tranches without information this number increased steadily138 to more than 80% 
in 2011. Since then the trend has somewhat slowed down, but with almost 90% of missing 
margin information in 2014 and 2015, public availability nowadays appears to be a rare 
exception rather than a rule. 
The lack of available information on commitment fees139 varied between 31% in 2002 and 
60% in 2006 in the years before the financial crisis. There was a significant rise of circa 15 
percentage points already in 2006 with a further 20 percentage point rise in 2007.  
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 27. Commitment fee: missing development. 
 
                                               
 
138 Only 2007 shows no increase of missing information compared to the year before. 
139 As commitment fees are predominantly applicable for RCFs, I present the respective share of missing data based on the 
population of RCFs. I apply the same methodology for utilisation fees (Figure 29). 
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Since 2010, the missing-share has always valued above 95% and a 99.5% share of missing 
values in 2015 underlines that commitment fees are basically no longer publicly available at 
all.  
Next, Figure 28 illustrates the missing tranche information on facility fees. 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 28. Facility fee: missing development. 
Facility fees are not common in the German corporate syndicated loan market and are mainly 
found in the U.S. Thus, the almost total lack of public availability is for obvious reasons based 
on which I will not further include facility fees in the subsequent figures. 
For utilisation fees, most of what has been established for commitment fees holds with even 
less information available (Figure 29). 
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 29. Utilisation fee: missing development. 
In 2015, for instance, no single utilisation fee was publicised. 
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 Upfront elements 
In some cases, participation fees were only available from 2000 to 2009 as shown in Figure 
30. 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 30. Participation fee: missing development. 
From 2010 onwards, a nearly total lack of participation fees in the public domain can be 
reported. 
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The underwriting fee140 is almost never publicly available, as displayed in Figure 31.  
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 31. Underwriting fee: missing development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
140 As underwriting fees are predominantly applicable for acquisition financings, I present the respective share of missing 
data based on the population of acquisition financings within the restricted sample. 
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 AISD 
The figure below tends to present a mirror image of Figure 26141 and displays the missing data 
patterns of AISD in the period under investigation.  
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 32. AISD: missing development. 
The mirror image occurs, as AISD is an automatically calculated field that in theory 
incorporates margin plus annualised fees as presented in section 2.5.2. Interestingly, once the 
tranche margin is available, an AISD gets automatically reported, irrespective of whether all 
or any other parts of the equation142 are available.  
With Dealogic Loanware, the automated field AISD takes the respective value based on the 
pricing element availability criteria expressed in Table 72. 
                                               
 
141 Plot of the tranche margin missing pattern. 
142 See Table 11. 
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Source: Adapted from Dealogic Loanware (2016). 
Table 72. Value of AISD dependent on data availability. 
In other words, under different data availability settings, AISD can take different values for 
the same deal. As in most cases, only tranche margin is available and no further pricing 
elements are published, AISD tends to equal to the respective tranche margin, a fact that 
results in the aforementioned mirror image. 
The following discussion refers to Table 12, which outlined a pricing structure example of a 
common RCF. In the case that the only tranche margin was published, AISD would take the 
value of 100. In the case that utilisation fees were also public, AISD would take the value of 
130. In the case that participation fees were published, the AISD would be 140. In the case 
that underwriting fees were published, the AISD would be 150. Arrangement fees are never 
included as defined by Dealogic Loanware and as discussed in 2.5.2. In other words, the 
public AISD value fluctuates between 100 and 150 bp p.a. based on the respective degree of 
data availability. Thus, an AISD of one is not comparable to another loan when information 
availability differs and each AISD-calculation is based on different available equation 
elements. Hence, the susceptibility to error and misinterpretation is severe. To achieve 
“transparency”,143 one would have to look at the respective tranche margin and fee 
information availability and then manually calculate AISD for loan groups in which 
information availability was aligned.144  
In the case at hand, however, the sample size would decline to close to zero. In line with 
Hallak and Schure (2011), on the other hand, taking only the tranche margins into account 
would neglect a major percentage of the total cost of borrowing. The fact that arrangement 
fees are not covered at all may also lead to misinterpretation.  
                                               
 
143 Based on the availability of pricing data. 
144 With the rare exception of for example, Hallak and Schure (2011) this effort has not been made by most researchers who 
took AISD as published with the provider. 
Value of AISD dependent on data availability
AISD in bp p.a. takes the value of …
… the respective tranche margin when no fees are disclosed.
… the respective tranche margin + utilisation fees (if applicable) when no further fees are disclosed.
… the respective tranche margin + utilisation fees (if applicable) + participation fee divided by the maturity in years when 
no further fees are disclosed.
… the respective tranche margin + utilisation fees (if applicable) + participation fee divided by the maturity in years + 
underwriting fee divided by the maturity in years (if applicable) when no further fees are disclosed.
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Based on the pricing elements in syndicated lending considered to this point, for an ex ante 
pricing view—based on possibly published pricing data at signing—in an “ideal world”, the 
following formula would cover AISD more appropriately: 
 
Table 73. Suggestion for more accurate AISD-definition. 
During the qualitative fieldwork, this more accurate AISD-definition will be enhanced 
incrementally by considering additional pricing elements and various pricing structural 
considerations thus far neglected. This incremental strategy will lead to the formulation of 
novel pricing definitions and measures that are presented in section 5.4. 
4.4 Preliminary conclusion: pricing element data availability 
Figure 33 plots the share of missing pricing information regarding all covered pricing 
elements over time. It is obvious that the share of missing AISD mirrors the share of missing 
tranche margins, in line with the reasoning provided earlier. 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 33. Comparison of missing-shares over time. 
Initial margin in bp p.a.
+ Utilisation fee (fully drawn) in bp p.a.
+ All upfront fees in bp / maturity in years
= AISD in bp p.a.
Suggestion for more accurate AISD-definition
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The share of missing tranche information in general has increased significantly over the years. 
With respect to all pricing elements of interest, a significant difference between pre-and post- 
financial crisis years is observed. Whereas before the financial crisis around 2008/2009, 
information on margins, commitment, utilisation, and participation fees had been available in 
roughly 50% of cases, this average fell almost to zero in the later years. 
Even though the share of deals where the tranche margin is available drops from almost 75% 
in 2004 to less than 11% in 2015, by 2015 the share of deals with AISD where the AISD is 
based exclusively on the tranche margin increases. This is because the availability of the other 
ingredients of AISD declined even more significantly compared to tranche margin.  
Because of these discrepancies, any analysis would not only face an oversampling bias 
towards the time before the crisis due to higher data availability, but there would also be a 
downward bias within AISD over the years, as more AISD values are identical to the 
respective tranche margin. Econometrically, the first issue might possibly be compensated for 
by assigning higher weights to later data points. However, the calibration of those weights 
might itself include new bias potential and could further increase the estimate volatility. 
4.5 Screening for inherent bias in the syndicated loan sample 
As discussed whilst debating some issues of bias in 3.4.3, samples might be inappropriate for 
conducting serious inductive statistical analyses if structural reasons appear to be responsible 
for certain data points being either available or missing (Remenyi et al., 1991). In other 
words, the sample would basically be “useless” if missing data would share systematic 
elements, inter alia via borrowers being affected by a disproportionally high degree of missing 
data leading to significant differences in central explanatory variables such as size and rating. 
Thus, I subsequently screen the data for such possible structural drivers. 
Figure 34 demonstrates that pricing data is more likely to be available for companies having 
obtained an external rating by S&P, Moody’s, or both. 
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 34. Pricing data availability: rated versus non-rated borrowers. 
As larger companies are also more likely to be externally rated, these data availability 
discrepancies between rated and unrated borrowers is related to the following plot (Figure 
35), which outlines the differences in average total deal values between deals where the 
respective pricing information is available for any of the tranches and those where it is not.  
In that context, Focarelli et al. (2008) stated that larger facilities are likely to be issued by 
large and transparent borrowers. Broad bases of supporting evidence has been provided by, 
amongst others, Anagnostopoulou and Drakos (2016), who have stated that externally rated 
enterprises in general and those with better ratings in particular carry lower loan pricings. 
Likewise, in their early contribution, Melink and Plaut (1986) found positive relationships 
between loan size, credit rating, and firm size. 
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 35. Missing analysis based on average deal values. 
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It is apparent that deals with available information are on average significantly larger. In 
2007, for instance, the average volume of deals with available margin amounted to almost €4 
billion, whereas volumes on missing information averaged approximately €750 million. The 
following descriptive scatter-plot displays more favourable terms of larger deals.  
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 36. Scatter plot: tranche margin versus tranche volume. 
It is thus reasonable to assume a related downside bias for the average costs of a deal whilst 
analysing publicly available data. 
The following graphs (Figures 37 and 38) display the development of respective ratios over 
time. A ratio of one would mean that a deal with available pricing information is exactly as 
large as one without (shown as a blue line). If the size of the deal was not a selection 
condition for the availability of pricing information, it was to be expected that the ratio would 
fluctuate by random chance around the value of one. 
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 37. Ratio: deal values of missing versus available pricing data. 
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However, the ratio persistently presents values greater than one and, for most variables, on 
average over three, as can be seen in Table 74. This and the strong fluctuations between the 
years provide evidence that the size of the deal plays a pivotal role with respect to the 
publication of deal pricings.  
Particularly, the tranche margin—the most commonly available information—displays a large 
spike during the financial crisis. In 2008, the average deal with an available tranche margin 
was circa nine times as high as compared to transactions, where the margin was unavailable. 
But, even in “normal” years, fluctuations from a factor of 4.8 in 2012 to 2.7 in 2013 are 
observable. As the size of deals is related to the terms, such fluctuations are likely to hide real 
developments and relationships the noise of varying deal sizes. Table 74 displays the 
respective mean ratios for the period under investigation. 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Table 74. Mean ratio: deal values of missing versus available pricing data. 
The following plot (Figure 38) shows the same proportionalities by using tranche instead of 
deal values. 
Margin 4.9
Commitment fee (RCF) 3.3
Utilisation fee (RCF) 3.8
Participation fee 2.4
Underwriting fee 2.4
AISD 4.1
Mean ratio: deal values of missing versus available pricing data
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 38. Ratio: tranche values of missing versus available pricing data. 
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The relationship of average tranche sizes for deals with available information to the rest 
mirrors the conclusions from deal sizes. Large fluctuations particularly during crisis years are 
likely to introduce a selection bias in any analysis as data is obviously not missing at random. 
 
Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Table 75. Mean ratio: tranche values of missing versus available pricing data. 
The preceding analyses powerfully indicate that the data sample is affected by severe bias 
issues and that the lack of published pricing data is due to structural reasons rather than being 
randomly induced. The question is now whether one can reshape the sample in such a way 
that it becomes “useful” again. 
4.6 Reconstructing a valid sample from biased data 
Various statistical methods attempt to reconstruct valid results based on incomplete data. One 
of the most famous is the so-called Heckman correction, also often referred to as “Heckit”. It 
is commonly used for self-selecting samples in economics145 (Heckman, 1974, 1976, 1979). 
The Heckman method uses a separate selection equation that models the probability of an 
observation being available. The estimate from this equation is then used in the main 
regression to correct for the selection bias, in this case, the higher probability of certain deals 
having publicly available pricing information. 
In econometrical terms, the main disadvantage of the Heckman correction is the tendency to 
produce borderline singular design matrices if the selection equation does not draw significant 
information from variables that are not in the pricing equation. In practical terms, this means 
that the Heckman correction tries to draw conclusions about an unobserved population from 
the observed data. This can only work if all the necessary information about the unobserved 
population can be deduced from the observed population and the information that is available 
about which members of the base population is part of the unobserved population. 
                                               
 
145 For example, wage equations in regions where a significant part of the population of interest is not working and, therefore, 
has no reported wages. 
Margin 3.9
Commitment fee (RCF) 3.3
Utilisation fee (RCF) 5.2
Participation fee 2.4
Underwriting fee 2.2
AISD 3.9
Mean ratio: tranche values of missing versus available pricing data.
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For the Heckman correction to work in practice, the underlying structure must be regular as 
even the best-case scenario is roughly equivalent to an x-value cut-off because of the nature of 
the data set at hand.146 This is compounded by the additional estimation volatility from the 
extrapolation and the numerical instability from a likely singular model. 
In summary, the Heckman correction should be employed if there are reliable selection 
variables—variables that predict whether data is observed but are not related to variables 
relevant to deal pricing—and the fraction of unobserved data is small and interleaved with the 
observed data. Neither applies to the sample at hand. Most of the relevant pricing information 
is missing, as discussed in the previous sections. Further, the main drivers for missing data 
that can be identified in the dataset are variables like year of signing, company size, and 
company rating, all of which are major pricing determinants. 
4.7 Excursus: a look at the U.S., UK and Eurozone markets 
As discussed whilst reviewing the literature, most studies on syndicated loan pricings are 
based on U.S. secondary data samples, whereas less research has been conducted based on the 
UK or other European markets, including the Eurozone.  
Having concluded that quantitative price analyses based on officially published information 
on the German corporate syndicated lending market would be problematic, it remains unclear 
whether public domain data in other markets is censored to a lesser extent and whether 
existing studies provide practical useful evidence. It would be beyond the scope of this 
research to attempt to answer this question in a comprehensive way. Instead, I cursorily 
examine these markets from 2010 to 2015 to highlight, if possible, some obvious structural 
differences.  
According to Figure 39, the U.S. market is shaped by significantly fewer missing tranche 
margin observations. For any given deal in the last six years, it is likely that the tranche 
margin is available if the deal was issued in the U.S. and that it is unavailable if it was a 
German deal. In 2015, 89.4% of missing tranche information for German deals compares with 
only 14.8% missing information for U.S. deals. 
                                               
 
146 The missing data is not homogenous among the explanatory variables. 
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 39. Missing pricing information: Germany versus UK, Eurozone, U.S. 
Quantitatively, the Eurozone (excluding Germany)147 and UK data availability appears to be 
slightly better compared to Germany; however, it appears significantly worse compared to the 
U.S. Other than in the U.S., in all the other markets, the share of missing margin information 
increased in the 2010 to 2015 period.  
In the U.S., the average deal size of those with published tranche margins is only slightly 
larger compared to those without (see Figure 40). This also holds true for the UK market from 
2012 on. With respect to the Eurozone (excluding Germany), the ratio between average total 
deal value of non-missing and missing data appeared to be equally low in the period of 2011 
to 2014, but to have increased significantly to three in 2015. 
                                               
 
147 With the exception of Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007), existing studies on Europe tended to look at Europe as a whole. In 
using a sample of only EURO-Zone countries, I assume a more aligned sample with view to the economic and financial 
development of its constituents. 
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Figure 40. Ratio: deal values of missing versus available pricing data (Germany versus 
UK, Eurozone, U.S.). 
In Germany, at its peak in 2008, the average deal with available tranche margin was roughly 
nine times as large compared to deals without available data. It is plausible to adjust results 
for the offset of the average deal size in the U.S., where available and missing data appear to 
be off by a maximum ratio of 1.5 in 2010.  
Thus, for the U.S. market, deal size provides no reason to conclude that the available pricing 
data does not represent the market, while in Germany this is obviously not the case. For the 
UK and Eurozone (excluding Germany) the data situation—based on this straightforward 
analysis—appears to be almost similarly critical with a view to quantity, but with a tendency 
of more randomly selected missing data points. Thus, analyses based on European data 
samples need in general to be interpreted with caution. 
The importance of borrower size for loan pricing is one of the major advantages of U.S. 
and—with some drawbacks—also for Euro Zone- (excluding Germany) and UK-based 
secondary data samples. 
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4.8 Conclusion and impact on further course of the study 
In summary, the German corporate syndicated loan data sample appears to be censored due to 
a high degree of non-randomly missing pricing data. Even the most elementary pricing 
component—the tranche margin—is not available for more than three quarters of all tranches 
in post-crisis years and for almost 90% in the last two years.  
For other elements such as the commitment fee, the missing proportion reaches as high as 
99% in 2015. The significant upward movement of the proportion of missing data points—in 
case of the tranche margin from 30% in 2000 to 89% in 2015—is a strong indicator that data 
is not missing randomly. 
These above-mentioned phenomena cause serious issues for the use of the information for 
quantitative analysis in general and for those of smaller deals in particular.148 Remember that 
the average value of tranches with available margin amounts to over €1 billion, which is 
almost four times larger than those of the tranches in general, a fact making reconstructive 
methods like the Heckman correction to appear impractical. 
While it is never possible to conclude with certainty that the data is not missing at random, 
both the timing of the deal origination and its size are obviously major drivers for the pricing 
of a German corporate syndicated loan. Therefore, it is not sensible to assume that the data is 
missing at random. The predictive power of possible regression analyses would, therefore, be 
limited.  
The Heckman correction can never substitute for an almost total lack of information 
(Heckman, 1974, 1976, 1979). Such methods allow researchers to correct for systematically 
missing data in the margins of the observed range. In this case, the range of interest is almost 
entirely missing. Even sophisticated statistical methods can only extract the maximum 
information being available in a set of data. For example, were no data on smaller companies 
available, but were data available only on large multinational corporations, then no model 
would be able to provide information on smaller companies beyond the information from 
corporations that might apply to smaller companies or extrapolations of such. This issue 
appears particularly important in light of the wide differences in size of German corporate 
syndicated loan borrowers as presented in 2.4.2.1.  
                                               
 
148 Most likely thus, for smaller firms. 
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To summarise, the discussion provided in this chapter highlights major weaknesses of 
publicly available pricing data for the German corporate syndicated lending market. Due to a 
non-random sample selection, a statistical analysis, using publicly available pricing 
information as dependent variables to produce practical useful evidence on pricing 
determinants, is not appropriate.  
A qualitative study is thus necessary to shed light on these issues. Furthermore, the question 
as to why the German pricing data situation is shaped by such a high degree of opacity 
remains to be answered. 
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5 Research findings and discussion: qualitative fieldwork 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 is devoted to the discussion of RQ 2, RQ 3, RQ 4, and RQ 5 and to meet their 
corresponding objectives. Further, I provide some supplementary insight and broad 
confirmation of the hitherto established findings regarding RQ 1 as established in Chapter 4. 
The related interview processes and analysis procedures have been extensively discussed 
within the respective sections of Chapter 3. For the sake of clarity, I underpin the findings and 
discussion with sample citations of the research participants in un-numbered tabular formats. 
Throughout the chapter, I critically compare these findings with extant literature and with the 
findings of the preceding quantitative study. This enables me either to confirm, extend, or 
contradict existing evidence and, thereby, identify key findings that will eventually form the 
basis of contributions to knowledge. 
5.2 Pricing opacity—the underlying rationales  
As concluded in Chapter 4, publicly available data, especially with respect to pricing, is 
structurally censored. Over time, data transparency has deteriorated and is—other than in the 
market for U.S.-based borrowers—characterised by a high degree of missing pricing 
information. Hence, constructing meaningful quantitative pricing measures for German 
corporate syndicated loans appears impossible. To shed light on pricing-related phenomena in 
general and with respect to their determinants in particular, a qualitative study was necessary 
that—addressed via RQ 2—begins by exploring the underlying phenomena and rationales of 
the pricing opacities. 
First, I briefly present findings of the qualitative fieldwork regarding the publicly available 
data quantity and quality to confirm findings of the statistical analyses. Hence, sections 5.2.1 
and 5.2.2 summarise the opinions of the respondents concerning the quality and quantity of 
available data, before I discuss the reasons for the lack of transparency in the German market. 
 General syndicated loan information 
Regarding some basic German corporate syndicated loan related information, such as 
borrower name, deal amount as well as the initial lender group, all interviewees reported solid 
degrees of transparency. 
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Finding: Regarding syndicated loan announcements in general and certain basic-level 
deal elements such as loan amount, the market transparency appears sufficient. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 You see most transactions being reported to league table providers. You have borrower names, you 
have volumes, and so on. 
I 6 Quantity is ok. You still get information on most of the loans that are relevant to us. I would guess that 
circa 80% of the loans we do are in the public sphere. They are publicised via Dealogic Loanware or 
LPC, for instance. 
I 8 There are data providers that collect data for the German corporate syndicated loan market. The best 
one is Dealogic Loanware in my view. It is quite complete when it comes to deals of certain sizes. 
From € 50 million onwards, most of the loans are mentioned in the database, as the banks want to get 
league table credit. You will, for example, find information on who the borrower is, what the volume 
is, and who the lending banks are. 
I 12 The accuracy in terms of deal volumes is very good. 
 
Hence, the German market at first view seems to be transparent with respect to public 
syndicated loan related information. 
 Pricing related information 
By means of extensive quantitative analyses throughout Chapter 4, I presented major 
shortcomings regarding public availability of pricing information for German corporate 
syndicated loans. With respect to quantity and quality of publicly available pricing 
information, all interviewees confirmed this by reporting major inadequacies. In line with the 
findings presented, pricing information is rare, and, if any, only initial margin information 
tends to be in the public domain. However, initial margins are said to constitute only one 
element of multidimensional pricing packages, making it impossible to conclude what the 
total loan-related costs are. In other words, these costs are hidden to outsiders, such as 
financial researchers. 
Finding: Regarding syndicated loan pricing elements in general, the market is 
characterised by a high degree of opacity.  
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The following interviewee statements illustrate this finding: 
I 1 In terms of pricing, you hardly find any public information. 
I 2 In some cases, you may find that the initial margin is disclosed or mentioned somewhere. However, 
usually other key elements of an all-in-pricing, like upfront fees are not in the public domain. These 
other elements, however, are often key constituencies of the total pricing by representing a relatively 
high percentage of the overall pricing. 
I 6 We basically have no more deals, where margin or general pricing information is published. You only 
know that there is a deal and maybe who the lending banks are and maybe what the tenor is. 
I 8 You will usually not find information about the margin and other pricing elements or any covenant of 
the loan. 
I 9 There is nearly nothing available in terms of pricing data. 
I 17 We have no proper publicly available historic database on margins and other pricing elements in the 
German corporate market. 
 
The conclusions drawn in Chapter 4 established that publicly available pricing information in 
the German market is very limited. This was confirmed by the interviewee statements.  
In 2015, for instance, only in roughly 10% of the reported transactions were initial margins 
disclosed with this percentage being reduced further with respect to various other pricing 
elements such as utilisation or certain upfront fees. In 2015, no single utilisation and 
participation fee was published. Moreover, even within this 10% group, a clear bias was 
reported towards larger deals and, thus, larger borrowers, as well as towards transactions 
issued by externally investment-grade-rated companies. According to the data, back in 2008, 
for instance, deals with publicly available margin were on average almost nine times as large 
compared to transactions lacking such public information.  
This is consistent with the view of 18 interviewees who argued that initial margin information 
was only publicly available for very large and usually stock-listed multinational companies 
and here mostly for their back-up facilities. For smaller borrowers with private legal forms, 
one hardly finds any public pricing information.  
Finding: Regarding pricing transparency, one needs to distinguish between certain 
borrower characteristics, such as size and legal form. Smaller, private companies are 
less likely to publish pricing information compared to larger and/or listed ones.  
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The following statements of interviewees substantiate these findings: 
I 4 Whenever you have a private company, you often do not find any information at all. 
I 5 For larger, rated high-grade borrowers, the information gets more available and it is more public, 
because the attention to the deal is bigger when you have a multibillion facility for instance. However, 
these facilities are mostly back-ups with very low margins. If these clients go for acquisition financing, 
pricings would most likely also remain private. 
I 9 I can only get data, let us say, from the very large companies, from the DAX companies, for example, 
or from LBOs, in which it is usual to disclose pricing information. 
I 17 Only high-grade companies might still be willing to provide such pricing levels to the outside world. 
 
Next, all research participants confirmed the findings of Chapter 4 by suggesting that the 
degree of pricing publicity significantly deteriorated towards the end of the investigation 
period 2000 to 2015. Especially during and after the financial crisis around 2008/2009, 
publicity levels plummeted and, remarkably, have not recovered since then. 
Finding: Between 2000 and 2015, the financial crisis period marks a divergence with 
respect to publicly available pricing data. 
The following interviewee statements underpin this phenomenon: 
I 2 Pricing publicity has gone away since the crisis and it–interestingly–has not returned. 
I 4 It changed a lot after the financial crisis. The announcement of loan details, the willingness to 
announce pricings has shrunk dramatically. 
I 5 It has changed dramatically from 2008 and 2009 onwards. 
I 14 Market publicity is almost completely gone since the crisis. 
 
Without any contradiction, the findings mirror the quantitative analyses of Chapter 4.  
As a side note, these broad confirmations provide strong support for the assumption of a high-
quality interviewee sample that provides credible and rich insights to the phenomena under 
study. Here, quantitative and qualitative data were used to provide a means of triangulation. 
The consensus in this respect provides a measure of confidence in the validity and reliability 
of the forthcoming discussions, where quantitative data is commonly not readily available to 
provide this triangulation. 
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 Reasons for German corporate syndicated loans pricing opacity 
Next, I focus on the underlying reasons for pricing opacity. Based on the answers of the 
industry experts, I am able to identify certain primary patterns and explanations for the pricing 
opacity within the German corporate syndicated loan market. 
5.2.3.1 Borrowers’ discretionary power 
By law, German corporates have the power of discretion as to whether to publish their 
syndicated loans at all, and if so, to what degree of depth with respect to certain transactional 
parameters such as pricing. In line with Voisey (2016), other than public bond or equity 
markets, the German corporate syndicated loan market is private and discreet in nature. 
Thus, for the market under investigation, I challenge the earlier cited general remark of 
Champagne and Kryzanowski (2007, p. 3,146): “While most inter-bank relationships are not 
observable to outsiders, loan syndicates represent visible manifestations of bank interactions 
that can be studied”.  
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 Borrower bank relationships are private. They remain confidential amongst those parties who are 
participating in it. In addition, even in the facility agreement you would not find all elements of 
pricing. Only what is paid to everybody is disclosed in the facility agreement (e.g., margin or 
utilisation or commitment fees). Certain upfront fees like coordination or documentation fees are for 
the arrangers only. These fees are usually agreed upon in the mandate documents or even in separate 
fee or side letters. At the end, you would never have the full picture. 
I 3 This is mainly due to the very private, discrete nature of the syndicated loan market. 
 
This privacy right and the power of discretion regarding a possible publication of information 
is commonly addressed by special loan documentation clauses, as mentioned by 15 
interviewees, confirmed by Slaughter & May (2013) and exemplified by the following 
statements: 
I 2 You have confidentiality agreements in the legal documentation and in the mandate documents, which 
makes it up to the borrower to decide whether he wants to disclose anything. Banks without 
permission of the borrower cannot disclose anything. 
I 4 Whenever it comes to publicity, there is a standard wording in the mandate documents, which outlines 
if the borrower is fine to announce the loan after it has been signed. It is fully at the borrower’s 
discretion. This is a German speciality. First, we have the so-called “Bankgeheimnis” in Germany, 
which is something of very high value for our clients. 
I 12 Usually at the signing of a loan agreement, there is a section regarding publicity on what can be 
disclosed and based on that information will be released or not.  
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5.2.3.2 Borrowers tactically exercise its discretionary power 
Nineteen interviewees expressed the view that some borrowers choose to publicise their 
syndicated loan and its pricing—mostly, however, only the initial margin—as a consequence 
of being proud to having obtained especially attractive terms. Hence, the pricing 
announcement can be interpreted as a signal of borrower strength to other market participants.  
Finding: Borrowers tactically exercise their discretionary power whilst making certain 
pricing elements public or not. Signalling and striving for confidentiality are the main 
related drivers.  
These facts enhance the understanding of the pricing downside bias within public loan 
samples presented in 4.5. Signalling motivations appeared to be more pronounced in the years 
prior to the financial crisis around 2008/2009. As pricing levels tended to increase during and 
in the immediate aftermath of this crisis, publicity levels plummeted. Although pricing levels 
dropped again, the degree of publicity not only remained low, but even deteriorated further—
a phenomenon that remains to be understood. 
Overall, the foregoing discussion confirms the findings presented in the quantitative analysis 
in Chapter 4 and provides an enriched understanding, as exemplified by the following 
statements: 
I 1 There might be very few exceptions, such as where corporates and their treasury teams are keen to 
show to the market that they have made a success. 
I 2 There are only a small number of exceptions with view to some highly rated, mostly listed blue chip 
companies. For marketing purposes, some of them disclose their initial margin, which then becomes a 
statement of their financial strength when they got away with an optically very low pricing. 
I 4 Each corporate, before the financial crisis, proudly presented its very small, tiny, little margin, that 
was negotiated with its bank-group to demonstrate the market, what a perfect and strong credit it was. 
But during the crisis, pricings went up and nobody or hardly anybody had the interest to present these 
increased pricings to the public. Therefore, since then we have seen a lack of public pricings and this 
remains stable until now. 
I 10 There was a bit of a competition between treasurers and CFOs to get the best deal. In addition, you 
could see that every CFO, every treasurer, was keen on getting broadcasting and press releases out. 
First, because he did a deal at all, and second, because it was very cheap. Moreover, the next one 
came saying, I did a deal too and it was even cheaper. 
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Besides the general downside bias, the statement of interviewee three introduces additional 
bias potential which I describe as the single transaction pricing downside bias, grounded on 
tactical borrower considerations. 
I 3 Especially large back-up revolving facilities are usually structured with utilisation fee concepts which 
reduce the initial undrawn margin. After the crisis, borrowers only published this very low margin 
without mentioning utilisation fees. Thus, it looked at a first few very cheap. However, that does not 
reflect what the borrower would really have to pay if he would actually draw down cash. 
 
Many revolving credit facilities—especially those that are not intended to be frequently drawn 
—are equipped with utilisation-fee-concepts. Utilisation fee(s) are add-ons to the margin in 
the case of a drawdown.149 Thus, only to publish the initial margin, which non-industry-
experts might interpret as the “real” cost of borrowing, might lead to distorted assumptions 
about the market by underestimating current prices for certain risks.  
In their regression analyses of the European syndicated lending market, Gaul and Uysal 
(2013) controlled for a similar assumed downside bias, however grounded on a different 
assumption. They hypothesised that, during the financial crisis, lenders increased only the 
upfront fees by holding margin levels constant. The higher upfront fees would then not have 
been published, leading to a possible market-misperception of pricing. The results of Gaul and 
Uysal after controlling for this possible bias did, however, hold, indicating, that this was not a 
regular pattern in Europe.  
The thoughts of interviewees 2 and 12 confirm this. 
I 2 This is no issue in the corporate syndicated loan world. It is however sometimes seen in syndicated 
loans for financial institutions in emerging markets. These loans usually have a tenor of only 364 days 
and everyone thus looks at the all-in-yield. In that area, after the crisis one somewhat played with 
margin and fee levels to look strong for the outside world. 
I 12 From my experience, this happens in the Asian market where fees are discussed on an all-in-basis. 
Some state-owned enterprises for example may prefer to pay a higher fee and lower margins. This will 
vary depending different variables. Regarding Europe, I'm sure that this could happen but how 
significant is this occurrence? I haven't heard that this is common practice here. 
 
Some interviewees explained that, in practice, certain pricing elements like upfront fees and 
margin elements do not substitute for each other. A borrower who, based on various pricing 
determinants, is required to pay a relatively high margin, also faces relatively high upfront 
fees. This is in line with Berg et al. (2016), who suggested that fees depend on the respective 
                                               
 
149 See sections 2.5 and 5.3.1.1.8. 
Research findings and discussion: qualitative fieldwork 195 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
borrower risk and are not idiosyncratic in nature. Supporting evidence is provided by Barbosa 
and Ribeiro (2007), who found margins and fees to be complements rather than substitutes.  
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 16 There are so many different stakeholders and often competing interests in syndicated lending and with 
respect to pricing. All must be satisfied. Playing around with these elements by simply putting one 
element down and the other high, would not work in an environment, where such a broad consensus is 
needed. 
I 21 Substitutability of pricing elements in syndicated lending is basically not possible due to the high 
number and diversity of involved parties. This may be possible in bilateral loans, where you can make 
such bespoke deals with a borrower. In syndicated lending, when a borrower must pay a high margin, 
he also needs to pay an accordingly high participation fee for instance. 
 
With respect to my German loan sample, in 2009, arguably a year of crisis and financial 
turmoil, in 29.5% of the loan tranches, the initial margin was published, compared with 0% of 
published utilisation fees. Thus, the earlier statement of interviewee three, highlighting the 
“single transaction pricing downside bias” based on tactically hidden utilisation fees, appears 
reasonable. This issue relates also to the functioning of AISD as presented in 4.3.3. 
Remember, AISD is an automatically calculated field that, in theory, incorporates margin plus 
annualised fees. However, once the tranche margin is available, an AISD gets automatically 
reported by the data provider, irrespective of whether all or any other parts of the equation are 
available. 
Besides signalling and other tactical considerations, a key motivation of borrowers to hide 
pricing information purposely is their striving for confidentiality. This might be driven either 
by relatively high pricing levels, which enterprises intentionally hide, or by general 
preferences for privacy. This preference is said to be especially pronounced in private legal 
form firms across the size spectrum, constituting a major share of German corporations. 
Beside this softer factor, which is arguably closely linked to a general German mentality, 
more hard-headed competitive tactics, like intentionally hiding pricing information from 
direct competitors, probably play a role.  
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All interviewees agree with these outlined reasons, exemplified by the following statements: 
I 2 One of the reasons certainly is that people do not want to disclose what their actual costs of 
borrowings are. 
I 4 Talking about financials and personal earnings is not common and not liked, whereas in the U.S. for 
instance, people are proud on declaring what value they have contributed. Therefore, this is 
something, which is very special in Germany. 
I 5 They do not want to give other competitors maybe of the same industry the knowledge about their 
funding situation or the prices they are paying for debt. Further, the German mentality is also adding 
to that. You want to stay more in a private terrain also to avoid benchmarking by competitors. 
I 9 Firms are generally reluctant to publish any information where competitors or other parts in the 
public can look deeper into their company, because it also gives a sign how a bank judges the 
respective risk. 
I 13 We notice as well that an increasing number of clients do not want publicity.  
 
Beside these legally-induced and rather borrower-led reasons for opacity, some interviewees 
reported lender-induced drivers of opacity that I discuss next. 
5.2.3.3 Banks' implicit compliance and regulatory obedience 
According to nine interviewees, in the early 2000s and until the financial crisis around 
2008/2009, it was standard market practice that banks included some pricing information into 
their league table submission sheets.150 Borrowers often appeared to sign off on these without 
further questioning or attempts by banks to persuade them to do so. However, pricing 
information is not compulsory by league table and market data providers like Dealogic 
Loanware or LPC to obtain league table credits. 
Finding: Nowadays, banks no longer push clients to announce pricing information and 
tend to focus solely on league table relevant information. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
150 After a syndicated loan is closed the bookrunner provides the respective data provider with a sheet (“league table 
submission sheet”) that contains the deal information being intended to be published. If certain criteria are met, the deal will 
be published and the bookrunners were allocated with the related bookrunner volume. Does a €100 million transaction inter 
alia consist of two bookrunners and two further non-bookrunners, the two bookrunners were allocated €50 million league 
table volume each. Pricing information are not compulsory in that respect. Given the reported discretionary power above, 
clients need to agree on any sort of publication and hence need to sign-off these submission sheets (Dealogic Loanware, 
2016). 
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The following interviewee statements exemplify these findings: 
I 1 Banks are not striving for a disclosure of the margin. Maybe that was the case before the crisis. Banks 
maybe tried to convince the client to disclose the margin and they said yes. Today, banks, when they 
send the league table submission to the client for sign-off, they often do not try to include the margin 
or other pricing elements, because they already know what the answer will be. 
I 8 Banks do not really push for it anymore. The banks try to get the volume published in the system to get 
the league table credits. The bookrunner league table is very important. Publishing the margin is not 
an important thing as it is not a condition to get league table credits. That is the reason why they are 
not pushing the borrowers. In the early 2000s, it was just a market standard. After a deal, banks filled 
a deal form, which included the margin and that was then signed off by the borrower and then sent to 
the league table provider. This kind of market standard then changed. After 2008 and 2009, the 
companies then simply said “no” and did not sign-off the data provider submission sheet. 
I 11 Banks do like to get the league table submissions in. So, if it was required that a certain amount of 
information was included in the league table submission sheet then they would try to do what they can 
to get permission to disclose that. But if they do not have to disclose it, they won`t. 
 
This finding directly leads to the question why banks are no longer pushing for borrowers’ 
consent to publish pricing-related information. Analysis of the interview statements allows 
two major conclusions to be drawn concerning the drivers of the lenders’ behaviour in this 
respect. The first is an implicit compliance and regulatory obedience and the second is the 
banks’ intention to protect private market intelligence. 
After periods of deregulation in the general banking system, the aftermath of the financial 
crisis saw increasingly strict regulatory and compliance environments (LMA, 2015). Many 
banks were convicted and had to pay major penalties for non-compliant behaviour and some 
still face pending lawsuits.  
Finding: Without concrete legal and regulatory requirements, banks, with regulatory 
compliance pre-eminent, are cautious about publishing price-sensitive data. 
Eight interviewees argued that these issues are the main reasons for banks not to push any 
longer for public pricings. 
I 6 I assume that the decline in public data was a function of bigger discussions around LIBOR initially. I 
think that probably started it. The LIBOR discussion whether there was price fixing and anti-
competitive behaviour. That made people much more worry about anti-monopoly and cartel issues and 
this then coupled with the fact that the English authorities changed the rules on anti-competitive 
behaviour. That made people very much aware that discussing and disclosing pricing could potentially 
be seen as anti-competitive behaviour. 
I 11 In addition, there were some regulatory changes on that front as well. There was some guidance 
provided by some regulators to disclose less and to make sure that no confidential information is 
disclosed. But what exactly is confidential? It is not written in law that a margin is confidential. 
I 12 What happened was that the increasing compliance topics made it that banks could not send all the 
details they wanted to and borrowers did not want to get the details out. 
I 13 Generally, the market is getting more opaque which has to do with regulation and things like LIBOR 
manipulation and so on. There is not much information exchange between the banks any more. 
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As it has always been mandatory for clients to provide consent for submissions to data 
providers, this reluctance appears to be illogical at first glance, as emphasised by the 
following statement of interviewee eight. 
I 8 Publishing pricing has always been subject to client approval. When we were using league table 
submissions, also before 2008, we did always ask the client for approval and its sign-off. Therefore, 
from a compliance and regulatory point of view, this is and has always been fine. 
 
I interpret these superficially contradictory statements as follows: Regarding the related 
behaviour of banks, a difference between “legally permitted” and the “perception of 
permission” seems to be apparent. The influence of legal and compliance issues on the work 
of loan professionals appears to be overwhelmingly present today. The fear of misbehaving 
which nowadays ultimately tends to be accompanied by individual consequences, as well as 
major financial penalties, appears to make bank-employees to behave in an “over-compliant” 
way. I will now focus on the second bank-led element, the protection of market intelligence. 
5.2.3.4 Banks’ intention to protect private market intelligence 
All interviewees felt that currently the German syndicated loan market is shaped by fierce 
competition, where huge levels of loan supply face only modest levels of demand.151  
As one key discipline in syndicated lending is the calibration of “right” or, in other words, “at 
current market” pricing packages, a high degree of pricing publicity would lead to a sharing 
of market intelligence of established big lenders with less established and smaller market 
players.  
Finding: Especially in competitive market surroundings, some banks strive to build up 
private market intelligence. 
Nine interviewees shared this view, exemplified by the following statements: 
I 4 Whenever you declare pricings, it is market intelligence, which you as a bank share with your 
competitors. Banks often have an own interest to keep pricings unrevealed. 
I 12 Then even the banks often do not want the market to get certain information on the loan, as the private 
kind of knowledge is a valuable thing. 
I 17 On the other hand, it is also related to the banks and particularly to the leading banks, because it is 
obvious, that it is not necessarily in the interest of a few leading banks to provide all other market 
participants, which must have access to public information, your private and sensitive pricing 
information, because this is obviously very much valuable to those lead banks. 
                                               
 
151 See section 5.5.15.2.  
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 Prioritisation of reasons for pricing opacity 
Within the previous paragraphs, I first confirmed the findings of the quantitative analysis. 
Publicly available data on German corporate syndicated loans is affected by bias, with both 
quality and quantity having significantly declined in recent years. Thereafter, I established the 
main factors contributing to this situation. Next, the question of which groups of factors are 
the main drivers and which might play only minor roles remains open.  
A prioritisation of the reasons for the low quality of public pricing data appears reasonable, 
although tentative, as illustrated in Figure 41, where the three clusters of drivers are shown in 
rank order in descending order of influence. 
 
Figure 41. Reasons for pricing opacity (prioritisation). 
The general nature of the market, or more specifically the fact that borrowers by law carry the 
discretionary power to publish any deal information at all, and to what degree, is a sufficient 
condition for the manifestation of opacity and hence the strongest contributor.  
Then, I classify borrower-related reasons, especially the striving for confidentiality, as the 
second important one. I ground this classification on the frequency and lack of diversity of 
related interviewee statements. All the research participants argued that confidentiality is a 
key concern for German corporates. Furthermore, 12 interviewees would opt for more or even 
full transparency if they were enabled to change the market, as illustrated by the following 
quotations: 
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I 7 If I could, I would opt for more or even complete transparency and the key reason for this is: Let us 
take a small side step: We probably need to differentiate between relationship-driven best efforts deals 
and underwritings. If you go for an underwriting, you are in a very significant risk with respect to 
syndicating this successfully in the market and getting down to your approved hold amount. To do so, 
you certainly welcome any detail you can get hold of, with respect to how other transactions went and 
were they were priced. For that reason, from my point of view, complete transparency would be the 
ideal environment.  
I 11 If it were my decision I would go for full transparency I think it makes the market more competitive. 
I 12 The dream of any economic model is perfect competition, which basically means perfect transparency. 
But it is clear that you have a lot of information asymmetry overall. Having complete disclosure would 
be something tremendous for the market. 
 
The interview data, combined with a significantly lower frequency of mentions of bank-
related reasons overall, led me to rank them as the lowest importance as drivers of opacity. 
 Excursus 1: the U.S. market 
Section 4.7 provided an overview of the U.S. market and highlighted strong indications that 
U.S. data quality appears to be significantly more representative compared to German data. I 
challenged this throughout the qualitative fieldwork and 13 interviewees confirmed greater 
transparency in the U.S. Once a U.S. borrowers’ loan consortium contains at least one non-
bank-lender, the enterprise has issued public bonds, and/or is a publicly traded company, it is 
by law obliged to publish all deal-related information with the SEC. In that vein, Schenone 
(2010) stated the need of SEC-compliant behaviour to lead to more transparency. Further, via 
the secondary data provider “Compustat”, balance sheet data are also readily available for 
SEC-eligible companies, a resource used by numerous authors of U.S. studies to match loan-
specific financial data with borrower-specific financial data.  
Interviewees offered views on major general differences in the way U.S. capital markets 
function. It was said to be more open and investor driven. This is in line with, Bartram, 
Brown, and Stulz (2012) holding U.S. capital markets to be more developed and innovative 
compared to the bank-oriented markets in Europe, such as the German. In other words, 
compared with Germany, the U.S. financial system is more capital market-orientated.  
Finding: The market for corporate syndicated loans in the U.S.—especially with view to 
publicly available pricing information—is more transparent as compared to the German 
one. 
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 3 The major difference that you see is with the U.S. market, where listed companies by law are obliged 
to file their whole documentation package with the SEC. You even see mandate documents or fee 
agreements being published. That is where you can find out what the complete pricing details under 
each transaction are.  
I 7 The U.S. market it is working very differently anyway. In a way, that the corporate market in the U.S. 
is largely driven by sub-investment grade rated clients. In the first instance, we have a clear majority 
of all those borrowers having an external rating, which is not the case in Germany. That already 
brings a certain level of publicity. These clients are used to share information firstly with the rating 
agency and then in the rating report who finds its way into the public. Whereas especially in Germany 
but generally in Europe–as only relatively view companies are rated–it is a very different picture. It is 
also a problem when comparing pricings of transaction “x” with pricing of transaction “y” because 
you do not have a common rating view. 
I 11 The U.S., for example, has a much greater depth of information because of the SEC, which requires 
that any loan that is sold to an investor, or any security that is sold to investors, must provide a 
prospectus approved by the SEC to the public. So, all the loans that are sold to an investor in the U.S. 
do receive an SEC-filing and, therefore, these have the margin and a lot of the fees and you have the 
full bank list and things like that. Therefore, you have a lot more information in there. 
 
These statements underline the fact that it is worthwhile to conduct studies on a single-
country-level. As mentioned whilst reviewing the literature, most studies have been conducted 
by means of using U.S.-based loan samples. Given the major structural differences, this is 
likely a worthwhile approach for the U.S. market especially, but probably unsuitable for 
drawing comprehensive conclusions about the German market. Further, syndicated loan 
markets worldwide are fragmented and not fully integrated, with borrowers overwhelmingly 
issuing loans in their respective home market. In other words, they tend not to cross borders 
and lender portfolios display significant home biases (Barbosa & Ribeiro, 2007; Carey & 
Nini, 2007; Gaul & Uysal, 2013). I later establish that foreign banks that are active in the 
German corporate syndicated loan market need to adapt to certain local requirements to 
conduct business successfully, a further indication that there is not full integration.  
These differences might least partly explain “the pricing puzzle” whereby pricings in Europe 
are lower compared to the U.S., all else being equal. I discuss this issue in more depth in 
section 5.5.13.2. 
 Excursus 2: the wider European market 
With a view to the wider European corporate syndicated lending market, interviewee 
statements appear to be somewhat diverse. Some interviewees state the publicity situation to 
be quite similar in all major European countries, whilst others report differences.  
Finding: Besides some regional differences, the public pricing data situation in major 
European countries is said to be similarly weak to that of Germany. 
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I plot some sample statements about this below: 
I 1 From my observation, I would not say that this is only a German issue. It is definitely also pronounced 
within Europe 
I 2 European markets are in my view not very different, because the way funds are being raised in the 
European loan market for corporates is the same all over the place. Therefore, I would not say that 
French or Spanish borrowers tend to be more open about their costs of funds then Germans. 
I 12 In Europe, the market is still regional. If you look at the UK market, the French market, the German 
market you will see German banks lending into Germany, and so on. You have the international 
investment banks doing more of the M&A-deals. With general corporate financings, it is domestic and 
there you can see the relationship nature of the market in Europe, which still prevails. In terms of 
publicity I observe the German situation to be particularly problematic. 
 
These statements are broadly in line with the reported degree of pricing publicity in the Euro 
Zone (excl. Germany) as well as in the UK, where the proportion of missing data appear to be 
only slightly lower than in Germany. However, according to the ratio of total deal value of 
non-missing to total deal value of missing pricing information,152 samples of these markets are 
likely to be less severely affected by bias. 
 Excursus 3: further financing products and syndicated loan asset classes 
With a view to other sub-asset classes of syndicated loans and other financing products, 14 
interviewees expressed a higher degree of transparency compared to corporate syndicated 
loans. 
Finding: Within the German market for syndicated loans, LBO-financings are found to 
be more transparent compared to general corporate financings. This holds also true for 
the corporate bond market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
152 See Figure 40. 
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The following statements exemplify this finding: 
I 3 The LBO market in Germany is as transparent as you would expect it to be in any other markets of the 
world. The structure of that market is essentially different in the sense that it is investor driven. It is 
from that perspective similar to the bond market. The investors in an opportunistically way will 
require certain pricings and will accommodate to the structure, will have to accept the structure, (e.g., 
the advantage and other key elements). They are fine with the pricing to be publicly known. That is 
different in the corporate loan market which is mainly relationship driven. 
I 8 The corporate bond and the LBO-market are much more transparent. These markets are of a different 
nature compared to the corporate bond. 
I 12 The bond market is a public market, where you usually have a prospectus. It is a lot more visible. You 
have to get investors to buy your paper and no one will buy a black box. They want to know what is 
inside. Therefore, you must give the market participants as much details as possible and there is a 
need for disclosure. The investor needs to know where they are putting the money. The loan market is 
very somewhat clubby, when we are looking at the corporate market. The relationship bank 
community in Europe is also local. You will not have a Spanish loan without a Spanish lead bank on it 
normally. In addition, it will be a small group of banks. Thus, there is no incentive to get every detail 
out. 
 
This finding further supports the decision to exclude other syndicated loan asset classes in 
conducting the study of corporate syndicated loans.  
 Conclusion: German corporate syndicated loans’ pricing opacity 
In general, financial markets tend to have become more transparent and innovative over time 
(Berg et al., 2017). Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007) and Santos and Winton 
(2008) stated that database coverage regarding syndicated lending has followed the same 
pattern, constantly improving in recent years. At least with respect to pricing of German 
corporate syndicated loans, this trend, however, follows a reverse direction, with the 
respective reasons for this increased pricing opacity having been extensively discussed and 
established above. Based on the previous discussion in conjunction with the findings of 
Chapter 4, it is reasonable to summarise and conclude: 
Finding: Publicly available pricing data on the German corporate syndicated loan 
market is biased and does not adequately represent the population. Moreover, the 
multidimensionality of pricing and its related phenomena cannot be studied based on 
officially published information. 
The following statement finally underpins this: 
I 12 I do not think from a pure corporate German perspective, public pricing data would be representing 
the population adequately. If we look at how much disclosure we have compared to the volume it is 
pretty much none. In the past, it was easier to get pricing data. It was relevant to have pricing but 
right now you have pricing on some deals you can have a direction on it but it is not statistically right. 
Looking at the German market there are nearly no data publicly available. 
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Based on the quantitative analysis and the supporting evidence from the qualitative research, 
RQ 1 can be said to have been thoroughly explored and answered, with a high degree of 
consensus among the interviewees. 
Regarding research RQ 2 and the interrelated objective, I have clarified and prioritised the 
underlying causes of the opacity. During the interviews, I could explore the ways in which 
borrowers’ discretionary power with respect to pricing announcements enables them to 
exercise discretion tactically, as well as to address their general striving for confidentiality. 
Further, bank-related reasons for opting for non-disclosure have been shown to support the 
trend towards opacity and its current scale.  
Hence, it is reasonable to summarise and conclude as follows: 
Finding: The pricing opacity of the German corporate syndicated loan market has 
multidimensional roots in general market-, borrower-, and lender-related drivers. 
The answering of the first two research questions carries powerful implications with respect to 
the further course of the study. Further extensive qualitative fieldwork is thus needed to study 
German corporate syndicated loans’ pricing determinants as relevant publicly available 
quantitative data is not readily available, thereby preventing quantitative analyses. Further, 
given the overall opacity, much remains unknown in relation to the various pricing elements 
in general, their respective raison d`être, and their interaction. It is important to remember 
that pricing information in the public domain appears to be even rarer with regards to 
elements other than the initial margin. In other words, it so far remains unclear what the term 
“pricing” constitutes in German corporate syndicated lending. I address these shortcomings in 
5.3 and 5.4. by providing answers to RQ 3 and RQ 4 respectively. 
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5.3 Classification and prioritisation of syndicated loans’ pricing 
elements 
In line with RQ 3, the core goal of this section is to explore the classification and 
prioritisation of the various German corporate syndicated loan pricing elements from a 
lending banks’ perspective. For the market under study, this remains an empirical goal, due to 
the low degree of pricing publicity and the fact that extant literature tends to lump pricing 
elements together into one single measure. In other words, the relative importance of one 
pricing element versus another remains unclear to date. 
It is important to note that publicly available data, both in Germany and worldwide, mainly 
covers the basic pricing elements like initial margin or, in even rarer cases, other elements 
such as a participation or commitment fee. Secondly, extant academic literature, which is 
mostly based on publicly available pricing data, also predominantly focuses on these basic 
elements, making it challenging to capture the complexity and interconnection of syndicated 
loan pricing structures adequately. 
During the first interviews, the list of pricing elements brought up by the research participants 
became increasingly extensive, and elements were mentioned that were not yet covered by 
any extant academic literature. Due to the problem of data availability and the methodological 
approaches of existing studies, numerous pricing elements and their underlying rationales 
remain so far unobserved and undiscussed in the literature. Therefore, I first provide a 
straightforward and comprehensive listing of pricing elements, their functions, and underlying 
rationales, before focusing on their prioritisation from a lender’s standpoint.  
Accordingly, from interview three onwards, I explicitly asked what (“all”) the various pricing 
elements of German corporate syndicated lending are, for what each of them compensates the 
lender or other involved parties, and how they function and interact in practice. Based on the 
findings that were generated, I present a comprehensive summary of pricing elements and 
some new practical insights. Later in the thesis, I propose two novel pricing 
measure/definition frameworks—one qualitative and one quantitative—with the aim of 
portraying the overall pattern of “pricing” more completely than the frequently used proxies 
introduced in 2.5. 
Table 76 depicts the pricing elements, arranged by two initial ordering dimensions, which is 
in line with the syndicated lending literature in general (Altunbas et al., 2006b; Fight, 2004; 
Rhodes et al., 2004). 
Research findings and discussion: qualitative fieldwork 206 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
 
Table 76. Corporate syndicated loan pricing elements. 
Table 76 distinguishes the various pricing elements by their payment frequency, as shown by 
the column headings. In line with the literature, and as stressed in 2.5, recurring elements, of 
which the majority are paid on a per annum basis, are common in corporate syndicated 
lending. Secondly, and in line with Hale and Santos (2009), non-recurring elements also 
occur—most of which become due once a syndicated loan has been signed—to compensate 
lead banks/lenders for various tasks. Hence, these payments are often referred to as upfront 
fees. In addition to these payment types, various fees payable in specific instances during the 
lifetime of a syndicated loan also commonly occur. 
 Margin  Participation fee
Margin grid Old/new money fee
Foreign currency premium Increase fee
Extension fee
Waiver fee
Interest rate period Amendment fee
Breakage fee
 Commitment fee
 Facility fee Documentation agency fee
Fee skim/pool
 Utilisation fee Invited/"passive" arr./bookr./coord. fee
 Underwriting fee
 Duration fee
 Advisory/structuring fee (bank related)
 Early bird fee
 Facility agency fee  Transfer fee
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The elements are also arranged with respect to their overall connectivity to syndicated 
lending. The first grouping displays the common/usual pricing elements being incorporated 
within the majority of facilities, especially in general corporate financings. The second 
grouping shows elements grouped under the heading “special features”, being typical in 
special purpose and more complex financings, such as underwritten acquisition financings. 
The third grouping includes several servicing elements commonly paid annually or semi-
annually for administration of the loan during its lifetime.  
The fourth group comprises “3rd party elements”. These are non-bank parties such as external 
lawyers, who are involved in syndicated lending with their work having to be compensated 
accordingly (Altunbas et al., 2006b). As I am conducting my study from the bank/lender 
perspective, servicing and 3rd party elements are beyond its scope, but a discussion of these is 
provided in Appendix E. 
I continue by explaining the respective raison d`être and operative functioning of each 
element. Where appropriate, I support my discussion with citations of extant academic works, 
“textbook” literature, and related publications of the Loan Market Association (LMA153), along 
with sample quotations from the research participants.  
 Common/usual pricing elements 
5.3.1.1 Per annum-/recurring elements 
5.3.1.1.1 Margin 
The margin is also commonly called risk premium or spread, and is expressed in basis points 
or in percent per annum (Rhodes et al., 2004). Regarding margin, I located no controversies 
within the literature, as it can be said to be the standard element of each credit pricing, 
compensating a lender for the default risk taken (Antczak, Fabozzi, & Lee, 2012; Ghattas, 
1987; Watson & Head, 2001). Even in corporate syndicated lending, margin levels can range 
from only very few basis points—for example, in the case of commercial paper back-up 
                                               
 
153 The Loan Market Association (LMA) is the trade body for the EMEA syndicated loan market and was founded in 
December 1996 by banks operating in that market.  Its aim is to encourage liquidity in both the primary and secondary loan 
markets by promoting efficiency and transparency, as well as by developing standards of documentation and codes of market 
practice, which are widely used and adopted. Membership of the LMA currently stands at over 600 and consists of banks, 
non-bank lenders, law firms, rating agencies and service providers. The LMA has gained substantial recognition in the 
market and has expanded its activities to include all aspects of the primary and secondary syndicated loan markets.  It sees its 
overall mission as acting as the authoritative voice of the EMEA loan market vis-à-vis lenders, borrowers, regulators and 
other interested parties (LMA, 2016a). 
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revolving credit facilities for high-rated multinational stock-listed firms—to a few 
percentages for sub-investment-grade firms.  
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 The basic element is always the margin. The margin should usually reflect the risk of the respective 
counterpart. 
I 5 The margin is an element to be paid for the risk involved.  
 
5.3.1.1.2 Margin grid 
Syndicated loans are usually equipped with margin grids—also referred to as ratchets, or 
more theoretically, performance-based pricings (Asquith et al., 2005). Over the loans’ 
lifetime, the margin is linked to such a grid, which itself is tied mostly to an external rating, if 
available, or to specific balance sheet ratios like leverage or interest rate coverage. If, for 
instance, the leverage ratio rises or the external rating deteriorates during the lifetime of the 
loan, the borrower must pay higher margins to ensure the increased risk being reflected. In 
other words, initial margins, which are the only or the main ingredient of extant pricing 
proxies, might change quickly after signing. Hence, concrete margin-related payments in 
syndicated lending can only be known ex post. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 We commonly see rating or leverage grids, where the margins are dependent on leverage or rating 
changes. 
I 8 Margins are usually dependent on certain balance sheet ratios of the client via margin grids. There is 
an initial margin and a margin development over time. The margin grid adjusts the margin based on 
financial ratios over the lifetime of the loan. 
 
In the German corporate syndicated loan market, in contrast, for example, to the U.S. 
market,154 such grid structures are almost never publicly available. If there are any, the initial 
margin is in the public domain as discussed in Chapter 4. 
5.3.1.1.3 Foreign currency premium 
Foreign currency premiums represent add-ons to the margin. Numerous syndicated loans— 
mainly RCFs—are equipped with so-called multi-currency-options. A €100 million RCF may 
also be fully, or in pre-agreed portions, drawn, for example, in USD, GBP, or CHF (Slaughter 
                                               
 
154 Via respective SEC-filings, whole facility agreements are commonly made public as commented upon in section 5.2.5. 
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& May, 2013). The specific funding costs for these foreign currencies by, for example, 
German banks might be higher compared to Euro-related costs as a bank having its natural 
funding base in Euros needs to purchase USD itself and must pay the respective price of the 
related cross-currency swap.155  
Thus, lenders may require this premium, exemplified by the following interviewee statement: 
I 17 This is a premium, which is relevant under specific circumstances to provide investors, which might 
have problems to get the respective currencies funded at the same pricing levels as those banks, which 
are dealing in their home markets. For instance, USD are easily available for U.S. banks, but not 
necessarily for those banks which are acting out of Europe and which would need to fund USD via the 
New York market. 
 
5.3.1.1.4 Reference rate  
Common syndicated loan facilities are floating rate instruments (Altunbas et al., 2006b). 
Borrowers pay the price of a base/reference rate156 such as EURIBOR for Euro-denominated 
loans or LIBOR for USD-denominated ones. The margin and perhaps further margin elements 
are added to the value of the reference rate. This summation, from a borrower’s point of view, 
can subsequently be interpreted as the interest rate or the coupon (Fight, 2004; Slaughter & 
May, 2013).  
In principle, the base rate component of this coupon should compensate banks for their costs 
of funding (Voisey & Slocombe, 2011). Under this assumption, the reference rate represents 
the price at the interbank market which institutions need to pay whilst borrowing money 
themselves (Hallak & Schure, 2011). Following this assumption, banks would face no 
duration risk via syndicated lending (Gupta et al., 2008). Further in this thesis, I will why this 
is only a theoretical assumption and why banks’ costs of funds tend to be higher in practice, 
compared to the respective EURIBOR-values. 
The following statements exemplify the respective interviewee thoughts: 
I 1 The reference rate should compensate the banks for their costs of funds, at least in theory. In today’s 
markets, we see that this is not necessarily the case. 
I 16 If the reference rate changes over a time, like EURIBOR or LIBOR does frequently, then of course the 
pricing for the facility over time changes, unless he hedges the interest rate change risk. Today we 
have a further issue–negative interest rates, which may even reduce the margin and the all-in-pricing. 
We usually work with certain floor languages here to protect the bank. 
                                               
 
155 See section 5.5.3.4. 
156 Also regularly referred to as risk-free rate, prime rate or benchmark. 
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Today, the reference rate turns out to be negative for various maturities (interest rate periods), 
a fact that does not necessarily lead to negative funding costs for banks. The phenomenon of 
negative reference rate values raises the question as to how this issue is handled in practice. 
How it gets addressed is established in the facility agreement.157  
5.3.1.1.5 Interest rate period  
Interest rate periods are closely linked to the reference rate, with an interest rate period 
representing the duration of the particular reference rate value. If a borrower decides to pay an 
interest rate based on a three-month period, it must compensate lenders with the three-month 
reference rate value at the time of funding plus the margin, and maybe further per annum 
elements too, such as a foreign currency premium and/or utilisation fees. Common in the 
German corporate syndicated lending market are periods of one, two, three, and six months 
(LMA, 2013). After three months, the borrower may decide to prolong or roll-over for another 
three-month interest rate period, or to switch to another agreed option. At the end of each 
interest rate period, a borrower is allowed to repay the loan amount without having to pay so-
called breakage fees,158 a fact that distinguishes the floating rate from a fixed rate debt-
instrument. This again is related to the underlying assumption of the reference rate being the 
price to which a bank funds itself via the interbank market. Thus, after the three-month 
interest period, this interbank credit to the respective lender is also due, and no financial 
damage for the bank should occur to repay and cancel the facility.  
The following interviewee statement on interest rate periods exemplifies this: 
I 17 Interest periods are relevant because most, if not all, syndicated loans are provided on a 
variable/floating basis, and therefore interest rate periods will be agreed between banks and the 
borrower. The most common ones are three and six months, and under certain circumstances, there 
are one- or twelve-month periods available. The duration of the reference rate is defined as the 
interest period. 
                                               
 
157 There are three common options: 
a. The lowest value that the reference rate may take is zero. Thus, a negative value of the reference rate has no implication 
on the margin itself. Assume a borrower agreed to pay 100 bp p.a. margin over Euribor, which (for the respective interest rate 
period) values at -10 bp p.a. Then, the borrower would still have to pay 100 bp p.a. margin to the lenders. The respective 
clause is called “Zero Floor”.  
 
b. A negative reference rate reduces the margin as long as it turns to be zero. It can, however, never fall below zero. In 
other words, the margin plus reference rate cannot fall below the value of zero. With view to the aforementioned straight-
forward example, the margin would be reduced by 10 to 90 bp p.a. In a thoretical case in which the reference rate would fall 
further to -110 bp p.a., the margin erosion would stop at zero and not fall to -10 bp p.a. The respective clause is called “Zero 
Coupon”.  
 
c. There is no such limitation mentioned in the facility agreement, and the margin may fall below zero. 
158 See section 5.3.1.2.2. 
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5.3.1.1.6 Commitment fee 
Commitment fees must be paid by the borrower for the undrawn portion of a revolving credit 
facility on a per annum basis, and are usually calculated as a percentage (commonly 35- or 
40%) of the applicable margin. From a bank’s perspective, an undrawn loan commitment can 
be defined as contingent assets or claims. However, the banks must allocate a certain portion 
of liquidity and common equity159 to this claim. With respect to the liquidity coverage ratio 
(LCR)—one element of Basle III160—regulators recommend the assumption of drawdown 
rates of 10% for back-up revolvers and 30% for RCFs with draw-intention (LMA, 2015). In 
line with Altunbas et al. (2006b), commitment fees should compensate for this. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 The commitment fees simply compensate the lender for providing a commitment. Even though we do 
not lend the money effectively—meaning we do not give the money cash away—we do have costs as a 
bank. These costs are costs for liquidity or funding as well as RWA that have to be allocated. 
I 8 The commitment fee is a percentage of the margin and it covers for the credit commitment that you 
provide, because you have to book the risk into your internal system and you have to allocate equity 
and liquidity to it. It basically covers your regulatory and risk costs for the undrawn amounts. 
 
5.3.1.1.7 Facility fee 
Facility fees carry similar underlying rationales compared to the commitment fee. However, 
the concept works differently, as here fees are to be paid on the whole loan amount, 
irrespective of whether this commitment is drawn or undrawn (S&P, 2011). According to 
interviewee 21, facility fees are not common in the German and wider European syndicated 
loan market, and rather tend to be a U.S. market standard. 
I 21 Facility fees are common in the U.S., and applicable for revolving credit facilities. The concept is 
comparable with the commitment fee concept in Europe, but the difference is that the facility fee must 
be paid on the whole loan amount irrespective of whether it is drawn or not. 
 
5.3.1.1.8 Utilisation fee 
Utilisation fees are add-ons to the respective margin in case a revolving credit facility is 
drawn. It is usually staggered, based on different drawing percentages (Rhodes et al., 2004). 
As outlined in the literature review and during the quantitative analysis, a fully drawn margin 
                                               
 
159 In form of risk-weighted assets (RWA). 
160 See section 5.5.11.3. 
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may be significantly higher than the initial margin. The rationale behind this concept is two-
fold: First, higher drawings may represent higher indebtedness and, thus, higher risk, and 
second, higher funding and equity allocation costs need to be reflected.  
Since most revolving credit facilities that carry utilisation fee concepts are used for back-up 
purposes, and are not intended to be ever drawn, the question then occurs: why does one 
simply not set the margin as it would be in a hypothetical case of (full) draw-down? The 
underlying rationale is linked to the commitment fee, which is what the borrower must pay 
per annum over the lifetime of the undrawn loan. Since it is expressed as a percentage of the 
margin, it would be much higher if the margin was directly set as being fully drawn. In other 
words, 35% of 100bp, is less than 35% of 150bp.161 To conclude, one key underlying rationale 
is to reduce commitment fee related payments for borrowers as well as to protect the bank for 
possible increased cost-bases in a draw-scenario. Under certain circumstances, this might also 
be important to mitigate possible funding cost mismatches162 of banks vis-à-vis borrowers. A 
further underlying rationale in relation to the raison d'être of utilisation fees has already been 
mentioned in 5.2.3.2. To recap, several clients tactically decide to publish only the initial 
margin without mentioning the utilisation fees, leading to apparently very cheap pricing for 
outsiders relying on publicly available data. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 In an RCF, the utilisation fee is a further component of the margin. It usually works this way: If the 
facility is drawn up to 1/3, the borrower must pay a certain amount of utilisation fee on top of the 
margin (e.g., 15bp p.a.). If it is drawn up to 2/3, you pay a higher utilisation fee which is a 
compensation of the higher capital costs banks have then (e.g., 30bp). If it is fully drawn (e.g., 50bp), 
the utilisation fee, in addition to the margin, should be a proper reflection of the capital costs that the 
banks have, as well as providing a proper risk premium. 
I 5 In addition, the margin is accompanied with utilisation fees that are added to the margin for revolvers, 
mainly for standby facilities, which are supposed to remain undrawn. The utilisation fees help banks to 
cover their liquidity costs. Further, it enables clients to reduce the commitment fee. 
 
The discussion on utilisation fees revealed several complex underlying rationales that, given 
the almost complete lack of related public data, would have been impossible to reveal, based 
on officially published information. 
                                               
 
161 Margin plus fully drawn utilisation fee in light of Table 12. 
162 See section 5.5.3.4. 
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5.3.1.2 Upfront-/non-recurring elements  
5.3.1.2.1 Participation fee 
Participation fees are usually one-time paid fees, being awarded after signing. Participation 
fees are usually expressed in basis points based on the committed loan amount of the 
respective lender. In theory, participation fees should only be rewarded to the participants in a 
syndicated loan, who have on behalf of the borrower been invited by the active structurer(s)163 
to join a facility. While the per annum elements are equal for each lender, participation fees 
are usually staggered in the sense of a rising function of the commitment size. This fact 
already indicates that the overall remuneration or overall yield of a syndicated loan financing 
varies in a sense that those banks who provide a larger commitment receive higher upfront 
fees in general (Carey & Nini, 2007; Hallak & Schure, 2011).  
The following table displays an example: 
 
Table 77. Example: participation fee staggering. 
Participation fees can thus be interpreted as an incentive for participating banks to commit to 
a relatively higher commitment rather than a lower one, improving the likelihood of 
successful syndication. Further, the fee can be defined as compensation for the upfront work164 
that an invited bank must facilitate before committing to join into a loan. In practice, however, 
it is standard for an active bookrunner, for example, to receive participation fees as well. I 
explicate the underlying rationale for this phenomenon in a later section of this chapter. The 
discussion thus far has already indicated that the concrete labelling of the various pricing 
elements is not necessarily logically linked to the respective use in practice, which might lead 
to misinterpretation by inexperienced observers. 
From an accounting perspective within banks, participation fees and the upcoming 
participation fee sub-forms are treated as per annum elements by being amortised over the 
                                               
 
163 For example, bookrunner(s)/mandated lead arranger(s)/coordinator(s); see section 2.4.6. 
164 For example, preparing loan application, going through approval committees, etc. 
Title Participation amount Participation fee (upfront)
Mandated Lead Arranger € 30,000,000 75 bp
Lead Arranger € 20,000,000 60 bp
Arranger € 10,000,000 45 bp
Example: participation fee staggering
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lifetime of the loan165 and preserved as interest surplus. This issue will be returned to later in 
this chapter.166 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 In addition, the participation fee is to compensate for providing the commitment upfront, and it is a 
market standard of which the client not only pays a p.a. component, but also an upfront/one-time 
component at the beginning. 
I 5 Another element is the participation fee. It is an upfront fee which is paid in the beginning of the 
transaction. Banks need to annualise it over the lifetime of the facility. Thus, in a certain way, it adds 
to the margin as well. 
I 8 The participation fee covers the upfront work that you have in your credit decision for kind of doing 
the credit analysis, getting the internal rating, and the approval. 
I 15 Participation fees have more or less evolved to a margin element over time; it has evolved to a delta, 
which helps you to get to the overall return. 
 
These discussions provide some first and basic thoughts on the underlying rationale for usual 
participation fee payments. There are a few further fee types which I have classified as sub-
forms of participation fees. I do this because these fees are also payable based on the 
committed amount, and carry major characteristics of the general participation fee rationale in 
the context of a common syndicated loan. These are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
5.3.1.2.1.1  Old/new money fee 
There might be a situation during the lifetime of a syndicated loan in which the borrower 
intends to increase the initial loan amount. This intention to increase occurs “spontaneously” 
or, in other words, has not been pre-agreed in the loan agreement via, for example, an 
increase option. Thus, these fee elements cannot be measured and incorporated at loan 
signing (ex ante). Existing lenders, in such a material change of the loan terms, can decide 
whether to “stay in” with their existing amount or to increase their current lending 
commitment. To incentivise existing, or perhaps, new lenders, borrowers are sometimes 
inclined to offer old/new money fees. In the case an existing bank decides to just stay in the 
facility with the same commitment, it would be rewarded an old money fee, or in other words, 
a new participation fee. For new or old banks who decided to increase their existing loan 
                                               
 
165 Such an amortisation may look as follows: Assume a €100 million syndicated loan with a five-year maturity pays 50 bp 
participation fees to the lenders. These €500 thousand from an accounting point of view are allocated to the respective 
receiver within the bank on a daily basis. Five years equals 1,825 days with a resulting in €274 participation fee allocation 
each day. In the case the client decides to refinance or pay-back the loan after three years (1,095 days), the remaining €200 
thousand (730 days at €274) are being released and allocated in one lump. 
166 See section 5.3.3. 
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amount, a new money fee would be applicable on the newly committed amount. Logically, 
old/new money fees cannot be incorporated in an ex ante pricing measure such as the AISD. 
The following interviewee statement exemplifies this: 
I 21 Old money fee is a kind of pricing component which is applicable under circumstances where you 
intend to increase the amount of an existing loan. You aim at least to maintain all the existing 
relationships and existing commitments, and to increase the amount by either letting in new banks or 
letting existing ones increase their commitment (new money fee). It is a tool to incentivise old and new 
loaned money in such a scenario. With the old money fee, existing lenders should at least be inclined 
to maintain the existing commitments and new money needs to be sufficiently incentivised as well via 
the new money fee. 
 
5.3.1.2.1.2  Increase fee  
Like old or new money fees, increase fees are elements serving as an additional kind of 
participation fee in the case the facility amount is increased by the borrower. The distinction 
between old or new money fee elements is that usually an increase option and the respective 
increase fee levels are pre-agreed whilst negotiating the initial contract. Usually, the increase 
amount is fully funded by existing banks and no new banks typically need to join to fill the 
new demand. As it is ex ante impossible to anticipate, if and when the increase option is 
exercised, the fee type cannot be reflected in a pricing measure created at signing. 
The following statement from interviewee 17 exemplifies this: 
I 17 Increase fees are fees which are applicable under deals, where increase options have been pre-agreed, 
that can be exercised during the lifetime of a loan. Normally, those of increase fees are payable at the 
relevant date when the company opts for such an increase, and will be payable to those banks on the 
value of their increased amount. 
 
5.3.1.2.1.3  Extension fee 
If the borrower intends to extend the maturity—either without prior formulation in the facility 
agreement or via pre-agreed extension options—lenders usually receive a new participation 
fee, named extension fee, in case they agree to extend the loan to a longer maturity. Again, it 
is ex ante impossible to anticipate if an extension option will be exercised. 
The following interviewee statement exemplifies this: 
I 8 Extension fees are agreed under deals with extension options. In these days, you usually see 5+1+1-
year facilities. In other words, this is a five-year loan with the option to extend it by one or two years. 
The extension fee is often pre-agreed in the loan agreement at signing as a pricing component, which 
is payable at the date of the relevant extension for those banks which are willing to extend their 
commitment. Further, it is possible to negotiate this fee only at the time of the respective extension 
request based on the current borrower and market situation. 
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5.3.1.2.1.4  Waiver fee/amendment fee 
In the case where a certain contractual element of a facility agreement, like a financial 
covenant, is violated, the client may ask its lenders “simply” to waive this through once or for 
a specific period (waiver) or to change the facility agreement constantly in that respect 
(amendment). The need for a waiver or an amendment might have loan contract technical 
reasons with such contractual adjustments being common in the case of a deterioration of the 
borrower’s credit quality. Further, also the borrower might actively request a waiver or an 
amendment to improve certain elements of the contract (e.g., margin, maturity, financial 
covenants).  
Thus, the waiver and amendment fee negotiation might be based on a new credit risk 
assessment during the loan’s lifetime. As it is ex ante impossible to anticipate whether such 
fees might occur, they cannot be captured via pricing measures created at signing. 
The following interviewee statement exemplifies this: 
I 18 Waiver fees and/or amendment fees are related to transactions where the client is asking for either a 
waiver or an amendment during the lifetime of a loan. Clients are then asking the banks for giving 
their consent to this particular request. A waiver can be an easy one, saying interest periods of one, 
three, and six months are agreed via the facility agreement and the client is now asking for a two-
month interest period. That would be quite easy for the banks. However, if you are asking for a waiver 
of a leverage covenant, (e.g., not to be tested for one testing period), this could be a waiver that is 
more risk relevant. In general, a waiver just allows the borrower to be “non-compliant” with a 
contractual feature once. Thereafter, the facility agreement—as negotiated before signing—is valid 
again. An amendment could be: the respective borrower has two financial covenants and would like to 
ask the banks for the rest of the period for the existing facility to have only one covenant in place any 
more. That will be quite a substantial and risk-related amendment where banks would probably ask 
the client to pay some kind of fee to agree on a more aggressive documentation. 
 
5.3.1.2.2 Breakage fee 
Syndicated loans are floating rate instruments which could thus be cancelled/repaid without 
penalty at the end or after each interest period (Slaughter & May, 2013). In case a client 
intends to repay whole or parts of a loan within a running interest period, banks might charge 
a breakage fee—a kind of penalty—to be compensated for their breakage costs.167 Again, it is 
ex ante impossible to anticipate whether such fees might occur. 
 
                                               
 
167 The respective calculation is based on the difference between reference rate (e.g., EURIBOR) from the early repayments’ 
settlement date to the next due date of the agreed interest rate period. 
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The following interviewee statement exemplifies this: 
I 14 In the case, a client is asking for a cancellation of the whole or a part of a drawn facility, banks might 
ask for a breakage fee to receive some compensation for their related costs. It is only applicable for 
cancellations within a running interest period, because the syndicated loan is usually a floating rate 
instrument that can be cancelled after an interest period at any point in time, at the discretion of the 
borrower. 
 
5.3.1.2.3 Arrangement/bookrunner/coordination fee 
In 5.3.1.2.1, I provided insights into the various participation fee-type pricing elements and 
their underlying rationales. In relation to this, I also stressed that the theoretical and first 
intention rationales are often hidden and driven by special interests and market practice. This 
also holds true and appears to be even more prominent and bespoke for 
arrangement/bookrunner/coordination fees and their various sub-formats. The labelling of 
this fee which anecdotally simply was an “arrangement fee” evolved in parallel to the various 
syndicated loan titles introduced in 2.4.6. Hence, the concrete fee labelling depends on the 
agreed title structure of a loan that might individually differ, though its raison d'être is 
identical.168 Theoretically, this fee is a compensation for the numerous works that active 
“arrangers”, “bookrunners” or “coordinators” must execute “upfront” to successfully place a 
facility in the market. These tasks include preparing several documents, such as mandate 
letter, term sheet, invitation letter, and sometimes an information memorandum,169 negotiating 
the facility agreement, inviting banks, organising the bookrunning, and so forth. Other than 
the participation fee elements, arrangement fees, from an accounting perspective, are not 
amortised over the loan lifetime. They are usually fully “booked” as commission surplus and 
allocated at signing.   
 
 
 
                                               
 
168 Hence, going forward, by possibly using only one term—“arrangement fee”, “bookrunner fee” or “coordination fee” the 
respective meaning is identical. This is also important in light of the diverse interviewee statements in this context. 
169 According to LMA (2013, p. 10), such a memorandum “is typically prepared by both the arranger and the borrower and is 
circulated by the arranger to potential syndicate members. It will typically contain an executive summary, a commercial 
description of the borrower’s business, management and accounts, and a financial model, as well as the details of the 
proposed loan facilities being given, and typically includes a sample term sheet. In addition, the information memorandum 
will usually include a statement from the arranger limiting, as far as possible, its liability for the content of the information 
contained in the document”. 
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 The upfront fees are a compensation for the work of the arranging bank–like inviting other banks, 
preparing the documentation, etc. 
I 2 The arrangement or structuring fee is usually an element paid to the one, two, or three arranging 
banks in a loan for the work of structuring the transaction, running the syndication, engaging with the 
syndicate of banks, answering questions of invited banks, and so on. These banks might be labelled 
bookrunner or coordinator nowadays, whereas it simply used to be the mandate lead arranger in the 
past that received an arrangement fee. The title structures and related fee labelling is not necessarily 
rational. 
I 5 In addition, there are various elements of fees that you can imagine. It also depends on the structure of 
the financing, and you usually have arrangement fees that are for the bookrunner and for the 
arranging banks that sign the mandate letter with the client, and that usually get paid an arrangement 
or bookrunner fee for the work they have put upfront into the deal. 
I 14 Other than participation fees, arrangement fees, or whatever their concrete labels might be, must not 
to be amortised. So, this is a real upfront fee from our point of view. 
 
5.3.1.2.3.1  Documentation agency fee  
The documentation agency fee is a special sub-format of the arrangement/bookrunner/ 
coordination fee, being the compensation for the arranger, bookrunner or coordinator, who—
among other tasks—carries the special role of the documentation agent who needs to draft 
mandate letters and term sheets and to serve as the main contact of the external law firm that 
drafts the facility agreement. Especially when it comes to more complex transactions, the 
arrangement and structuring process is said to be smoother when there is a documentation 
agent who organises the time-consuming and demanding documentation and negotiation 
processes. This fee element is often completely hidden not only to the wider market, but also 
to the other bookrunner(s) and participants, and is facilitated via so-termed fee side letters.170  
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 A documentation fee, for instance, is a fee paid when a bank is particularly good in structuring and 
negotiating documentations based on broad market knowledge. It may make sense for a borrower to 
engage a particular bank to set up the documents to ensure that the final documentation is on in line 
with its competitors. 
I 3 Then you have specific work fees that you may see for documentation work at certain times. These fees 
are individually bespoke. It is not in every transaction where you would see that. 
I 16 From my point of view the most time-consuming work by setting up a syndicated loan is related to its 
documentation. Having a good documentation agent is valuable in that case. This agent also needs to 
be compensated. 
 
 
                                               
 
170 According to LMA (2013, p. 11), “details of these fees are usually contained in separate side letters to ensure 
confidentiality“. 
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5.3.1.2.3.2  Fee skim/pool  
The fee skim, also referred to as fee pool, represents an “extra compensation” for the 
arranger(s), bookrunner(s) or coordinator(s) which is created through an “intelligent” 
invitation processes. Technically, it is the difference between the agreed upfront fee wallet for 
the whole facility and the fees actually paid out to the participants. If the bookrunners are able 
to place the facility with participants successfully without rewarding them with the full wallet, 
they may take this difference as extra compensation. Table 78 displays an example calculation 
for this fee. Here, an overall participation fee of 30 bp has been agreed between lead bank(s) 
and borrower. For the smallest ticket size (€20 million), lead banks however only award these 
participants 25 bp and thus increase their own revenues by circa €14,000 via the “pool fee”. 
Hence, the difference increases the lead bank’s fee income. 
 
Table 78. Example: Fee skim/pool. 
The following statement exemplifies this: 
I 17 Fee skimming is somehow equal to the so-called fee pooling. In typical syndication scenario, a lead 
bank invites banks for different commitment levels, and it is normal market practice that those banks, 
which are providing higher commitments, will be paid a higher fee than those ones who provide 
smaller tickets. If you agree with a company, the upfront fee elements, for the overall facility amount 
and are thus able to allocate fees for the participating banks on your own, the skimming kicks in. 
When you receive commitments from banks on lower levels, you pay out smaller amounts of fees. The 
difference between the overall fee and the paid-out participation fees to the invited banks is called 
skim or pool. This normally is something that the lead bank(s) will earn additionally. In practice, in 
many cases these days, particularly with companies with an excellent credit rating, fee skimming is not 
going to take place, as borrowers would not agree on this. 
 
 
 
Facility amount € 400 mn
Participation fee 30 bp
Investor Initial commitment (€) Final allocation (€) % € Pool fee (€) Total (€)
Bank a 55,000,000.00 47,500,000.00 0.30 142,500.00 14,166.67 156,666.67
Bank b 55,000,000.00 47,500,000.00 0.30 142,500.00 14,166.67 156,666.67
Bank c 55,000,000.00 47,500,000.00 0.30 142,500.00 14,166.67 156,666.67
Bank d 40,000,000.00 34,500,000.00 0.30 103,500.00 103,500.00
Bank e 40,000,000.00 34,500,000.00 0.30 103,500.00 103,500.00
Bank f 40,000,000.00 34,500,000.00 0.30 103,500.00 103,500.00
Bank g 40,000,000.00 34,500,000.00 0.30 103,500.00 103,500.00
Bank h 40,000,000.00 34,500,000.00 0.30 103,500.00 103,500.00
Bank i 20,000,000.00 17,000,000.00 0.25 42,500.00 42,500.00
Bank j 20,000,000.00 17,000,000.00 0.25 42,500.00 42,500.00
Bank k 20,000,000.00 17,000,000.00 0.25 42,500.00 42,500.00
Bank l 20,000,000.00 17,000,000.00 0.25 42,500.00 42,500.00
Bank m 20,000,000.00 17,000,000.00 0.25 42,500.00 42,500.00
550,000,000.00 400,000,000.00 1,157,500.00 42,500.00 1,200,000.00
Participation fee
Example: Fee skim/pool
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5.3.1.2.4 Invited/“passive” arrangement/bookrunner/coordination fee 
In practice, carrying the title “arranger”, “bookrunner”, or “coordinator” does not necessarily 
imply that such a bank is actively putting together the facility and “running the book”. It may 
be the case that such banks were awarded the title because they committed to a relatively high 
amount. Without being provided with this title that enables them to be awarded important 
league table credits, the chance of a successful syndication would be smaller. In other words, 
these “bookrunners” are only named as such but perform none of the work of an active one. 
Thus, technically, they are only participants. Besides the participation fee, these invited or 
passive bookrunners also commonly receive a bookrunner fee. This, at first glance, appears 
counterintuitive—as does the fact that these banks are labelled “bookrunners” at all. One key 
driver of also getting allocated such a fee is the accounting standpoint, mentioned earlier. This 
component enables these passive banks to book some fees fully at the moment of signing as 
commission surplus. The endeavour for this is related to internal incentive structures within 
banks—a phenomenon that I comment upon later in depth.171  
The following interviewee statement exemplifies this: 
I 15 This issue has changed over time. For big deals, where we were invited for a pure participation, in the 
past we would have just been awarded a participation fee, let us say, 50bp. These days you probably 
must say participation fee is 35bp and arrangement fee 15bp, which is completely paid up-front and 
not to be annualised over the lifetime of the loan, which participation fees mostly are. 
 
This phenomenon is another example of hidden market mechanisms carrying serious bias and 
misclassification potential for quantitative studies, in which all named bookrunners are likely 
to be treated as active ones. This is particularly important in the huge strand of information 
asymmetry literature that focuses on lead bank and participant bank interactions. Furthermore, 
these hidden compensation structures cannot be captured via public secondary data sets. 
 Special features elements 
The various syndicated loan pricing elements discussed above are common in straightforward 
general corporate financings. Syndicated lending is, however, also a frequently used tool to 
finance special purposes such as acquisitions (Voisey, 2016). In such special financing 
arrangements, special and usually complex fee structures also occur. 
                                               
 
171 See section 5.3.3.2. 
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In line with my earlier discussions, I arrange these special elements under per annum-
/recurring and upfront-/non-recurring elements. 
5.3.2.1 Per annum-/recurring elements 
5.3.2.1.1 Ticking fee 
The ticking fee is a common per annum element in acquisition financings. It functions like a 
commitment fee although is percentagewise regularly set lower. Frequently, acquisition 
financing facilities are signed before the precedent conditions are met. In other words, the 
draw-down is blocked until these conditions are satisfied. This might be the case in bidding 
processes for targets in which the results remain open. However, certainty of funds is required 
to submit a binding offer in the first place. It might also be the case that antitrust approvals are 
pending, as is the payment of the purchase price. In this period after signing and before the 
legal possibility to draw down the loan, ticking fees are paid, because lenders at this time 
already have to allocate liquidity and equity (RWA) to this commitment. Based on the 
practical pricing example for such a loan (Table 79), until the facility is unlocked and 
subsequently drawn down, the borrower must pay ticking fees.172  
Practically, today, ticking fees might be the only margin-like per annum income during the 
whole lifetime of an acquisition financing even if the M&A deal turns out to be successful. 
This is because many of companies only need the signed facility agreement to substantiate 
certainty of funds at the bidding stage. If the deal turns out to be successful and the need 
arises for cash funding, then often a bond or Schuldschein take-out is issued quickly and only 
parts of the acquisition loan, or none at all, are ever utilised. These facts and pricing issues are 
not captured by public data providers and are thus hidden. The actual related payments that 
occurred can only be known ex post. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
172 13bp p.a. in t0 (10% of 130bp p.a.), 26bp p.a. in t1 (20% of 130bp p.a.), and so on. 
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 3 As an element on the interest side again, we have the ticking fee in acquisition financings, which is 
meant to compensate for the capital costs of participating banks for the period prior to the actual 
possibility of the client to draw down the loan. That is often priced lower than the traditional 
commitment fee and it only covers the reservation of capital for that participation of any bank during 
that period that the client can actually not draw. Nevertheless, the bank has already blocked the 
capital. 
I 8 You have a ticking fee element as well. This means that given that such a financing is tied to an 
acquisition and the client is not sure if he really gets the target, whether the acquisition will occur or 
not. Therefore, instead of paying a full commitment fee, the client has to pay a ticking fee until he is 
really in the position of drawing the funds. 
 
5.3.2.2 Upfront-/non-recurring elements 
5.3.2.2.1 Underwriting fee 
In syndicated lending, two major syndication modes are common: “best efforts” and 
“underwriting”.173 In the latter case, the bookrunner(s), instead of just committing a part of the 
facility amount (best efforts) commits to fund the whole amount and faces the risk of not 
being able to place fully the residual between intended final take and initial underwriting 
commitment into the wider market (Rhodes et al., 2004). Facing this market risk is usually 
compensated by underwriting fees, to be paid upfront to the underwriter (Fight, 2004; Sickel, 
2010). In practice, the underwriting fee and other upfront elements are not necessarily fully 
paid upfront, but might instead be staggered according to several milestones within an 
acquisition process. From an accounting standpoint, banks are allowed to book this upfront 
fee fully at the time of its payment. What payments actually occurred, however, can only be 
known ex post. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 In an acquisition scenario, which is the most common one where you usually have the underwriting 
fees, these compensate the bank for the risk of pre-funding a group of banks. In acquisition financings, 
the reason for starting with a small group of underwriters, or even only with one single bank, is 
confidentiality. As a borrower, you usually need to have the funding in place before you actually place 
an official bid for a certain target. That is usually provided by a relatively small group of banks that 
support you with an underwriting. 
I 5 In acquisition finance, you add underwriting fees. It is a component to pay for the financing security 
provided to the borrower in a situation where he needs financing, secured financing at a certain point 
in time and you make that available to the borrower. In addition, you are paid for that because you 
take more as you would usually take into your books for a certain period. You afterwards invite other 
banks to join into the deal, which then are paid a participation fee. 
                                               
 
173 See section 2.4.7.1. 
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5.3.2.2.2 Duration fee 
Term loans in acquisition financings are commonly structured as bridge loans with a 
relatively short lifetime or lifetime staggering. The intention here is to “take out”/refinance 
this bridge with, for example, a public corporate bond, a Schuldschein and/or IPO/PO very 
quickly, once the M&A deal has closed and has become public knowledge (Barbosa & 
Ribeiro, 2007). In the case that this take-out does not occur, as the borrower has not been able 
to access successfully the capital market, the bridge loan maturity may need to be extended. In 
this instance, the duration fee would have to be paid to penalise the borrower for not having 
successfully tapped the capital markets on time. The following table displays the respective 
functioning. 
 
Table 79. Pricing example: acquisition term loan. 
Duration fees might also be interpreted as a compensation for higher risk as it likely would 
have concrete borrower-related reasons to fail in tapping capital markets. It is also common 
that such incidences are addressed via grids, with the margin simultaneously rising as well. 
The actual payments that occurred can only be known ex post. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 5 You can also have incidences when you want borrowers to go quickly into the bond market to replace 
an existing facility, which was only meant to facilitate an acquisition. Banks usually do not want to 
keep the whole loan on their books as it is in such scenarios often very large. Then, you might see 
things like duration fees, which are paid for a short time and bring up the pricing significantly, so that 
you are encouraged to refinance the facility quickly in other markets. 
I 19 A duration fee concept is applicable in underwritten acquisition financing scenarios, where the 
structures are usually very much targeted at bringing the initial loan exposure down at a certain point 
in time via take out instruments. If this would not happen, these duration fees would kick in and the 
company would be penalised because they were not able to reduce the loan exposure in an timely 
manner, because of which a duration fee would be payable. In that case, usually also the margin 
increases, which is addressed via respective margin grids. 
 
P
e
r
io
d
Margin* 
in bp p.a.
Ticking fee 
(t0=10% of margin; 
t1+t2=20% of 
margin; t3-t5=35% 
of margin)
Participation 
fee 
(75bp upfront, 
annualised over 
lifetime)
Underwriting 
fee 
(50bp upfront, 
annualised over 
lifetime)
Duration fee 
(t2=10 bp; 
t3=15 bp; 
t4=20 bp 
upfront)
AISD*
in bp p.a.
Arrangement 
fee 
(25bp upfront, 
annualised over 
lifetime)
t0 130 13 15 10 0 155 5
t1 130 26 15 10 0 155 5
t2 150 30 15 10 10 185 5
t3 140 49 15 10 15 180 5
t4 130 45.5 15 10 20 175 5
Pricing example: syndicated acquisition term loan facility
M
a
rg
in
 g
ri
d
* Common pricing measures of extant literature; AISD based on Dealogic Loanware definition.
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5.3.2.2.3 Advisory/structuring fee (bank-related) 
If banks—besides the role of negotiating and structuring a syndicated loan—provide further 
advisory, such as in case the loan is only one part of a larger financing package also often 
referred to as “multi-product solutions” (Malone, 2011, p. 116) or in restructuring cases, for 
instance, an advisory/structuring fee may be paid as a one-time payment, or occasionally after 
meeting certain milestones. Hence, related payments might also be only known ex post. 
The following interviewee statement exemplifies this: 
I 18 This could be either bank and/or non-bank-related. It is not a fee solely paid for putting the concrete 
facility in place. It is more for the process beforehand, for instance, if the client needs to have advice 
in his specific situation as to what kinds of products are best for him. This could be a syndicated loan, 
a bond, or a Schuldschein for instance. Then the client is asking either bank or some kind of financial 
advisor for this financial advice on how to structure the whole financing package. 
 
5.3.2.2.4 Early bird fee 
Early bird fees are common in large-scale best-efforts or underwriting syndications, where 
initial bookrunner(s) intend on locking in commitments quickly to reduce their often-large 
initial loan commitment to mitigate market risk exposure. This is particularly appropriate if 
underwriting amounts are extraordinarily high.174 In other words, early bird fees incentivise 
invited banks to commit very quickly to joining the financing.  
The following interviewee statement exemplifies this: 
I 17 An early bird fee is a sub-form of the participation fee in mostly complex financing structures. It is a 
kind of additional income source for those banks, which are invited in a syndication process at the 
very beginning. It is in the interest of the lead banks to make sure that ideally some larger banks with 
larger commitments will join the transaction very quickly to achieve placement security. To incentivise 
these early commitments, you pay such a fee. 
 
 Prioritisation of pricing elements 
In the previous sections, I have provided an overview of various syndicated loan-related 
pricing elements, as highlighted by the research participants. It is necessary to note that it is 
most likely that even this list is not fully comprehensive, and that new pricing features or 
respective labelling emerge constantly. Based on these discussions, I subsequently move 
forward to present a prioritisation of the respective core elements from a bank’s perspective. 
                                               
 
174 For example, in a multi-billion acquisition with only one or only very few underwriters. 
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Intuitively, from an overall bank perspective, the relative importance of the various corporate 
syndicated loan pricing elements is a function of the overall share of the payments received 
that derive from these elements. The following interviewee statements provide thoughts of the 
research participants of respective pricing elements’ shares within a syndicated loan pricing 
package. 
I 5 Margin should be about three-fourths of the whole. One-fourth should be the fee component. That is 
what I think for normal deals. In an underwriting scenario, the fee component in absolute terms gets 
higher, but the margin is also usually higher because there is an acquisition premium added to it. So, 
three-fourths to one-fourth should also hold here. 
I 6 I think we need to make a distinction between pure backup, e.g., usually undrawn and likely to remain 
undrawn. I would say it is for a normal five-year tenor back-up loan, about 60 to 65% commitment 
fee, 35% participation, and arrangement fee. That should roughly work. For drawn facilities, I would 
say it is more around 80 to 20%. 
I 8 Let us say you have a five-year facility. As a proxy, I would say the upfront fee is half a one year 
margin. Therefore, if the margin were 50bp p.a. over years, then the upfront fee would be 25bp 
arrangement and participation fee. So, 10% of fees, roughly. 
I 10 It depends on two things: how much is drawn and what the tenor of the loan is. Therefore, I suspect, 
on a short-term acquisition finance deal, upfront fees pay a larger role than in a long-term investment 
grade loan. For us, I think, if you look at a drawn margin of 90bp p.a. over five years and upfront fees 
of–let’s say–30bp., it would be roughly 10%. My feeling is that for a bank such as ours, the upfront fee 
is clearly not the main component. 
 
Since the margin is generally found to account for the overwhelming part of the overall 
pricing proceeds, it can be seen as the most important elevating screw. However, from a 
holistic bank perspective, the question as to which kind of pricing element feeds the equation, 
and to what degree, should be irrelevant.  
Finding: From an overall bank perspective, the relative importance of the various 
syndicated loan pricing elements is a rising function of their share of the total payments 
received. 
This is in line with the explanations of the interviewees, and exemplified by the following 
statement: 
I  16 There is no real prioritisation, in terms of p.a. pricing elements and other fee elements, from an 
overall bank standpoint. 
 
In practice, several different bank units are involved in syndicated lending who differently 
prioritise the diverse set of syndicated loan pricing elements. I call these departments the 
within-bank-stakeholders of corporate syndicated lending.  
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5.3.3.1 Introducing the “within-bank-stakeholders” 
Before I present the related findings, I briefly provide some background information on the 
following “within-bank-stakeholders”: 
 Loan product unit 
 Asset owner/risk taker 
o “Opportunistic” credit portfolio management 
o Relationship management 
 Risk management 
 Agency (out of scope) 
5.3.3.1.1 Loan product unit 
The loan product unit is responsible for structuring and placing a syndicated loan in the 
primary market, aiming at winning active bookrunner mandates by constantly pitching with 
possible borrowers in so-called beauty contests or RFP-processes.175 The success of this unit 
is reflected in the bookrunner league table position. It might be sub-divided into further 
departments, like origination, execution, sales and trading. For simplification, I will proceed 
by using “loan product unit”—with a related loan originator being responsible for setting the 
pricing in the primary market—as the collective term. Furthermore, it is common for these 
entities to handle the process of pure, passive invitations to join a syndicated loan by 
examining related documents, by writing structure opinions, and by other tasks.  
In practice, loan product units are differently integrated into the operational bank set up and 
happen to be organised as profit or cost centres, being either located in investment- or 
commercial banking units.  
5.3.3.1.2 Asset owner/risk taker 
The tasks of loan product units usually end with the closing of a facility, after which it “hands 
over” the loan to the department that over the lifetime of the loan “owns” and “risk-takes” it. 
These asset owners might appear to be organised in two different ways within a common 
banking structure: “opportunistic” credit portfolio management and relationship 
management. 
                                               
 
175 In RfP-processes or pitching phases (beauty contests), borrowers solicit competitive offers of possible syndicated loan 
lenders. 
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5.3.3.1.2.1  “Opportunistic” credit portfolio management 
Opportunistic, mostly centralised loan portfolio management entities act as a risk-neutral 
investor, evaluating loans at a risk-neutral, “fair,” or “arm’s length” market price. The loan 
product unit transfers the asset after signing to the opportunistically acting credit portfolio 
management department at a current, risk-neutral market price, which might be valuing above 
par, producing a so-called longfall to be distributed by a certain key within the bank, or it 
might yield below par. In the latter case, a so-called shortfall must be refunded to the portfolio 
management entity by those units that, in the opposite case, would have received the longfall 
proceeds. In other words, economically, the portfolio manager invests at all times at par in a 
way that the recurring pricing elements present a fair risk-premium. This very sophisticated 
approach is rather common within investment banks or in investment banking divisions of 
universal- or wholesale banks, being responsible for a certain group of predominantly large 
clients. 
5.3.3.1.2.2  Relationship management 
It is also common in commercial lending for the relationship manager of a certain borrower 
to act as asset and risk taker, meaning that the relationship management unit has to manage 
the loan portfolio of its client base, mostly in a decentralised manner. The relationship 
manager usually does not act purely opportunistically, having a strong interest in granting the 
loan to his client. 
5.3.3.1.3 Risk management 
Risk managers who are usually responsible for a pre-defined borrower group176 typically 
constitute the ultimate bank-decision-makers for granting loans. Risk managers also 
continuously monitor clients over a loan’s lifetime. These duties include among others 
internal rating renewals and performance monitoring. 
 
 
 
                                               
 
176 For example, in terms of size as well as industry sector. 
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5.3.3.1.4 Facility agency 
The loan agency carries the responsibility to act as servicer for the whole syndicate during the 
lifetime of a loan. It handles the respective payments, distributes documents, and may 
administer security if available177 (Jones et al., 2005; Laubrecht & Heller, 2012).  
The agency’s functions are usually structured as pure cost centre service entities, supporting 
other parts of the bank to be able to conduct syndicated loan business. Thus, besides agency-
related fees, these agents have no stake in any pricing element decision, and are consequently 
pricing indifferent. As stated above, I will not focus further on the facility agency’s function 
in this study. 
5.3.3.2 Pricing-related interests of the “within-bank-stakeholders” 
Overall, 14 interviewees shared the view that the various syndicated loan pricing elements 
were partly designed to meet the different expectations and interests of the various internal 
stakeholders. Borrowers, on the other hand, were said to be interested mainly in managing 
their total cost of borrowing. The way this total cost amount is being split is of minor interest 
for the borrower. The fact that several lenders with potentially different internal organisation 
and incentive structures team up in a syndicate further increases the multi-dimensionality and 
complexity of pricing elements.  
Finding: Syndicated loan pricing multi-dimensionality provides mechanisms to address 
various bank internal incentive structures.  
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 3 The income resulting from a syndicated loan must be shared or split up. However, that depends on 
internal bank organisation and incentive structures. 
I 10 At the end, it is driven by various functions in a bank, and the need to divide revenues among these 
functions, like portfolio management, front office, or what have you. 
I 15 The countless different pricing elements are a kind of distribution mechanism for income within the 
banks. They just make the bankers happy. 
 
Significant questions remain as to what are the interests and incentive structures of these 
various entities and how they are addressed by different pricing structures. Loan product units 
                                               
 
177 Also view my explanations regarding the various servicing fees in the Appendix E. 
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tend to be organised as profit centres, by often being remunerated via arrangement fees178 and 
maybe parts of, or seldom, the whole participation fee. The reception of these proceeds may 
technically be executed via income shadowing, hard-cash payments, or a mix of both. 
Usually, the loan product unit does not receive any of the per annum payments and thus, from 
a pure economic standpoint, primarily focuses on maximising upfront fee income. Even if this 
unit is being allocated with participation fees or a part of them, arrangement fee elements are 
prioritised higher as these do not have to be amortised. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 5 The loan originators look more on the upfront fees and what they can earn from underwritings and 
what they can earn from arrangement fees. They are more interested in upfront fees because they put 
long hours of work into structuring such a deal, and they want to be compensated for work and effort 
they have put into such a deal. 
I 6 Loan origination entities usually get the arranger fee or coordination fee. Possibly also the whole, or 
parts of the participation fee. Thus, all other things being equal, my key concern would be to maximise 
the arrangement fee as it puts most money into my pocket. What we do traditionally is try to maximise 
the arrangement fee and then prioritise the participation fee second, and then thirdly, the margin. 
I 8 In our department, we get the arrangement fee. On the origination side, we are incentivised to arrange 
the transactions. So, the upfront fee is important. 
I 13 The syndication people generally look more at the fees. It may depend on your internal accounting 
model—whether you are a cost centre, whether you are shadowing the fees, and then how you shadow 
them. That determines what you are focusing on, but in the end, regardless of what your focus is, if 
you can shadow all the fees, the fee is the absolute number and most important to you. 
I 14 For me as a loan originator, the focus is always primarily on the upfront fees. 
 
As the loan product unit—via the respective loan originator—is said to be responsible for 
calibrating the entire pricing package of a syndicated loan, which has to be marketed 
successfully,179 it is not possible simply to set margins down to increase the fees. For most of 
the other “within-bank-stakeholders”, the margin and the other running income elements, such 
as commitment fees, are the most important and visible ones, and are also—from a 
quantitative standpoint—the biggest income-generating source out of a syndicated loan, as 
already mentioned earlier.  
Thus, although the loan product unit does typically not receive any per annum income, loan 
originators must focus strongly on the margin as well when it comes to marketability and 
meeting the interests of the other stakeholders. Hence, margins are commonly defined as a 
pure comparability instrument, a so-called “comp” from an originator’s perspective.  
                                               
 
178 Meaning: arrangement/bookrunner/coordination fee. 
179 Or the pricing package which is successful in an RfP-bidding phase. 
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In other words, besides their own incentive issues, loan originators need to establish a 
compromise pricing package, to be accepted by the various involved stakeholders. From the 
point of view of the product unit, an incentive/remuneration-based prioritisation needs to be 
balanced to ensure marketability (both internally and externally). Logically, calibrating the 
“right” per annum elements by the originator can be interpreted as the sufficient condition for 
being enabled to earn upfront fees. 
Finding:  Besides considerations of commercial incentives, syndicated loan originators 
need to focus on all pricing elements to ensure the successful marketability of a 
syndicated loan. The margin, as the most visible pricing element, is therefore used as a 
“comp”-tool. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 For the originators, we also look at all pricing elements certainly. The most visible ones are margin 
and upfront fees for us. 
I 2 From an originator’s point of view, the key element is always to find a pricing package that works for 
everybody. 
I 13 The overall calculation should work for your bank, and then obviously for you as an originator. If 
there is any kind of distribution risk, then you need to be aware of what the requirements of other 
investors are. 
 
The above discussion assumed that the loan product unit was organised as a profit centre, 
enjoying its own “monetary” benefits. For most of the sample, this holds true. Of course, there 
are differences in the way income is distributed and shared between profit centres as well, but 
the broad patterns outlined above hold in general.  
In rare cases, loan product units are structured as cost centres with an aim to support other 
functions of the bank, like relationship management, to win and execute business. In that case, 
the above-mentioned, incentive-driven prioritisation patterns are less pronounced. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 6 Being a bank that is maybe not so sophisticated in the way that it allocates income, we tend to take a 
holistic approach. We tend to make sure that the overall pricing works for all parties–the client, and 
the whole bank, and the other involved syndicate banks. 
I 10 I find that a very interesting development because it also drives the division between participation and 
arrangement fee. At the end, it is just one pot of money. It should not matter so much, but it does 
matter for many institutions. For us, it does not. 
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On the asset taker’s side, the main interest will mostly be adequate running risk remuneration 
with respect to a certain syndicated loan. That holds true for both the above-mentioned 
structural options.  
Finding: Asset takers within banks predominantly focus on per annum elements like the 
margin.  
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 The most important one is the booking office—mostly the relationship side and the asset owner who 
takes the loan on the book. For them, the most important pricing element is usually the margin 
because the margin is really designed to compensate them for the costs and risks that occur, and for 
the fact that they provide the loan for a certain period. Other elements, such as the various upfront 
fees, are in a sense design elements, and it actually depends on what kind of transaction you have. 
I 3 The most important element is obviously the margin. That is the precondition for any portfolio, be it 
managed on an automated basis or on a bespoke basis, to accept a credit asset on the book. Portfolio 
managers need to know what the p.a.-remuneration for that assets risk is. 
I 14 The recurring income, which represents the revenue flow to those business units. 
I 15 You are talking to a markets person, and I as a market person do not see the margin income. It goes to 
the relationship manager, who “owns” the deal. 
I 17 First, there is the portfolio manager who takes the general decision whether to invest into such an 
asset or not. Obviously, he is very much keen to receive an adequate return from a p.a. perspective. 
 
Risk managers focus on the overall structure of the loan, and whether the loan and its 
contractual features in general adequately address the risk profile of a borrower. Besides, for 
example, the security package, covenants, and maturity, pricing is only one element of these 
contractual features. As the risk manager focuses on the risk structure of a loan, and the 
margin or other per annum elements should reflect this risk, the focus lies on the margin or 
the running elements. 
Finding: Risk managers within banks predominantly focus on per annum elements like 
the margin.  
The following interviewee statement exemplifies this: 
I 5 There is a difference that risk departments look at the margins and originators look at the fee. If the 
margin is compensating for the risk appropriately, the deal gets usually approved. 
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 Conclusion: classification and prioritisation of syndicated loan pricing 
elements 
Section 5.3 was devoted to the classification and prioritisation of various syndicated loan 
related pricing elements as addressed via RQ 3. I outlined that numerous pricing elements 
exist in practice that have not been captured by extant academic literature. Furthermore, I 
revealed the underlying rationales of these elements, with certain of them such as 
participation fees and arrangement fees being at least partly based on rationales that have been 
so far hidden. 
In addition, pricing structures have been shown to differ extensively between various loan 
types. Here, even a differentiation between term and revolving credit facilities as advocated 
by Berg et al. (2016) seems not to be granular enough, as, for example, general corporate and 
acquisition financings carry different price mechanisms which need to be taken into 
consideration whilst debating the term “pricing”.  
Furthermore, it became apparent, that price-related payments and pricing decisions are not 
only made ex ante but often also ex post. Hence, the precise overall pricing outcomes in 
relation to a specific syndicated loan type can only precisely be measured ex post. I thematise 
this intellectual challenge in 5.4. 
I then provided a prioritisation of these elements and emphasised that one key rationale of the 
complexity and multidimensionality of pricing is to account for the different and sometimes 
competing interests of a bank’s diverse internal stakeholders.  
Overall, I would argue that new pricing measures and definitions need to be established that 
attempt to address aforementioned issues more adequately than do existing ones such as the 
AISD. 
5.4 A novel perspective towards the understanding of “pricing” 
As established whilst reviewing the literature, determinants of syndicated loan pricing have 
extensively been studied by scholars, predominantly based on quantitative analyses of 
secondary data sets, comparable to the Dealogic Loanware one analysed in Chapter 4. As no 
study has comprehensively focused on the German corporate syndicated lending market, and 
as the publicly available data is unsuited for quantitative regression analyses, the findings 
presented here will enable a richer understanding of the pricing determinants and their 
interaction from a bank’s perspective.  
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Based on the conclusions drawn from the discussions in sections 2.5 and 5.3, before focusing 
on the price determination, I however must provide deeper insights and perspectives in 
relation to the term “pricing” to enhance its understanding. 
 Ex ante and ex post reciprocity and further challenges surrounding “pricing” 
In 2.5, I discussed syndicated loan pricing measures that have predominantly been used as 
dependent variables within extant quantitative pricing literature. These look at the relevant 
syndicated loan pricings at signing as attempted to be covered by the respective data providers 
and mostly rely purely on initial margins or AISD. In other words, these measures rely on 
publicly available pricing data at the time of the loans’ origination in the primary market. To 
quantify and proxy the price of a syndicated loan, this ex ante perspective appears sensible at 
first glance given that it should reflect the point-in-time pricing shaped by its various 
determinants and the related information at hand.  
Corporate syndicated loans, however, are in a means special that loan originators are already 
ex ante aware of and expect the factual price-related pay-offs to differ extensively from what 
the ex ante price tag would ordinarily suggest. Hence, the price-setting process in the primary 
market already incorporates and processes implicit ex post perspectives. In other words, 
whilst evaluating prices’ determinants, loan originators, or more broadly, the lenders need to 
forecast what the factual pricing will be, both in absolute as well as in relative terms (p.a. 
yield). This exercise is likely predominantly driven by experience and tacit knowledge, being 
unobservable to outsiders.  
This is underpinned by the following statement of interviewee three: 
I 3 You cannot simply compare price setting of a corporate syndicated loan with, for example, the one of a 
bond or Schuldschein. There you usually have one fixed coupon that is being paid out every year and 
for example, the bond gets repaid bullet exactly at its defined maturity date. So, an investor is capable 
to exactly plan and count in the related cash-flows. For our product, this hardly ever the case. We 
need to bare this in mind when we set a pricing. 
 
Besides this ex ante and ex post reciprocity, I further generally criticise existing definitions for 
not adequately capturing the complexity and multidimensionality of the diverging pricing 
structures. It is noteworthy that numerous price elements are not even covered by the 
respective AISD formula. 
In that vein, Bharath et al. (2011, p. 1,158) defined AISD as “the most comprehensive 
measure of the borrowing cost”. In line with the statement of interviewee 12, I challenge this 
view and propose a goal of presenting a pricing definition framework that encompasses all 
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pecuniary transfers from borrowers to lenders over the lifetime of a loan, excluding 
amortisation payments. 
I 12 Even AISD won`t cover the total cost of borrowing as it, for example, does not take into account 
arranging fees. As data is so limited, the margin in its own is basically the closest proxy to borrowing 
costs with all associated limitations. 
 
For the remainder of this thesis, such a framework needs to be qualitative in nature, given the 
limited availability of public data. Under a rather unrealistic laboratory assumption of full 
data availability, I however also propose a quantitative ex post total cost of borrowing 
framework later in this section. 
 Required information in a laboratory setting 
The relative importance and occurrence probability as well as the specific determinant 
sensitivity of individual pricing elements that are not comprehensively covered by Dealogic 
Loanware, LPC, and others, upon which extant scholars have solely relied, depend on the loan 
type for each of which pricing packages and mechanisms appear to inherently differ. 
Thus, I first establish four different loan type categories, appearing to be most common180 in 
the current German corporate syndicated lending market, where each differs from the others 
significantly with regard to its price-related, contractual design.  
1. RCF. RCFs are common revolving credit facilities, where the borrower’s intent is to 
draw down, repay, and redraw frequently—for example, to finance general corporate 
purposes like working capital.181  
2. Backup-RCF. These RCFs are back-up lines, predominantly for commercial paper 
programmes, being intended to remain undrawn over the lifetime of the loan and are 
thus, used and priced systematically differently compared to common RCFs.182 
3. Term loan. Traditional term loans might be used to finance a bigger capital 
expenditure or specific base amounts of debt.183 
4. Acquisition term loan. Mainly for very large clients, these are special and often 
underwritten as large term loans, commonly structured as bridge facilities with the 
                                               
 
180 Because these have repeatedly been mentioned by the research participants throughout the qualitative fieldwork. 
181 See section 2.4.4.2. 
182 See section 2.4.4.2. 
183 See section 2.4.4.1. 
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intent to finance an acquisition discretely and quickly at an early stage and 
subsequently to refinance swiftly via capital markets instruments (take-outs).184 
With respect to the needed information in a laboratory setting, Table 80 extends the initial 
pricing element that Table 76 introduced in 5.3.  
                                               
 
184 See section 2.4.4.1. 
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Table 80. Loan type specific pricing elements with determinant sensitivity. 
 
 
Margin                       x                       x                       x                       x                        x                        x                        x                        x
Margin grid                       x                       x                       x                       x
Old/new 
money fee
                       x                        x                        x /
Foreign curr. 
premium
 x  x / / Increase fee                        x                        x                        x /
Extension fee  x  x  x                        x
   x    x    x    x Waiver fee  x  x  x  x
Interest rate 
period
   x    x    x    x
Amendment 
fee
                       x                        x                        x                        x
 x  x  x  x
                      x                       x /                       x
                       x                        x                        x                        x
/ / / /
Document. 
agency fee
                       x                        x                        x                        x
Fee skim/pool                        x /                        x                        x
 x  x / /
Invited/ "passive" 
arr./bookr./ coord. 
fee
                       x                        x                        x                        x
/ / /                        x                       x /                       x                       x
/ / /                       x
                      x /                       x                        x
                      x /                       x                       x
 x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x
 x /  x  x
                       x /                        x                        x
                      x  x                       x                       x
 x  x  x  x
not relevant not relevant relevant
relevantrelevant
relevant relevant
Facility agency fee
Security agency fee
Breakage fee
relevant relevant
Margin changes 
(grid) 
relevant (not) relevant not relevant relevant
Margin changes 
(grid) 
relevant relevant
Participation fee
Underwriting fee
Duration fee
Early bird fee
Servicing- and 3rd party elements are out of scope
 Ticking fee
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Arrangement/ 
bookrunner/ 
coordination fee
Transfer fee
Advisory fee (non-
bank related)
Commitment fee
 Facility fee
 Utilisation fee
Reference rate
Loan type
relevant Factual lifetime
"Factual" total cost of borrowing
Backup-RCF Term Loan
Upfront-/non-recurring elements
Acquisition 
Term Loan
Acquisition 
Term Loan
RCF
Per annum-/recurring elements
RCF Backup-RCF Term Loan
Factual lifetime relevant relevant
Loan type
relevant
Determinant sensitivity 
("x" if at least "")
Relevance for loan type          
("", "" or "")    
Relevance for loan type          
("", "" or "")    
E
x
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o
st
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n
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n
not relevant not relevant relevant relevant
Factual average 
lifetime
not relevant not relevant relevant relevant
relevantrelevant
Average draw 
percentage
Factual average 
Lifetime
Determinant sensitivity 
("x" if at least "")
Average draw 
percentage
relevant
not relevant
relevant
Legal fee
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In a complete informational environment—to measure the factual costs or the accurate per 
annum yield of any syndicated loan—one would need large sets of information as shown in 
Table 80. First, a clear distinction between the four loan types would be essential, a 
requirement, being hard to accomplish by using publicly available German corporate 
syndicated loan data. According to interviewees 5 and 18, the identifiers within publicly 
available data sets are not accurate in this respect. 
I 5 You have available sometimes the amount of the loan, or the tranches. Then it starts already to get less 
accurate; sometimes you do not know the tenor of the loan and of its different tranches and tranche 
types. You just know the total amount and the borrower. 
I 18 Data is only more or less accurate when it comes to borrower name and overall deal volume. When we 
talk about concrete loan purpose and loan types, it gets already hard to really get useful and reliable 
information. Overall this situation is very unfortunate.   
 
Additionally, all pricing elements of which a certain loan type consists as well as the factual 
(average) lifetime would need to be acknowledged—an impossible premise given the limited 
pricing element coverage and availability at all. 
In practice, the factual (average) lifetime heavily deviates from the contractually set one, as 
back-up RCFs, for example, tend to be refinanced at least one year prior to their contractual 
maturity date. For term loans, on the other hand, the factual average lifetime would be needed 
to accurately incorporate possible amortisation schedules, besides the impact of a possible 
early refinancing. Logically, whilst screening the commonly used pricing measure in extant 
literature—the AISD—one would need to annualise upfront fees based on the factual lifetime 
for RCFs and on the factual average lifetime for TLs rather than on the contractually set ones. 
In other words, existing studies are likely to overestimate loan maturities systematically and, 
hence, underestimate upfront fees from a per annum yield perspective.  
The following interviewee statement underpins this: 
I 8 In a true calculation, it gets complicated because most of the deals do not survive five years. If you 
look at the average lifetime, which was probably three and one-half years, then the upfront fee 
elements would increase. 
 
Next, the average percentage of drawings or, even more rigidly, the precise drawings for each 
day would need to be known to calibrate the interaction exactly of, for example, margin, 
commitment, and utilisation fees.  
Rationally, information on factual (average) lifetime as well as factual draw percentages 
cannot readily be available at signing, when the credit decision is made and the pricing is 
being set. The same is true for numerous further price-elements, like, for example, waiver or 
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amendment fees being newly negotiated during the lifetime of a syndicated loan. Lastly, 
possibly triggered margin changes via grids during a loan’s lifecycle would need to be 
incorporated by using an average or a diurnal margin, rather than solely relying on the initial 
margin. 
Regarding average draw percentage for RCFs, one could ex ante work with predictions or 
historical averages that are available in the U.S,185 however, not publicly available in 
Germany. Other than for back-up RCFs, where the draw rate is said to be historically (close 
to) zero, for general corporate purpose RCFs—for example, used by smaller privately held 
firms—the average draw percentage depends on various borrower-specific and unobservable 
drivers (at least for outsiders) that are to estimate. In that setting, Gupta et al. (2008, p. 351) 
pointed out, “It is impossible to predict the drawdown schedule of a borrower at origination”. 
This is accentuated by the following interviewee statement: 
I 5 It depends on the situation the respective corporate is in at a particular point in time. Someone who is 
expanding clearly needs finance, someone who is doing many small acquisitions clearly needs finance, 
someone who has a very seasonal business needs finance, while someone who is retracting and 
shrinking and not doing much, maybe needs less funds. Therefore, my estimate would be 40 to 50% of 
drawing is usual for normal RCFs. 
 
Overall, the discussion above established that pricing assessments and decisions are not 
necessarily only made ex ante based on the influence of various determinants, but also post-
signing, during the loan-lifetime at specific points in time when the determinants are possibly 
re-evaluated and reassessed. Ongoing margin adjustments, accompanied with individual 
draw-down percentages and individually diverging factual maturities constitute further 
challenges. It is hence reasonable to state that, from a bank’s perspective, the factual per 
annum yield of a German corporate syndicated loan can only be precisely measured ex post 
depending on all pricing elements, its real (average) lifetime, its draw-downs, possible 
ongoing margin adjustments, and incorporation of possible unplanned fee income during the 
lifetime. A circumstance which further complicates the related calculations is the fact that 
different lenders obtain different levels of upfront fees due to different lending amounts and 
different roles and hierarchies within the syndicate. 
In summary, especially for external researchers, pay-off structures of corporate syndicated 
loans are almost completely unpredictable and differ across individual banks, underlining 
                                               
 
185 For example, via “CapitalIQ”, as applied by Berg et al. (2016). 
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their private and bespoke character, shaped by numerous hidden characteristics and 
mechanisms. As already briefly stressed, these multidimensional facets distinguish tailor-
made corporate syndicated loans from more straightforward, rigid corporate bond financings, 
inter alia, where pay-off-schedules are commonly not subject to change and hence are reliably 
set ex-ante186 (Focarelli et al., 2008). This is underpinned by the following statements of 
selected research participants: 
I 4 As our product is more opaque given the lack of information and given the various structures, many 
deals are specially structured and tailor-made. It makes it really complicated. 
I 16 All pricing packages are individually negotiated. You do not really find any standard pricings.  
I 21 Several banks made the experiment of having one single debt department that takes care of corporate 
bonds, corporate loans and LBOs. From what I have observed this does not work in practice. These 
are almost completely different markets and products at the end. Although at first glance they might 
look similar. 
 
Because the majority of the elements in Table 80 displayed information that is neither 
publicly available at signing nor after maturity, it is necessary to establish a qualitatively-
based framework that will enable an enhanced overall understanding of German corporate 
syndicated loan pricings.  
 Derivation of a qualitative ex post pricing definition framework 
In Table 80, I labelled all pricing elements with an estimated occurrence probability in 
relation to the four different loan types.  
The label “” means the respective pricing element is most likely be present within the 
specific loan type classification (e.g., margin and commitment fee in an RCF). The label 
“” identifies elements that are common, but are not necessarily always present within a 
loan type (e.g., utilisation fees in an RCF), whereas a single check, “”, marks elements that 
are uncommon, but are generally possible in practice (e.g., underwriting fee in an RCF). A “/” 
represents pricing features that are not to be expected under a certain loan type (e.g., ticking 
fee for a backup-RCF). Lastly, for the elements that are labelled with a weighted probability 
of being included in a pricing package (“”,””, or “”), I provide an indication of 
their pricing determinant sensitivity (“ ”). An “x” on the right sight denotes the highest 
degree of determinant sensitivity, whereas an “x” in the middle represents a moderate 
sensitivity and an “x” on the left side identifies a non-existent sensitivity. Reasonably, for 
                                               
 
186 With the exception of, for example, more complex bond structures with inter alia call options, etc. 
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non-applicable pricing elements (“/”), no sensitivity indication is provided. Inter alia the 
margin for an RCF (as well as for all other loan types) is most sensitive to pricing 
determinants. The same holds for participation and arrangement fees. Reference rates, for 
instance, are common within all loan types (“”), but are set irrespective of any 
individual determinant and plausibly non-determinant-sensitive.  
Table 81 combines all elements of loan pricing for the respective loan types into one 
framework.  
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Table 81. Qualitative ex post pricing definition framework. 
RCF Backup-RCF TL Acquisition-TL
  > Factual average lifetime
  > Average margin
  > Factual average lifetime
  > Average draw percentage
  > Average margin
Margin                                                         x                                                         x                                                         x                                                         x
Margin grid                                                         x                                                         x                                                         x                                                         x
Foreign currency 
premium
 x x
 x  x  x  x
Interest rate 
period
 x  x  x  x
                                                        x                                                         x                                                         x
x x
                                                        x
                                                        x                                                         x                                                         x                                                         x
Old/new money 
fee
                                                        x                                                         x                                                         x
Increase fee                                                         x                                                         x                                                         x
Extension fee x x x                                                         x
Waiver fee x x x x
Amendment fee                                                         x                                                         x                                                         x                                                         x
x x x x
                                                        x                                                         x                                                         x                                                         x
Documentation 
agency fee
                                                        x                                                         x                                                         x                                                         x
Fee skim/pool                                                         x                                                         x                                                         x
Invited/"passive" 
arr./bookr./coord. 
fee
                                                        x                                                         x                                                         x                                                         x
                                                        x                                                         x                                                         x
                                                        x
                                                        x                                                         x                                                         x
                                                        x                                                         x                                                         x
Advisory/structuring 
fee (bank related)
Qualitative ex post  pricing definition framework
Revolving credit facilities ("RCFs") Term loans ("TLs")
Loan types
Ex post 
information 
                                              > Factual lifetime
                                              > Average draw percentage
                                              > Average margin
Per annum-/recurring elements (ex ante  & ex post  information)
Upfront-/non-recurring elements (ex ante  & ex post  information)
Early bird fee
 Utilisation fee
 Ticking fee
Participation fee
Reference rate
Arrangement/ 
bookrunner/ 
coordination fee
Commitment fee
Breakage fee
Underwriting fee
Duration fee
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The rationale for interpretation of the framework might best be illustrated by an example 
which I provide based on an acquisition term loan, arguably the foremost pricing-complex 
loan type. 
With respect to per annum elements, we first need the real average lifetime and draw 
percentage. It is likely that an acquisition term loan is structured as a bridge loan, which might 
never be (fully) drawn down at all in practice. Because, for example, a capital market take-out 
financing takes place before funding is due, ticking fees might be the only recurring income 
elements. The ticking fee carries the highest degree of determinant-sensitivity as well as do 
the other per annum elements except for the reference rate. With a view to the upfront 
elements, beside the factual average lifetime, the draw percentage is also essential here as 
upfront fee payments187 might be staggered based on pre-defined usage periods, milestones, 
and/or factual draw-downs. This differentiates this loan type from the other three, where 
upfront fees are commonly fully paid at signing. The following interviewee statement 
exemplifies this: 
I 5 Especially for borrowers with debt and equity capital markets access, we have recently observed that 
acquisition finance facilities have not been drawn at all, as the capital market take-out took place 
prior to the M&A-deal’s closing. At the end, all these structures are pretty sophisticated and complex 
in theory or with view to contractual terms. For the borrower-group we are talking about here, these 
features however tend to rarely kick-in. At the end of the day, from an economic point of view, pricing 
related income of such a transaction is often far below what one would expect by simply looking at 
overall margin and upfront fee numbers. As a consequence, when pricing such a deal, we already need 
to take anticipated further income (e.g. resulting from the take-out financings into account). 
 
Based on this example, whilst debating pricing determinants, one can only qualitatively define 
and explain “pricing” of an acquisition term loan, for example, as an expected ex post 
complex interwoven and somehow determinant-weighted cocktail of its numerous pricing 
elements in the light of the factual average lifetime and average draw percentage.  
 Excursus: derivation of a quantitative ex post pricing definition framework 
Based on the above discussion and motivated by the ingenious contribution of Berg et al. 
(2016), who provided important steps towards capturing quantitative syndicated loan pricing 
measures’ complexity more accurately,188 I next present a novel quantitative ex post inclusive 
pricing framework. It might perhaps be applied by future academics with access to 
“complete” data with such an application not being not feasible at present. However, the 
                                               
 
187 Underwriting, arrangement/bookrunner/coordination fees. 
188 Section 2.5.3. 
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framework could be individually adjusted based on available information. Banks, however, 
have all information readily available and are therewith enabled to derive their individual true 
ex post yield on a certain syndicated loan facility by incorporating as much information as 
possible. This novel measure can be interpreted as the factual total per annum yield of a 
syndicated loan. According to the interviewees, it is reasonable to assume that this tends not 
to be rigidly conducted in practice. 
I 8 We do not rigidly reassess our assumptions which we made when we initially calculated and booked 
the loan. The real payments received of such a loan remains relatively unclear. 
I 20 Until now I worked for four banks, which are very active in corporate syndicated lending. Such a 
reassessment, which you have mentioned to be indeed an interesting task, is to my knowledge not 
comprehensively done by any of those. 
 
Hence, the mentioned ex ante price setting-process in the primary market, which already 
incorporates and processes implicit ex post perspectives, is driven by experience and tacit 
knowledge and also within banks not grounded on thorough quantitative ex post analyses with 
the latter being however generally feasibly conductible. 
Beside specific patterns—like average draw percentages of non-back-up-RCFs, or factual 
(average) lifetimes in light of inter alia different borrower characteristics—on the long run, 
this ex post view is likely to reveal further systematic arrays that could be facilitated in future 
ex ante loan negotiations, where loan originators nowadays need to work with rather 
unsystematic assumptions—based on experience and tacit knowledge—on what the true ex 
post yield of a certain transaction will be. These assumptions, which influence the ex ante 
chosen price structure and how determinants are processed ex ante would likely significantly 
gain accuracy by constantly applying the ex post view as presented below. Further, 
apprehending the factual yield of a syndicated loan ex post would allow banks to assess more 
correctly the relationship profitability, an important theme to be discussed in 5.5.13.1. 
Respective time series analyses might not only lead to enhanced knowledge of loan 
originators and banks in general. Banking-authority approved adjustments in ex ante RWA-
allocation frameworks could lead to more accuracy regarding the adequate mapping of risk in 
financiers’ balance sheets and could ultimately enhance the stability of the banking system 
overall. Table 82 displays the new quantitative ex post total cost of borrowing (p.a. yield) 
framework. 
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Table 82. New ex post total cost of borrowing (p.a. yield) framework. 
 
 
(1- average draw percentage) * commitment 
fee in bp p.a.
(1- average draw percentage) * commitment 
fee in bp p.a.
Average margin in bp p.a.
(1- Average draw percentage) * ticking fee 
in bp p.a.
+
Average draw percentage * average margin 
in bp p.a. + foreign currency premium in bp 
p.a. * average foreign currency applicable 
draw amount
+
Average draw percentage * average margin 
in bp p.a. + foreign currency premium in bp 
p.a. * average foreign currency applicable 
draw amount
+
Average reference rate in bp p.a. (e.g. 
EURIBOR; based on interest rate period)
+
(1- average draw percentage) * commitment 
fee in bp p.a.
+
Average draw percentage * applicable 
utilisation fee in bp p.a.
+
Average draw percentage * applicable 
utilisation fee in bp p.a.
+ Participation fee in bp / factual lifetime +
Average draw percentage * average margin 
in bp p.a.
+
Average draw percentage * average 
reference rate in bp p.a. (e.g. EURIBOR; 
based on interest rate period)
+
Average draw percentage * average 
reference rate in bp p.a. (e.g. EURIBOR; 
based on interest rate period)
+
(Applicable loan amount in % of overall loan 
amount * old money fee in bp) / factual 
lifetime
+
Average draw percentage * average 
reference rate in bp p.a. (e.g. EURIBOR; 
based on interest rate period)
+ Participation fee in bp / factual lifetime + Participation fee in bp / factual lifetime +
(Applicable loan amount in % of overall loan 
amount * new money fee in bp) / factual 
lifetime
+ Participation fee in bp / factual lifetime 
+
(Applicable loan amount in % of overall loan 
amount * old money fee in bp) / factual 
lifetime
+
(Applicable loan amount in % of overall loan 
amount * old money fee in bp) / factual 
lifetime
+
(Applicable loan amount in % of overall loan 
amount * increase fee in bp) / factual 
lifetime
+ Extension fee in bp / factual lifetime
+
(Applicable loan amount in % of overall loan 
amount * new money fee in bp) / factual 
lifetime
+
(Applicable loan amount in % of overall loan 
amount * new money fee in bp) / factual 
lifetime
+ Extension fee in bp / factual lifetime + Waiver fee in bp / factual lifetime
+
(Applicable loan amount in % of overall loan 
amount * increase fee in bp) / factual 
lifetime
+
(Applicable loan amount in % of overall loan 
amount * increase fee in bp) / factual 
lifetime
+ Waiver fee in bp / factual lifetime + Amendment fee in bp / factual lifetime
+ Extension fee in bp / factual lifetime + Extension fee in bp / factual lifetime + Amendment fee in bp / factual lifetime + Breakage fee in bp / factual lifetime
+ Waiver fee in bp / factual lifetime + Waiver fee in bp / factual lifetime + Breakage fee in bp / factual lifetime + Arrangement fee in bp / factual lifetime 
+ Amendment fee in bp / factual lifetime + Amendment fee in bp / factual lifetime + Arrangement fee in bp / factual lifetime +
Documentation agency fee in bp / factual 
lifetime
+ Breakage fee in bp / factual lifetime + Breakage fee in bp / factual lifetime +
Documentation agency fee in bp / factual 
lifetime
+
Passive arrangement fee in bp / factual 
lifetime 
+ Arrangement fee in bp / factual lifetime + Arrangement fee in bp / factual lifetime +
Passive arrangement fee in bp / factual 
lifetime 
+ Underwriting fee in bp / factual lifetime
+
Documentation agency fee in bp / factual 
lifetime
+
Documentation agency fee in bp / factual 
lifetime
+ Underwriting fee in bp / factual lifetime + Duration Fee in bp / Real Average Lifetime
+
Passive arrangement fee in bp / factual 
lifetime 
+
Passive arrangement fee in bp / factual 
lifetime 
+ Structuring fee in bp / factual lifetime + Structuring fee in bp / factual lifetime
+ Underwriting fee in bp / factual lifetime + Underwriting fee in bp / factual lifetime + Early bird fee in bp / factual lifetime + Early bird fee in bp / factual lifetime
+ Structuring fee in bp / factual lifetime
+ Early bird fee in bp / factual lifetime
+
= Ex post  total cost of borrowing in bp p.a.
RCF
New ex post  total cost of borrowing (p.a. yield) framework
Backup-RCF Term loan Acquisition term loan
Possible further not yet captured elements 
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This relatively straightforward framework provides approximations inter alia with a view to 
the per annum elements. Regarding margin,189 utilisation fees,190 commitment fees,191 and 
reference rate, one would need to capture each individual day192 of the loans’ real lifetime to 
obtain rigid accuracy193 and could further apply a bank-individual NPV-based discounting. 
Note that also with respect to the non-recurring upfront elements, which might be paid at an 
ex ante unspecified point during loans’ lifetime (e.g., waiver or amendment fees), the specific 
date of payment would be needed to conduct the NPV-based calculation. 
To provide respective examples in the case where all information is accessible, the following 
specifications might substitute the per-annum-related parts194 of the equation depicted in Table 
82. 
∑ (discount factor)t
act*real lifetime
t=0
 * (1- draw%t)* 
applicable commitment feet
360
 
∑ (discount factor)t
act*real lifetime
t=0
 * draw%t* 
applicable margin
t
+ applicable foreign curr. premiumt
360
 
∑ (discount factor)t
act*real lifetime
t=0
 * draw%t* 
applicable utilisation feet
360
 
∑ (discount factor)t
act*real lifetime
t=0
 * draw%t* 
reference ratet
360
 
discount factor = √
1
1+x%
act
 
The NPV view can be addressed by discounting future cash flows (Watson & Head, 2001). 
With a discount rate of x%, the discount factor could be calculated as presented above.  
                                               
 
189 In relation to margin-grid. 
190 Staggered based on specific draw-percentages. 
191 Percentage of the respective applicable margin related to margin-grid. 
192 For EURIBOR-based floating rate instruments based on act/360, the so-called Euro-Interest-Rate-Method. 
193 Even these formulas are likely to be subject to further individual adjustments, as certain pricing elements of syndicated 
lending have different paying frequencies. In other words, appropriate accrual views would then need to be incorporated for 
the discounting exercise.  
194 Highlighted in bold. 
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 Conclusion and implications for the thesis’ remainder  
The foregoing discussion underpinned the complex and multifaceted nature of the overall 
term “pricing” given the various syndicated loan types. This complexity, especially with 
respect to the ex ante and ex post reciprocity creates an exceptional challenge not only for 
scholars in the field of syndicated lending but also for loan professionals who must set and 
negotiate respective pricings in the primary market.  
On the one hand, it is clear that—besides specific non-recurrent elements such as waiver or 
amendment fees—overall price packages need to be set ex ante with related assumptions 
regarding, for example, factual (average) lifetime and factual drawings being made whilst 
evaluating certain determinants. On the other hand, according to the interviews, these 
assumptions are commonly very difficult to make. Hence, the quantitative ex post view would 
significantly enhance the understanding of pricing by bank professionals and scholars in the 
field, although—for the latter—the accuracy and complexity discussed earlier might never be 
practically applicable due to limitations of data availability. For this reason, I can only 
continue with the qualitative definition provided. Hence, while discussing the determinants of 
syndicated loan pricing in the primary market (ex ante), I interpret pricing as an expected ex 
post complex, interwoven, and somehow determinant-weighted cocktail of its numerous 
pricing elements in the light of its factual (average) lifetime and average draw percentage. 
With all its related practical shortcomings, I claim to have provided a significantly enhanced 
understanding of the concept of pricing up to this point. Based on the qualitative “pricing” 
definition, I now advance my focus to the determinants of pricing. 
5.5 Pricing determinants in German corporate syndicated lending 
After having presented the new pricing definitions and measures for the four most common 
loan types in 5.4, I now focus on the determinants of pricing and thereby address RQ 5. 
Whilst presenting the findings, I will constantly compare these with extant literature. The 
fieldwork, therefore, carries both confirmatory and exploratory elements with the aim to 
establish a comprehensive and integrated German corporate syndicated loan pricing 
determinant framework—an empirical goal of this study. 
As suggested by Corbin and Strauss (1996), the coding of the interview material regarding the 
pricing determinants resulted in eight “higher-level concepts” (henceforth, determinant 
categories), each consisting of further “lower-level concepts” (henceforth, determinants).  
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In a way that is comparable to univariate analyses in quantitative academic works, I start by 
presenting the pricing directional findings in relation to these determinants in isolation under 
an implicit ceteris paribus assumption. I cross-reference, however, from one determinant to 
another if respective linkages happen to be central to the apprehension of a determinant within 
its “insulation”. The ceteris paribus view is also important given the bias of the research 
participants towards the current syndicated loan market environment,195 which might narrow 
the breadth of view and, therefore, needs to be carefully addressed. It is important to note that 
I treat ceteris paribus as “implicit” and from an interpretive point of view. In the context of 
this study, it is not to be viewed as a statistically correct term. From a positivist point of view 
“ceteris paribus” would be defined in the context of relationships between variables196 rather 
than of concepts (Charmaz, 2006).  
On the individual level of each determinant category, the corresponding sections conclude by 
providing a prioritisation of the inherent influential magnitude of the determinants towards 
their determinant category. It also appears that certain determinants carry higher levels of 
determinant sensitivity for one vis-à-vis another loan type. Hence, I also comment on such 
phenomena if appropriate. 
In Chapter 6, I endeavour to synthesise and prioritise the various determinants categories into 
one comprehensive and integrated framework that seeks to address the idiosyncrasies of the 
various pricing determinants. The eight determinant categories that emerged are shown in 
Table 83. 
 
Table 83. Eight determinant categories and correspondong sections. 
                                               
 
195 See section 5.5.15. 
196 Analysis of a context assuming that only the variable under consideration changes with simultaneous constancy of all 
other economic variables (Bleymüller et al., 2008). 
Sections
1 Borrower-specific credit risk profile and rating 5.5.1&5.5.2
2 Lender characteristics 5.5.3&5.5.4
3 Contractual features 5.5.5&5.5.6
4 Credit story 5.5.7&5.5.8
5 Syndicate structure and syndication mode 5.5.9&5.5.10
6 General market environment 5.5.11&5.5.12
7 Lender-borrower relationship 5.5.13&5.5.14
8 Syndicated loan market environment 5.5.15&5.5.16
Eight pricing determinant categories
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 Borrower-specific credit risk profile and rating 
All interviewees expressed that the clients’ credit risk profiles—determining their individual 
debt servicing capacity, or in other words their overall financial strength—constitute an 
important determinant of syndicated loan pricing. Intuitively, the better a client’s credit risk 
profile, the lower the probability of failure, which, in turn, is reflected in loan pricing. A broad 
base of supporting evidence for this finding was provided in 2.6.1 by, among others, 
Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010), Anagnostopoulou and Drakos (2016), and Alexandre et 
al. (2014), all of whom concluded that high default-risk borrowers are charged a higher 
pricing.  
Finding: Ceteris paribus, corporate syndicated loan pricings in Germany are determined 
by a borrower’s specific credit risk profile. 
The following interviewee statements underpin this finding: 
I 3 The credit risk of the client is the most important issue. 
I 8 The higher the risk, the higher the margin and the other price elements get. 
I 16 I think it goes without saying that the default risk of a client drives loan prices either up- or down. 
I 20 The risk of a borrower to default during the loan lifetime is certainly important. The higher that risk, 
the higher the pricing of a loan needs to be. 
 
In line with extant literature, all interviewees shared the view that the borrower’s credit rating, 
whether internal and/or external, was a manifestation of the client’s risk profile. Internal 
ratings represent the probability of default (PD)197 and are shaped by various borrower-related 
characteristics, which can be classified as either hard or soft factors (Hainz & Wiegand, 2013; 
Treacy & Carey, 2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
197 The internal rating is therefore often referred to as the PD-Rating (Everling & Kreutz, 2012). 
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The following interviewee statements underpin this finding: 
I 1 First of all, borrower related elements like the rating of the client. Here, things like probability of 
default, loss given default etc. come into play. 
I 4 If you have a customer that pays a low margin, then we talk about clients that usually have a very 
good rating. 
I 7 It is certainly a total difference whether or not you are talking to an “A”-rated borrower as opposed 
to a “B”-rated one. 
I 9 All borrower characteristics at the end go into the rating, be it external, internal, or both. 
I 13 Certainly, one of the key guidance is the rating of the company. 
I 14 A major issue that influences the price is the rating, because the risk costs are very large factors in the 
overall calculation. These risk-related costs calculated based on the rating. 
I 18 There are many elements that at the end lead to a credit rating that normally provides very good 
indications about the overall risk. Most importantly, it incorporates banks estimates regarding a 
possible failure and the related losses with such a possible failure. 
 
Given the above discussion, I evaluate the two components “rating198” and “borrower-specific 
credit risk profile” as alike. This is in line with, among others, Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007), 
Alexandre et al. (2014), and Treacy and Carey (2000), who take external ratings as direct 
measure for credit risk.  
Finding: Ceteris paribus, corporate syndicated loan pricings in Germany are a declining 
function of the borrower’s credit rating reflecting its overall credit risk profile based on 
numerous underlying borrower characteristics. 
The interview analyses with respect to the determinant category borrower-specific credit risk 
profile and rating enabled me to establish the corresponding determinants that are displayed 
in Figure 42. 
                                               
 
198 Internal and/or external. 
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Figure 42. Borrower-specific credit risk profile and rating and its determinants. 
Below I discuss these underlying borrower characteristics, constituting a borrower’s overall 
credit risk profile, as revealed by the research participants. Note that borrower nationality is 
always expected to be German. Thus, “borrower nationality” has not been separately 
classified as determinant, as it would certainly be in a cross-country study. However, I touch 
upon this issue in section 5.5.11.1 by discussing general macroeconomic issues and by 
debating “the pricing puzzle” in 5.5.13.2. 
5.5.1.1 Financial information 
All research participants agreed that specific financial information like balance sheet, income 
statement, and credit record data—also often referred to as key performance indicators—are 
major ingredients of an enterprise’s specific credit risk profile. In line with the literature, the 
leverage ratio has been mentioned to be an important measure of risk (e.g., Focarelli et al., 
2008; Schenone, 2010; Gaul & Uysal, 2013; Harjoto et al., 2006).  
Banks not only take backward-looking financial data into consideration, but also evaluate 
forward projections, especially in the field of larger scale event-related financings—such as 
acquisitions—that are likely to change a clients’ balance sheet structure. Practitioners usually 
talk about transformative acquisitions in this respect. Overall, these findings broadly confirm 
the view of extant literature as presented, for example, Jorion et al. (2009), who identified 
financial statements and financial information in general to be the key source for lenders to 
assess a client’s risk profile. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, financial information determines a borrowers’ specific credit 
risk profile and its rating. 
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 The leverage ratio is usually the most important ratio banks and other investors look at. Then we look 
at the whole balance sheet and how it evolved and how it is expected to evolve in the future. This is, 
however, more important when significant changes are expected. 
I 3 General financial information is important. The client needs to deliver credible projections especially 
with regards to its leverage ratio. To really look at that you would have to have either in-house 
planning or projections or publicly available information that you can source (e.g., from research, 
rating agencies or the company provides it). 
I 9 We are more cash flow based. We look at the cash flows and want to be paid back from operative cash 
flows. 
I 17 Particularly the prospects are important for us. Banks also care very much on historic figures as well. 
Most important ratios are leverage, interest coverage, and gearing in my view. 
I 21 One of the most important things a bank or an external rating agency looks at is balance sheet data. 
They look backwards to make their own predictions for the future. These own predictions are then 
compared to delivered predictions or forecasts by the client. 
 
5.5.1.2 Size and geographical reach 
Twelve interviewees held that the size of a borrower affects pricing, as larger clients tend to 
be able to obtain more favourable pricings than can smaller ones. This is in line with the 
extant literature (e.g., Mattes et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2014). In that vein, 
Focarelli et al. (2008, p. 341) stated, “Larger loans carry lower rates because they are granted 
to larger borrowers, which have lower default risk, greater bargaining power and more 
transparent conditions”. Furthermore, large borrowers tend to be active in several 
international markets, enabling them to diversify their sales markets. This leads to a certain 
level of independence against possible home market volatility, as mentioned by six 
interviewees. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, firm size as well as breadth of geographical reach determine a 
borrower’s specific credit risk profile and its rating. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 If you look at a company like Volkswagen for example or any other car dealer you have to take into 
account their size and their position in the world market. 
I 8 The more international a client is the more streamlined its earnings are usually. We evaluate this as 
positive. Of course, this is strongly dependent the firm size. 
I 12 If you are BMW or one of the very big companies, which can do the loan without an arranging bank, 
you will definitely pay very little. If you were a very small company, which is struggling to get credit, 
you would have to pay more for it. 
I 15 If it is a global company, let us say it is a German corporate being everywhere in the world, being in 
Asia, Latin America and so on, it would get so much better prices. 
I 20 Large clients are commonly less risky. Not always of course, but there is a strong relationship between 
a companies’ size and its credit risk from what I have observed over the years. 
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5.5.1.3 Organisation form and information availability 
Fifteen research participants held a borrowers’ legal form, and the interlinked degree of 
information availability, to shape its risk profile. In line with Schenone (2010), public 
companies are by law required to disclose broadly and systematically large sets of 
information, which is less the case for other legal forms. In contrast, private firms with 
concentrated ownership structures are found to be charged higher pricings with related 
evidence inter alia provided by Fang et al. (2016) and A. Saunders and Steffen (2011). 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, a borrower’s legal form, being interrelated to the degree of 
transparency, determines its specific credit risk profile and its rating. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 For large and listed corporates, it is easy to conduct credit analyses. There is lots of information 
available that can be evaluated. 
I 3 The legal format of the borrower might play a role when we have a syndicated loan borrower who is 
rather small. In rare cases, there might be family-owned businesses which borrow in our market. Most 
companies which are big enough to tap the market are GmbHs or AGs, however. Here you sometimes 
must handle rather complex ownership structures of holding companies. 
I 20 To make a proper credit analysis it is important to have as much high-quality information about the 
borrower at hand as possible. The quality of such information is best when we talk about large and 
public clients. However, nowadays financial information is of high quality also for smaller borrowers 
in this market. So, I would say it is a factor, but not a major one. 
 
However, according to 5 of 15 interviewees, inter alia via audited financial statements and 
ongoing reporting, likewise smaller non-listed companies provide sufficient information to 
evaluate the borrower-specific credit risk profile and its rating. These statements hence, 
somewhat weaken the magnitude of this determinant. 
I 5 Of course, large listed companies provide more public information, via research papers, external 
ratings huge annual report packages, and so on. What I observe, however, is that this information is 
mainly for equity and maybe bond-investors. We as a bank look at the financial data that we somehow 
evaluate via our systems. Therefore, also, the financial reporting of a smaller company is sufficient in 
my view. 
I 21 For the large client groups, we are talking about financial information that is really good and reliable 
across the size spectrum and across different company legal forms. 
 
5.5.1.4 Wider capital markets access 
Eighteen interviewees emphasised that borrowers having access to wider capital markets 
instruments are able to obtain lower syndicated loan pricings. This is in line with extant 
literature such as Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010) or Santos and Winton (2008). In line 
with A. Saunders and Steffen (2011), firms with more public information are easier to 
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evaluate by arm’s length capital markets investors and thus have easier access to the corporate 
bond or equity markets. This access puts downward pressure on pricings, as corporate bonds, 
for example, might directly compete with syndicated term loans. In other words, borrowers 
can use their capital markets capability as a bargaining tool. According to three interviewees, 
next, more accurate price benchmarking199 is possible providing the bookrunner relative 
placement certainty, especially in underwritten transactions such as acquisition financings. 
Given the market opacity with respect to publicly available pricing data, this appears 
reasonable. Further, especially when take-out financings might need to be assessed before 
pricing an acquisition financing,200 the capital market access enhances a borrower’s risk 
profile and reduces its pricing.  
Finding: Ceteris paribus, wider capital markets access determines a borrower’s specific 
credit risk profile and its rating, exerting a downward effect on pricing. 
The following interviewee statements underpin this finding: 
I 5 If there is a large borrower with all the capital markets instruments available, banks are using this 
information to benchmark the loan pricing. 
I 9 The ability to tap the capital markets is generally positive for the client because it means we as a bank 
can more quickly de-risk ourselves. This gets especially important in event-driven finance. When you 
have a large acquisition financing for a few billion Euros, for instance, then a company, which has 
access to capital markets can more quickly access capital markets and has more options than 
companies without that access. Others are more limited. Therefore, you can price these more 
aggressively in the loan. 
I 16 Clients who can to tap the corporate bond market are usually able to negotiate lower loan pricings 
compared to clients who do not have this access. This has many reasons. First, these clients are often 
larger and more sophisticated and thus, have a better credit quality at all. Second, current secondary 
pricings for bonds or CDS provide a first price indication and clients usually expect banks to provide 
relationship discounts. Lastly, this access is important in M&A deals, where very large bridge loans 
can be refinanced in the capital market. 
I 20 When the client can also fund itself via other instruments, it is a positive sign. When we talk about the 
largest sets of borrowers, then we mainly talk about revolvers or bridge loans here. The rest is 
basically financed via bonds etc. 
 
5.5.1.5 Management quality 
According to nine research participants, management quality is a credit risk profiles’ 
determinant that needs to be assessed by banks. According to Grunert et al. (2005), 
managerial quality is the most important soft factor for banks whilst evaluating a credit risk 
profile of an enterprise. Some supporting evidence was provided by Wasan et al. (2013), who 
                                               
 
199 Possibly by looking at respective slopes of comparable bond yield curves. 
200 Most likely an acquisition bridge term loan. 
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found that high accrual quality drives pricing down. As accounting accruals are based on 
management estimations, their respective quality can be defined as one ingredient of 
managerial quality overall. According to the interviewees, management quality evolves to a 
more prominent pricing determinant for complex and commonly underwritten acquisition 
(bridge) term loans. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, management quality determines a borrower’s specific credit 
risk profile and its rating. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 Management quality is one ingredient of a rating which should not be underestimated. 
I 19 The management of a firm is a point we certainly look at to a certain extent in general. It gets really 
important, however, in acquisition financings. Here, you need to have a good management, at best 
with a certain track-record, to ensure a successful integration of the target firm. Issues like cultural 
differences of acquirer and target are one of the most frequent reasons for M&A-transactions to be 
seen as unsuccessful after a while. 
I 20 We as a bank also look at the quality of the respective firm leaders. I think rating agencies also 
increasingly look at those soft factors. I mean management mistakes may bring firms in serious trouble 
which might cause losses under a loan in the worst case. 
 
5.5.1.6 Reputation 
In agreement with the argument of Godlewski and Weill (2011) that reputation is shaped by 
borrower honesty that ultimately creates trust, 11 interviewees agreed that a resilient firm 
reputation is an enhancing determinant of its credit risk profile. The reputation of a borrower 
can be evaluated by its general business practices, its track record of financial performance, 
its past behaviour in the capital markets, as well as other individual parameters (Sufi, 2007). 
The conclusions of Gaul and Uysal (2013) and Kysucky and Norden (2016), namely, older, 
established firms obtain lower loan pricing, might be interpreted as confirmation of this. If the 
client for instance has over time demonstrated financial probity, for example, regarding 
repayments of debt, this history is one determinant of a strong credit risk profile (Diamond, 
1991; Ivashina, 2009; Mattes et al., 2013). Conversely, young firms that have not built such 
reputations tend to be evaluated as riskier (Santos & Winton, 2008). 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, reputation determines a borrower’s specific credit risk profile 
and its rating. 
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This finding is underlined by the following statements: 
I 5 We as a bank of course track each borrower on an ongoing basis and match projections with actuals. 
To build up a good reputation, for instance, these projections need to be realistic and not too much off 
compared to the actuals. 
I 13 But it is not only that it; is also the soft facts as well like the general standing and reputation of the 
company. 
I 19 I mean usually you have repeated transactions in Germany. And thus, you have gone through a 
syndicated loan process for several times. You know if processes will be smooth with one or the other 
borrower. And you also know borrowers and where problems will occur. These do not necessarily 
have to be related to possible defaults of covenant breaches. Positive and uncomplicated interactions 
are good for a client’s reputation in the community. 
 
5.5.1.7 Business sector sentiment 
Twelve research participants mentioned the borrowers’ business sector as a determinant of its 
overall credit quality. The directional pricing impact is said to cyclically change and adjust 
constantly in tune with economic phases or political and regulatory themes. Following this 
argumentation, Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010), found utility companies to be able to 
obtain especially low pricings, a 2010 fact that is likely not to hold any longer in 2016, 
especially with a view to the German government’s energy policy201 and its impact on utility 
firms’ business models. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, business sector sentiment determines a borrower’s specific 
credit risk profile and its rating. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
201 In light of the nuclear accident 2011 in Fukushima, the German government of Chancellor Angela Merkel decided to quit 
nuclear energy production sooner than planned, which negatively affected, and has ongoing effects on, major energy and 
utility companies’ business model and profitability. 
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 If you have a very stable business like, for example, food & beverage, you as a bank operate on much 
lower probabilities of default compared to sectors being highly dependent on economic cycles. 
I 9 This issue always changes. When you have a borrower from fashion or retail sectors, I would say this 
leads to higher prices now because these sectors are under review from a number of banks. The same 
is true when you have credit facilities from sectors like oil and gas, for example, as this means also an 
increase in margins. 
I 14 There is some differentiation with regard to industrial sectors, often even within the same credit rating 
category. So, if you think about a company that is rated “BBB” and you compare to another company 
rated “BBB” and one of them is Glencore, the global commodity trading company, and one is ASML, 
the Dutch semiconductor manufacturer, these two very different clients but would they have the same 
pricing simply because they are both rated “BBB”? No actually, they would not. Glencore at the 
moment because of the commodity cycle and certain events in the history of the company and the fact 
that it became somewhat over-leveraged has a slightly weaker credit profile and would have to pay a 
little bit more whereas ASML, being an absolute market leader in one of the highest tech industries of 
the manufacturing spectrum, with an outstanding credit story, has a slight sharper pricing. 
I 15 Industry sector is important because if you did oil and gas three years ago, it was seen as the safest 
haven. Everybody said ok that is a great company. If you could lend to BP or something like that, they 
had fantastic fundamentals and you would have done it at very thin margins. Now, it is a different 
story. Everybody says, “Oil at the moment is at around 50 dollars a barrel and it was a lot lower; 
maybe it goes to $20, who knows”? So, all of a sudden, that industry sector has come under huge 
pressure.  
 
5.5.1.8 Social responsibility and ethical issues 
For the employees of three research participants it is important to grant loans to borrowers 
behaving ethically by not engaging in equivocal businesses. Thus, a respective behaviour can 
be associated with lower spreads, in line with Kim et al. (2014). 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, ethical and social responsibility issues determine a borrower’s 
specific credit risk profile and its rating. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 14 Things getting more important are reputational risk considerations from a banks point of view. We try 
to only finance companies that have an ethical justifiable business model. We had one case a couple of 
years ago when we granted a loan to a defence company and had the internal obligation not to publish 
the transaction at all, which was a pity as we did not get any league table credits. 
I 17 We have seen the advent of green bonds, now we will increasingly see green Schuldscheindarlehen 
and very likely green loans in the near future. It is going to be a part of the overall reputation of a 
bank to probably invest a fair share in socially responsible or sustainable investments.  
 
 Conclusion: borrower-specific credit risk profile and rating 
The main factors contributing to the evaluation of the borrower’s specific credit risk profile 
and its rating have been established throughout 5.5.1. The findings based on the statements of 
the research participants broadly confirm those presented in 2.6. As intuition suggests, 
creditworthiness is mainly shaped by hard factors such as firm size, large batteries of financial 
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data but also by soft ones like managerial quality and a firm’s reputation overall or ethical 
behaviour. Interestingly, there were no significant contradictory statements within the 
research participant sample, in line with the reported tendency of a broad consensus and level 
of saturation among the core literature.  
The discussion remains to be enhanced by prioritising the determinants in light of their 
different influential magnitude towards their determinant category (Figure 43). 
 
Figure 43. Borrower-specific credit risk profile and rating: determinant prioritisation. 
It is apparent that financial information and size are major ingredients of a credit risk profile, 
underpinning the strong focus on hard and quantifiable information for the borrower groups at 
hand. Supporting evidence has been provided by Strahan (2008), who pointed out that large 
and mostly well-established borrowers can be credit assessed by predominantly hard 
information, such as audited financial statements. Cole et al. (2004) stressed that larger banks 
commonly base their lending decisions on systematic as well as verifiable information sets. 
The wider capital market access that has been established as a major driver of a borrower’s 
specific credit risk profile and rating was said to be especially pronounced in acquisition 
financings, where usually large underwritten bridge term loans are intended to be refinanced 
quickly via capital markets instruments such as corporate bonds. Also, the soft factor 
management quality was mentioned as particularly important in event-related financings, such 
as M&A-processes, because the subsequent integration of a target company demands high 
levels of respective managerial experience. 
 
Research findings and discussion: qualitative fieldwork 258 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
 Lender characteristics 
Each interviewee stressed that the characteristics of lenders determine syndicated loan 
pricing. As German corporate syndicated loan syndicates usually consist of multiple banks 
that might differ, inter alia, by legal form, business focus, nationality, or lending philosophies, 
diverse sets of characteristics and interdependencies influence pricing.  
The interview data analyses with respect to the determinant category lender characteristics 
enabled me to establish the corresponding determinants that are displayed in Figure 44. 
 
Figure 44. Lender characteristics and its determinants. 
5.5.3.1 Type 
Fifteen interviewees stated the bank type is a determinant of syndicated loan pricings. In 
2.4.2.2, and in line with Hockmann and Thießen (2012), I established that bank type 
categories from a strictly legal and regulatory point of view are confusing. Hence, by 
concentrating on their different business foci, I presented three different bank types, namely, 
universal, wholesale, and investment banks. To provide an example, from a legal and 
regulatory perspective, pure investment banks happen to be rare. Thus, by labelling a bank as 
an investment bank, the interviewees more correctly refer to banks that act predominantly in 
an investment banking manner. Following this logic, different bank types in light of their 
business focus have different lending suppositions, requirements and philosophies. In other 
words, corporate syndicated loan tariff policies differ across banks—a finding shared with 
extant literature. According to 11 interviewees, investment banks are generally evaluated as 
the bank type with the riskiest business focus. According to the research participants, banks 
with strong investment banking focus tend to not engage in general corporate lending and 
rather conduct event-related financing business such as M&A.  
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In that context, Harjoto et al. (2006) and Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool (2009) found 
investment banks to charge higher spreads than do banks with commercial banking activities. 
Furthermore, investment banks are said to invest in riskier borrower classes and engage more 
in loans that are tradable (Maskara, 2006).  
Finding: Ceteris paribus, the bank type determines corporate syndicated loan pricings 
with the respective general direction being ambiguous. A strong investment banking-
focus however tends to be associated with higher pricings. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 I would not say that a loan originated by Landesbanks is necessarily cheaper or more expensive than a 
loan originated by a commercial or by a pure investment bank. Therefore, these are normally market 
driven pricings. The issue is that investment banks commonly do not take part in common corporate 
loans. They want to do more complex M&A or LBO-business. 
I 7 Whether it is a commercial bank or a pure play investment bank also plays a role, because a pure play 
investment bank does not necessarily tend to keep a couple of hundred million Euros on its books for 
five years or so. 
I 8 If you go with global investment banks, the pricing will be higher. They focus more on riskier asset 
classes and would originate the loan and then sell it to other investors. 
I 11 Some banks are more determined towards servicing specific client bases. Like the savings banks or 
Spaarkassen in Germany, they work quite closely with the smaller borrowers in their region to ensure 
that the borrower stays with them. 
 
5.5.3.2 Nationality 
Nine interviewees highlighted that a lender’s nationality and its impact on pricing is subject to 
cyclical changes. In Germany, this is, inter alia, characterised by the presence of foreign 
banks tending to price themselves aggressively into syndicates, especially in times of 
economic prosperity. However, those banks tend to retreat to their home markets in times of 
economic downturns. In light of the 2008/2009 financial crisis, supporting evidence for this 
flight home effect has been provided by Giannetti and Laeven (2012) and de Haas and van 
Horen (2013). Additionally, foreign banks might also demand higher pricings as return 
hurdles of German banks tend to be lower compared to peripheral European ones, for 
example.  
Thus, the appearances of foreign banks in German corporate loan syndicates may lead to 
pricing discounts as well as pricing premiums. An indication for the latter is provided by 
Haselmann and Wachtel (2011), who stated that in larger European countries such as 
Germany, foreign lead arrangers price syndicated loans at a premium. In a different vein, 
Houston et al. (2017) found firms with foreign assets to benefit from foreign lenders located 
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in these countries. Based on the research participants’ statements, I reach the following 
finding: 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, the impact of a lenders’ nationality on pricing is ambiguous. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this:  
I 8 In Germany, the more national the bank group is that the client uses, probably the more attractive the 
pricing, the client can get. Why? If you look at international banks, they look at various deals at the 
same time across Europe and maybe worldwide and the German market tends to be especially 
competitive in pricing especially compared to southern Europe. These kinds of banks tend to ask for 
higher pricing compared to pure local players that support the client.  
I 14 The domestic banks in each country have a key role in the whole game. In many countries, they will 
instinctively want to protect their relationship with their local companies by being quite aggressive on 
pricing. This effect is actually compounded because if you then have an incoming external competitor 
bank from another country, they must undercut it, and so it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy actually 
that pricing just keeps pressurising down. 
I 19 There are certainly foreign banks who try to enter the German market and gain market share here, as 
credit risks seem to be pretty good in Germany. Often these banks offer clients with really cheap 
dumping pricings and try to pressure themselves into a facility. This is a cyclical issue. With view to 
the last 10 years, I saw foreign banks entering the market aggressively but also leaving it again in 
times of crisis. 
 
5.5.3.3 Size and capitalisation 
According to 17 interviewees, the better a bank is capitalised in relative terms, the more 
incremental lending supply it can create compared to more capital-constrained banks. Besides 
financial health, the amount of capital (common equity) in absolute terms can be interpreted 
as the main proxy of bank size, constituting a limiting factor of a bank’s scarce lending 
capacity (Strahan, 2008). According to the research participants, the bank’s size is crucial in 
large-scale financings, especially if these are underwritten. Here, larger banks have a 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis smaller (i.e., lower capitalised) peers. Furthermore, a high 
degree of relative and absolute capitalisation leads to a better credit quality of the bank itself 
and reduces its funding costs. In line with Mattes et al. (2013), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), 
and Hubbard et al. (2002), a well-capitalised bank is capable of granting cheaper loans, with 
nine interviewees agreeing on this. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, German corporate syndicated loan pricings are a declining 
function of bank size and capitalisation.  
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 Of course, the size of a bank is an issue, especially for larger loans. You need a certain amount of 
capital to be able to provide big-ticket lending. 
I 5 If you would like to get higher into the league table positions and if you have lots of capital to put to 
work, and then in a competitive environment you might be willing to accept less pricing and less fees 
and structures that are more aggressive. However, if the bank is in a difficult capital situation and you 
have many lawsuits or other external factors that influence the way you can allocate your capital. 
I 16 The banks size in terms of its equity and balance sheet is naturally linked. The bigger the bank, the 
more fire power it has in terms of loan volume. Nowadays, being able to provide what we call big-
ticket lending is very important. Syndicates are becoming smaller, and so we need to provide larger 
amounts. Also, recently, larger acquisition financings were back on the map. Without being able to 
provide large scale underwriting offers, you do not have any chance in that competitive market. So, 
bank-size matters. 
 
5.5.3.4 Funding costs  
Twenty research participants expressed that banks’ funding costs are a syndicated loan pricing 
determinant. Rather than as supposed by theoretical models and by the majority of extant 
syndicated loan pricing literature, banks’ overall costs of capital procurement appear to 
individually differ, compared to the current reference rate values. Since the use of terms like 
“funding” and “liquidity costs” as well as the related concepts appear somewhat slippery, I 
will attempt to provide some simplified background here, with Figure 45 displaying the basic 
underlying phenomena. It is likely that terminological differences across banks occur. The 
core concept of Figure 45 should however hold for all banks active in German syndicated 
lending. 
 
Figure 45. Funding and liqudity cost illustration. 
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If the theoretical model of a frictionless interbank market funding at the costs of, for example,  
EURIBOR or LIBOR would hold in practice, no differentiation between different levels of 
bank credit-worthiness would be incorporated (Hallak & Schure, 2011). In other words, a 
bank would purchase liquidity for the price of the current reference rate value for the client’s 
chosen interest rate period (component 1 in Figure 45). In other words, the associated costs of 
capital procurement would only appear as an item in transit. According to the research 
participants, additional costs of liquidity differ extensively across banks, leading to the need 
of higher weighted overall funding cost components in loan pricing calculations, 
predominantly via so-called funding spreads,202 also sometimes referred to as liquidity 
premiums. In practice, this appears to only be an issue since the financial crisis, before which 
bank specific liquidity premiums appeared to be negligible. 
I 10 After the crisis, we have been matching funding and loans much more. Before the crisis, this was not 
much of a topic. 
I 17 The whole funding and liquidity cost discussion only came up in and after the financial crisis. Before 
that, banks were basically all treated equally, although they of course weren’t equal. The bankruptcy 
of a bank was, however, no realistic scenario and we could fund ourselves broadly at current market 
terms like EURIBOR or LIBOR. 
 
This trend or higher costs of capital procurement in comparison to current reference rate 
yields even gets accelerated as banks do not necessarily refinance large loans based on their 
actual underlying interest rate period but commonly for longer time horizons. Hence, the 
respective maturities swap price needs to be paid by the bank as well.203 In other words, 
although syndicated loans are floating rate instruments, in practice lenders face duration 
risks.204 The price for a cross-currency swap might also be added for foreign currency loans.205 
Banks’ individual funding spreads are determined by banks’ own creditworthiness (Craig & 
Dinger, 2013). Based on hybrid costing, large universal banks, for instance, refinance their 
lending business through the acquisition of deposits, through central bank borrowing, repo-
borrowing, and the issuance of capital market securities (Bace, 2016). Yield levels of senior 
unsecured debt instruments provide rough indications for banks’ funding spreads. In that vein, 
                                               
 
202 Component 4 in Figure 45. 
203 Component 2 in Figure 45. 
204 As established in section 5.3.1.2.2, this duration risk can only be partly be priced via breakage fees that are only applicable 
for repayments within a running interest rate period.  
205 Component 3 in figure 45. 
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Figure 46 plots historical yield developments of banks’ CDS with a five-year maturity if 
found available at Bloomberg.206  
 
Source: Based on Bloomberg207 secondary data. 
Figure 46. Five-year CDS spreads of selected banks. 
Figure 46 displays wide yield-level deviations across banks, especially since the financial 
crisis around 2008/2009. Although these spreads have in general converged again, they have 
stayed wider as compared to pre-crisis periods, a trend that mirrors the research participants’ 
statements. Thus, a conservatively operating, well capitalised universal bank with substantial 
retail deposit activities is likely to carry lower funding spreads compared to banks not sharing 
these characteristics, such as those with a strong wholesale or investment banking focus 
(Bace, 2016; Craig & Dinger, 2013).  
                                               
 
206 Note that Figure 46 displays information on overall 13 banks. Since the figure and the lines would have become 
unreadable when plotting and highlighting all banks in the same manner, I randomly highlighted three banks and only 
displayed the remaining ones in the background. This appears reasonable as Figure 46 is only included to provide the reader a 
quick overview on how widely funding spreads across banks might differ. 
207 Here, I used Bloomberg data as information on CDS-spreads is not readily available at Dealogic Loanware which serves 
as the main secondary data source in this study. 
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In practice, wide lender-borrower funding cost mismatches in favour of the former might 
cause challenges: Suppose that a bank faces higher costs of funding compared to current debt 
capital markets yields of the potential borrower. This theoretical constellation might happen to 
become reality especially for high investment grade borrowers, who, when it comes to bank 
loans, commonly benchmark themselves to their outstanding fully disintermediated capital 
markets instruments (Fitzgerald, 2011; Gaab, 2011). With regards to Figure 46, it becomes 
obvious that this was a pronounced issue during the financial crisis around 2008/2009. 
I later explain that these large capital markets clients tend not to rely on term bank debt at all. 
However RCFs are commonly issued, even for the largest clients. These might either be back-
up RCFs securing a client against possible turmoil in the commercial paper market or a 
common RCF for seasonal working capital funding if, for example, no commercial paper 
programme was in place. Hence, on a cost base, fully drawn pricing levels might be higher 
compared to an outstanding bond of a borrower, for example. To a certain extent, utilisation 
fee208 concepts might adress this issue, especially for back-up RCFs. Remember that these are 
expected to remain undrawn. Thus, the bank only has to allocate a smaller amount of liquidity 
compared to an RCF being expected to be frequently drawn. On a per annum basis, the 
borrower in that constellation only needs to pay commitment fees calculated based on the 
margin net of utilisation fees. In other words, the client pays very little and the bank—via the 
utilisation fee concept—is somewhat protected against higher related costs of funding in the 
unusual case of a drawdown. For term debt, the discussed phenomenon might become an 
issue in the area of acquisition term loans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
208 See section 5.3.1.1.8. 
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The foregoing discussion and its interrelated issues were discussed by four interviewees, as 
exemplified by the following statements: 
I 2 Funding costs of banks are becoming very important when we lend to the biggest multinational clients, 
which have very good external rating. Here, their own costs in the debt capital markets can be cheaper 
than funding costs of banks. I mean there are still a couple of “A”-rated corporates out there in 
Germany. Private banks, however, not so many. This leads to this issue within in this group of clients, 
which is in terms of number very small but in terms of possible syndicated loan volume very large. 
However, I need to put that into perspective a bit. Such a client would never tap the syndicated loan 
market for a term loan except in the case of an acquisition bridge. So, we basically talk about large 
undrawn back-up lines. 
I 10 Most banks work in certain spectrums. Therefore, you know, if you look at bank “X”, for instance, a 
bank that specifically looks at non-IG crossover or even LBO-names, they are working at that kind of 
spectrum. They would not look at BASF because they do not have the products for BASF. BASF would 
also not look at them because mainly it does not fit. The banks such as we are, generally look at 
investment grade names. 
I 16 Mismatches in funding costs might be handled by structures like utilisation fee concepts. However, the 
issue was more pronounced in the financial crisis, where we had to pay a couple or percentages for a 
five-year loan for instance. 
 
Finally, in extreme situations banks might not be able to compete any more for lending 
business for corporates as their funding costs are just too high. In that case, these banks need 
to focus on risky assest classes like LBOs. In line with Maskara (2010) and Craig and Dinger 
(2013), whilst funding costs increase, banks need to invest in riskier loans with higher 
pricings to be enabled to fully cover these costs.  
I conclude: 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, German corporate syndicated loan pricings are a rising 
function of banks’ individual funding costs.  
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 Banks have different funding costs. Therefore, some banks can definitely accept a lower pricing than 
others. Particularly, banks having a very good rating have lower costs of funding and could 
theoretically accept lower pricings. 
I 4 Because of funding costs, it makes a significant difference whether the customer goes for a short-term 
loan or a long-term financing. 
I 8 So, what reflects the refinancing costs? As a bank, we have an asset pool on the basis of which we 
refinance ourselves. There is the money coming from the retail customers and another part is on how 
we finance on the capital markets. If the overall economic outlook is negative, then our bond spreads 
tend to widen and our refinancing costs increase and then this also reflects in the syndicated loan 
pricing. We have 40 bp p.a. for five years for instance at the moment.  
I 10 That depends a lot on the position of the bank. A bank such as ours has funding possibilities and a 
rating that maybe other banks do not necessarily have. Thus, our position in terms of actually making 
money from loans is a good one generally. Our funding costs are lower than the ones of a few of our 
competitors. That overall is a positive thing for our product. 
I 16 Well funding costs might push banks into higher risk loans. I mean, it is clear that the higher the risk, 
the higher the margin and the less important the funding costs will be. 
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5.5.3.5 Credit pricing and return model 
Sixteen interviewees expressed a view that banks’ individual pricing and return models have 
an influence on syndicated loan pricings. Banks often run mathematical models to calibrate 
their individual credit pricing views. Although these models are said to differ with respect to 
specific intricacies, they tend broadly to follow two major methodological approaches, as 
argued by the research participants, namely, the cost and the market opportunity cost-based 
approaches. 
5.5.3.5.1 Cost-based approach 
Here, risk-neutral loan pricings are calculated bottom-up, based on the bank’s cost elements, 
as exemplified by Figure 47. 
 
Figure 47. Cost elements of syndicated loan pricing.  
Following this methodology, credit pricings consist of the bank-specific funding cost 
component as discussed, as well as of certain administrative costs that are unrelated to a 
borrowers’ specific credit risk profile.  
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To these fixed components, one must add a risk-adequate compensation for the expected loss 
(EL). For a specific loan, the lenders estimate the respective loss (Loss Given Default: LGD) 
and the outstanding loan amount in the case of failure (Exposure at Default: EaD).209 Based 
on these values, banks are then enabled to calculate their loan-specific EL by multiplying 
EAD, LGD and PD. Besides the costs for the expected loss, the pricing contains a premium 
for unexpected losses and the required return on equity. Broadly, the ratio of a bank’s equity 
to its total risk-weighted assets (RWA) should on average amount to eight percent. Loan-
specific RWA allocations appear to differ quite extensively in practice, based on various 
factors such as borrower-individual default probability, security, etc. Taking the possible 
variety of the equations’ elements into account, one can imagine how widely pricing 
requirements may vary across banks, underpinned by the following statements: 
I 2 Our bank calculates in theory the needed pricing based on a very complex algorithm that is fed by 
numerous sorts of quantitative data. The most important element is the internal rating. And from a fix-
cost perspective our funding costs. These again are related to the maturity of the loan. 
I 5 Although all models generally base on the same idea, they all have their specifics which at the end 
lead to different price views. 
I 8 If you look at our internal pricing mechanics for syndicated loans on a cost basis, we have the 
regulatory costs, we have the costs for the equity that we have to put insight, and we have the costs for 
the default risk. We take into account the loss given default. We take into account the funding costs. 
This is the cost side that we look at. This is kind of a minimum margin that we have to achieve. 
I 16 Our banks pricing tool is a cost based one. We look at certain fix cost elements, we look at of course 
the clients risk profile and we look at our funding costs. At the end, the required return is also added. 
This leads to the mathematically derived loan pricing. If this is at the end the real price of a facility is 
a different story. 
 
5.5.3.5.2 Market opportunity cost-based approach 
In 5.3.3.1.2.1, I introduced the “opportunistic credit portfolio management”, acting as “risk-
neutral” investor by evaluating loans at a “fair” market price with the cost components 
presented in Figure 47 playing no role or only indirect roles. The pricing is set based on 
current market yields, outlined by the following example: Suppose a German DAX company 
intends to borrow via a bullet repayment term loan carrying a five-year maturity. 
Simultaneously, the client has a corporate bond outstanding with a remaining time to maturity 
of exactly five years which is currently yielding at 100 bp p.a. in the secondary market. Thus, 
the loan price, based on this opportunistic approach, would at least need to amount to 100bp 
p.a.  
                                               
 
209 LgD and EaD can differ inter alia in the case a loan is backed with security which leads to lower LgD compared to EaD in 
a default scenario. 
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Usually the bank individual funding spread will be added as the only fixed cost component 
needed to purchase the liquidity needed. The opportunistic and risk-neutral portfolio manager 
would not efficiently allocate its capital if the pricing was valuing below the actual market 
price and would hence face opportunity costs. The basic underlying assumption concerning 
this approach is that disintermediated capital markets themselves are continuously producing 
“right” and “risk-neutral” pricing views, independent of any bank-specific cost and return 
models.  
In practice, often mixed calculations are conducted, for example where the borrower has 
several outstanding benchmark instruments210. In addition, benchmarking based on asset-
baskets replicating specific borrower-risk clusters might be applied.211 Because the market 
opportunity cost-based approach relies on capital markets benchmarks, this is only 
realistically applicable for large clients that can access these capital markets.212 For smaller 
more opaque ones, it appears rather unrealistic. Consequently, this approach is mainly used by 
institutions with an investment banking focus or by specific investment banking-like acting 
entities of commercial or wholesale banks, by means of a differentiation between capital 
markets and smaller, non-capital-markets-orientated clients, as underpinned by the following 
statements: 
I 3 We have an internal pricing view that is based on costs. Other banks often have different systems, 
especially for larger firms and use a market driven pricing model. They compare and look at CDS or 
bond spreads. If a client has, for example, a bond outstanding and these spreads would widen, those 
banks would also require higher loan pricings. So, there is a huge implication of where bonds are 
trading. As I said, some banks use the market pricing approach and others an internal cost approach. 
Some also do both dependent on the borrower size. 
I 14 These approaches are completely different because one is the approach of a completely objective 
investor who has €100 million available to invest and he does not need to put that into a loan. He can 
also buy CDS, or bonds. Whatever gives him the highest yield is what he would go for. And if he is 
being pushed into something with a lower yield, then he says “Ok”, I need to be compensated for that 
loss.  
I 21 There are banks that run a pure portfolio management approach. They do not rigidly calculate their 
costs. They look at the pure market. If you have a drawn loan for company “x”, then they simply look 
where their bond is currently trading. So, the loan must at least meet this current market price. 
Otherwise there will be a shortfall. That is a very different approach compared to looking on cost 
bases. 
 
                                               
 
210 For example, CDS, bonds. 
211 Usually in the case this client has no sufficient or transparent instruments outstanding itself. 
212 See also my related discussion in section 5.5.3.4 on possible funding cost mismatches. 
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To conclude, whether a bank uses one or the other approach, as well as differences of 
methodological specifics of one bank vis-a-vis another, leads to different pricing policies 
across lenders. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, banks credit pricing and return models determine corporate 
syndicated loan pricings with the directional influence being ambiguous. 
5.5.3.6 Reputation and experience in syndicated lending 
According to eight research participants, reputation and experience drive syndicated loan 
pricings, especially in large syndications, for example, for underwritten M&A deals. A 
reputable bookrunner, having led several major high quality transactions in the past, is able to 
set the loan pricing package relatievely tight and is nevertheless able to successfully place it in 
the market. This is in line with the arguments of Godlewski et al. (2012) and Ivashina (2009). 
In contrast, several authors have found an opposite relationship. According to Alexandre et al. 
(2014), McCahery and Schwienbacher (2010), and Cook et al. (2003), given its relatively high 
reputation, a bookrunner might also be enabled to charge higher pricings, as borrowers have 
to pay a premium for this reputation.  
Reputation can be assessed by general market shares (Drucker & Puri, 2005) and with respect 
to a certain industry in which the lender is predominantly active. Due to a lower signalling 
power, less reputable and/or less experienced banks might need to set the pricing higher to 
ensure a successful syndication.  
Finding: Ceteris paribus, syndicated loan pricings are a declining function of a (lead) 
banks’ reputation.  
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 15 The reputation of the bookrunner is important, as signalling plays a role. Banks do look at who is 
leading a deal and what is the standing of this Bookrunner and where are they positioned in league 
tables. If you have a big German, French, or U.S. bank, they are credible banks. If they lead a deal, 
that is a good signal into the market. You must differentiate again between underwriting and best 
efforts, but the big banks have a general standard, which they have to adhere to. 
I 18 Being well positioned in the bookrunner league table clearly enables us to price transactions more 
aggressively. This is particularly true in M&A-deals. In normal financings, which are club-like either 
way nowadays, it does not matter so much. 
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5.5.3.7 Lending philosophy 
All research participants stressed the lending philosophy of banks to be a syndicated loan 
pricing driver. For instance, foreign universal banks with a strong global investment banking 
focus are likely to have different target clients as well as return considerations, compared to a 
German wholesale bank such as a Landesbank. The following list displays different lending 
philosophies that were identified through analysis of the interview data: 
 Opportunistic asset takers 
 Relationship lenders 
 Credit growth/shrink strategy 
 Geographical issues 
 Social responsibility issues 
5.5.3.7.1 Opportunistic asset takers 
Above, I introduced the opportunistic pricing deviation approach that does not necessarily 
suggest that the whole bank acts opportunistically or, in other words, is risk-neutral. It might 
be simply a tool to manage portfolios and to benchmark pricings. It might however be the 
case that the whole bank’s lending philosophy follows this approach by only conducting 
arm’s length business. Today, this is only seldom the case, however, and is only applied by 
purely investment bank-like acting lenders. The German corporate syndicated loan market in 
fact is mainly driven by relationship aspects that are discussed in 5.5.13. Opportunistic asset 
takers might also be present in the form of institutional investors, such as insurance 
companies or other non-bank financial institutions. In practice, the corporate syndicated loan 
market in Germany is, however, a pure bank-driven market. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, opportunistic asset takers require higher German corporate 
syndicated loan pricings.  
The following interviewee statement exemplifies this: 
I 3 One key question is if you as a bank are doing the loan with view to certain return considerations, 
which is hardly ever the case these days, but it used to be a strong incentive in the 90s and early 
2000s. It has gone away because of the low pricings most of these loans carry. At that time, we had 
many pure and opportunistic asset takers in the market. This is coming back at least at the demand 
side to a certain extent with new entrants in the loans market as investors. Insurance companies want 
to be asset takers. Again, for them the difficulty is, to identify assets that respond their needs of a 
certain return. In the relationship market, they hardly find loans, which are profitable enough to meet 
their requirements. It is nearly a 100% bank-driven market. So, you find these kinds of lenders mainly 
in the LBO or project finance market. 
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5.5.3.7.2 Relationship lenders 
Relationship lenders value syndicated loans as entry keys into client relationships. The 
rationale behind this is that the bank avails the borrower balance sheet and establishes itself as 
a relationship lender. In return, the borrower avails the bank with cross-selling opportunities 
such as cash management, bond structuring etc. (Voisey, 2016). According to all 
interviewees, the corporate syndicated lending market in Germany especially obeys to this 
relationship rationale, with banks’ lending philosophies usually adhering to related underlying 
practices rather than engaging in opportunistic lending. The relationship component as one 
driver of the syndicated loan pricing happens to be so pronounced that it has been devoted a 
whole determinant category.213   
Finding: Ceteris paribus relationship lenders accept lower pricings in the German 
corporate syndicated loan market. 
5.5.3.7.3 Credit growth/shrink strategy 
A bank’s lending philosophy might be focused on expanding lending activities or on the 
opposite. The question as to whether a bank is willing and able to expand its credit portfolio is 
linked to the general capital and liquidity situation, as a lender characteristic discussed above. 
However, also soft factors, like the bank managements’ view on the future economy, or the 
relative importance it avails the syndicated loan product are key. If a bank’s management 
decides to strive to gain market shares in German corporate syndicated lending, pricings 
might well be more aggressive compared to banks pursuing other strategies. Earlier, I 
presented the internal pricing models which define the profitability of a transaction with a 
business decision being needed whether to grant a specific loan. In “expanding-mode”, bank 
managers might consider substituting certain parts of the underlying equations to price more 
aggressively. Such a substitution can, inter alia, be a treasury discount regarding allocated 
funding spreads. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, the credit growth/shrink strategy of a bank determines 
syndicated loan pricings with the respective direction being ambiguous. 
 
                                               
 
213 See section 5.5.13, where an array of interviewee statements will be displayed underpinning related phenomena. 
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 6 We had a business committee meeting today for somebody who is doing a refinancing, which is a good 
example: It is a well rated German borrower, credit quality is beyond doubt, we are second row up to 
now, we have never led a deal for this client and they are fairly aggressive. My colleagues came in 
with a pricing proposal that was 60 bp p.a. and then we discussed it and I said, “Do we really have a 
chance to lead this time?” They said,”Yes.” We think the relationship manager has a good view and is 
optimistic to lead the deal, because we have been on the side-lines for a long time and the client knows 
that we want to be in the first position here. Then I said, “Ok, go for 55 bp p.a.” We push it slightly 
down so that we increase our chance to get a first-tier role. 
I 9 In addition, it is a question of strategic importance of the client. Are you keen to have a leading or 
active role in the deal? Then you have to be aggressive, because your competitors will also be 
aggressive. Some banks have certain defined amount, which they can use for very aggressive pricings. 
For example, you have € 300 million free amount per year where you can price below internal 
treasury costs. 
I 14 In my world, which is corporate syndicated lending, what primarily drives pricing is banks desire to 
expand their lending relationships. 
 
5.5.3.7.4 Geographical issues 
The geographical location of a borrower within Germany might play a role in syndicated loan 
price settings. In other words, a client located in “x” might be able to obtain better conditions 
compared to an in “y” located client. Six interviewees identified this apparently illogical 
practice. For example, banks in regions with less-developed client bases or with lower lending 
opportunities might show a willingness to grant syndicated loans with more favourable 
conditions, compared to borrowers located in “client-rich” regions.  
Finding: Ceteris paribus, regional aspects determine syndicated loan pricings with the 
related direction being ambiguous. 
The following interviewee statement exemplifies this: 
I 9 There are regions in Germany where there are not that many corporates and potential borrowers 
located. In such areas, the heads of corporate banking are keen to be in a deal of this important 
company out of his region and then they are ready to accept nearly everything. These are areas where 
you then see prices, which are very low. In another area in Germany, the same deal would maybe 
more expensive. When you compare same ratings, you may find that this company pays 30 bp p.a. less 
margin, compared to the other company. In that sense, it is good for us that the market is so opaque. 
Otherwise, all companies would also push for the low pricing. 
 
As explained by interviewee 9, it is pricing opacity that may facilitate this reported 
discrepancy that might be interpreted as an example of so-termed investment distortion. In the 
case of more pricing transparency, the situation of two otherwise identical clients located in 
different regions being charged different prices would appear unlikely.  
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 Conclusion: lender characteristics  
In this section, the main factors constituting lenders’ individual characteristics have been 
established. Based on the analysis of the research participants’ statements, I was able to 
confirm certain findings of extant literature, but also to provide important incremental insights 
into the influence of lender characteristics on syndicated loan pricings. Especially with respect 
to the funding costs of banks, their credit pricing and return models, and their general 
investment and lending philosophies, extant syndicated loan-related research is scarce. 
Moreover, where it does exist, it does not recognise the interplay of these numerous and 
diverse factors.  
The discussion remains to be enhanced by prioritising the determinants in light of their 
different influential magnitudes towards their determinant category (Figure 48). 
 
Figure 48. Lender charactersitics: determinant prioritisation.  
It appears that the bank’s lending philosophy and its individual funding costs constitute key 
price determinants. It is likely that outstanding syndicated loan-related literature has not 
extensively focused on the latter, given the fact that this only became an issue during and after 
the financial crisis,214 and/or through simply relying on the assumptions of frictionless inter-
bank-market funding. With respect to banks’ credit pricing and return models, I have provided 
some novel insights by presenting the two common mechanisms in depth. Size and 
capitalisation were mentioned to be an especially important price determinant in large, event-
                                               
 
214 Much of the syndicated loan literature was published before 2008. 
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related financings, as banks’ ability to provide large scale underwritings is mainly determined 
by this factor. 
 Contractual features 
In line with extant literature, all interviewees expressed certain German corporate syndicated 
loan non-price-related terms and conditions to determine pricings.  
Analyses of the interview data with respect to the determinant category contractual features 
enabled me to establish the corresponding determinants displayed in Figure 49. 
 
Figure 49. Contractual features and its determinants 
5.5.5.1 Amount 
Twenty interviewees mentioned that loan amounts can drive pricing. In line with the majority 
of authors in the core literature (e.g., Barbosa & Ribeiro, 2007; Carey & Nini, 2007; 
Christodoulakis & Olupeka, 2010), 15 research participants stated that especially large loans 
were commonly issued by relatively large borrowers with an unstained creditworthiness. 
Smaller loans in return are said to be predominantly issued by smaller and usually more risky 
borrowers. Besides the risk component, extant literature usually related the lower pricings to 
economies of scale. According to the interviewees, the largest loans in general corporate 
financings commonly are back-up RCFs for borrowers with the strongest credit risk profiles. 
These typically amount to several billion Euros.    
The statements provide further support for the reported downside bias within the public data 
sample, as presented in 4.5. To recapitulate, syndicated loans with published pricing 
information are significantly larger compared to those without such public information. It 
further supports the “single-transaction downside bias” with respect to back-up lines where 
initial margins sometimes get published, but utilisation fees intendeldy do not.      
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 Very large loans are mostly borrowerd by very huge clients. These borrowers often have very good 
ratings and can negotiate very attractive pricings. Very large loans are in my view either back-up 
revolvers or bridge loans. And these back-up loans are at least from an initial margin perspective the 
cheapest loans of all. 
I 5 I think the larger the loans, usually the thinner the pricing. 
I 8 Historically very large loans are either back-up RCFs like e.g., the € 9 billion one for Daimler, or very 
large acquisition loans like the recently €52 billion Bayer Monsanto deal. Speaking of the former, 
these loans are very cheap by only carrying a few basis points of margin and by paying very little 
upfront fees.  
I 20 When you look at the very huge revolvers outstanding in Germany, these margins are just ridiculously 
small. However, in a hypothetical draw down scenario utilisation fees would need to be paid which 
need to be added if you would look at it from a full-cost base. 
 
However, according to eight interviewees, opposite directional influences might also be 
found, especially in multibillion non-back-up RCFs in general, and for those related to event 
purposes such as acquisitions. There are critical loan sizes, especially for certain purposes 
inhabiting more complex structures, where loan pricing shifts to a rising function of loan 
amounts. Logically, the higher the amount, the more money has to be raised via syndication—
an especially critical fact if loans are underwritten. Furthermore, individual banks’ 
commitments tend to be significantly larger compared to relatively small financings.  
In this vein, a minority of authors (e.g., Godlewski & Weill, 2011; Calomiris & 
Pornrojnangkool, 2009) found such a positive relationship, however, without relating this to 
an in-depth reasoning vis-à-vis the bulk of contradictory evidence.  
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 3 Loan amounts in general are hard to judge with view to their influence on pricing. When we have very 
large loans, let us say a €5 billion acquisition financing, then it is clear that it needs to be priced 
higher compared to a €500 million one for the same client. There is simply a higher placement risk 
involved as these loans are usually underwritten. On the other hand, very large revolvers that can well 
amount to €10 billion are in my view the cheapest. There is a kind of ambiguity in that respect. 
I 7 It is relatively obvious that if you do a deal of €15 billion that you need to think about this differently 
than doing a deal of € 3 million for instance. 
I 16 I think the larger acquisition financings are the more expensive loans must be priced. 
I 21 Jumbo deals of a certain size must be priced at a premium as there is of course a natural limitation in 
bank appetite in the market. 
 
Overall, given the diversity of related discussions for German syndicated loans overall, I 
conclude: 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, the influence of German corporate syndicated loan amounts on 
pricing is ambiguous.  
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5.5.5.2 Maturity 
According to 15 research participants, longer tenors lead to higher loan pricings by relating 
this, among other factors, to greater risk associated with a longer term and to higher related 
bank funding costs as the latter rise as a function of maturity. The argument of greater risk 
associated with longer tenors can be linked to the earlier presented trade-off hypothesis, 
postulating that relatively risky borrowers tend to seek long-term financing to moderate early 
and costly liquidation risks. Banks, on the other hand, face higher risks in engaging in long 
term loans for risky borrowers and are only willing to offer long tenured loans to risky 
borrowers at a price premium (Coleman et al., 2002). The funding cost argument is, however, 
detached from borrowers’ specific credit risk, with these costs being fixed components. 
Grounded on the ideas of the trade-off hypothesis, a small majority of the authors of core 
papers found positive relationships between pricing and maturity (e.g., Focarelli et al., 2008; 
Barbosa & Ribeiro, 2007; Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011). Nine interviewees, however, 
remarked that loan maturity is not usually subject to extensive negotiation in non-event-
related corporate syndicated lending.  
In other words, for general corporate financings, tenors in certain rating clusters tend to be 
market standard. Favourably-rated investment-grade215 firms usually obtain five-year maturity 
loans equipped with two one-year extension options, often referred to as 5+1+1 loans. Solid 
investment grade companies are said to predominantly close five-year loans, whereas 
crossover and sub-investment grade firms commonly achieve three years of tenor. This view 
would fit the credit quality hypothesis, which suggests negative maturity-price relations as 
lenders strive to limit their risk-exposures by forcing high-risk borrowers into short-term debt 
(Berger & Udell, 1990; Dennis et al., 2000; Strahan, 1999) and offer long-term loans only to 
the highest quality borrowers. With respect to the core literature, Santos and Winton (2008) 
and Bharath et al. (2011) confirmed this view. 
Eight interviewees held maturity to become more subject to negotiation in acquisition 
financings, predominantly for large-scale underwritten bridge term loans. Here, banks 
strongly focus on a quick de-risking and incorporate special pricing features like duration fees 
to manage maturity profiles.  
                                               
 
215 Either external and/or internal rated. 
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The above-mentioned findings can be interpreted as confirmation of elements of both credit 
quality as well as the trade-off-hypothesis, depending inter alia on the loans’ purpose and 
considering banks’ funding costs. Overall, I conclude: 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, syndicated loan pricings are a rising function of maturity.  
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 Longer maturities lead to higher related bank funding costs. That makes it naturally more expensive. 
I 4 It makes a significant difference whether the customer goes for a short-term loan or a long-lasting 
revolver with all kind of flexibilities. 
I 6 Most good borrowers have five-year tenor or 5+1+1 if they adhere to that template. 
I 9 You see pricing differences between three- and five-year loans. 
I 10 The longer the term, the more expensive it gets. 
I 16 The tenor of a loan is usually not a big discussion point with corporate borrowers. For good ones, it is 
five and, for not so good ones three years. Tenors become a topic in M&A deals or long-term project 
financings, but not in the general corporate world. 
I 19 In the market, we are elaborating here it plays a role but I think maturities are a kind of market 
standard for certain risk categories. We are not talking about project financings with tenors of 20 
years. 
I 20 The most important issue with tenor is related to the funding costs of banks. Granting a three-year 
loan–even if these loans in theory are floating rate instruments–is much cheaper for us than providing 
a five year one for the same client. Risk classification is rather reflected in a way that certain rating 
categories are associated with certain maturity profiles. The best clients can go for 5+1+1, solid ones 
for five, and a bit weaker ones, for three years. 
 
5.5.5.3 Type 
According to all interviewees, the loan’s type, whether it is a backup-RCF, a common RCF, a 
term loan or an acquisition facility as sub-format of term loans, affects pricing. In line with 
Godlewski and Weill (2011), Harjoto et al. (2006), and Schenone (2010), seven interviewees 
generally agreed that term loans are commonly more expensive compared to RCFs. Amongst 
others, Santos and Winton (2008) and Hale and Santos (2009) further noted that bridge loans, 
being usually used to support acquisition financings, are on average the most expensive loan 
type, a finding, confirmed by 15 interviewees. 
In contrast, four interviewees stated that full-drawn pricings often tend to be identical for term 
and revolving debt in general corporate lending. In many cases, where syndicated loans 
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consist of several tranches,216 the margin on the term loan equals the fully drawn one of the 
revolving line after having incorporated applicable utilisation fees.217  
Overall, these discussions underline the importance of loan-type individual pricing 
definitions. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, revolving credit facilities tend to be cheaper compared to term 
loans. Hidden utilisation fee concepts might however partly or even fully explain spread 
differences between revolvers and term loans.  
Finding: Ceteris paribus, acquisition term loan facilities are the most expensive loan type 
within the German corporate market.  
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 This depends. On average revolvers are cheaper compared to term loans. However, you need to 
compare pricings of term loans with fully drawn pricings of revolvers. Then this pricing disparity 
narrows or in the case of investment grade borrowers goes away completely. 
I 10 RCFs tend to be cheaper than drawn term loans. Term loans have historically been more expensive 
than revolving credit facilities. 
I 16 In terms of loan types, acquisition financings, mainly bridge loans, are the most expensive. These 
loans are usually underwritten and carry higher uncertainty anyway. 
 
5.5.5.4 Currency 
According to six research participants, the overall currency or contractually embedded 
currency-options affect pricings. Although most German corporates tend to borrow in Euro, 
some have funding needs in other currencies that are commonly addressed via multi-currency 
options within RCFs. In a more particular vein, cross-border acquisitions are usually financed 
via foreign currency syndicated term loans, as the price for the foreign target commonly needs 
to be paid in the local currency or in USD. Especially for smaller German banks that lack 
competitive funding access abroad, funding costs tend to be higher compared to banks having 
that access or compared to foreign lenders joining the facility. Higher associated costs are 
often addressed via foreign currency premiums218 in RCFs and via general premium for term 
debt. 
                                               
 
216 For example, of a term loan and of a revolving credit facility. 
217 See Table 12 for a related example. 
218 See section 5.3.1.1.3. 
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Finding: Ceteris paribus, loans denominated in a foreign currency tend to be more 
expensive compared to local currency ones. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 If it is not their original currency, it becomes more difficult for them, because they have then to 
somewhere source that money as well. 
I 3 I observed that currency discussions are often getting intense in cross-border acquisitions. If we as a 
German bank support a USD-denominated acquisition financing and commit a billion here, we first 
need to evaluate what the funding premium of USD in comparison to € will be. 
I 8 Currency is often an issue. We as a German bank need to swap Euros into the respective foreign 
currency. This swap might be so expensive that the overall pricing is not competitive any more. Thus, 
currency issues need to be taken into consideration carefully. At best, you talk to your treasury 
department before pitching in other currencies than Euros. 
 
5.5.5.5 Covenants and security  
Conventional wisdom suggests that credit risk-mitigating elements like covenants and 
security should reduce syndicated loan pricings, especially as security commonly eases the 
LgD and might further lead to lower required RWA allocations for such loans. According to 
12 interviewees, however, covenants and collateral carry only limited pricing influence in 
general corporate syndicated lending. Certain covenant and security sets are rather market 
standards for certain borrower-risk groups and a precondition for a loan to be issued at all, 
rather than a mitigating pricing factor.  
Like maturity, collateral and covenants are sequentially determined before the loan pricing is 
set and can only be used within limits to pricing trade-offs. Further, my finding follows the 
broad core consensus in the core literature on the observed-risk hypothesis, indicating that 
borrowing costs for secured loans are higher due to borrowers being evaluated as more risky 
(e.g., Kim et al. 2014; Barbosa & Ribeiro, 2007; Carey & Nini, 2007; Ivashina, 2009). In 
other words, collateral or extensive covenant requirements can be associated with rather weak 
credit qualities.  
According to eight research participants, covenants and collateral gain influential importance 
in event-related financings such as acquisitions, where usually shares of target companies, for 
example, are pledged to the lenders. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, loans with covenants and/or collateral carry higher pricing. 
However, covenant- and/or security packages—for certain borrower-risk profiles—tend 
to be a pre-condition to obtain a loan at all rather than a direct pricing driver in their 
own right. 
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 5 I think banks are saying, if the loan has a weak structure, weak covenants, they are backing away from 
participation at all. Pricing is not even a point in that decision. 
I6 Most of the loans we are talking about here are unsecured. Most are also without any covenants or 
might have one covenant.  
I 8 Whether or not you have financial covenants is not so important in this competitive environment. 
I 10 If you try to sell a credit as a decent investment grade credit and then suddenly you cannot say I like to 
have security and five covenants and then I take the margin down. The market would say: Structure 
does not match the credit story. 
I 14 Do things like security, covenants etc. impact pricing? Not in a huge way. If you are looking at a low 
investment grade corporate, in most cases you would hope that there will be one financial covenant. If 
you look at a sub-investment grade company, you would hope to see two financial covenants of certain 
levels. And if you do not have those, then there is a problem to start with for the loan negotiation 
anyway. Those elements however do not really impact pricing in a particular way. It is kind of a 
separate bucket. 
I 16 In short, pricing influence in general corporate financings is low, but in event-related ones, it is 
gaining importance. 
I 21 Here you have to be a bit careful. When we talk about LBOs or asset financings such as aircraft 
finance etc., there is a trade-off between collateral, covenants, and other non-price terms. It is a more 
technical market. In the case, you can achieve RWA releases, for instance, via higher collateralisation 
and, thus, lower loan-to-values; pricing goes down, because of this fact. The corporate world in that 
case is structured differently. Collateral or certain covenant packages are common for certain rating 
categories and for others not. A direct link to pricing is if at all weak. 
 
 Conclusion: contractual features 
In this section, I have discussed the main non-price-related syndicated loan terms and 
conditions, “contractual features”, which affect German corporate syndicated loan pricing. It 
appeared that contractual features in syndicated lending often seem to be templates for certain 
borrower risk categories and are not subject to extensive negotiations, and, thus, are not 
instruments to be subject to trade-off against pricings. In event-related financings, however, 
this becomes a more intense debate.  
The discussion remains to be enhanced by prioritising the determinants in light of their 
different influential magnitude towards their determinant category (Figure 50). 
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Figure 50. Contractual features: determinant prioritisation. 
It became clear that the loan amount appears to be a significant pricing driver, with very large 
back-up RCFs often being priced relatively low, whereas very large, mostly underwritten, 
acquisition term loans usually command a price premium. Mainly in relation to banks’ 
increased funding costs, longer maturities have been established to generally lead to higher 
pricing, albeit also commonly adhering to certain template structures. Likewise, loan type 
appeared to determine pricing significantly, whereas currency and certain protection 
mechanisms such as covenants are also determinants, although to a lesser degree. Furthermore 
I established that—the more complex the financing rationale appears—the more important 
contractual features become. 
 Credit story 
All interviewees agreed the so-termed credit story (i.e., related themes, which I decided to 
locate in the category of credit story), to be a determinant of German corporate syndicated 
loan pricing. The term “credit story” is commonly used in the industry to refer to the “story” 
behind the application for credit. In other words, I interpret credit story as the overall 
underlying rationale for demanding a syndicated loan. This rationale may be straightforward 
and less sensitive to pricing, for example, with regards to commercial paper back-up facilities 
for high-grade borrowers or other straightforward loan renewals. On the other hand, credit 
stories can be complex, resulting in strong requirements to properly communicate and explain 
them to lenders’ internal constituencies—in other words, to the earlier established “within-
bank-stakeholders”—and to outside investors (e.g., in the case of event-related transactions, 
such as acquisitions).  
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The interview analyses with respect to the determinant category credit story enabled me to 
establish the corresponding determinants that are displayed in Figure 51. 
 
Figure 51. Credit story and its determinants. 
5.5.7.1 Transaction history 
The need of proper credit story articulation and explanation to lenders’ internal constituencies 
and to potential investors is of minor importance for general corporate financings, especially 
if the borrower-specific credit risk profile appears unstained. In line with Fitzgerald (2011), in 
German corporate syndicated lending, these are overwhelmingly transactions that already 
exist long term, having gone through numerous refinancing cycles. In other words, here the 
credit story usually builds on an existing transaction history. 
Godlewski and Weill (2011) and Hale and Santos (2009) found refinancing and working 
capital loans to be cheaper relative to, for example, M&A purposes, as such loans tend not to 
increase the borrowers’ indebtedness and, thus, carry lower degrees of future uncertainty. 
Some of these general corporate financings are commercial paper back-up lines which in 
practice are not supposed to be drawn at all. Thus, this straightforward and clear purpose of 
the loan, accompanied by the fact that these are mainly refinancing transactions within an 
existing group of lenders, reduces the credit stories’ relative importance.  
Finding: Ceteris paribus, in (explicit or implicit investment grade) general corporate 
lending (e.g., refinancing), the predominantly history-based credit story affects pricing 
only to a limited degree. 
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Fifteen interviewees agreed on this, as exemplified by the following statements: 
I 2 The uses of proceeds of a loan, in the market spectrum at hand, are less relevant from my point of 
view. 
I 13 On the corporate side, especially in investment grade, it is less relevant. I think it is a bigger factor on 
the LBO side definitely. There you need to have a rationale making sense. 
I 21 The credit story when it comes to normal financings for borrowers with a solid risk profile is not a key 
pricing driver in my view. Usually these loans are refinancing within existing bank groups and 
basically no explanation of a deal rationale is needed unless the borrower faces some big issues. That 
is however also usually not common in these days, as the German economy is going very well. 
 
5.5.7.2 Borrower prospects 
For those financings being special in the way they may be used and executed, e.g., to finance 
an extraordinary event like an acquisition, the credit story becomes a key price determinant. 
In line with extant M&A literature such as Bauer, Matzler, and Wolf (2016), relatively large-
scale acquisitions typically change a borrowers’ specific credit risk profile219 with balance 
sheet ratios deteriorating220 and with the integration of the target firm creating operational as 
well as cultural risks that might put future performance at risk. Such acquisitions are 
commonly defined as transformative (Bauer et al., 2016; Mohr & Bärtl, 2012).  
In other words, in this situation, the borrowers’ overall prospects in its multiple dimensions 
must be evaluated; these are complex exercises, being likely marked by bank-specific 
assumptions and marred by uncertainty. 
Hence, what professionals label a deleveraging story after big capital expenditures is a crucial 
credit story ingredient that carries the need of being carefully addressed and made subject to 
due diligence. In practice, such due diligence is supported by roadshows and information 
memoranda that mainly include a series of financial forecasts and comprehensive discussions 
of the company’s future following the acquisition. Given the lower credit stories’ intensity, 
this appears not to be a pronounced exercise in straightforward general corporate (re-) 
financings.  
A broad menu of supporting evidence is provided by Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010), 
Schenone (2010), and Alexandre et al. (2014), who found loans granted for M&A purposes to 
                                               
 
219 For example, via rating downgrades. 
220 For example, a rising leverage ratio. 
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be more expensive. Further, the fact that bridge loans are broadly considered the most 
important loan type underpins this. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, the credit story becomes a key determinant of syndicated loan 
pricing, once the financing is for special purposes such as an acquisition. 
Seventeen interviewees agreed on this, as exemplified by the following statements: 
I 1 The risk associated with the loan is in an acquisition scenario higher as a lot of debt finances that.  
Your leverage will increase first. It is a different initial rating so to say and you are really giving 
money out and not only providing a line of credit, which can but does not have to be drawn. 
I 2 Acquisitions are sometimes company-transforming, and come along with a higher company risk 
overall. The leverage usually goes up. There is uncertainty on both the management’s and employee’s 
sides. Therefore, acquisition financings are even more individual and complex compared to the usual 
corporate financings. 
I 3 The deleveraging capacity that this client has over time is important. That is a forward-looking 
element. The client needs to deliver credible projections. So, to really look at that you would have to 
have either in-house planning or projections or publicly available information that you can derive, for 
example, from research, or the company provides it. This element relates mostly to acquisition finance 
or real investment loans, where balance sheet ratios change and the whole company strategy may 
change (e.g., a transformative acquisition). For medium to low risks, high-grade risks, banks usually 
do not look at that. 
I 7 It is certainly important whether a potential acquisition is widely regarded as something which does 
make sense strategically and under other aspects. If there are relatively interesting or less favourable 
analyses publicised from brokers, there might be possibilities to address this by an increased pricing, 
but not to a full extent. However, the perception of the market, if the acquisition does make sense, and 
will the company be able to manage it successfully, will be key. 
I 8 If you have an acquisition financing, the client is usually levering up and the risk increases. Margins 
then tend to be higher as well. In addition, the credit story is important with respect to deleveraging. 
 
In contrast to these views, and somewhat weakening the foregoing argument, two 
interviewees expressed the view that the impact of credit stories on pricing has weakened over 
time. 
I 9 The differences between, for example, M&A and general corporate purposes unfortunately disappears 
to a very large extent. It is also a discussion we have internally. I personally see that M&A financing 
structures are more usually corporate refinancing structures as well as the pricing structures. There is 
still some differentiation but it is not as large as in the past. Even underwriting fees are relatively 
small compared to the past. 
I 14 However, what we have recently observed is that there has been a strong conversion between 
acquisition financings and general corporate pricing. So, in other words, it is not that corporate 
pricing has gone up, it is the M&A pricing that has come down quite a lot. But I would say this is 
related to the current market environment. Historically event-related pricing used to command a 
premium. 
 
The statements of interviewees 9 and 14 can be related to the current syndicated loan market 
environment, which is said to be marred by fierce competition and supply and demand 
mismatches in favour of the borrowers. Syndicated loan market environment as a determinant 
category in its own right is debated in 5.5.15. 
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5.5.7.1 Draw expectation  
According to 18 research participants, given that a large part of general corporate financing 
volume is structured as revolving loans, respective draw-expectations are important credit 
story ingredients. Commercial paper back-up lines are basically never drawn, whereas 
working capital lines, predominantly for smaller companies, are frequently drawn, repaid and 
re-drawn, based on individual needs and in light of their cash-cycles. These facts influence 
both general pricing direction as well as pricing structure, as established in 5.3 through its 
corresponding sub-sections on common RCF pricing elements. 
Further, the expectation of drawings is an important element of for acquisition term loans.221 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, the drawing expectation in revolving credit facilities and 
acquisition term loans affects pricing and pricing structure. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 It plays a role if a loan or more precisely an RCF is supposed to be drawn or to be undrawn. That 
makes a huge difference in the price setting. Also the pricing in the way it is structured overall is 
affected by that information. 
I 7 There are revolvers which are mainly used as a back-up facility, because the company needs to have a 
certain cushion which it can draw upon for specific purposes. 
I 14 It might be the case that acquisition bridge loans are never or only partly drawn down. This is because 
the M&A transactions are not successful—like in a bidding phase—or a refinancing via capital 
markets instruments succeeds the draw-down need. These considerations play a big role in the price 
setting of such transactions clearly. 
 
 Conclusion: credit story 
The discussion provided on credit story confirm the findings of extant literature with respect 
to the uses of proceeds and significantly enhances the debate by incorporating further 
complex phenomena that enrich the simplified discussions on uses of proceeds within the 
extant literature by the inclusion of the determinant category of “credit story”. It became 
apparent that ceteris paribus, the relative pricing importance of the credit story is a rising 
function of the syndicated loan’s underlying speciality and complexity.  
 
                                               
 
221 See section 5.4.4. 
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The discussion remains to be enhanced by prioritising the determinants in light of their 
different influential magnitudes towards their determinant category (Figure 52). 
 
Figure 52. Credit story: determinant prioritisation. 
As established above, the credit story becomes a key price determinant ingredient in even-
related financings. Here the borrower prospects are the most important theme that must be 
evaluated by the lenders. Also within this area, the draw expectation was established to play a 
key role, as acquisition bridge loans are commonly not fully or even never drawn down, for 
the reasons explained in the discussion. In the field of general corporate financings facilitated 
via RCFs, the draw expectation needs to be evaluated, because such loans are either issued 
with a clear draw motivation, or not at all in the case of back-up RCFs.  
 Syndicate structure and syndication mode 
A syndicate, also often referred to as a consortium, represents the bank group, teaming-up to 
lend money to a borrower at equal terms and conditions222 (Fight, 2004; Rhodes et al., 2004). 
The next determinant category is devoted to the structure of such lending alliances as well as 
the underlying procedures regarding how the syndicate is assembled in the primary market. 
Overall, 15 interviewees agreed that syndicate-related issues drive German corporate 
syndicated loan pricings. Founded on the answers of the research participants, the syndicate 
structure’s impact on pricing is essentially based on different underlying phenomena 
compared to the findings within the associated extant literatures, which are generally 
constructed on assumptions derived from theoretical considerations of information asymmetry 
                                               
 
222 Besides various upfront compensations that vary based on the respective lending amounts. 
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issues. The syndications’ mode is typically not thematised at all in extant scholarly pricing 
literature.  
Analyses of the interview data with respect to the determinant category syndicate structure & 
syndication mode enabled me to establish the corresponding determinants displayed in Figure 
53. 
 
Figure 53. Syndicate structure and syndication mode and its determinants. 
 
5.5.9.1 General number of lenders 
In line with the diversification hypothesis, five interviewees argued that, for a given loan size, 
larger lender groups lead to relatively lower final take levels by lenders and thus lower 
pricings. Godlewski and Weill (2011) and Kim et al. (2014), for example, also found loans 
with higher numbers of lenders to be lower-priced. 
According to three research participants, on the other hand, a relatively larger number of 
banks might increase the need for pricing compromises, as each institution carries different 
characteristics that need to be aligned. These might put upward pressure on pricings and 
might counterbalance the diversification advantages of larger lender sets. This would be in 
line with the finding of Alexandre et al. (2014), stating that more lenders in a syndicate tend 
to lead to higher pricings. These contradictory interviewee statements do not provide clear 
guidance at this time. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, the impact of syndicate size on pricing is ambiguous. 
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 7 It is an important influencing factor on the pricing, whether or not in relation to the size of the credit 
facility, that particular client has a smaller or larger group of banks. Because a larger group would 
mean, that each of the banks would need to take only smaller amounts and that certainly could 
influence pricing downwards. 
I 8 If the syndicate gets really big and you are relying on different banks with lots of different interests the 
pricing might be smaller neither because you have to have an overall compromise. Kind of an 
extended club deals with 5 to 10 banks in Germany get probably the best pricing.  
 
5.5.9.2 Number of lenders and cross-selling potential 
Twelve interviewees discussed syndicate size and its impact on pricing in the light of 
relationship lending considerations. German corporate syndicated lending is said to be a 
relationship driven financing product223 with banks tending to accept relatively low pricings 
and in return expect to be awarded cross-selling opportunities. According to the research 
participants this client-related cross-selling potential drives syndicate structures. If a client’s 
cross-selling potential is large, more syndicate members can potentially be satisfied compared 
to borrowers with lower cross-selling potential. In other words, here the syndicate size does 
not directly influence pricing, but indirectly via relationship aspects. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, the size of a syndicate can be interpreted as a rising function of 
a borrowers’ cross-selling potential leaving a general pricing direction ambiguous. 
The following statements exemplify this: 
I 4 What we see in the market is that companies are reducing their bank groups because the treasurer 
always says, “I cannot serve 25 banks with cross-sell”. Thus, many clients have a common interest to 
reduce the bank group to a minimum. The bank then needs to provide a higher credit proportion, but it 
is also awarded and profiting from higher amounts of cross-sell. In addition, with a higher probability 
of being awarded cross-sell, of course. 
I 9 It is general phenomenon for all deals that syndicates tend to get smaller. The CFOs have a clear 
intention to having a relatively small bank group because they have limited cross-sell wallets and, 
therefore, do not want discuss business opportunities with 20 banks. Twenty banks are showing up 
twice a year minimum and present products to the client who knows all this already. You can always 
service four or five banks with significant business. The rest gets really nothing and, therefore, this is 
for the last four or five years a clear tendency that we even have smaller syndicates and that in most of 
the situations we have club style structures with only one or two levels of tickets. On the other hand, 
you also have to lend very big tickets. 
I 17 Ticket sizes of banks are ready to be high these days if cross-sell potential is promising.  
 
                                               
 
223 See section 5.5.13.1. 
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5.5.9.3 “Modern” best efforts syndication process 
According to 15 interviewees, the procedure under which syndications are practically 
executed and syndicate structures emerge has been subject to significant change over time. 
Whereas in the years before the financial crisis, “text-book-like”, large syndication processes 
with only one or just a few “real” bookrunners were common, today’s markets appear to be 
characterised by club deal or “club deal-like224” financings, even for very large loans.  
Club deals are syndicated loans consisting of a relatively small group of a client’s existing 
banks, usually providing the same or similar levels225 of commitments. Thus, no new 
syndication takes place, involving formal invitations to numerous possible participants. The 
banking group is instead pre-agreed (Gadanecz, 2003; LMA, 2013). In other words, all 
attending banks treat each other as lead bank (Fitzgerald, 2011).  
According to Godlewski et al. (2012) and Ivashina (2009), among others, the arranger largely 
selects the initial set of potential participants to be invited and specifies certain ticket sizes 
and the titles awarded to the invited banks. Francois and Missonier-Piera (2007, p. 228) 
stated, “The arranger collects confidential bids from other banks regarding their contributions 
to the loan”. For common German corporate syndicated loans, however, this tends not to hold 
any longer, as highlighted by the following interviewee statements: 
I 5 We see more and more self-arranged deals in the form of club-deals or extended club deals with only 
one or two ticket sizes nowadays. I cannot remember any recent normal refinancing loan which was 
executed based on a real broad syndication. This is obviously different for M&A deals or other event 
deals. But even here it is getting more and more pre-discussed. 
I 19 Real syndications have become rare in Germany. Mostly syndicates are pre-agreed groups of banks, 
with the borrower deciding whom to invite at what ticket size to what levels of fees. 
 
In other words, borrowers in the German corporate syndicated loan market now tend to 
substitute bookrunners’ original tasks by conducting hidden RfP processes226 and “pre-place” 
facilities themselves. The labelled bookrunners are instructed by the borrower whom to 
“invite” into the “syndication-process”. The pricing of loans in general, and the upfront fee 
allocations227 particularly, is effectively set by the borrower, based on offers received via these 
RfP processes. In contradiction to what extant scholarly literature commonly postulates, the 
                                               
 
224 Also often referred to as club-style- or extended club deal. 
225 This would be the case in a club-style- or extended club deal transaction. 
226 See section 5.3.3.1.1. 
227 Hence, the earlier (5.3.1.2.3.2) presented technique of fee skimming or pooling appears to be an exception rather than a 
rule at present. 
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bookrunners’ original role has changed towards a more administrative one, where the focus 
predominantly lies on handling loan documentation issues rather than the acquisition and 
“education” of new, uninformed investors. This is in line with O'Donovan (2011, p. 111), who 
stated that companies attempt to conduct more self-syndication and commonly appoint “a 
documentation bank or a co-ordinator rather than an MLA”. 
Given the pricing opacity discussed earlier, via these private RfP-processes, clients are 
enabled to create hidden price competition and thus put downward pressure on pricing if 
numerous banks are willing to bid.228 This situation is highlighted by the following statements:   
I 8 Today, you have some clients doing really hard negotiations via RfP-processes and push the pricing 
down. 
I 17 The RfP-phases are really tough. We somewhat poke around and do not know what is going on. We 
offer a price and have basically no idea what the others do and then receive a call from the client 
saying, “If you want to be in the deal you need to adjust the pricing downwards to ‘x’”. That has 
relatively little to do with what classical bookrunner or MLA roles would suggest. 
 
Understanding of these phenomena might well be enhanced by considering theoretical auction 
considerations. According to McAfee and McMillan (1987, p. 701), “An auction is a market 
institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis 
of bids from the market participants”. Given the “modern” best efforts syndication process, 
explicit rules are effectively substituted by market practice and experience and are subject to 
ongoing changes and developments. Certain elements of the so-termed first-price sealed-bid 
auction however serve as a promising analogy to enhance the understanding of the complex 
phenomena under study. 
McAfee and McMillan (1987, p. 702) defined this auction type as a tool where, “Potential 
buyers submit sealed bids and the highest bidder is awarded the item for the price he bid. The 
basic difference between the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction229 is that, 
with the English auction, bidders are able to observe their rival’s bids and accordingly, if they 
choose, revise their own bids; with the sealed-bid auctions each bidder can submit only one 
bid.” 
                                               
 
228 This is strongly related to supply and demand issues being discussed in section 5.5.15.2. Especially in a market with loan 
supply exceeding loan demand, clients are enabled to decide which and how many institutions join their syndicate. The level 
of price competition is shaped by the number of banks whose clients invite to pitch/compete for a respective loan.  
229 In the English auction, the price is successively raised until only one bidder remains (Keskin, 2016; Shachat & Wei, 
2012). 
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According to Shachat and Wei (2012), Keskin (2016), and others, many variations exist with 
respect to different auction types. In that vein, the established “modern” best efforts 
syndication process includes certain elements of the first-price sealed-bid auctions where 
bidders (banks) are not able to observe their competitors’ bids. However, here, bidders (banks 
who bid) are commonly allowed by the seller (borrower who sells the investment opportunity) 
to revise their initial bids. 
As corroborated by 10 interviewees, the opacity caused by an almost complete lack of 
publicly available pricing information is accelerated, given that the so-called market sounding 
is no longer conducted. Back in the early 2000s until the financial crisis, it appeared to be 
standard practice for loan professionals to streamline pricing offers in bidding and pre-
syndication phases across banks by means of “informal polling” or “price-talks” (Wu et al., 
2013). Fang et al. (2016) defined this market practice as solicitation of informal feedback 
from potential lenders in a transaction, especially regarding pricing. Reforms to the UK 
competition law230 that came into force by April 2014 have since spread across the whole of 
Europe and caused market sounding as common practice to come to an abrupt halt and to 
completely disappear. 
Based on this, besides “official” and “external” pricing opacity with regards to public 
databases, a second “unofficial” and “internal” opacity has evolved, influencing the 
underlying processes by which syndications are organised and executed. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 10 Certainly, what people do not do any more is market sounding. They used to do it a couple of years 
ago. Like ok, I just phone my friend at the other bank and try to find out what the pricing is. It is not 
happening any more.  
I 14 It would be getting hold of one of the sales colleagues and say, “Hey, go and have a chat around the 
market and see what other people think”. You cannot do it anymore. You can no longer do this and 
that does mean that the market is more opaque today and less transparent and more difficult to read. 
 
It is hence reasonable to conclude that price setting processes of German corporate syndicated 
loans as well as the way syndicates are structured have fundamentally changed in a way that 
                                               
 
230 It is a criminal offence for each individual to fix prices, share markets or customers, fix or limit capacity, rig-bids and/or 
exchange non-public competitively sensitive information (LMA, 2014). According to Clifford Chance (2014), dishonesty no 
longer must be proven to secure a criminal conviction for individuals involved in a cartel. It might be punished with 
imprisonment for up to five years and/ or an unlimited fine. For the related banks, fines of up to 10% of its worldwide 
turnover are possible (LMA, 2014). 
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contradicts the remark of Bharath et al. (2011, p. 1,188), “The loan syndication process has 
become increasingly similar to the book-building process used to sell publicly and privately 
placed bonds”. 
The following statement of interviewee 16 underpins this: 
I 16  The way syndicates are being set nowadays has changed in such a dramatic way that a couple of 
banks have significantly reduced their sales forces or even completely closed down the respective 
department. This is the case because primary syndications are nowadays run differently as compared 
to former times. We mostly talk about club deals or club-like deals. In that cases, the loan originator 
talks to the other banks either way, as all are involved, for example, in the documentation phase. Thus, 
there is basically no need for huge sales forces any longer. 
 
Based on these new insights into syndication processes that have revealed major mismatches 
between theoretical assumptions and practice, it is reasonable to propose the following 
finding: 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, “modern” best efforts syndication processes lead to lower 
German corporate syndicated loan pricings. 
The interviewees’ discussions around these developments in syndication processes, and the 
disappearance of market sounding having the effect of deepening pricing opacity, revealed 
further practical implications. Eleven interviewees reported significantly widened pricing 
offer-spreads, so that today pricing offers tend to differ more greatly in comparison with 
earlier, pre-crisis, years. 
The following interviewee statements underpin this: 
I 14 It is a very interesting thing and I think these offers are indeed widening and it comes with the 
regulatory obligation for confidentiality and not just confidentiality but also against anti-competitive 
behaviour.  
I 15 As a borrower, if I would now send out an RfP to get financing offers from banks, I think the variation 
would be dramatic, because there is no publicly available market.  
I 19 Market sounding disappeared completely and we cannot talk to other banks about pricings any more. 
In talks to clients, they often reveal that the pricings they got offered vary quite a lot from bank to 
bank. I guess that is the cause of not talking to each other anymore. 
 
This observation might carry negative consequences for underwritten syndicated loans, which 
are discussed in the following section. 
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5.5.9.4 Underwriting 
The foregoing discussion assumes that the syndication is run on a best-efforts basis. This 
holds true for the majority of issued loans in the primary market. In underwriting scenarios, 
different phenomena need to be taken into consideration. As outlined by 11 professionals, in 
such situations underwriters initially commit higher amounts than their intended final takes, 
so face market risks as a failed or stalled syndication may have serious negative 
consequences. Here, clients usually only approach a very small number of lenders before 
launching a syndication and hence are not enabled to create hidden competition to the extent 
that is common in “modern” best-efforts processes. Hence, pricings need to be “attractive” to 
ensure a successful syndication. However, the limitations in properly “reading the market”, 
the opacity situation, and the increased pricing-offer spreads in bidding phases tend to further 
complicate price calibrations for underwritings and could increase the risk of stalled 
syndications. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, underwritten syndicated loan transactions tend to carry higher 
pricings than do best efforts ones. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this finding: 
I 5 Underwritings in the current market solely occur in acquisition financings. Here, you have to set a 
pricing that brings your initial underwritten commitment down quickly. So, I would say the fact that a 
deal is underwritten in its own should lead to higher loan pricings. The fact that those loans, as I said, 
are solely for M&A-deals might push that direction further. 
I 15 Obviously, if it is an underwritten deal, there is only one question: Where can you get the risk away at 
the best price? Where would you achieve a sell-down for that particular asset? For best efforts, it is a 
completely different approach. For this, it is just the client that wants the best possible price. The 
client here does not need certainty of funds. 
 
 Conclusion: syndicate structure and syndication mode 
The foregoing discussion and the diversity in the interviewees’ statements revealed the 
influence of syndicate structure on pricing to be ambiguous as well as multi-faceted, with no 
clear directional influence on pricing. In other words, several countervailing forces are at 
work, making the impact of syndicate structure on German corporate syndicated loan pricing 
confusing and ambiguous. However, especially with respect to the syndication mode, the 
discussion revealed that for non-underwritten loans, pricings in light of the “modern” best 
efforts syndication process tend to decline, ceteris paribus.  
With respect to the large body of extant literature concerning syndicate structure, I ought to 
provide the following remarks: remember, outstanding scholarly literature tends to study 
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syndicate structures in the context of prospective informational frictions based on the 
assumption that lead banks, the delegated monitors, are fully informed and participant banks 
(completely) uninformed and thus dependent on information collected by the lead bank 
(Ivashina, 2009; Pichler & Wilhelm, 2001; Sufi, 2007). 
However, Champagne and Coggins (2012) found that syndicate structures in light of 
information asymmetry issues are of minor pricing significance in Europe compared to other 
markets. In a similar vein, Godlewski et al. (2012) found the French syndicated loan market to 
have become a “small world” over time. According to the authors, a “small world” is 
characterised by high local density with short social distances allowing information 
asymmetries between lenders to diminish over time.  
Based on the interviewee statements, I am enabled to confirm and extend these views with 
respect to the German corporate syndicated loan market. The syndicate structures’ influence 
on pricing seems to be predominantly determined by so far neglected and interdependent 
factors, rather than information asymmetry. I can therefore challenge theoretical information 
asymmetry assumptions in terms of to their general actuality as well as their explanatory 
power with regards to pricing within the market at hand.  
The idea of ex post moral hazard in effort, postulating that relationship lead arrangers to 
conduct monitoring duties in favour of participants in a sense of delegated monitoring, 
appears to be a less pronounced practical issue and is thus overestimated in its importance 
within the wide body of existing literature. According to theory, lead arrangers who, other 
than in bilateral lending affiliations, only hold fractions a loan, are less incentivised to 
properly monitor and screen borrowers. Ex ante, this unobservable less thorough monitoring 
effort—so-called shirking—is anticipated by participants who require a higher spread and/or a 
higher lead share as a compensatory or a mitigating/signalling factor (Bharath et al., 2011; 
Ivashina; Leland & Pyle, 1977; Sufi).  
Following these assumptions, syndicates tend to become rather small and concentrated if 
severe information asymmetries exist. Periods of economic turmoil are said to be shaped by 
higher degrees of information asymmetry—a fact that should lead to smaller syndicates in 
such times compared to times of prosperity where syndicates are large (Godlewski, 2010a). 
Interestingly, as displayed in Figures 19 and 20 in my quantitative analysis, 2015 marked the 
all-time low in terms of average numbers of lenders within the investigated period 2000 to 
2015, disproving the aforementioned information asymmetry-based argumentation. The year 
2015 clearly was not a year of recession or financial turmoil in Germany.  
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In contradiction to Fang et al. (2016) and Ivashina (2009), for example, who argued that 
participants must rely on the monitoring of lead lenders, both in practice and legally induced 
via the so-called MaRisk,231 each lender carries out its own monitoring activities, irrespective 
of any syndicate structure. In other words, neither implicitly nor explicitly does German 
corporate syndicated lending reduce the degree of monitoring necessity for any lender. I also 
warn against labelling as a means of delegated monitoring the work of facility agents who 
administer loans on behalf of the syndicate, with respect to payment activities and the 
distribution of certain documents, as is done by, among others, Francois and Missonier-Piera 
(2007). In that vein, the following extracts of a standard syndicated loan contract underpin 
this (LMA, 2016b, pp. 80, 82). 
 
Source: Adapted from LMA (2016b, pp. 80, 82). 
Table 84. Contract example: duties of an agent. 
From an overall standpoint, screening and monitoring gets duplicated in the manner of a 
rising function of the syndicate size. As syndicated lending relates to large clients usually well 
exceeding yearly turnovers of €250 million232 and as client exposures are monitored on a 
single-name rather than at a portfolio level,233 monitoring can be said be close and intense, 
with credit officers234 covering only a couple of firms in each size spectrum. Each year 
internal ratings are reassessed and overall client credit exposures need to be prolonged 
accentuated by a respective credit-quality-assessment of the risk officers (Treacy & Carey, 
2000). Beside these yearly reviews, clients are monitored throughout the year, among other 
means by assessing quarterly financial reports or profit warnings. Possible creditworthiness 
deteriorations would thus trigger immediate rating changes.  
                                               
 
231 “Mindestanforderung an das Risikomanagement”/“Minimum requirements for risk management. 
232 See Table 7. 
233 For example, via standardised portfolio scoring techniques. 
234 Usually risk officers for large clients cover a special group of clients from the same industry sector such as health care, 
automotive, etc. 
Duties of the agent (p. 80)
(a) Each Agent’s duties under the Finance Documents are solely mechanical and administrative in nature.
(b) Subject to paragraph (e) below, each Agent shall promptly forward to a Party the original or a copy of any document which is 
delivered to the Agent for that Party by any other Party.
(c) An Agent shall advise every other Agent of all Utilisation Requests in respect of all Loans which are received by it from time to time 
immediately upon receipt of the same.
No duty to monitor (p. 82)
None of the Agents shall be bound to enquire:
(a) whether or not any Default has occurred;
(b) as to the performance, default or any breach by any Party of its obligations under any Finance Document; or
(c) whether any other event specified in any Finance Document has occurred.
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Regulatory developments towards a greater emphasis on hard-information based risk models 
facilitated through technological improvements have fostered this environment (Hainz & 
Wiegand, 2013; Udell, 2008). According to Strahan (2008), larger and mostly well-
established borrowers, which are the focus of this work, can be credit assessed by 
predominantly hard information such as audited financial statements. 
Also with respect to ex ante adverse selection, each invited participant bank conducts own due 
diligence via extensive credit decision processes. Further, many clients have—beside a 
syndicated arrangement—additional bilateral loans outstanding, which need to be monitored 
accordingly. Another example of the duplicative nature of the administrative costs of banks in 
syndicated lending is related to the work of internal lawyers. Beside an external law firm 
which advises lender groups in negotiating the loan contract, each bank conducts its 
individual legal due diligence for each syndicated loan participation, be it acting as a lead 
bank or be it as acting as a participant with a very small lending commitment. 
Another theme relevant to the German market is that it is relatively saturated, in the sense that 
there are now few debut transactions. Most general corporate loans are refinancings, mainly 
within an existing, or only slightly changing, group of lenders. In light of a credit story, 
lenders tend to be well informed about transaction histories underpinned by the following 
statements: 
I 1 For smaller clients, there is certainly less public information available. But usually all German clients 
have already long-term client relationships with many banks who then know the client very well. And 
the financial information, which syndicated loan borrowers have to provide us on a confidential basis, 
is also very good. I mean we do not speak about small businesses here. These are mostly large and 
professional clients. 
I 10 You basically see no greenfield loans in corporate Germany. 
I 12 The loan market is very kind of clubby, when we are looking at the corporate market. 
I 18 You have the situation in Germany that you have very little new large firms entering the economy in 
general. Thus, syndicated loan borrowers are also not sprouting from the earth. Borrowers usually 
have been tapping the market for a long time. Debut transactions might only happen if a client grows–
maybe due to an acquisition or another bigger capital expenditure–and subsequently shifts from 
bilateral loans to a syndicated loan. The incidence, where a completely unknown new client rings the 
door and asks for a syndicated loan, does not happen in the German corporate market. 
 
If syndicate structures change, then this is more in a sense that lending groups become smaller 
as displayed in Figures 19 and 20, with this fact not being related to increased information 
asymmetries as theory would suggest, but presumably to cross-selling distribution issues. 
Thus, as lenders and borrowers tend to have interacted for long periods—irrespective of 
syndicate seniority and lending share—information asymmetrical problems represent less 
severe issues in the market for German corporate syndicated loans. In other words, borrowers 
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and lenders—be they arranging or pure participating parties—have been able to diminish 
possible informational frictions across several repayment cycles (Gadanecz et al., 2012) and 
tend to be relatively symmetrically informed concerning the borrowers’ credit quality 
assessment and pricing. As Godlewski et al. (2012) have found for the French market, it is 
likely that the German corporate syndicated loan market has adopted elements of a “small 
world” in a network theoretical context.  
This observation finds support by the following interviewee statement in relation to 
conversations across banks within syndication phases. Here, discussions on a borrower’s 
creditworthiness appear rather uncommon. 
I 20 In our bank, we have no primary sales desk for corporate syndicated loans any longer. Thus, I as an 
originator talk to the banks which we invite or of whom we are invited. Interestingly, the general 
creditworthiness is basically never an issue. We do not talk about certain balance sheet data or 
forecasts. Everyone has this information at hand and evaluates it individually. Discussions are 
predominantly technical and concerning documentation issues. For example one bank needs this 
specific clause on sanctions, the other one needs a different FATCA wording and so on. The rating 
view is basically no topic as each bank has its own sophisticated approach here. 
 
These discussions are further supported by the statement of interviewee 16 who explains that 
in normal corporate financings, information memoranda and bank meetings being held to 
inform invited banks, have become rare exceptions. 
I 16 In general, corporate financings, you usually do not have to provide an information memorandum to 
the invited banks. Also bank meetings are rather uncommon. This is in my view due to the fact that 
banks and clients are already in lending relationships for a relatively long period of time. Also the 
loans are often very straightforward without the need to tell a huge story around it. Exceptions are 
certainly event driven situations, where e.g., a large acquisition is being done and the balance sheet 
proportionalities get shattered. Then such a memorandum might be needed to explain a deleveraging 
story and to provide a post-acquisition consolidated balance sheet forecast. 
 
Based on this discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that the opacity of the market with 
respect to price-setting needs to be studied separately from the general ability of banks to 
evaluate a borrowers’ creditworthiness. Regarding the latter, ongoing monitoring and 
hierarchical elements of syndicates, informational frictions appear to only play minor roles 
across banks. In practice, it is unlikely that a bank gets invited to join a syndicated loan 
without having had any business contact beforehand or without having competed for 
bookrunner mandates in past beauty contests.  
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that the German corporate syndicated lending market only 
carries relatively minor elements of delegated monitoring. With respect to a borrower’s 
specific credit risk profile, information asymmetries of lenders vis-à-vis lenders is a less 
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pronounced issue, and free-riding, as suggested by Alexandre et al. (2014) on screening and 
monitoring is less apparent.  
Some elements of ex ante adverse selection might be reality in underwriting situations, where 
an underwriter usually has conducted due diligence sequentially before an invited bank. In 
other words, invited banks must conduct their ex ante due diligence sequentially later, but 
mainly based on the same set of historic and new information. 
From an overall economic and theoretical perspective, it is thus reasonable to conclude that 
the German corporate syndicated loan is not primarily a mechanism for reducing monitoring 
and due diligence costs and efforts across banks. Instead, the risk and capital diversification 
arguments appear to be more powerful in relation to the rationale of syndicating loans in 
general, as discussed in 2.4.2.2., among others, Simons (1993) emphasised that diversification 
is the main motivation for banks to engage in syndicated lending. 
Other than in the field of bank-only corporate syndicated loans, where borrowers in general 
tend to be large and financially sound (Kim et al., 2014), information asymmetry issues, 
however, do play a role in interaction with non-bank lenders and within very large, diffuse 
syndicates, which are common, for example, in the LBO market (Angbazo et al., 1998; 
Voisey, 2016).  
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 3 That is true for alternative lenders. I think it is less the case for banks, because banks will usually not 
limit their cooperation and monitoring activity with a client after making a syndicated loan. It is just 
one aspect. The bank will usually have other bilateral lines in place. In addition, the regulatory 
requirements, for example, annual reviews that you have for every single client are very strict for 
banks. They are less so for shadow banks if you may call them that and the alternative investors such 
as insurance companies, that have openly told us, that they are outsourcing the client analysis work to 
the banks that have arranged the loan and to the facility agent and they will trust that it will be 
properly monitored by them.  
I 20 Even though the German market is very competitive and I would also say overbanked, all parties know 
each other for a long time. An invitation to an unknown bank by both client and bookrunner, 
completely out of the blue, is not realistic. You certainly have this in other asset classes like project 
finance and LBO but certainly not in corporate Germany. 
 
This fact again underpins the need to carefully distinguish between different syndicated loan 
asset classes. 
It appears that text-book-like syndication processes, where one or a few informed lenders 
invite further uninformed ones on an arm’s length basis, have become an exception rather 
than the rule. How syndicate structures affect pricing depends on various factors. Also, the 
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way syndication processes are executed impacts on pricing. Pricing opacity might be 
advantageous for borrowers that conduct a “modern” best efforts process; it might, however 
also carry disadvantages in underwriting situations, ceteris paribus. 
The discussion remains to be enhanced by prioritising the determinants in light of their 
different influential magnitudes towards their determinant category (Figure 54).  
 
Figure 54. Syndicate structure and syndication mode: determinant prioritisation. 
It appears that the syndication mode, being either the established “modern” best efforts 
syndication process or underwriting, are the pivotal direct pricing determinants under this 
determinant category. The former is common for most transactions in the corporate market 
whereas the latter is almost solely used in acquisition financings. The syndicate structure in 
terms of its size tends to be only an indirect influence on pricing, via the anticipated cross-
selling potential a client offers. 
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 General market environment 
All interviewees agreed that the overall market environment is a determinant of German 
corporate syndicated loan pricing. Analyses of the interview data with respect to the 
determinant category general market environment enabled me to establish the corresponding 
determinants displayed in Figure 55. 
 
Figure 55. General market environment and its determinants. 
 
5.5.11.1 Macroeconomic environment 
According to 13 interviewees, the cycle/state of an economy drives pricing to a certain extent. 
As the German economy is generally said to be robust, highly developed, and grounded on 
solid legal frameworks, for example, with a view toward creditor-protection rights, law 
enforcement,235 or corporate governance standards (Gaul & Uysal, 2013; La Porta et al., 1997; 
Qian & Strahan, 2007), the general macroeconomic sentiment somewhat affects pricing, but 
to a lesser extent compared, for example, to developing countries. This is said to hold true for 
typical cycles. Given the highest seniority of the loans, it is likely that strong creditor rights 
protection in Germany enables lenders to become more “relaxed” about such typical cycles, 
where no widespread company failures are to be expected. However, in line with Schnabl 
(2012), in times of systemic economic turmoil such as the financial crisis that began in 2008, 
the macroeconomic situation however impacts pricing significantly. 
                                               
 
235 This follows the assumption that in a situation where lenders are able to enforce repayment or gain access to collateral 
more easily, the willingness to grant loans as well as their conditions tends to be greater (Anagnostopoulou & Drakos, 2016). 
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According to four research participants, the dependence on the current state of the home-
market economy in general is less pronounced if a company is internationally active, enabling 
it to diversify its market outlets. These findings are in line with Carey and Nini (2007), among 
others, suggesting that although country risk issues might influence pricing in Europe and in 
the U.S., the effect is expected to be much smaller compared to emerging markets borrowers. 
Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010) did not contradict this finding by reporting higher 
pricings for borrowers with weak economies in their home countries.  
Finding: Ceteris paribus, the general macroeconomic situation within “normal” 
economic cycles influences syndicated loan pricing in Germany, however to a lesser 
magnitude as compared to within emerging markets and/or countries with low creditor 
protection rights. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 Germany itself is AAA rated, so there is no political uncertainty really. I think the macro elements are 
less important here. I think if the GDP growth is 2, 3 or 1 or even 0 %, that does not really drive the 
pricing of syndicated loans here. My expectation would be that in emerging markets, this is more 
important than in such a big industry than Germany. Further our loans are usually the most senior 
financing of a large company. Until we are going to lose money with a syndicated loan, a lot needs to 
happen first. Of course, when we talk about real situations of stress—like Lehman—it becomes a real 
pricing or credit availability issue. 
I 7 Whether or not we are in more recession or more growth driven economic environment will also have 
some sort of influence but in the end, I think that is something that is probably of minor influence as 
opposed to the other elements, especially in a strong economy like Germany’s. 
I 10 You have the relationship banks and many of the companies you deal with are not actually exposed 
only to one certain market. If you buy bunds you expose to the German economy or Spanish or 
whatever you like to be exposed to. If your relationship might be with Telefonica you expose yourself 
to many international markets and you know one strong market might actually be counterbalanced by 
another weaker market. While for example people who might not necessarily have a lot of confidence 
in Spain, might have lot of confidence in Telefonica. I think that drives pricing of many international 
companies. That means that the macroeconomic influence on that front, yes they are there, but they 
are rather long term. Unless you are looking at emerging market credits. 
 
5.5.11.2 Banking and interest rate environment  
Fifteen interviewees agreed that the general financial situation faced by a banking system 
affects pricing. In line with Anagnostopoulou and Drakos (2016), the general macroeconomic 
situation of a country influences the overall health of the banking system.  
Twelve interviewees stated that this general banking sector condition is mainly shaped by the 
ease of funding as well as by the regulatory environment, with the former being significantly 
driven by the general interest rate environment. Currently, the financial sector in general is 
flushed with liquidity, given the low interest rate environment, as well as the quantitative 
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easing policy of the ECB. A high degree of liquidity—or in other terms availability of funds 
that need to be put to work—tends to pressure pricings downwards. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, syndicated loan pricings are a declining function of the overall 
liquidity in the banking system.  
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 You have to think about the liquidity situation in the banking system in general. The ECB is currently 
flushing the European banking system with lots of liquidity. It makes those funds very cheap to 
corporates. 
I 4 Given the very high liquidity in the market, the flooding with liquidity by the central bank, the very low 
interest rates, and the high liquidity in the market from institutional investors and from savings banks 
prices are also very thin in the Schuldschein-market. These are game changers.  
I 16 Investors currently face a lack of investment opportunities. Liquidity is certainly there also given the 
low interest rate environment, but especially the credit demand is not sufficient.  
 
5.5.11.3 Bank regulation 
Seventeen interviewees stressed the regulatory environment to become increasingly 
complicated, multifaceted and demanding. This is especially pronounced with regards to 
regulatory capital requirements, liquidity, and banks’ leverage, putting upward pressure on 
pricing. The fact that regulatory innovations like Basle III236 have long-lasting negotiation and 
introduction phases leads to bank individual approaches regarding the timing of 
implementation. Furthermore, issues like sanctions and FATCA237 are causing loan contract 
negotiations to become increasingly legally intense—a fact which should, all else being equal, 
lead to higher pricings. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, syndicated loan pricings are a raising function of regulatory 
intensity and ephemerality. 
 
 
                                               
 
236 According to LMA (2015, p. 4), “Basle III is a package of reforms which makes changes to the existing Basle II 
framework and was put together by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). […] These amendments 
strengthen existing capital requirements, but also introduce new prudential requirements, notably a new leverage ratio and 
two new liquidity ratios—the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR)”. 
237 According to LMA (2015, p. 59), “On March 18 2010, the United States enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (FATCA) the aim of which was to increase transparency in the financial markets and, more specifically, to make it 
difficult  for US taxpayers to hold unreported assets outside the United States”. 
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 4 In addition, the high regulation. Banks will struggle going forward to take huge and long-term credits 
and this will be more and more pricing relevant going forward. 
I 5 Let’s say regulation and sanctions, and it all comes to the point when you also want to implement or 
have to implement the regulation. Let’s talk about Basle 3. You have the first elements now up and 
running, but usually you have to implement it in one and two years’ time and there also is a timing 
difference: One bank applies it as if it was already legally binding by now. Other banks do it on a later 
stage, and so you have different time elements influencing pricing development. 
I 7 I think certainly regulation in a sense that everybody is making calculations with respect on how much 
capital do I need to keep for a certain credit commitment, be it a back-up commitment, or be it drawn 
and what the return on that is and what the RWA generated out of this are, and so on. So, all of the 
banks are running certain KPI calculations for a certain client relationship and that is certainly 
mostly driven by regulatory aspects (e.g., the amount of capital I need to allocate, the amount of 
revenue I need to generate to provide or be able to generate returns which satisfy my shareholders). 
I 9 Regulation is important for pricing because it depends on what specifically will change in 2019 and in 
the years thereafter. There are certain things being discussed currently. But it is not yet clear how they 
will be handled. The situation is that you are now booking assets for minimum of five years. Therefore, 
decisions you take today might affect your profitability in three or four years’ time. That is a situation, 
which is not very easy to handle. My perception is that the most banks only look at the next two years 
ahead. 
 
5.5.11.4 Non-syndicated loan benchmarks 
If borrowers have additional outstanding debt capital markets instruments being traded on the 
secondary market, their current yield levels influence syndicated loan pricing. According to 
15 research participants, these current yield levels provide first indications regarding how the 
wider debt capital market assesses a certain borrower.  
If the borrower has no bonds or CDS (inter alia) outstanding, syndicated loan originators in 
practice nevertheless normally take a close look at certain bond and/or CDS baskets 
representing the borrower industry, to get a “feeling” where current debt yield levels might 
lie. 
Further insight to this discussion was provided in 5.5.3.5, where banks’ pricing and return 
models were presented. If a bank conducted its respective calculation based on a market-
based approach, these non-syndicated loan benchmarks become the single biggest pricing 
determinant. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, current secondary market spreads in disintermediated debt 
capital markets influence syndicated loan pricing. 
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 For the larger clients, you can certainly look at other capital markets products, I would also look at, 
for example, the bond pricing or the CDS pricing. From there, you derive a rough loan pricing at first 
hand. 
I 5 If you have a large borrower with other instruments available and then the environment of that capital 
market instrument also influences the pricing. If, for example, the bond market is totally high in 
margins or in spreads, everybody looks at it and says, “Why the loan is so cheap”? But, on the other 
hand, when the bond market is so aggressive, then bonds are more attractive than loans, so that it 
might for sure impact the pricing. 
I 8 Secondary valuations of other debt instruments certainly are important. 
 
5.5.11.5 Product substitution 
Ten interviewees stressed other capital markets instruments to possibly directly compete with 
syndicated term loans. The degree of the respective availability of instruments such as 
corporate bonds or Schuldscheindarlehen is chiefly influenced by general market drivers as 
discussed throughout the section. If general market environments cause favourable terms for 
such instruments they downward pressure syndicated loan pricings, with the rationale that 
these are expected to be granted a certain discount vis-à-vis opportunistic instruments further 
accelerating this trend. It might lead to banks not being able to compete here at all. In extreme 
situations, this might be the case if not even the funding costs of the bank(s) were covered by 
the loan pricing.  
Logically, this argumentation is said to be especially pronounced for clients being able to tap 
the corporate bond market. Over the last years, the Schuldscheindarlehen has however also 
evolved to a major instrument for term debt for smaller clients not being able to tap the 
corporate bond market.  
The statements of the interviewees indicate that product substitution phenomena are highly 
cyclical and, therefore, best be situated as a determinant of the general market environment.  
Six interviewees highlight that for bridge loans to be refinanced quickly via, for example a 
corporate bond, product competition evolves to an important complementation factor rather 
than a competing one. Here, a liquid substitutive market might lead to increased certainty 
when it comes to take-out financings for underwritten bridge loans and allows lower pricing. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, corporate syndicated loan pricings are a declining function of 
availability-degree and pricing attractiveness of competing/complementary financial 
products.  
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 4 We see also the Schuldschein-instrument as a competitive product to the syndicated loan. The 
treasurer is not doing a beauty contest only with credit people from various banks, but also with other 
product people. We have recently seen that prices in the Schuldschein market can be even more 
attractive than in the Syndicated Loan market.  
I 5 Other instruments can be seen as competition but also as complementing each other. Bridge loans in 
acquisitions often carry such huge amounts that we as bank want to de-risk ourselves very quickly not 
only by syndication of the loan into the wider bank market but also by being refinanced with a bond or 
a Schuldschein. 
I 14 Bonds and Schuldscheine compete with syndicated loans or more precisely term loans.  
I 19 If a client has other funding opportunities compared to the loan, which nearly every client in our 
market has, the current market environment in relation to these products affects pricing as well. 
 
 Conclusion: general market environment 
The discussion remains to be enhanced by prioritising the determinants in light of their 
different influential magnitudes towards their determinant category (Figure 56). 
 
Figure 56. General market environment: determinant prioritisation. 
Based on the statements of the interviewees it became apparent that the general 
macroeconomic environment within normal economic cycles influences pricing to a rather 
limited degree whereas bank regulation, the general banking and interest environment more 
strongly influence pricing. In addition, non-syndicated loan benchmarks were found to 
strongly influence pricing, becoming the core determinant of pricing if a bank conducts its 
price deviation based on the market approach. Product substitution potential in general puts 
downward pressure on pricing either as it competes or complements syndicated term debt. 
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 Lender-borrower relationship 
All research participants emphasised that relationship aspects of lenders and borrowers 
constitute determinants of German corporate syndicated loan pricing. In comparison to the 
related findings of the extant scholarly literature with the interview data, there appears to be a 
stark contrast in the underlying rationales of relationship lending, suggesting disconnections 
between theory and the world of practice. This perhaps exemplifies the view of Alexandre et 
al. (2014, p. 100), who stated, “The role of lending relationships in syndicated loans remains 
virtually unexplored”. The inconclusive state of the debate concerning syndicated relationship 
lending that was highlighted in 2.11.3 requires both views to be addressed in the illumination 
provided by the interview findings. 
5.5.13.1 Relationship lending: the practitioners’ view 
All research participants define the German corporate syndicated lending market as 
relationship-driven, with related aspects representing essential pricing determinants. This fact 
distinguishes this corporate238 from opportunistic markets, for example for LBOs and project 
or other asset financings. The relationship aspect appears to be particularly pronounced in 
Germany, but is likewise mentioned to be relatively distinct within the wider European 
market. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, lender-borrower relationship-aspects determine German 
corporate syndicated loan pricings. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 2 When you look at a client relationship that you have as a bank, you have to see the loan generally as 
the anchor of this relationship. 
I 5 Relationship is an important pricing driver especially in Germany. I think that is special. 
I 7 It seems to be especially pronounced in Germany in a sense, although I am not sure whether that is too 
much different in the UK or in France. It certainly is pretty much pronounced here in Germany. 
I 19 At the end, it is all about the relationship. Corporate syndicated lending has relatively little to do with 
rationale investment decisions. 
 
 
 
                                               
 
238 In light of the definition applied in this thesis. 
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Analyses of the interview data with respect to the determinant category lender-borrower 
relationship enabled me to establish the corresponding determinants displayed in Figure 57. 
 
Figure 57. Lender-borrower relationship and its determinants. 
 
5.5.13.1.1 Cross-selling potential and relationship discount 
German corporate syndicated loans are said to constitute “entry-keys” and “anchors” of bank-
borrower relationships, grounded on the ensuing underlying phenomena: Banks avail 
significant balance sheet shares or in other words allocate capital by committing to join 
syndicated loans. From a bank’s point of view, these commitments are presuppositions to be 
rewarded with, or realistically to compete for, cross-selling239 opportunities, also often 
referred to as ancillary business. This cross-selling might be lucrative capital markets 
business or more standardised financial services, enabling banks to generate (“risk-free”) fee 
income. Examples of capital markets cross-selling are bonds, Schuldschein, equity, M&A, or 
other advisory mandates. Examples of standard financial services are cash management, 
foreign exchange, or guarantee businesses. The latter is particularly important for clients that 
might be not able to conduct a broad menu of capital markets business at all. Thus, by means 
of granting syndicated loans, banks take substantial balance sheet risks by backing loans with 
common equity and by taking respective default risks. In return, borrowers usually reward the 
lenders with non-risky, fee-generating business opportunities. Without the loan commitment, 
banks would basically be “suspended” from the opportunity to access or to compete for cross-
selling. In other words, the syndicate provides a group-exclusive access to cross-selling. 
                                               
 
239 In practice, loan professionals commonly simply use the term “cross-sell” as can be seen in various related interviewee 
statements throughout this section. 
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According to the research participants, it is common that borrowers—especially with respect 
to more standardised financial services—precisely allocate ancillary business based on banks’ 
lending shares in their syndicated loan. Interestingly, this is said to be the case across the 
borrower-size spectrum. In other words, smaller and perhaps also privately held firms are said 
to adhere to this relationship rationale. For clients that are users of the wider capital markets, 
this also holds true for straightforward transactions like frequent bond issuances, for instance, 
under EMTN240 programmes. For complex investment banking services like M&A or IPO 
advisory, being a syndicate member usually puts banks in the position to realistically compete 
for cross-selling. In a similar vein, Elsas (2005) stated, that a pivotal factor of a lending 
relationship in general, is the relative commitment size of a lender vis-à-vis its total debt 
position. Hence, the underlying rationale of banks investing in corporate relationships via 
syndicated loans is different compared to the one of, for example, corporate bond investors 
acting risk-neutrally and commonly not conducting further business with issuers.  
Finding: From a bank’s perspective, an existing syndicated loan lender-borrower 
relationship can be interpreted as the precondition for being awarded cross-selling 
opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
240 According to Ramanthan (2012, p. 395), “Euro Medium Term Notes (EMTNs) allow for debt issuance in different 
currencies and maturities under one umbrella agreement. This agreement is like a “shelf registration” in which investors can 
issue debt on multiple occasions for a specified period of time but need only to file one offering prospectus”. 
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 4 We define ourselves a relationship bank. Therefore, our strategy is to grant loans, but to earn money 
with other banking products.  Clients are usually willing to distribute other business in accordance to 
the respective credit stakes of the syndicate banks. Therefore, whenever you have a credit relationship, 
you are a financing partner of the client and you are then qualified to do additional business. My 
impression is that this additional business distribution is really calculated by the borrower in 
accordance with the stake of the bank in the loan. You have the situation that you can only have cross- 
sell once you have a credit relationship. That is for pricing a very relevant determinant.  
I 5 Syndicated lending is the key entrance-card into additional ancillary business. Only those banks who 
participate in the loan have an opportunity or are being given an opportunity to compete for all sorts 
of other business. 
I 8 The discussion that you have with corporates is that they define their relationship banks with view to 
their respective share in a syndicated loan. They look at commitments over the next five years and they 
define the bank pool which then does nearly all the side business with the client. If you are not in the 
deal, you will not get the cash management mandate for a company or important capital market 
transactions of derivatives business. 
I 16 What I have seen in recent years is that nearly all borrowers in the market look at their syndicate and 
the respective lending percentages. With respect to easy business like cash-management, they allocate 
the cross-sell exactly based on that share. One rather small client told me that he–via certain IT– 
allocates its cash management services in light of the loan shares to the syndicate banks. I found that 
very interesting. I mean we talk about the corporate-world, right? For LBOs this would be inherently 
different, as we see different investors there.   
 
It is commonly understood that cross-selling potential leads to price reductions in German 
corporate syndicated lending, the so-called relationship discount. In other words, this discount 
leads to pricings being more favourable compared to what factual risk-neutral 
creditworthiness views would suggest. In other words, these loans appear to be factually 
under-priced, as exemplified by the following statements: 
I 2 I would expect that basically everybody is kind of complaining. You as a bank are lending to a good 
relationship borrower actually not receiving the price on your loan as you would expect it under 
normal fully competitive circumstances, because of the relationship. 
I 16 The pricing of any transaction is just one aspect of a relationship. Banks are inclined to accept certain 
discounts if they like the client and are constantly awarded with cross sell from him. 
I 17 Everybody has an idea of what the fair market pricing would be and then you can deduct what you call 
the relationship discount. It is at the end a black box as everybody has its own opinion on how large 
this discount should be. 
 
Under the theoretical view, relationship loans would not be factually under-priced as they 
were simply cheaper to produce by the relationship lender given its information-related cost 
savings (Boot & Thakor, 1994; Calomiris & Pornrojnangkool, 2009; Sharpe, 1990). Likewise, 
for participants, no factual under-pricing would occur given the lower information asymmetry 
premium they require. In practice, the magnitude of under-pricing depends foremost on the 
potential for ancillary business.  
With respect to extant academic literature, these findings might be related to the discussion of 
bundling benefits, for which, however, only weak evidence has been presented. According to 
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Schenone (2010), bundling of financial services under the theoretical assumption of 
information economies of scope is not a significant driver of pricings in relationship lending. 
Kysucky and Norden (2016) found that product synergies drive pricings downward in the 
U.S. whereas relationship lending in Europe does not necessarily bring these borrower 
benefits.  
Finding: Ceteris paribus, corporate syndicated loan pricings are a declining function of a 
borrowers’ cross-selling potential. 
In practice, banks tend to move even beyond this, not only agreeing to discounts on loan 
pricing compared to arm’s length instruments, but even accepting loan pricings that do not 
fully cover their actual costs (loss-leading pricings). In section 5.5.3.5, I introduced the 
common loan pricing and profitability calculation approaches conducted by banks. Even if 
these calculations, being based on either one or the other approach, or on a mixed approach—
resulted in negative return contributions, lenders would tend to accept shortfalls, a mechanism 
visualised through Figure 58. 
 
Figure 58. Syndicated loan profitability. 
This at-first-view counterintuitive, irrational lender behaviour carries the underlying 
justification that the ancillary business should firstly compensate for banks’ losses until break-
even 1 (Figure 59) and secondly lead to an overall profitability of the lender-borrower 
relationship (break-even 2). In other words, the profitability of loans on a stand-alone basis is 
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of minor importance in corporate syndicated lending. The balance sheet risk taken by lenders 
is remunerated risk-adequately and covers full costs from an overall relationship perspective 
only when cross-selling increases revenues to a sufficient level. 
 
Figure 59. Relationship profitability. 
It is hence reasonable to state that banks tend to “buy” themselves in or “invest” in 
relationships by availing loss-leading syndicated loan commitments with the goal to “boost” 
the overall relationship in profitable territories over time. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, banks tend to accept real and/or opportunity-cost losses on 
German corporate syndicated loans under the assumption that future cross-selling more 
than compensates for the loss taken. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research findings and discussion: qualitative fieldwork 312 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
All interviewees agreed on this, as exemplified by the following statements: 
I 2 We as a lending bank in the corporate world accept loss-leading syndicated loans as we expect that 
cross-sell comes in and that over time the whole relationship is getting profitable. 
I 4 Hardly anybody is interested in pure credit lending because these corporate loans often carry very low 
pricings and shortfalls. 
I 7 People always have said it does not make sense that the loan or lending in general is a continuously 
loss leading exercise in a bank relationship with a particular client. It always has been the case and 
continued to be the case over the last 20 years. 
I 8 Most of the deals do not cover the costs. This is the common understanding of banks and clients in 
Germany. They expect you to give something and then you get something in return. This is the reason 
why it is OK to accept shortfalls or, in another words, loss-leading loans. 
I 13 It is a remarkable phenomenon but it is as old as the syndicated loan market in Germany that you 
make losses on those loans. 
I 19 Unfortunately, nearly all corporate loan transactions nowadays do not cover our costs. They produce 
losses and that is ok for the banks being active in the German market and I would say also in Europe, 
as they expect future revenues out of ancillary business. The loan is just one part of the medal. If the 
cross-sell really materialises, there is nothing wrong with it. It is in my view just a market practise that 
has been established over decades. In general, this works quite well in the market. 
 
5.5.13.1.2 Adherence to hidden contracts 
If the anticipated ancillary business does not materialise after a certain amount of time241, so 
that not only the loan itself was loss-making but the overall relationship remains so too, 
lenders need to evaluate a possible relationship discontinuation. Such a discontinuation might 
either be executed by off-loading the loan in the secondary market or by not taking part in 
renewals or extensions. With respect to the latter, syndicated loans are commonly equipped 
with extension options242 that can be exercised by the borrower at the loans’ first or second 
anniversary. If the borrower exercises the option after year one, the lifetime shifts back to five 
years. The same functioning applies by exercising the second extension option in year two 
(LMA, 2013; Slaughter & May, 2013). As lenders are required to vote on such extensions, 
non-approval would result in the commitment of the bank to end one year earlier than the 
commitments of the approving lenders. Disapproval of the extension, however, also causes 
the respective bank to be cut off immediately from ancillary business for the remaining four 
years, making it a finely-judged decision to choose this way of discontinuation. 
 
 
                                               
 
241 Commonly over the lifetime of the loan. 
242 Usually so-called 5+1+1-year facilities. In other words, a five-year tenor with two one year extension options. 
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The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 7 That is always the discussion and it is at the end a difficult one. Some banks do this relatively rigidly 
but you only get a real opportunity to do this once there is a maturity. We also have transactions in 
which we have two extension options and not to extent as a bank, especially as a current market 
practice says that the extension option is already exercised after the first or second year.  Therefore, 
you are stuck with the non-extended portion of the loan for further three or four years, if you do not 
extend it. You then have money committed, and have ruined or at least worsened the relationship by 
not extending. It is always a difficult decision. That decision in theory is relatively easy, because you 
only look at the numbers and say, “Ok;” it has not worked out over the last five years. Thus, I do not 
participate in the refinancing, but especially for foreign banks probably active in Germany, it is a 
matter of how often can you do this, unless or until you lose the critical mass of relationships which 
you need to have to pay the people active at the banks. 
I 18 Once you articulate to the client that you do not want to be part of the syndicated loan any more, he 
will directly cut you off from the cross-sell. On the one hand, you therewith signal to the client that you 
do not want to conduct business with him anymore and another bank needs to step in for you. This 
bank then wants to see cross-sell as well, which is limited overall. 
 
Given the factual under-pricing, a possible secondary sale—especially if the buyer acted risk-
neutrally—is likely to lead to losses, as prices would only be achieved below par. Thus, 
together with the mechanisms of extension options discussed earlier, it is reasonable to 
assume that relationship lenders might be effectively “locked in” by borrowers by facing 
discontinuation costs. These conclusions appear to turn previous theories upside-down. Rajan 
(1992), for example, assumed borrowers to be locked in by their relationship lender whilst 
facing high switching costs.  
Finding: Ceteris paribus, corporate syndicated loan borrowers are able to lock in their 
relationship lenders who face relationship discontinuation costs. 
According to eight interviewees, the decision whether to discontinue constantly non-profitable 
relationships is determined by diverse bank internal considerations.243 However, four of these 
interviewees pointed out that approaches to the measurement of relationship profitability have 
become more sophisticated over time. In the past, banks have often realised that the ancillary 
promised by borrowers did not materialise. Hence, a slight tendency towards more decisively 
leaving such a relationship might be present today, or a movement in this direction may have 
started. This is especially underpinned by the statement of interviewee 21, highlighting that it 
has become more common that lenders pre-agree to certain cross-selling events244 with 
mandate letters or private side-letters.  
                                               
 
243 See section 5.5.3.7 and the discussions on banks’ lending philosophies.  
244 For example, a mandate to originate a corporate bond. 
Research findings and discussion: qualitative fieldwork 314 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
I 21 In cases in which we accept a very low pricing, we try to fix a bond- or Schuldschein mandate with 
signing the loan. We want to enhance the chance of a profitable relationship with the client. That it is 
particularly important when competition is high. 
 
As a side note, these techniques for more accurately measuring the overall relationship 
profitability might well be significantly enhanced if banks applied the “novel ex post total cost 
of borrowing (p.a. yield) framework” as developed in 5.4.4. Given that banks tend not to 
conduct rigid ex post reassessments of factual syndicated loan yields, the relationship 
profitability measurement is likely to be predominantly based on a comparison of the 
shortfall—as calculated ex ante based on the expected ex post yield—with the cross-selling 
related revenues made within a loan’s lifetime. Applying the ex post reassessment in the 
manner of Table 82 is likely to reveal that shortfalls have ex ante been either overestimated or 
underestimated. Hence a much clearer view on the overall relationship profitability could be 
reached. 
Finding: Based on various bank related reasons like the new “locked-in hypothesis”, the 
decision whether to discontinue constantly non-profitable lending relationships is 
ambiguous. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 4 Banks` internal controlling has to capture precisely, whether you have a fair share of cross-sell. 
I 13 For a couple of years maybe and I think that the monitoring of relationship profitability is getting 
much more strict in many banks. That is why we see many banks selling out of relationships after a 
while, because they just could not make them profitable. And then other banks can step into these 
relationships in such situations hoping to make the relationship profitable then. The whole thing is 
very bizarre. 
I 15 This will be measured after a year as to whether they have delivered or not. We would step out of the 
relationship if it does not make sense overall and, if it is loss leading, we would not do the loan. 
 
In theory, discontinuations should reduce loan supply and subsequently lead to higher pricing 
again. In light of the current syndicated loan market environment,245 this appears however not 
to be feasible in the short run. 
Given the incompleteness of loan contracts, the above-mentioned hidden rationale of lender-
borrower-relationships tending to drive syndicated loan pricings downwards, is based on 
elements of hidden contracting between lender and borrower being publicly unobservable. 
Firstly, there is an ex ante assurance of being awarded or being enabled to compete for cross-
                                               
 
245 See section 5.5.15. 
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selling when joining or staying in a lending syndicate. Secondly, a further aspect of such 
unobservable contracts embedded in a relationship loan is common, especially with respect to 
large revolving credit facilities for listed multinational companies. As already stressed, lots of 
these are in place for commercial paper back-up purposes, tending to remain virtually 
undrawn (Voisey, 2016). Although the borrower might face situations where drawing the loan 
would appear to be more favourable as compared to tapping the commercial paper or capital 
market in general, they tend to refrain from doing this. The relationship lender expects the 
borrower not to draw, which is particularly important with regards to regulatory required 
liquidity ratios, under which a lesser drawdown rate needs to be assumed, in the case a facility 
is not placed with draw intention (LMA, 2015). In other words, banks’ cost bases would rise 
in the case of borrower “misbehaviour”, a fact that would even accelerate possible shortfalls, 
although utilisation fee concepts might in principle partly address these concerns (Wherity, 
2011). 
I 18 As these kinds of loan commitments are historically basically never drawn down, banks often consider 
this fact and internally allocate less liquidity or funding to a particular loan, which allows lower 
margin levels, or reduces the shortfall these loans usually produce. The model based on which such 
the allocation is made would, however, need to be changed if frequent drawings might occur making 
the loan with respect to internal calculations more expensive. 
 
Furthermore, large clients usually state that it would be a bad signal to the capital markets if 
bank debt needs to be used for the financing of general corporate purposes. This is in line with 
Gupta et al. (2008, p. 354), “[These] companies have a greater ability to disintermediate their 
fund raising activities and borrow directly from the public capital markets via equity, bond or 
commercial paper issuance”.  
The statements of interviewees 3 and 10 underpin this: 
I 3 When we talk about really big clients, the ones who are stock-listed, have commercial paper 
programmes, and bonds outstanding, then these do not need bank debt for their daily business. They 
need us when it comes to the financing of an acquisition. Would e.g., a revolving credit facility, 
initially meant to serve as a back-up-line be drawn by a client to finance its warehouse that would be 
really a weird signal to the capital markets community. 
I 10 Interestingly enough when we look at 2007 or 2008, everyone was scared that borrowers might just 
draw down their lines of credit but actually, they did not. Our experience was they had not at all. 
Structurally there was no drawing and that has given many banks a lot of confidence that these lines of 
liquidity are just that. Why? Because for a large well-rated corporate, there are other sources of 
liquidity to access. They are higher priced potentially, but in the past these sources have been there. 
 
In line with Boot and Thakor (2000), this kind of financing for the biggest clients is meant as 
an ultimate liquidity insurance. However, other than as stated by Berg et al. (2016), even if 
the draw option would value “in the money”, it is very unlikely to be exercised in Germany. 
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Thus, the underlying assumption in defining revolving loans as credit derivatives with the 
respective counterparties acting risk-neutrally does not hold for German corporate syndicated 
revolving credit facilities. In practice back-up lines are predominantly in place to satisfy 
rating agencies’ requirements to have an outstanding back-up line with a residual maturity of 
at least one year in place if the borrower uses a commercial paper programme (Voisey, 2016). 
Agencies require this to evaluate a client being secured against possible liquidity shocks in the 
commercial paper market (Gatev & Strahan, 2009). These facts further underpin that a 
distinction is important within the revolving credit area between pure back-up as well as 
working capital or general corporate purposes. Furthermore, I can confirm the thoughts of 
Harjoto et al. (2006), who stated that RCFs in general are more relationship-oriented than 
term loans. 
According to interviewee 13, during the financial crisis, one German corporate decided to 
draw down its back-up line, an incidence not being well received by its lender-group leading 
to tougher negotiations and pricing premiums in the aftermath. 
I 13 It works to the downside as well. We have seen this for the company “x” that did not act the way that 
banks expected it to act. The clients’ back-up RCF was expected not to be drawn. And they drew it for 
financial gains. This was reflected in the terms and conditions that banks quoted to this company 
thereafter for a while to the downside. Banks made it more expensive. It is all a give and take at the 
end. 
 
The aforementioned example suggests that non-compliant behaviour regarding hidden 
contracts may reduce the relationship discount or might even lead to relationship penalties or 
discontinuation. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, non-compliant client behaviour with respect to syndicated 
loans’ hidden contracts has an upward influence on pricing. 
 
5.5.13.2 Relationship lending: the theoretical view in the extant literatures  
The aspects of relationship lending discussed above, based on the interview data are 
predominantly built on a forward-looking element, namely, the anticipated revenues 
generated by means of cross-selling, driving pricing discounts via a rising function of this 
anticipation. The theoretical definition of relationship lending and its impact on pricing is, 
however, founded on a different underlying rationale, a backward view with regards to the 
mainly soft information on borrowers’ default risk gathered over time. It is useful here to 
recall the related discussion whilst reviewing the associated literature in 2.11. Relationship 
discounts are apparent due to lower costs of information production resulting from various 
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interactions with clients over time (Bharath et al., 2011; Boot & Thakor, 2000). Theory 
suggests that banks engage in relationship lending to produce proprietary information leading 
to an information monopoly, resulting in credit assessment advantages vis-à-vis uninformed 
competitors. Subsequently, relationship lenders might possibly “lock in” their clients and are 
enabled either to extract rents or share information production related cost savings with the 
clients (Mattes et al., 2013). 
Regarding the practitioner-based definition and the syndicate structure issues discussed in 
5.5.9 and 5.5.10, informational frictions appear to play a less prominent role in general in 
Europe and in Germany in particular. In the German corporate syndicated loan market, a 
rather diffuse and well-informed group of banks competes for loan mandates to access the 
lucrative cross-selling opportunities. As the cross-selling potential rises with firm size, larger 
and thus probably more transparent firms benefit the most from relationship discounts. 
However, based on the interviewee statements presented earlier, smaller syndicated loan 
borrowers also benefit from relationship discounts. In their case, the cross-selling is rather 
standardised bank business such as cash-management.  
With a view to very small bilateral lending relationships with corporates or retail clients, 
which are not the focus of this work, the information production element might indeed be 
more prominent. Syndicated lending relationships are, however, less grounded on proprietary 
information production in Germany, but constitute a sufficient condition for a profitable client 
relationship. In hard terms, without syndicated lending there might be no fruitful business 
relationships with large enterprises.  
Based on the interviewees’ statements, the theoretical information-asymmetry-grounded 
definition of relationship lending is likely, however, to be also more practically valid in the 
U.S., where most research had been conducted. According to 13 research participants, as with 
the transparency situation with respect to publicly available pricing information, this 
practitioner-based relationship feature is said to be less pronounced in the U.S., where each 
corporate loan is required to be profitable in stand-alone terms. This is in line with Yafeh and 
Yosha (2001), who stated that arm’s length driven markets such as the U.S. are associated 
with less pronounced lender-borrower-relationships compared to bank-based ones like 
Germany. Further, Strahan (2008) reported the role of relationship lending in the U.S. to be 
relatively clear, whereas outside the U.S. it is not. 
The statement of Bharath et al. (2007, p. 411) looking at non-financial stock-listed U.S. 
borrowers, can be interpreted as supporting evidence: “Although lending relationships do 
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have a positive (but economically small) impact on the probability of generating future 
investment banking business, overall, the impact of relationships seems to be considerably 
stronger in the loan market compared to the public debt or equity markets”. In other words, 
and following their argument, banks acting for U.S. clients are also likely to be awarded with 
public debt or equity mandates, for example, without participating in a syndicated loan—a 
fact that is almost impossible in Germany. 
In another inquiry, Bharath et al. (2011) studied relationship lending effects in the light of 
information asymmetry theory for the U.S. and found that predominantly opaque borrowers 
benefit from relationship discounts due to less informational frictions and lower information 
cost production associated with repeated lending relationships, which are (partly) passed on to 
borrowers. For the U.S. syndicated loan market, which is more concentrated with respect to 
active bookrunners and, furthermore, characterised by a very deep and developed institutional 
investor base being active in the corporate market, these reported rationales appear sensible 
(Bharath et al.; Gupta et al., 2008). In contrast, the European market in general, and the 
German one in particular, are not shaped by a high degree of institutional investor loan supply 
(Shivdasani & Wang, 2011). 
The following table plots a U.S.-based bookrunner league table from 2000 to 2015, derived by 
applying identical selection criteria compared to the German one246 presented earlier. 
                                               
 
246 See Tables 8 and 68.  
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Source: Based on Dealogic Loanware secondary data. 
Table 85. U.S. corporate syndicated loan bookrunner league table 2000 to 2015. 
The 25 banks amount to an overall share of the total bookrunner volume of roughly 95%, with 
the top three institutions—J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch and Citigroup 
together—accounting for a market share of almost 60%. In comparison, in the German market 
the top three institutions only achieve a share of circa 30%. Furthermore, the finding of this 
research that large, cross-selling rich clients benefit most from relationship lending directly 
contradicts that of Bharath et al. (2011) that relationship benefits disappear for borrowers for a 
certain size. The finding is exemplified by the statement of interviewee 5: 
I 5 The bigger the client, the more cross-sell is available.  
 
Further support is provided by Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool (2009), who found banks to 
price financial services tactically by being able to extract rents. Based on their findings, loans 
tend to be even more expensive if bundled with further security underwriting business. In 
Germany, these security underwriting businesses would be classified as cross-selling leading 
to relationship discounts. 
Bookrunner
Deal value 
(€ mn equivalent)
No. %-share
1 J.P. Morgan 4,849,940.68 13,492 26.69
2 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 3,574,058.90 16,105 19.67
3 Citi 2,259,221.28 5,006 12.43
4 Wells Fargo Securities 1,448,120.54 8,849 7.97
5 Barclays 654,633.63 2,200 3.60
6 Deutsche Bank 531,259.21 1,986 2.92
7 Credit Suisse 464,935.58 1,688 2.56
8 NatWest Markets 325,260.76 1,449 1.79
9 Morgan Stanley 322,292.23 1,055 1.77
10 Goldman Sachs 315,296.09 1,156 1.73
11 BNP Paribas 299,248.13 1,140 1.65
12 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 251,605.84 1,095 1.38
13 PNC Bank NA 238,162.14 2,758 1.31
14 SunTrust Robinson Humphrey Inc 210,556.22 1,679 1.16
15 RBC Capital Markets 185,269.61 1,041 1.02
16 US Bancorp 178,924.84 1,661 0.98
17 UBS 166,380.81 697 0.92
18 KeyBanc Capital Markets 155,013.08 1,396 0.85
19 HSBC 128,921.43 463 0.71
20 General Electric Co 128,842.05 1,302 0.71
21 BMO Capital Markets 117,830.37 1,011 0.65
22 Scotiabank 96,800.79 498 0.53
23 Bank of New York Mellon Corp 87,865.24 376 0.48
24 Mizuho 80,021.05 324 0.44
25 Credit Agricole CIB 67,556.78 398 0.37
U.S.: 
Corporate syndicated loan bookrunner league table 2000 to 2015
Research findings and discussion: qualitative fieldwork 320 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
Taking these findings together, it is realistic to assume that in the U.S.—in line with 
information asymmetry theory—costs and benefits of relationship lending chiefly accrue 
based on scale economies in information production which financiers might enjoy vis-à-vis, 
for example, relatively uniformed (institutional) investors. Here, the theoretical definition of 
syndicated lending as being a hybrid of relationship lending and publicly traded debt carrying 
elements of delegated monitoring seems to hold.  
The fact that major U.S. banks are also active in German corporate syndicated lending leads 
to the assumption that foreign banks at least partly adopt different market practices whilst 
crossing borders. This is underlined by interviewee statements247 of foreign banks in general 
and U.S.-based ones in particular, stating that communicating this relationship rationale to 
their headquarters in the U.S. is difficult, as markets work differently there. 
Finding: The relationship aspect (practitioners’ view) of corporate syndicated lending is 
less pronounced in the U.S. market and based on different underlying rationales. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 9 In the U.S., banks are more rigorous and it is more a capital markets approach. You have to have this 
or this return. If you not get it then you choose other financing instruments, like buying a bond. 
I 10 As I understand the difference in terms of banking model in that respect is huge. 
I 14 When I spend a couple of years in New York and found it very refreshing that the pricing in the U.S. 
market for debt is more rational and a loan is expected to wash your face independently of ancillary 
business. And coming back to Europe from the US, I was quite shocked at how much tighter pricing is 
here and how much more it is dominated by excessive competition. 
 
Besides data issues as stressed earlier, these different underlying market rationales and 
standards of a bank-based financial system (Germany) compared to a market-based one (U.S.) 
could be a further explanation for “the pricing puzzle” (Carey & Nini, 2007) in extant 
academic literature on syndicated lending.  
 
                                               
 
247 Given the confidentiality issue mentioned in section 3.5.7.1, I refrain from providing sample interviewee statements in 
that respect. 
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 Conclusion: lender-borrower relationship 
Relationship discounts appear to be primarily driven by expected revenues generated via 
future ancillary business and to only a limited degree by cost savings in information 
production regarding creditworthiness assessments, as extant literature commonly predicts.  
Under the extant relationship lending definition, severe information asymmetries between 
lead lenders and participants with respect to the credit assessment of a borrower are the 
sufficient condition for relationship lending to exist at all. As discussed in the section on 
syndicate structure, such information asymmetries do not however appear to be a significant 
issue in the market under investigation. In other words, less (soft) information-based related 
cost savings of one vis-à-vis another bank occur in reality. Logically, the relationship 
component needs to be predominantly built on different underlying rationales, as established 
in 5.5.13.1. Furthermore, the classical relationship theory was established to be more likely 
applicable to the U.S. market, whereas not to the German one. In that vein, Strahan (2008) 
rightly remarked the role of relationship lending especially outside the U.S. to remain 
unclear—a gap which has been narrowed by this research. 
The discussion remains to be enhanced by prioritising the determinants in light of their 
different influential magnitudes towards their determinant category (Figure 60).  
 
Figure 60. Lender-borrower relationship: determinant prioritisation. 
It became apparent that the predominant pricing driver of the overall relationship concept is 
the cross-selling potential that banks anticipate, which influences their individual willingness 
to accept discounts. However, this concept may only work consistently if clients adhere to 
hidden contracts and provide the respective cross-selling in reality. Another established 
element of adherence to hidden contracts is related to back-up RCFs being mutually agreed to 
remain undrawn. In the words of, Shockley and Thakor (1997), the availed option to utilise 
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these loans is expected never to be exercised by the borrower even if it would rationally make 
sense to do so. 
 Syndicated loan market environment 
All research participants highlighted the respective “sentiment” of the German syndicated 
loan market to constitute a respective pricing determinant. The drivers of the specific 
syndicated loan market environment are, on the one hand, driven by general ones discussed 
throughout 5.5.11, but also by conditions specific to syndicated loans,  pushing the bargaining 
power of lenders vis-à-vis borrowers in one or the other direction (Grunert & Norden, 2012). 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, corporate syndicated loan pricings are driven by the syndicated 
loan related market environment. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 You need to make sure that it is a market pricing. Otherwise, you have no chance to make the deal. 
I 4 However, if you are asked as a syndication person, at what price you can place the risk or what is the 
best mix between placing the risk and winning the mandate in the first place, then you really must 
revert to market standards and current pricings. 
I 15 First of all, of course the market environment. The market now is very different compared to after the 
financial crisis, so it goes without saying that the market and the future market outlook and industry 
sector of the borrower are very important. 
 
Analyses of the interview data with respect to the determinant category syndicated loan 
market environment enabled me to establish the corresponding determinants displayed in 
Figure 61. 
 
Figure 61. Syndicated loan market environment and its determinants. 
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5.5.15.1 Syndicated loan benchmarks 
In section 5.5.11.4, I established that external benchmarking, by means of screening current 
secondary market spreads of non-syndicated-loan debt capital markets instruments, influenced 
corporate syndicated loan pricing. Benchmarking to outstanding and/or recently signed 
syndicated loans of the respective borrower itself, or to those of comparable borrowers, are 
also a key pricing determinant. Thus, benchmarking exercises are important loan originator 
tasks for deriving pricing offers. Given the external and internal opacity, these exercises are 
mainly based on non-public information that banks collect, store, and facilitate by repeatedly 
joining syndicated loan transactions. In other words, this benchmarking takes place in privacy 
hidden to outsiders. Next, this benchmarking can only be conducted based on pricings that 
finally materialise in the market and in which the specific bank either took part or had been 
asked to take part.248 Information about the bids other lenders might have quoted via the 
“modern” best efforts process is unobservable. Given the current bargaining power of 
borrowers vis-à-vis lenders and the triggered downward pressure via hidden RfP-processes, 
these benchmarks are thus not only incomplete, but are also not reflective of an average view 
of all syndicate banks, but are likely biased towards lower bids. These phenomena are 
discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 6.  
All interviewees agreed on this. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, benchmarking via comparable syndicated loan transactions 
determines German corporate syndicated loan pricings. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 1 Then the comparable deals in the market are very strong determinants. We conduct a lot of 
benchmarking. 
I 6 Assuming that it is a greenfield loan, a debut deal, then we probably just work purely on the basis of 
comparable deals and try to find the best comparable to get an idea of what could be a fair pricing 
package for the client. 
I 7 And then what we have seen as comparable deals in other similar transactions? When I say similar 
transactions, we are not just looking the German market, but also at the European market to search 
for comparable deals. 
I 9 We are looking at what we have seen from peer transactions from the market in our internal database. 
Then we come to a certain pricing. 
I 16 You need to get a good feeling of what the level for the margin is, what the upfront fee level, is and 
what you would need to pay to the market as participation fee and so on. 
                                               
 
248 Via invitation letter and term sheet, the respective pricing gets revealed to the invited bank irrespective of a possible 
succeeding commitment. 
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5.5.15.2 Market balance and competition 
Supply and demand mismatches might cause upward or downward pressure on pricings as 
highlighted by all interviewees. Loan supply is mainly driven by shape and concentration of 
banking systems in general. If many banks compete for business and if these tend to be well 
capitalised and liquid, loan supply tends to be high (Boyd, De Nicoló, & Al Jalal, 2006). Loan 
demand on the other side is driven by various components like firms’ cash positions, their 
general investment sentiment as well as their possible access to other financing products. 
Furthermore, the general economic situation and the interrelated degree of confidence into the 
economy are important and determine the above-mentioned sentiment. According to four 
interviewees, this sentiment—with respect to German corporate syndicated lending—can be 
studied relatively precisely by looking at activity levels in event-related financings, such as 
acquisitions. According to Fitzgerald (2011), corporate managers are often reluctant to take 
excessive incremental risks in pursuing M&A in times of economic stress.  
In general, supply and demand constitute the bargaining power of financiers vis-à-vis 
borrowers (Boot, 2000). According to Grunert and Norden (2012), tougher competition 
among lenders raises the bargaining power of debtors. 
Finding: Ceteris paribus, syndicated loan supply and demand are main pricing 
determinants. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 5 Supply and demand is also a question of whether banks are willing to lend and that perspective is 
driven by the overall sentiment of the market and the particular bank. If a bank has lots of capital 
available and says we want to invest this capital, then we can be more aggressive on the margin side 
and on the fee side. 
I 14 Of course, supply and demand is underneath everything. 
I 17 At the end, it is all about the market. 
I 21 A syndicated loan is a product for which you have supply by banks and demand by clients. Possible 
imbalances of supply versus demand shapes the general environment; a kind of sentiment which 
determines all other aspects somewhat. 
 
According to all interviewees, the German corporate syndicated loan market is currently 
characterised by a supply and demand mismatch in favour of borrowers. Loan demand 
appears too low to allow for a fair market equilibrium to be established.  
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The following interviewee statements demonstrate this: 
I 2 There is not much credit demand at the moment. 
I 6 In today’s markets, I need to evaluate what the borrower is willing to pay me rather than what are the 
costs related to the loan.  
I 5 Competition is fierce, a fact that puts pressure on pricing. But also, things like other commercial terms 
such as security or covenants are simply competed away.  
I 10 If you look at German treasurers, they have a large range of banks they can talk to and it is very easy 
for them to substitute banks. 
I 12 It is also dependent on the cycle you are in. Is it a borrower’s market? Is it a bank market? And it will 
change constantly. We are seeing this. We are in a borrower market at the moment with very low 
rates. 
I 17 I mean it is obvious that we would love to close more deals here in Germany. But there are just too few 
to match the high levels of liquidity. Banks want to put their balance sheets to work at the moment. 
Unfortunately, clients do not demand enough loans at the moment. 
I 21 We as banks are under-lent. 
 
This lack of loan demand creates fierce lender competition, pressuring pricings downwards 
and bank risk-taking upwards (Broecker, 1990). Further non-price-related standards are 
becoming more lax, in line with Mattes et al. (2013), who suggest that credit standards are 
relatively lax in good times, which might lead to higher default risks in banks credit 
portfolios.  
Due to its strong economy, shaped by many market-leading corporates, as well as relatively 
low bankruptcy levels, Germany is characterised by a bank market with numerous active 
institutions and a relatively low level of concentration. Thus, bankers tend to characterise the 
German loan market as “overbanked”. Based on the interviewee statements, it is realistic to 
conclude that active banks in the German syndicated loan market are currently facing severe 
competition, leading to relatively low pricings and favourable non-price terms.  
Finding: Ceteris paribus, German corporate syndicated loan pricings are a declining 
function of lender competition. 
The following interviewee statements exemplify this: 
I 3 Another aspect is that the market is so competitive, that things like other commercial terms, for 
example, security, are simply competed away. 
I 8 The German market tends to be especially competitive in pricing compared to Southern Europe. 
I 10 If you look at German treasurers, they have a large range of banks they can talk to and it is very easy 
for them to substitute banks. If you just look at one particular product let’s say international cash 
management, there are five banks you can actually choose from outside of the German bank universe. 
A supply and demand mismatch is out there now. 
I 14 And those are the two things certainly the fact that the German banking market is overbanked and 
undersupplied with lending opportunities is and has for several years now been artificially impressing 
pricing in the market so I think bank on bank competition is a huge factor in this market. 
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 Conclusion: syndicated loan market environment 
Section 5.5.15 established the syndicated loan market environment as the major driver of the 
bargaining power of lenders vis-à-vis borrowers, currently leading to fierce lender 
competition given a relatively low loan demand that faces an abundance of supply. This 
determinant category is particularly important, as it is likely to cross-determine all other price 
determinants in their respective magnitude. 
The discussion remains to be enhanced by prioritising the determinants in light of their 
different influential magnitudes towards their determinant category (Figure 62). 
 
Figure 62. Syndicated loan market environment: determinant prioritisation. 
The factors shown in Figure 62 tend to constitute equally strong price determinants. 
Furthermore, these elements are hard to separate. If, for instance, a supply and demand 
mismatch in favour of borrowers puts downward pressure on pricing, the syndicated loan 
benchmarks accordingly become cheaper as well. 
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6 Integration and conceptual framework 
6.1 Introduction 
Section 5.5 established the main determinants of German corporate syndicated loan pricing 
based on an implicit underlying ceteris paribus assumption. The coding procedures of the 
interview material led to the formation of eight determinant categories, where each of which 
consisted of various determinants.  
According to the research participants, all determinants are different in their specific pricing 
impacts’ magnitude and interdependent by means of complex interactions. Hence, the “all-
else-being-equal” potentially conflicting as well as reciprocally enhancing phenomena must 
be disentangled and integrated. At this point, I face a complex residual challenge of 
integrating the findings, as recognised by the following statements: 
I 2 There is a huge variety of elements. Honestly, I find it very difficult to prioritise these correctly. From 
the outside, it may all seem that it is a relatively easy process to come to a pricing package for 
particular client, but in fact it is not, because there are just so many elements which influence pricing 
one way or the other that it is almost impossible to say with certainty that even when you carefully 
derive a certain pricing for a particular client, it will work i n the market unless proven. Further, there 
are so many elements of pricing often even bilaterally negotiated and completely unrevealed to the 
public that it is hard to really comment on syndicated loan pricings from an outside perspective. 
I 8 It is a very complicated issue. Everything interacts to a certain extent. It is also very complicated if not 
impossible to really separate all these different determinants. 
I 13 There are so many things in this market which are entirely unscientific and often irrational. 
I 20 The beauty of this private market is that there are so many things to take into account that it cannot be 
reduced to a simple econometric model. 
 
In other words, a puzzle remains to be built that strives, at least to a certain extent, to 
rationalise and make sense of the price determination of German corporate syndicated loans. 
With the new conceptual framework, I attempt to capture the multidimensionality of German 
corporate syndicated loan pricing determinants by means of linking, prioritising, and 
combining them as well as by capturing their multifarious interfaces.  
Whilst devising the framework, grounded in the answers of the research participants, I could 
provide novel perspectives on financial scholars’ classical definitions of relationship lending. 
These novel perspectives ultimately enabled me to solve the puzzle.   
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6.2 A piecewise strategy towards an integrated framework 
As an initial step, I provide a straightforward preliminary prioritisation analysis based on a 
scaling with respect to how interviewees positioned pricing determinants by answering the 
question, “How do you prioritise the various determinants of pricing from your banks’ point 
of view”? 
 
Figure 63. Preliminary prioritisation of pricing determinant categories. 
Based on the interviewee statements and the straightforward prioritisation as displayed in 
Figure 63, two determinant categories appear to be overwhelmingly present: “Lender-
borrower relationship” and “syndicated loan market environment” have been identified as 
paramount pricing determinants by the interviewees, with most reporting similar underlying 
rationales. Nineteen research participants explicitly prioritised either “lender-borrower 
relationship” or “syndicated loan market environment” as the most significant pricing 
determinant. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the two determinant categories constitute 
outstanding pillars of an integrated determinant framework.  
However, it is also commonly understood that syndicated loan pricing should primarily 
compensate lenders for the borrowers’ default-risk that they take. Here, “borrower-specific 
credit risk profile and rating”, “credit story”, and “contractual features” would intuitively be 
the weightiest.  
I will start the derivation of the framework with a closer look at the lender-borrower 
relationship aspect as well as the extant literature’s theoretical understanding of syndicated 
lending in general. 
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 A hybrid of relationship lending and publicly traded debt 
Based on the interviewee statements, it became apparent that the relationship concept in 
German corporate syndicated lending is predominantly built on a forward-looking element, 
the anticipated cross-selling that determines pricing or relationship discounts via a rising 
function of its anticipated magnitude. In other words, the higher the anticipated revenues 
generated via future cross-selling, the larger the discount, resulting in factually under-priced 
loans.  
In contrast, recent academic research emphasises relationship lending and its impact on 
pricing to be founded on a backward view with respect to the borrower information, mainly 
soft, that banks accumulate over time. Under this assumption, relationship discounts might 
appear to be grounded on banks’ lower costs of information production with these cost-
savings resulting from numerous past interactions. Lower costs of ex ante default prediction 
and ex post monitoring might be passed on to borrowers, resulting in certain discounts (Boot 
& Thakor, 1994; Bris & Welch, 2005). 
The disparity between extant research and the conclusions drawn from my qualitative 
fieldwork, lead to the supposition that the commonly applied definition of syndicated 
lending—as constituting “a hybrid of relationship lending and publicly traded debt” (Altunbas 
et al., 2006b, p. 6) with only the lead arrangers carrying such relationships with borrowers, 
and with participants joining syndicates at arm’s length—merits a critical review. This 
definition suggests that syndicated lending exhibits classical theoretical banking elements of 
delegated monitoring, where participant banks delegate monitoring duties to the 
arranger/relationship bank (Diamond, 1984). 
Following these anecdotal assumptions, participants would agree to accept certain price 
discounts if the lead arranger proved already to have had a long-lasting, deep relationship with 
the borrower and was, hence, expected to conduct superior due diligence and monitoring. 
Here, for both parties—lead arranger and participant—the pricing would effectively be risk-
neutral.  
In 5.5.10, I established why German corporate syndicated lending involves rather limited 
elements of delegated monitoring, as each bank is responsible to conduct proper monitoring 
and due diligence. Accordingly, banks in the German corporate syndicated loan market tend 
to be generally symmetrically informed whilst assessing a borrowers’ specific credit risk 
profile and its rating. Second, if this rationale held true for the German corporate syndicated 
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loan market, it would be illogical that pure arm’s length participants would accept 
shortfalls,249 while also lacking access to relationship-related cross-selling. In other words, for 
these banks the loan itself would need to be profitable in its own right and risk-neutrally 
priced. This necessity would be intensified by the fact that the all-in pricing or the newly 
established lender-individual ex post total cost of borrowing measure is significantly higher 
for active bookrunner(s) or banks committing a relatively high loan share, given the upfront 
fee structures staggered by commitment level. Thus, the definition of syndicated lending as a 
hybrid of relationship lending and publicly traded debt does not adequately reflect and address 
the nature of German corporate syndicated lending.  
By discussing semantical issues, the definition’s second part, “publicly traded debt” is likely 
to be implicitly related to the participants joining the facility at arms-length, which I explained 
was not the case in practice. One could also take it literally, however, as syndicated loans 
happen to be traded on secondary markets. In corporate syndicated lending, however, only 
very little trading activity is identified, making the second part of the definition (“publicly 
traded debt”) almost obsolete. Not surprisingly, secondary loan trading was not mentioned as 
a significant pricing determinant by any research participant, as exemplified by the following 
statements:  
I 3 The secondary market liquidity is mostly important for loans that you expect to be traded. When we 
think about corporate lending, I would say 90% of the loans that we avail to corporates are 
relationship-driven. Therefore, they are not prone to be traded in the secondary market because 
participating banks want to reflect to the client, that they are standing with them and they do not trade 
this away. In the case of a sell-off in the secondary market, the access to ancillary business would 
basically be gone. Again, that is very true for the German market. 
I 16 Secondary market trading in syndicated loans is a pure LBO-game. Here you have daily price 
quotations and relatively liquid markets. In normal corporate loans, there is no frequent trading 
activity and no daily price quotations. If any trading is done, it is “ad-hoc” and with a special 
intention of the seller. But that is as I said very rare. 
 
The remark of Dolvin et al. (2007, p. 84) that “most syndicated loans trade in an active 
secondary market, similar to bonds” does not apply to the market under study. 
Scale economies in information production are not only a less-pronounced issue in general, 
but they also only play indirect roles within banks’ syndicated loan cost-based pricing tools. I 
thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing to my attention that the internal bank credit rating 
of his or her employer values the length of client relationships in the qualitative part of the 
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internal rating-methodology, however with a rather low overall weight of less than one 
percent. The rating itself is only one cost-driving element within a loan cost equation, a fact 
taking the relationship duration factor far below an overall one percent threshold. According 
to this referee, in administrative costs associated with the issuing of a syndicated loan, the 
relationship factor is usually not captured at all. If possible information monopolies would be 
priced, these administrative costs would need to be higher for relatively new vis-a-vis 
repeated and established relationships, as costs of information production. In other words: The 
costs to conduct (initial) due diligence and monitoring, would be higher.  
Soft information in general happens to play only minor roles in due diligence processes and in 
concrete credit-risk assessments, which is—given the sizes of borrowers and loans—a highly 
institutionalised and regulated process, relying predominantly on hard information that all 
active bank players in the German corporate market tend to share.  
In that context, Udell (2008, p. 98) rightly points out, “The management of bank credit risk 
has moved from a qualitative-based exercise to a quantitative-based exercise”. The fact that 
the author relates this to SMEs—which are commonly associated with more opacity—makes 
this argument even more profound considering the large corporate group being studied within 
this work. A supporting argument has been delivered by Strahan (2008), who suggests that 
large and mostly well-established borrowers can be credit-assessed by predominantly hard 
information such as audited financial statements. Cole et al. (2004) point out that larger banks 
commonly base their lending decisions on systematic as well as verifiable information sets.  
In summary, based on mainly hard information facilitated via their cost-based credit pricing 
and return models, banks can calibrate their own risk-neutral pricing by being relatively 
symmetrically informed. In the case in which a bank would facilitate its risk-neutral pricing 
deviation based on the market opportunity cost-based approach, it would simply look at non-
syndicated loan capital market benchmarks and perhaps add its individual funding spread.  
Thus, the relationship-pricing—in the sense of a corporate syndicated lending professional’s 
definition—where non-lead lenders are also provided with cross-selling based on their 
respective loan share, seems to be grounded to a lesser extent in information asymmetry 
issues. 
Another element of the classical definition is that it assumes the lead arranger pursues certain 
tasks on behalf of the borrower. According to Godlewski et al. (2012) and Ivashina (2009), 
the arranger largely determines the initial set of potential participants to be invited and 
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specifies certain ticket sizes and the titles awarded to the invited banks. However, in line with 
the “modern” best efforts syndication process, it appears that lead arranger, bookrunner or 
coordinator is rather an operative function in the issuing process of a common syndicated loan 
rather than a reflection of the original definition within relationship banking theory.  
 Transaction-based lending and cross-selling option 
Taking everything together, it is reasonable to interpret German corporate syndicated lending 
as one form of transaction-based lending (Udell, 2008), when considering due diligence and 
monitoring from a risk evaluation and management perspective.  
As foreshadowed in 6.2.1, each bank, be it an active bookrunner or the smallest participant, is 
likely to have appropriate tools at hand to calibrate their individual risk-neutral syndicated 
loan pricing for each loan type, without being affected by significant information 
disadvantages that could potentially severely limit their ability to do so. Hence, with regards 
to banks’ individual price calibration ability, I agree with Champagne and Kryzanowski 
(2007, p. 3,146) who remarked, “[Syndicated lending] is becoming more transactional in 
nature”. 
Lenders calibrating pricings based on a cost-based approach would conduct this transaction-
based lending pricing technique via its sub-form financial statement lending predominantly 
based on hard information culled from borrowers’ financial statements, the main ingredients 
of internal ratings. Banks applying a market opportunity cost-based approach would conduct 
their risk-neutral price deviation based on transaction-based lending pricing techniques in a 
form of arm’s-length capital markets benchmarking.  
The degree of anticipated future ancillary business, the “heart” of the relationship component 
under the practitioner-based definition, affects banks’ concrete price setting via the 
relationship discount. The degree of a banks’ accepted pricing discount is at the end to be 
evaluated and decided upon by their internal stakeholder(s) that has (have) to allocate the 
related shortfall and, therefore, have a strong incentive to access future cross-selling to (over)-
compensate for, or, in other words, re-earn this shortfall. 
Thus, from a single bank point of view, I define the first part of the price setting of German 
corporate syndicated loans as a transaction-based lending technique with the relationship 
discount representing the price for an implicit option-to-sell (“cross-selling option”) granting 
the right to access and to (“realistically”) compete for future cross-selling. 
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Hence, if one client with a weaker specific credit risk profile vis-à-vis another presents higher 
cross-selling potential, it can obtain a lower-cost syndicated loan compared to the client with a 
stronger credit quality. It is reasonable to add that the pricing in its own right is not risk-
neutral. This principle is illustrated by the following interviewee statements: 
I 13 We see better priced deals for weaker ratings in the case of really strong cross-sell wallets. 
I 19 It might appear astonishing to outsiders that two clients even of identical credit quality and business 
sector might have different prices depending on their ancillary business potential. 
 
I explicitly define the cross-selling option as “implicit” because it is important to emphasize 
that the underlying mechanisms and phenomena partly adhere to common stock option 
theories and its valuation as presented by, among others, Black and Scholes (1973), while also 
exhibiting major differences. In other words, elements of the theories’ underlying ideas 
provide an appropriate conceptual analogy that supports me by shedding light on certain 
phenomena in relation to the study. “A put option gives its holder the right to sell a specified 
amount of the underlying asset during some period in the future at a predetermined price”. 
Furthermore, “the option writer is the person from whom the option buyer purchases the 
option contract” (Levy & Post, 2005, p. 650). 
In the German corporate syndicated lending context, the cross-selling option functions as 
follows: It grants relationship lenders the “right” to sell an unspecified amount of financial 
services to a borrower during the lifetime of the loan at non-predetermined prices. In contrast 
to the sell option in the sense of Levy and Post, the cross-selling option does not securitise the 
right to sell financial services, but rather grants this right, based on hidden contracting 
between borrower and relationship lender. The discretion as to whether, when, what, and at 
what price the cross-selling options’ owner can sell financial services is not securitised and is 
based on hidden contracts.250 
Hence, the value of the option is tied to these hidden contracts with the option’s writer 
(borrower) assuring its owner the option to sell and to compete realistically for the sale of 
financial services, with the respective prices being likely to boost the overall relationship 
profitability in positive or risk-neutral territory. 
                                               
 
250 As outlined in section 5.5.13.1.1, it might however be the case that future cross-selling events are pre-agreed within a 
mandate letter or within a separate side-letter. Here a kind of securitisation would be given. 
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In light of theoretical ideas of, for example, Black and Scholes (1973), the price of the cross-
selling option might be partly determined by similar underlying mechanisms. The higher the 
probability-weighted anticipated revenues generated via ancillary business, the higher the 
option’s value. Further, the value is determined by the loan’s real (average) maturity. Hence, 
based on already executed cross-selling and/or the related expectation for the residual loan-
lifetime, the option might implicitly be “in the money” or out of it. The following interviewee 
statement illustrates the pragmatic view of this taken by the bank:   
I 9 The most important part is the potential of generating revenues in the future. In addition, I think the 
politically correct expression for that is “relationship”. But really, relationship means, that, yes, we 
have a working relationship, which is beneficial. Clients work with a certain bank and banks want to 
work with a certain client. I think in the future there is going to be revenue coming out sufficiently to 
cover costs effectively of the relationship. That is the main determinant for pricing. 
 
In a case where the expectations are not being met, a relationship discontinuation might be 
considered. In the case of a risk-neutral syndicated loan pricing at signing, the price for this 
option would be zero. 
The cross-selling option’s valuation is complex and individual from bank to bank. Here, soft 
factors and relationship-related interactions are likely to be more pronounced, in a sense that 
well-established relationship managers, accompanied by experienced product specialists such 
as a loan originator, might enhance the pay-off-structure of the option or, more practically, 
initiate more ancillary business.  
This might ex ante be anticipated or forecasted by the respective lender, leading to its 
willingness to pay a higher price for the cross-selling option in comparison to banks not 
having such well-established contacts into the borrowing firm. With respect to the valuation 
of the cross-selling option, a backward component is also included, namely, the experience in 
relation to hidden contracts, especially with respect to past degrees of cross-selling 
materialisation. Thus, one could argue that some elements of the theoretical relationship 
lending definition are relevant in light of a possibly superior ability of more experienced 
syndicate banks to evaluate the cross-selling option, compared to a possible new syndicate 
member. As the new entrant is also likely to benefit from cross-selling, this superior ability 
might be valuable, as an important part of a companies’ cross-selling distribution-key is 
simply related to the loan share. This assessment is, however, separated from the default risk 
prediction. Furthermore, syndicates for German corporates tend to have become smaller, and 
active banks and clients tend to know each other over numerous repayment cycles, thus 
weakening this factor’s importance.   
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Tentatively, I can thus summarise each individual bank’s price view to consist of its 
individual risk-neutral pricing and the embedded individual cross-selling option valuation.  
 
Table 86. Bank individual relationship pricing (1).  
 
 Syndicated loan market environment, syndicate structure and syndication 
mode 
So far, the pricing discussion based on two determinant sets of issues—the “classical” ones 
that determine the risk-neutral pricing and the cross-selling option, determined by the 
relationship aspect—have been at the level of the individual bank. Thus, the determinant 
categories “syndicated loan market environment” and “syndicate structure and syndication 
mode” remain to be integrated into this new perspective on German corporate syndicated 
lending.  
At this point, it is useful to recall that all of the interviewees highlighted the syndicate loan 
market environment to be the most pivotal pricing determinant category, alongside the 
relationship aspect, In this model, I define the syndicated loan market environment as the 
market place where supply and demand of banks’ individual relationship prices converge. The 
connector or catalyst between banks’ individual views—mainly based on the classical 
determinant set that leads to a risk-neutral pricing net of the individual cross-selling option 
valuation—with the syndicated loan related market environment is “syndicate structure and 
syndication mode”. 
Given the overall opacity of the market in bidding-phases, especially given the disappearance 
of market-soundings, bank-individual relationship prices are effectively quoted within a black 
box. No bidder is thus aware of their counterparts’ offers. As already suggested in 5.5.9.3, this 
process implies certain elements of first-price, sealed-bid options (McAfee & McMillan, 
1987). I defined this phenomenon as the “modern” best efforts syndication process. 
The current syndicated loan market environment has been established to be shaped by a high 
degree of competition, with loan supply outweighing corresponding demand levels. Thus, the 
syndicated loan market environment via supply and demand correlations and the interrelated 
Risk-neutral pricing
- Value of cross-selling option
= Bank individual relationship pricing (1)
Bank individual relationship pricing (1)
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level of competition together determine the general bargaining power of lenders vis-à-vis 
borrowers.  
In situations where the bargaining power lies with the borrowers, as is the case in the current 
environment, borrowers are enabled to “cherry-pick” at the lower end of the offered 
relationship pricings, then pass them on to the set of more expensive bidders to trigger a 
downward adjustment process. This process is unobservable for the involved banks. Thus, 
banks are only aware with certainty of final pricings which are unlikely to represent an 
average relationship pricing, but rather represent the lower end. This pricing subsequently 
gets warehoused in private bank databases, logically being biased towards these lower-end 
pricings. Thus, if banks expand their individual pricing process by private benchmarking 
before placing a bid, as 15 research participants argued is done in practice, they would 
benchmark themselves not towards an average market price but to a lower end view, which 
might further decrease the individual relationship-pricing. 
 
Table 87. Bank individual relationship pricing (2). 
Thus, in the current market environment a downward pricing spiral seems active, triggered by 
the markets’ opacity, by the general mechanisms of the market with regards to relationship 
discounts, and by the current syndicated loan market environment.  
This “cherry-picking” at the lower end is likely to constitute the key driver of shrinking 
relative syndicate sizes as established. In other words, there would likely not be enough cross-
selling available to satisfy a larger group of banks—a trend that is possibly accelerated by the 
fact that shortfalls for the initial higher-end bidders are likely to be higher, resulting in an 
even increased need of cross-selling. These phenomena present another argument for 
downplaying the role of information asymmetry-related pricing drivers, in favour of syndicate 
structure and relationship aspects.  
 
 
Risk-neutral pricing
- Value of cross-selling option
= Bank individual relationship pricing (1)
+/- Benchmarking residual
= Bank individual relationship pricing (2)
Bank individual relationship pricing (2)
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This process is explained in the following interviewee statement: 
I 20 Borrowers are in a good position at the moment. However they cannot play that game forever. At the 
end, even in this very low pricing environment, enough cross-sell needs to be ensured by a borrower 
on the long run. So, if the clients pushes for the lower pricing ends as they logically do, they need to 
keep the bank group very small as the cross-selling would simply not be enough to feed a large bank 
group at a very low pricing. Of course, this leads to high ticket lending which is ok as banks tend to be 
ready to put their balance sheet to work and as they face low loan demand levels. Maybe in a few 
years’ time it will look different. We’ll see. 
 
In a slightly weakened version, this process should also hold for underwritings. Here, 
borrowers usually only request bids from a smaller number of banks who then face market 
risks. Hence, and as established in 5.5.9.4, pricings tend to be ceteris paribus higher by 
choosing this mode of syndication. 
In the case of a converse syndicated loan market environment, as, for example, induced by a 
financial crisis like the 2008/2009 crisis, where loan markets might not be capable of fully 
absorbing demand levels,251 relationship discounts might even fully disappear. In other words, 
the cross-selling option would value at zero. In this situation, the overall opacity might 
conversely trigger an upward pricing trend in favour of banks.  
As a side note, with respect to a cross-selling option’s value in the secondary loan market, 
interesting questions remain open. Earlier, I established that a lending share qualifies a 
syndicate member to be awarded pro rata shares of standard bank-product cross-selling and to 
compete for complex business like IPO or M&A advisory mandates. Therefore, in a possible 
secondary sell-down to another relationship lender that strives to be awarded future cross-
selling as well, the option should be of value for potential secondary market buyers, paying a 
certain price for the remaining loan lifetime. In that case, the loan could either be sold at par 
or the loss/shortfall should at least be reduced to some extent. Given the circumstance that 
German corporate syndicated loans happen to be only very rarely traded, the experience of the 
research participants in that context is scarce, and, hence, an empirical answer cannot be 
given. However, it is reasonable to assume that no relationship lender would be interested in 
off-loading a German corporate syndicated loan piece if the cross-selling option was “in the 
money”. In other words, discontinuation is only likely in scenarios of non-adherence to the 
hidden contracts in an anticipated manner, or where the borrower faces other issues with 
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respect to its creditworthiness. Hence, it appears unlikely that potential buyers would 
significantly pay for that option with the initial costs being “sunk”.  
I now attempt to integrate and visualise my thoughts into one conceptual framework. 
6.3 Integrated conceptual pricing framework and conclusion 
Figure 64 presents the framework as informed by the arguments presented throughout this 
chapter. To summarise, according to this novel perspective on German corporate syndicated 
loan pricing, the related determinant categories can be classified into four major parts. 
First, a set of standard credit price determinants represents the basis for a transaction-based 
syndicated loan price determination at the level of the individual bank, which has either been 
conducted by means of a cost- or a market opportunity cost-based approach. The result of this 
calibration, is therefore, the bank’s individual risk-neutral pricing. In practice, these risk-
neutral views happen to vary quite significantly from bank to bank, with the respective 
reasoning having been established in 5.5.3.5 and elsewhere.  
Secondly, banks individually evaluate future cross-selling potential with the specific borrower 
and pay a price for an implicit cross-selling option, with its respective value representing a 
discount to the risk-neutral-pricing. This “relationship pricing (1)” will be adjusted by a 
benchmarking exercise based on private benchmarking information, leading to a “bank-
individual relationship pricing (2)”, which subsequently gets quoted into the “syndicated loan 
market environment” (determinant part three), which is clouded by opacity.  
Thirdly, “syndicate structure and syndication mode” acts as a catalyst and facilitates 
individual bank relationship prices, in the sense of hidden auctions, into a final pricing 
consensus. 
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Figure 64. German corporate syndicated loan conceptual pricing framework.  
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I acknowledge that this framework, although derived from a broad range of practitioner views 
that have been extensively discussed, is at the end a model which most likely does not fully 
capture the overall complexity and interconnectedness of the various price determinant 
categories.  
Hence, the eight determinant categories in reality cannot be seen as fully separable, as they 
are inter-connected in numerous ways. In the framework, I highlighted two such possible 
connections via dashed arrows that signal the links between cross-selling potential and 
syndicate size, and the lender’s size and capitalisation with its ability to offer large-scale 
underwritings.  
Besides the potential shortcomings of this framework, it nonetheless provides an enhanced 
understanding of German corporate syndicated loans’ price determinants, their related 
interactions, and the so far hidden underlying processes of price setting. These new insights 
into the reality of syndicated lending have enabled me to combine them within a holistic 
pricing framework. Given the dynamics of the context, I strongly suggest that it would be a 
worthwhile undertaking to repeat syndicated loan studies on a continuous basis and critically 
assess certain phenomena in light of current market developments and trends. In other words, 
theory and practice should repeatedly be compared and critically questioned so that both 
theory and practice benefit from one another. 
I therefore agree with the general statement of Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010, p. 325), 
who asserted, “Syndication is an instrument of a dynamic industry; hence a continuous 
modification of the basic practices is expected.” However, it is also important to recognise 
that theory must also develop to keep abreast of these changes.  
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 completes the thesis by recapitulating the main research findings as answers to the 
research questions (7.2) and by introducing and discussing the contributions to knowledge 
generated by the study in 7.3.  
The limitations to the research will be reviewed in 7.4 and suggestions provided for possible 
future avenues of inquiry (7.5). After having remarked on possible political and regulatory 
implications (7.6), I discuss the contributions of the research to practice (7.7) and conclude by 
offering personal reflections on the overall research process in 7.8. 
7.2 Review of main findings as answers to the research questions 
As suggested by Wallace and Wray (2011), whilst critically reviewing the extant worldwide 
syndicated lending literature in Chapter 2, I noted a series of knowledge gaps that I 
subsequently addressed through a set of research questions and their corresponding 
objectives. By exploring and analysing the “hidden drivers” of banks’ pricing of syndicated 
loans to German corporate borrowers, I developed an enriched understanding of the elements 
and determinants of pricing, and its underlying processes and decisions. In other words, this 
study of the German corporate syndicated lending market, predominantly by means of an 
extensive piece of qualitative research, has revealed and substantiated some important and to 
date hidden phenomena in relation to different dimensions of pricing.  
I begin below by providing brief reviews of the most important findings, ordered by the 
thematic structure of the thesis that was itself derived from the sequence of the research 
questions. 
 German corporate syndicated loans’ pricing opacity 
RQ 1 analysed the transparency situation regarding German corporate syndicated loan 
pricing.  
RQ 1: What are the limitations of publicly available information concerning German 
corporate syndicated loan pricing? 
By means of the extensive quantitative analyses presented throughout Chapter 4, I located 
major shortcomings regarding quantity and quality of publicly available data concerning 
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German corporate syndicated loan pricing. The analysis was based on a secondary data 
sample sourced from Dealogic Loanware and containing publicly available data on German 
corporate syndicated loans from 2000 to 2015 in general, with a special emphasis on pricing 
and its various elements. 
Public pricing information appeared to be limited, and if available, was mostly so only in the 
form of initial margin levels. Initial margins, however, which were made public only in 
roughly 10% of all newly issued loans in 2015, constitute only one part of complex pricing 
structures. Numerous further constituents such as additional per annum elements for RCFs as 
well as certain upfront fees constitute important pillars of pricing that all interact with each 
other. Even less data appeared to be in the public domain regarding these further pricing 
elements. In 2015, for example, no utilisation or participation fees were published.  
Interestingly, the level of publicity declined significantly within the period under study, an 
observation that contradicts the widespread a priori belief that financial markets tend to 
constantly gain in transparency over time (Berg et al., 2017). According to the data, from a 
high in 2004, where at least the initial margin was published in roughly 60% of newly issued 
German corporate syndicated loans, the proportion with publicised data declined steadily to a 
low of circa 10% in the post-crisis years.252 Accordingly, the data from the German market 
contradicts the assertion by Bharath et al. (2007) and Santos and Winton (2008) that public 
database coverage regarding syndicated lending has constantly improved in recent years. A 
brief comparison with the market for U.S.-based borrowers indicated that the transparency of 
syndicated loan pricing data has indeed increased over time, a fact that indicates major 
differences between the two markets. 
Next, I established that the sample of loan data published is affected by various types of bias, 
making it inappropriate to take these data forward for an in-depth quantitative pricing 
analysis. One example of non-random sample selection is the fact that average deals with 
available margin were on average almost five times higher as compared to transactions where 
it was unavailable. In 2008, this ratio almost reached nine. Furthermore, pricing information 
was significantly more often available for rated borrowers who are, according to Focarelli et 
al. (2008) and others, of higher creditworthiness as well as likely to borrow larger amounts. 
To conclude, a downward bias regarding the average costs of German corporate syndicated 
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loans was located, which rendered methods such as that of Heckman (1979) to reconstruct 
valid results based on incomplete data unsuited to this context. 
The reasons for the omission of certain pricing data were by no means random, but seemingly 
based on major structural causes. Constructing meaningful quantitative pricing measures for 
German corporate syndicated loans appeared to be impossible without an explanation for 
these phenomena. This led to the question as to what are the underlying drivers of this 
increased pricing opacity, which highlighted the need for a qualitative study to reach the 
overall research aim, to explore and analyse the “hidden drivers” of banks’ pricing of 
syndicated loans to German corporate borrowers, thereby developing an enriched 
understanding of the elements and determinants of pricing and its underlying processes and 
decisions. 
 Drivers of the pricing opacity of German corporate syndicated loans  
The limitations of public pricing data revealed by answering RQ 1 were subsequently 
confirmed by all the research participants who contributed to the qualitative fieldwork. RQ 2 
required an exploration of the reasons for the general and, furthermore, steadily increasing 
opacity. 
RQ 2: Why are some aspects of corporate syndicated loan pricing elements for German 
borrowers made public and others not? 
By exploring RQ 2 in 5.2, I was able to establish and to prioritise the key underlying causal 
phenomena of the (increased) pricing opacity. The fact that German borrowers possess power 
of discretion with regards to any sort of syndicated loan announcements provides them with 
the essential tool either to tactically exercise the option to publish certain pricing elements or 
to address their general striving for confidentiality by refusing to do so. Particularly low 
pricings were found to be sometimes published because of pride in having achieved attractive 
terms, confirming the reported downside bias. In general, a trend towards confidentiality was 
established for non-public and/or unrated firms that constitute most of borrowers in German 
corporate syndicated lending. Based on the interviewee statements, I was further able to 
reveal an additional bias in the data set related to a specific loan type, the back-up-RCF, 
where due to tactical considerations only parts of the pricing packages have sometimes been 
published, leading to misinterpretation for outsiders. I labelled this the “single transaction 
pricing downside bias”. 
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In addition, bank-related reasons, such as increased confidentiality concerns in light of 
harsher compliance and regulatory requirements and a striving to build private market 
knowledge reinforce the overall trends towards more opacity.  
With respect to the market for U.S.-based borrowers, and in line with the findings of my 
quantitative analysis, a much higher degree of publicity was reported. The research 
participants related this to a different legal environment with respect to compulsory SEC-
filings as well as to a greater openness of clients regarding pricing in general (Schenone, 
2010). With respect to the wider European market, most interviewees reported published loan 
information to be similarly limited and comparable to the situation in Germany. 
 Pricing elements of German corporate syndicated loans  
The answers to RQ 1 and RQ 2 demonstrated the limitations of publicly available pricing 
information and its general unsuitability to use for analysis. In particular, I showed that with 
respect to the various pricing elements other than initial margin levels in particular, the 
respective roles that further elements play within pricing structures remained unclear. 
Furthermore, a prioritisation from a bank point of view was needed to understand the 
underlying logic of specific pricing structures.    
RQ 3: How can the various German corporate syndicated loan pricing elements be 
classified and prioritised from a lending banks’ perspective? 
The discussion of pricing elements revealed that not only much public pricing data is missing 
in general, but also that numerous elements of pricing in common practice have not yet been 
researched at all. Hence, a comprehensive listing of “all” German corporate syndicated loan 
pricing elements needed to be established, followed by a discussion of their individual raison 
d'être and underlying mechanics. These rationales often appeared to be grounded on to date 
hidden and unexplained phenomena. For example, participation and arrangement fees are not 
solely awarded to either participants or arrangers, as suggested by extant literature such as 
Altunbas et al. (2006b), but in practice appear to be detached from their intuitive purposes. 
This fact is related to the accounting perspective within banks under which participation 
fees—and their various, so far neglected sub-forms—are treated as per annum elements and, 
hence, are amortised over the lifetime of the loan. Arrangement fees, in contrast, do not have 
to be treated this way, a fact which—at first glance illogically—leads pure participant banks 
to likewise require this price constituent then being labelled as a “passive arrangement, 
bookrunner, or coordination” fee by practitioners. 
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Given the almost complete lack of loan data in the public domain, the reality surrounding 
utilisation fees and their respective uses would have been impossible to reveal from the 
available data set without the primary research conducted for this study. 
From the perspective of an entire bank, I established that the relative importance of the 
various pricing elements would be an increasing function of their share of the total payments 
received. However, from the perspective of the bank’s internal stakeholders, prioritisation 
appeared to vary based on specific incentive structures. By and large, my efforts to clarify this 
interbank prioritisation revealed complex pricing structures and often counterintuitive use of 
certain elements, reflecting the occasionally competing interests of different banks’ internal 
stakeholders such as the loan product unit or the respective asset owners. The loan product 
units were said to be mainly interested in increasing payments from arrangement fees, as these 
are generally their main revenues. In contrast, the asset owners mainly focus on the per annum 
elements. Because syndicated lending involves numerous banks that team up to provide loans, 
this multiplies the number of internal stakeholders whose interests are likely to complicate 
competition across the syndicate banks. The overall effect is that this leads to theoretical and 
first intention rationales to be sometimes misleading, with the real grounds being hidden and 
driven by special interests, as well as current market practice.  
It also became apparent that pricing decisions are not solely made ex ante, but are subject to 
dynamic changes and possible re-evaluations of respective determinants throughout a loan’s 
lifetime. In other words, the “price-tag” and pay-off structure of a syndicated loan at signing 
and the anticipated revenues based on this initial price-tag appear to vary quite significantly 
from an ex post perspective. This fact distinguishes the syndicated loan from, for example, 
common corporate bonds, where investors can ex ante relatively rigidly calculate their returns 
(Feldstein et al., 2012; Ramanthan, 2012). 
The classification and discussion of the price elements further discovered pricing structures 
and mechanisms to differ extensively across four major loan types. Most extant studies of 
pricing tend to simply lump together pricing of term and revolving debt, whereas a smaller 
number of researchers acknowledged different price mechanisms between the two loan types 
(Berg et al., 2016). However, the interview data revealed that a more granular differentiation 
was needed to address and understand the complexity and individuality of pricing structures. 
Thus, I decided to proceed with four different loan types that appeared to be most common in 
the market under investigation: RCF; back-up RCF; term loan; acquisition term loan. For 
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these four loan types, with each carrying inherently different price mechanisms in light of 
their diverging raisons d`être, new price definitions and measures needed to be established. 
 German corporate syndicated loans’ pricing definition 
The analysis and discussions around RQ 3 revealed that the term “pricing”, its related 
elements, their interaction, and their underlying rationales are far more complex than existing 
bodies of research would suggest. Here, pricing was predominantly defined in terms of the 
initial margin (e.g. Focarelli et al. 2008; Wasan et al. 2013), or the AISD (e.g., Calomiris and 
Pornrojnangkool 2009; Hale & Santos 2009). Given the revealed complexity of the issues 
surrounding numerous pricing elements and their varying functioning and interaction across 
four major loan types, I attempted to explain and define “pricing” first, before moving on 
towards the discussion of the determinants of pricing decisions. In other words, before 
discussing the determinants of pricing decisions, the term “pricing” and what is meant by it in 
relation to the different loan types needed to be explored, as it is insufficiently addressed 
within the extant literature. 
RQ 4: How can the complexity and multidimensionality of German corporate 
syndicated loan pricings be summarised and explained? 
New pricing definitions for the four most common loan types within the market under study 
were derived from analysis of the interview data. Given the nature of the data, I first provided 
a qualitative framework, with the intention of explaining and making sense of the term 
“pricing” in more depth. 
These definitions address loan type differentiations by incorporating “all” possible pricing 
elements, by integrating ex ante as well as ex post reciprocity, and by integrating factual 
(average lifetime) as well as specific draw-down scenarios. As discussed earlier, pay-off 
structures of German corporate syndicated loans are often unpredictable and further appear to 
differ across banks, underscoring the private and bespoke character of pricings that are shaped 
by numerous “hidden drivers”. Qualitatively, pricing was characterised as an expected ex post 
complex, interwoven, and somehow determinant-weighted cocktail of its numerous pricing 
elements in light of the factual (average) lifetime and average draw percentage.  
I then converted the qualitative framework into a new quantitative ex post total cost of 
borrowing framework which could not be taken forward because of the public data situation, 
but nevertheless provided a tool for future research and bank practitioners. 
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 Pricing determinants of German corporate syndicated loans  
After having extensively built the foundation via RQ 1 through RQ 4, section 5.5 explored 
and established the determinants of German corporate syndicated loan pricing that were 
synthesised into a holistic conceptual framework in Chapter 6. As Kim et al. (2014) noted, 
despite fairly extensive numbers of scholarly attempts to elucidate the determinants of 
syndicated loans pricing, existing worldwide evidence remains fragmented and sometimes 
contradictory. Hence, for a major syndicated lending market, namely the German corporate 
one, I aimed at closing this gap and addressed it via the final research question. 
RQ 5: What are the pricing determinants in the German market for corporate 
syndicated loans and how do they interact with each other? 
The analysis of the interview data revealed pricing determinants to be versatile, highly 
interrelated, and difficult to disentangle. Hence, I first established a several determinant 
categories that each included various determinants under an implicit ceteris paribus 
assumption. These determinants were then prioritised in terms of their relative effects on 
pricing. Further, comments on the different influence of specific determinants in light of the 
four loan types were provided if needed. Eight determinant categories were identified, as 
shown in Table 88.  
 
Table 88. Eight pricing determinant categories. 
Discussions in relation to “borrower-specific credit risk profile and rating” broadly confirmed 
the extant worldwide syndicated loan pricing literature. In line with common a priori 
intuition, borrowers’ creditworthiness, as represented by its credit rating, determines pricing. 
In line with Cole et al. (2004) and Strahan (2008), predominantly hard information such as 
financial data was established to constitute crucial ingredients. Also, in line with the literature, 
firm size, transparency, and capital markets access were found to influence pricing in the 
expected manner (Fang et al., 2016; Mattes et al., 2013; Santos & Winton, 2008). Besides 
these, softer determinants like management quality and ethical behaviour have been 
1 Borrower-specific credit risk profile and rating
2 Lender characteristics 
3 Contractual features 
4 Credit story
5 Syndicate structure and syndication mode 
6 General market environment 
7 Lender-borrower relationship 
8 Syndicated loan market environment 
Eight pricing determinant categories
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identified, with the former being especially important in company-transforming M&A-
financings. 
In light of “lender characteristics” and their impact on German corporate syndicated loan 
pricing, findings based on the research data confirmed the literature’s view on bank type and 
its relationship to pricing, in the sense that investment banks are associated with higher 
pricing (Calomiris & Pornrojnangkool, 2009; Harjoto et al., 2006). Furthermore, factors that 
are currently underestimated within the extant literature, including banks’ individual funding 
costs, lending philosophical considerations and different credit pricing and return models, 
have been established to constitute key determinants of lender characteristics. 
Concerning the “contractual features” determinant category, in general research participants 
broadly related relatively higher loan amounts to lower pricings in general corporate 
financings, such as large back-up RCFs, and with higher pricings in large event-related 
financings, leaving the overall influence ambiguous. Extant literature predominantly reported 
negative relationships between loan amount and pricing (Alexandre et al., 2014; Haselmann 
& Wachtel, 2011). Other than amount, pricings of general corporate financings were said not 
to be tremendously affected by contractual features such as maturity or certain protection 
mechanisms like covenants and security. Based on certain borrower quality clusters, 
contractual structures were rather said to adhere to specific templates, or in other words, 
market standards. Other than suggested by Melink and Plaut (1986), non-price related terms 
and conditions happen to be no instruments that can be traded-off against pricings. They are 
sequential rather than simultaneously determined. In event-related financings—specifically 
for acquisition term loans—contractual features become key price determinants, being subject 
to more intense negotiation. 
In relation to “credit story”, which I defined as the overall underlying rationale for issuing a 
syndicated loan, I established that general corporate financings were usually less credit story-
intensive whereas pricing of event-related financings is significantly influenced by a coherent 
credit story. With revolving loans, the draw expectation as one element of the overall credit 
story affects pricing as well as the pricing structure. Extant literature tends to have thematised 
“uses of proceeds” as a foremost contractual feature by presenting a broad consensus that 
acquisition financings carry higher pricings (Christodoulakis & Olupeka, 2010; Hale & 
Santos, 2009).  
On “syndicate structure and syndication mode”, interview outcomes revealed that the impact 
of the sheer syndicate size on pricing was ambiguous. Extant literature appeared to be 
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discordant in this respect as well, with Wu et al. (2013) reporting a negative relationship and 
Carey and Nini (2007) a positive one. According to most interviewees, the relative number of 
lenders was said to be more closely related to the degree of anticipated cross-selling. Overall, 
the research revealed that the syndicate’s structure is to a lesser extent driven by asymmetric 
information issues than is suggested by the extant literature such as Sufi (2007). 
Interestingly, the underlying processes regarding how lending syndicates are set up was 
revealed to have changed over time. Perhaps surprisingly, these processes seem not to be of 
significant interest for recent scholars. For general corporate financings, the “modern” best 
efforts syndication process—where borrowers create hidden lender competition via private 
RfP-processes and themselves pre-place their facilities—ceteris paribus tends to drive pricing 
downwards.  
In line with anecdotal evidence, discussion of the influence of the “general market 
environment” on pricing revealed German corporate syndicated loan pricings to be to a much 
lesser extent driven by “normal” economic cycles in comparison to, for example, developing 
markets or ones with relatively weak legal infrastructures (Gaul & Uysal, 2013; La Porta et 
al., 1997; Qian & Strahan, 2007). Furthermore, increasingly intense regulation is ceteris 
paribus associated with higher pricings. Non-syndicated-loan capital markets benchmarks, 
such as CDS or corporate bond spreads are important determinants of pricing in general, and 
become the key determinant if banks were to calibrate their risk-neutral pricing view based on 
an arm’s length capital markets benchmarking. 
Discussions of the relevance of the “lender-borrower relationship” to pricing revealed factors 
in this category to constitute key determinants of syndicated loan pricing, in a sense that 
future cross-selling potential, ceteris paribus, leads to price discounts, or in other words to 
factually under-priced loans. It is common market practice that banks even engage in loss-
leading transactions with the implicit expectation that future cross-selling revenues boost the 
overall relationship into profitable territory. It was established that this relationship context is 
based on hidden contracting. As with the treatment of syndicate structural issues, the 
underlying rationales of relationship lending have predominantly been assumed to be based 
on issues of information asymmetry (e.g., Bharath et al., 2011; Alexandre et al., 2014), which 
was refuted by the research participants.    
The “syndicated loan market environment” via supply, demand, and the level of lender 
competition was found to constitute a further pricing determinant. Benchmarking to 
outstanding syndicated loans was mentioned to be a key price determinant in this respect. 
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After specific in-depth discussions under the implicit ceteris paribus view and after having 
prioritised each determinant within its corresponding determinant category, I synthesised all 
elements into an original, fully integrated conceptual framework. This appeared particularly 
challenging as all elements were found to be different in the magnitude of their specific 
impacts on pricing, but also interdependent by means of complex interactions.  
The key ingredient that enabled me finally to complete this puzzle was a critical assessment of 
the anecdotal definition of syndicated lending as being a hybrid of relationship lending and 
publicly traded debt (Altunbas et al., 2006b). I established that this definition was out of date 
and did not represent the current reality for German corporate borrowers. I finally defined 
parts of the price setting of German corporate syndicated loans as a transaction-based lending 
technique in the sense of Udell (2008), with the relationship discount representing the price 
for an implicit option-to-sell (“cross-selling option”), granting banks the right to access and to 
(“realistically”) compete for future cross-selling. Hence, individual bank relationship pricings 
established by means of transaction-based price setting techniques net of a relationship 
discount, or in other words the value of the cross-selling-option, which is likely to be further 
adjusted by a so-called benchmarking residual, are processed in the “syndicated loan market 
environment”. Via elements of hidden auction theory, here, all bank-individual relationship 
prices are processed and facilitated, with “syndicate structure and syndication mode” 
representing the catalyst that brings together supply and demand.   
7.3 Contributions to knowledge  
The study adds important insights and novel perspectives to financial intermediation and 
corporate finance literature in general and to various strands of extant syndicated lending 
research in particular. It is the first work dedicated to explaining the relative opacity of the 
German corporate syndicated lending market and identifying the underlying rationales behind 
this. Furthermore, the study has produced these outcomes in and for one of the world’s largest 
economies. 
Additionally, the analyses provide novel insights and enhance the understanding of the 
relatively loosely and sometimes incongruously defined term “pricing” by taking its different 
and hitherto neglected elements into account and by carefully distinguishing diverging 
structures in light of different syndicated loan types. Furthermore, this research is the first to 
analyse and synthesise comprehensively the pricing determinants of the German corporate 
syndicated loan market based principally and extensively on qualitative fieldwork, comprising 
interviews with distinguished lending professionals.  
Conclusion 351 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
By contributing to extant knowledge in this way, the work addresses several dimensions of 
knowledge—bank stakeholders, bank best practice, policy, and regulation. In the following 
sub-sections of 7.3, I will summarise and discuss the most significant contributions to 
knowledge. 
 New insights into limitations of market transparency  
Whilst some authors, Carey and Nini (2007) or Houston et al. (2017) among them, have 
commented on a general lack of published data regarding syndicated lending, the related 
underlying phenomena as well as the possible consequences have largely been neglected. It 
became apparent that the scholarly community interested in syndicated lending broadly 
followed Champagne and Kryzanowski (2007, p. 3,146) who remarked, “While most inter-
bank relationships are not observable to outsiders, loan syndicates represent visible 
manifestations of bank interactions that can be studied”. 
Hence, my work, based as it is on extensive quantitative analyses, is the first one to have 
proven that publicly available pricing data for German corporate syndicated loans is not 
adequate for use in serious quantitative inquiry, as it is affected by extensive omissions and 
bias. Hence, my work contributes a contradictory stance in the finance literature in general, 
which tends to postulate that financial markets have constantly gained in transparency over 
time. 
Furthermore, by its qualitative research design, my study is the first to establish reasons for 
the increasing opacity. The reported opacity with regards to the German market is 
hypothesised to be similarly true for the wider European market or at least major parts of it. 
Hence, my study demonstrates that extant European literature that has solely relied on those 
published data carries the risk of having provided distorted evidence and drawn tainted 
conclusions from such evidence. Accordingly, the quality of available data should be 
acknowledged more clearly in future works. 
 Reconceptualisation of the term “pricing” in light of different loan types 
This work is the first that comprehensively establishes the raison d'être and the relative 
importance of the various pricing elements of German corporate syndicated loans. In doing 
so, I have revealed that existing studies have broadly neglected the complexity of pricing and 
the diverging mechanisms of pricing across four major loan types. Hence, the use of pricing 
proxies as dependent variables in the regressions used in extant literature cannot adequately 
address this complexity. Simply using initial margin as a pricing proxy neglects numerous 
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additional pricing elements, whereas AISD incorporates only some of them. Even the recently 
established new “TCB” definition by Berg et al. (2016) only partly closes this gap and, 
furthermore, is grounded on a somewhat misleading supposition that RCFs generally 
constitute credit risk derivatives in the manner of Boot et al. (1987). I established that this is 
not the case for both common as well as back-up RCFs with the latter being—based on 
hidden contracting—not expected ever to be drawn, irrespective of whether the imbedded 
option to draw (Berg et al. 2016) was “in the money”.  
With respect to AISD, I revealed that mixed interpretations and labelling across data 
providers, leading to a general danger of non-comparability, might well be a significant issue. 
AISD was found to constitute an automated field with the data providers, taking a value after 
at least an initial margin has been reported, irrespective of whether all or any parts of the 
equation were available. Overall, I revealed serious potential for misinterpretation in studies 
of loan pricing and, thus, present a valuable contribution to financial contracting research. 
 Enhanced understanding of the determinants of syndicated loan pricings  
This inquiry adds to the relatively widespread body of syndicated loan price determinant 
literature that has been shown to appear somewhat fragmented and that tends to focus on just 
one or only few different determinant groups (Kim et al., 2014).  
By means of the in-depth analysis of the various determinant categories and determinants, this 
research makes a significant contribution to knowledge regarding these determinant 
categories such as characteristics of borrowers and lenders as well as specific contractual 
features. A new dimension of richness of understanding has been added by this empirical 
study, one that enables the determinants to be named in accordance with the language used by 
the lending professional research participants, rather than simply adopting the parlance of 
extant literature. For instance, through discussion of an at-first-glance, already documented 
theme, the “lender-borrower-relationship”, it became apparent that this concept’s underlying 
rationale and the phenomena that surround it are inherently different in the market under 
study, as compared to those embraced by the largely U.S.-based literature. By exploring and 
revealing these, this study provides a significant enhancement to the body of relationship 
lending literature, regarding which Strahan (2008) remarked that the role of relationship 
lending, especially outside the U.S., remains unclear.  
Beyond this, completely or partly new determinant categories such as “credit story”, 
“syndicate structure and syndication mode”, and “syndicated loan market environment” have 
Conclusion 353 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
been established, each embracing a set of newly-revealed pricing determinants. One of the 
striking contributions in this respect is that a wide body of existing literature on syndicate 
structure (e.g., Ivashina, 2009; Gadanecz et al., 2012; Focarelli et al., 2008) that examined its 
directional influence on pricing based on information asymmetry theoretical assumptions was 
refuted for the market at hand, with the syndication mode in the manner of the newly 
established “modern” best efforts syndication process being the pivotal driving force of 
pricing. It was revealed by the research that the syndicate structure is instead linked to the 
cross-selling potential of a borrower, rather than constituting a direct pricing determinant.  
Finally, to the best of my knowledge, this research has contributed the results of a first 
attempt to establish a holistic, multi-factor picture of the German corporate syndicated loan 
market and its idiosyncrasies with regard to pricing determinants. 
 New insights into “the pricing puzzle” 
Numerous excurses to non-German syndicated lending markets, particularly to the broader 
European and U.S. ones, enabled me to provide two novel perspectives on to date discordant 
views of extant literature concerning “the prizing puzzle”, as presented in 2.6.2. To recap, 
Carey and Nini (2007) showed that spreads of corporate syndicated loans in Europe tend to be 
significantly lower compared to U.S. ones, without being able to provide sufficient reasoning. 
Other authors who picked up the issue were unable to establish consistent evidence. 
Champagne and Coggins (2012) explained the puzzle in terms of a lower sensitivity of pricing 
and syndicate structure in Europe compared to the U.S. Gaul and Uysal (2013) found that 
equity volatility as a measure of firm volatility explains the pricing differences between U.S. 
and European borrowers, whereas Berg et al. (2017) did not confirm this finding. Instead, 
Berg et al. (2017) were able to explain “the pricing puzzle” in terms of different pricing 
structures for revolving credit facilities of European vis-à-vis U.S.-based clients. Given the 
insights of this thesis with respect to data publicity and related underlying forces between 
Europe and the U.S., it is reasonable to assume that the puzzle might at least partly be 
elucidated by data quality issues. An important factor in explaining “the pricing puzzle” is the 
severe downside bias in the German syndicated loan sample, with the data situation in wider 
Europe in comparison to the U.S appearing to be similarly weak.   
As a secondary explanation, this study revealed that the nature of syndicated lending in 
general and the role of the lender-borrower relationship in particular is different between the 
two markets. The phenomenon of factually under-priced syndicated loans, induced through 
relationship discounts, was recognised to play no pivotal role in the U.S., where such loans 
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are rather interpreted as stand-alone profitable financial services. Supporting evidence was 
provided by Yafeh and Yosha (2001), stating that arm’s length driven markets such as the 
U.S. are associated with less pronounced lender-borrower relationships, compared to bank-
based ones like Germany. This is underpinned by the statements of the interviewees, who 
discussed major general differences in the ways in which U.S. capital markets function in 
comparison to Germany. In line with Bartram et al. (2012), the former is said to be more open 
and investor-driven.  
This second explanation emphasises that it is very much worthwhile to study the German 
corporate syndicated lending market in its own right, rather than simply transferring the 
findings of the broad body of U.S.-based research.  
 Reconceptualisation of the general nature of syndicated lending 
The general and specific findings of the research enabled me to place them in the wider 
context of the general nature of syndicated lending. All the puzzle pieces together led to the 
conclusion that the extant understanding of syndicated lending should be redefined in the light 
of corporate syndicated lending in the German market. Accordingly, this work makes a 
significant contribution to the literature regarding the theory of syndicated loans.   
Altunbas et al. (2006b, p. 6), defined syndicated loans as “hybrids of relationship lending and 
publicly traded debt”, with elements of delegated monitoring in the sense of Diamond (1984) 
being inherent to the phenomenon. I have concluded that members of German corporate 
lending syndicates are relatively symmetrically informed regarding their individual borrower 
creditworthiness assessments. However, they constantly compete for significant lending 
shares that provide them with an implicit option to sell future financial services to the 
borrowers. This has relatively little in common with the information-based relationship 
lending definition of extant literature and with delegated monitoring in the sense that 
uninformed arm’s length participant banks rely on the credit assessment and monitoring 
efforts of the lead lender(s).  
Given the relationship concept as discussed, I tend to disagree with Jones et al. (2005), who 
conceptualised syndicated lending as a means of shrinking the differences between 
intermediated bank debt and disintermediated public debt. Given the factual under-pricing 
inherent to the market functioning of German corporate syndicated lending, the market is 
significantly different from the disintermediated debt markets, where risk-neutral investors 
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seek opportunistically priced assets without the intention of conducting further business with 
a borrower. 
7.4 Limitations of the research 
 My role as a researcher 
One limitation is that my expertise as a lending professional influenced the overall work. 
Hence —and perhaps to a higher degree than is common qualitative studies in general—I as a 
researcher implicitly took an active role in the research process and so could be recognised as 
a research participant. Analytical processes were shaped by my own inductive processes. If 
the same study was conducted by non-professionals, the outcomes would likely have been 
inherently different. However, given the very complex and idiosyncratic structures of the 
market under study, I argue that my ability to understand these issues enhanced the overall 
research quality, outweighing possible negative influences. Throughout the research, I was 
aware of this issue and consciously tried to detach myself from the data. Furthermore, I took 
other measures, such as talking to supervisors and constantly discussing findings with peers, 
providing a degree of triangulation to limit and ameliorate negative personal bias.  
 Sampling of research participants 
As is the case with qualitative works in general, sampling cannot be fully comprehensive. The 
entire population would have included hundreds of loan professionals being active in the 
German corporate syndicated lending market. As the sample was in effect determined by the 
department heads of the major banks, it was not a random sample. However, the diversity 
within the sample and the emergence of consensus on numerous issues, backed by the views 
of the key informants and triangulation processes discussed above, indicate that a satisfactory 
level of data quality was achieved.  
 Scope of the research project 
Overall, the research covered a relatively broad spectrum of related phenomena. This was 
necessary to establishing a broad knowledge foundation in relation to numerous so far 
neglected and hidden phenomena. I am aware of the fact that this breadth could possibly be at 
the cost of a certain degree of detail in relation to themes which might well constitute more 
specialised research topics in their own right. For example, the discussion of pricing 
determinants that carried the aim of establishing a multifactor picture based on the 
interviewee statements was intentionally very broad and the depth of discussion was driven by 
the respective foci of the interviewees from one pricing element to another. This led to the 
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fact that sometimes very complex topics, such as the influence of regulation on pricing, were 
not thematised by the research participants to the same levels of depth, as were, for example, 
some issues surrounding lender-borrower relationships.  
7.5 Avenues for future research  
As one common goal of exploratory research is to enrich the understanding of certain 
phenomena, various future research avenues regularly lead from it (Miles & Huberman, 1994; 
Patton, 2002). In that vein, I will provide some ideas regarding possible avenues for future 
research. 
 Apply novel “corporate syndicated loan” definition 
Throughout this study, I established that syndicated lending as an overall asset class consists 
of numerous sub-asset classes such as LBO and project financings. To simply conflate these 
classes, which differ significantly across numerous characteristics, carries the risk of diluting 
results. Hence, I accordingly recommend that they be clearly distinguished in future research. 
 Study data transparency in other markets 
This work was the first to establish that pricing analyses based on officially published 
information on the German corporate syndicated lending market are unfeasible because of the 
severe limitations of the data. Apart from some straightforwardly conducted excurses, it 
remains to be further established whether public data in other markets have comparable 
limitations and whether existing studies provide practical useful evidence. Hence, it would be 
a worthwhile exercise to study the representativeness of U.S., UK, and general European 
samples in a similarly comprehensive way.  
 Conduct study from a borrower’s perspective 
This study was intentionally conducted from a bank’s perspective. It is likely that certain 
perceptions and reasoning from a borrower point of view would be different and would 
provide further insights.  
 Take into account new pricing definition in light of different loan types 
In 5.4., I presented possible new pricing measures that more accurately apprehend the price 
complexity and multidimensionality in light of different loan types. As already mentioned, for 
researchers being reliant on officially published information, it is unrealistic in the short run to 
fully apply these definitions as presented. I recommend, however, that scholars who conduct 
future research take my related thoughts into consideration and perhaps also make use of my 
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novel quantitative price measure framework as a foundation for establishing more specific 
measures in the future. In relation to extant literature, it would also be interesting to screen 
relevant studies in relation to misinterpretation and calculation discrepancies with respect to 
AISD and, if appropriate, to repeat certain calculations based on a more realistic view of 
AISD. If scholars in the future should decide to take the “classical” AISD as a proxy, I 
strongly recommend that they calculate it manually rather than making use of the data 
providers’ labelling.  
 In-depth microstructure analyses of various pricing elements 
This work revealed that in addition to the pricing elements mentioned in extant literature, 
numerous other exist in practice. It is likely that the price determination is different across 
these other related pricing elements. In this vein my research provided some important ground 
work towards more precisely conceptualising syndicated loan pricing and its highly complex 
structures. The determinants have been mainly discussed by using “pricing” as a single term. 
Future works could analyse the determinants of each individual element for each individual 
loan type in research at the detailed level, for example by means of case studies of specific 
lending processes. 
 In-depth microstructure analyses of various pricing determinants 
As with the detailed research into pricing elements as proposed in 7.5.5, the various price 
determinants could be researched in greater depth in further studies. The aim of this research 
was to develop a multifactor picture of the various German corporate syndicated loan price 
determinants as completely as possible to gain an enhanced in depth understanding of the 
overall market functioning. As a follow-up, it would be useful to research specific 
determinants one at a time to enrich understanding of their operation. 
 In depth microstructure analyses of lender-borrower and/or lender-lender 
interaction 
The multi-party nature of syndicated lending opens numerous possibilities for future research, 
especially with a focus on practical processes. Such research could usefully be conducted at 
the level of the deal, whereby some cases of syndicated loan deals with a focus of the 
interaction of lenders and borrowers would generate new insights into the micro-structures of 
such negotiations and syndication processes. This could be of interest, given the established 
“modern” best efforts syndication process that characterises certain elements of hidden 
auctions. In that respect, the interactions between lenders should also be of interest for future 
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research as this was revealed to have changed from interactions via classical syndications, 
where one or a small number of lead banks invited a large number of participants, towards 
more club-style syndicates. 
 Constantly repeat research in the light of changing market practice 
As Christodoulakis and Olupeka (2010, p. 325) continue to remind us, “Syndication is an 
instrument of a dynamic industry; hence a continuous modification of the basic practices is 
expected”. I agree with this and recommend that researchers should constantly question 
anecdotal and established assumptions concerning the underlying mechanisms of syndicated 
lending. This is likely to be more useful if a qualitative approach is adopted that can reveal 
such changes of practice. Where appropriate, such new findings could then be quantitatively 
tested in further studies. This underscores the benefits of qualitative and quantitative research 
as complementary rather than competing forms of science. 
7.6 Political and regulatory implications 
This study revealed an “official/external” and an “unofficial/internal” pricing opacity of the 
German corporate syndicated lending market and the various interrelated phenomena. These 
findings should be of prime interest to regulators and policy makers. The almost completely 
muted academic literature in this respect is noteworthy. 
According to Kysucky and Norden (2016), a stable financial system with strong financial 
intermediaries leads to improved financing of the corporate sector. Though, the demonstrable 
opacity could cause serious harm to the overall stability of the banking architecture in the long 
run. Market opacity in general tends to be advantageous for those contract-parties holding the 
bargaining power which enables them to improve their profitability.  
In the current syndicated loan market environment, this bargaining power tends to reside with 
borrowers vis-à-vis the lender universe, a fact leading to even more significant degrees of 
factually under-priced loans than already induced via relationship discounting. The magnitude 
of this under-pricing is accelerated by the overall opacity situation. As shown in the earlier 
discussion, by means of private RfP-processes that include elements of hidden auctions, 
borrowers are enabled to create completely hidden competitive bidding processes that tend to 
push pricings further down. The statement of interviewee 6 provides a specific account of this 
reality: 
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I 6 In today’s markets, I need to evaluate what the borrower is willing to pay me rather than what are the 
costs related to the loan. Nobody really cares about credit risk any more. If you priced things off 
credit risk, which I do not see anyone do in corporate Germany, the margins would need to be much 
higher than they are. 
 
In this respect Broecker (1990), remarked that lack of loan demand creates lender 
competition, putting downward pressure on pricings and increasing bank risk-taking. Further, 
non-price-related standards are said to becoming more lax, in line with Mattes et al. (2013), 
who argue that credit standards are relatively low in good times, which might lead to higher 
default risks in banks’ credit portfolios. I agree with Carletti (2008, p. 461), who noted, 
“Analysing how competition in the banking sector works and whether it is beneficial is a 
difficult task”. Overall, however, it is sensible to assume that noticeable percentages of 
German corporate syndicated loan assets in banks’ balance sheets would likely value below 
par if they were to be marked to market,253 thus representing large-scale inventory risks. These 
hidden potential losses are possibly being revealed in secondary market sell-downs where 
risk-neutral investors would only be willing to purchase such assets with discounts. 
Furthermore, I established that even relationship lenders acting as buyers in the secondary 
market are most likely not to pay significant prices for the embedded cross-selling options, as 
the sell-off of a relationship syndicated loan would likely constitute a negative market signal 
(Dahiya et al., 2003). This assumption is shared with Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), stating a 
secondary sale would likely be perceived as a sale of underperforming loans by the market.   
In comparison, the corporate bond market, where secondary markets tend to be liquid, similar 
under-pricing tendencies would directly be revealed with respective valuations falling below 
par, once free to trade. In the current liquid syndicated loan market environment—
characterised by fierce lender competition and a supply and demand mismatch in favour of 
borrowers—predominantly being a take and hold marked with an almost complete silent 
secondary market, this is not yet a serious issue.254 In the future, however, if banks—perhaps 
to meet harsher regulatory requirements with respect to their capital ratios and liquidity—
might be forced to off-load large loan pieces from their hold-to-maturity valued bank books to 
free-up capital, losses would ultimately need to be channelled through their P&L (Carlstrom 
& Samolyk, 1995).  
                                               
 
253 Meaning: revaluing the price of an asset or a portfolio of assets on a frequent/daily basis. 
254 If a loan has been granted by a bank with the intention to hold it until maturity, it is commonly valued at amortised costs 
(LMA, 2015). 
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As established beforehand, this loss potential may be exacerbated because the German 
corporate syndicated loan secondary market is largely illiquid. In that context, Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) found that illiquid financial assets in general trade at lower prices. Overall, 
I found that German corporate syndicated loan borrowers are not locked-in or held-up by their 
relationship lenders due to switching costs, as postulated by authors such as Houston and 
James (1996), Rajan (1992), or Sharpe (1990). Instead, in the market at hand, relationship 
lenders—in the sense of the newly established practitioner-based definition—are being 
locked-in by their borrowers, by facing high discontinuation costs.  
A further issue is related to underwritings, which in today’s markets tend to be absorbed by 
the market rather easily. In a “tougher”, less liquid syndicated loan market environment, 
where banks might appear to be “pickier”, pricings would need, however, to meet the risk-
return-based requirements of lenders accurately. The opacity, as stressed above, leads to either 
over- or under-pricing of such underwritten deals, increasing the danger of stalled 
underwritings in times of economic turmoil, for example, or of changes in regulatory 
requirements, leading to substantial bulk risks exposures on banks’ balance sheets. With a 
view toward the major underwriting volumes, such as the recent Bayer-Monsanto €56.9 
billion acquisition financing, underwritten by only six banks, this might carry serious risk 
potential. Overall, these mechanisms and phenomena underpin the statement of Carletti 
(2008, p. 450), “It is well known that banks are special in that they are vulnerable to 
instability”.  
In summary, given the large amounts related to single borrowers in syndicated lending, the 
opacity of the German corporate syndicated lending market might lead to severe market 
imbalances and risks for the overall banking system. In the more granular bilateral lending 
market, this is likely not to be as serious an issue, as diversification effects happen to be more 
effective.  
In accordance with most of the interviewees, I advocate for more pricing transparency, which, 
in the long run, would lead to a more stable financial system. In the short term, however, it is 
possible that full transparency would lead to increased pricings for clients with currently high 
bargaining power and to reduced pricings for clients with currently lower bargaining power. 
After a process of adjustment, a more risk-adequate market equilibrium would be established. 
Furthermore, market dumping would be less pronounced. In such a situation, the perspective 
of Jones et al. (2005), who stated that syndicated lending shrinks the differences between 
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intermediated bank debt and disintermediated public debt, might be a more realistic 
possibility. 
Beside possible legal changes, for example, the obligation to make certain pricing elements of 
deals exceeding a certain size public to a banking supervisory authority, adjustments in the 
league table policies of private data providers might foster such a development. As league 
tables are an important marketing tool for banks, data providers like Dealogic Loanware and 
LPC could change their policies in the sense of only providing league table credit if pricings 
are reported. This would lead to the banking community exerting a strong pressure on clients 
and would subsequently lead to at least a better degree of transparency. Over the short run, 
this is certainly not feasible, but I find it important to make policy and regulatory makers 
aware of such risks inherent to the banking system. As a side note, it would be interesting to 
see whether the relationship-concept in the sense of relationship discounts would survive in a 
fully transparent market or whether it was simply a result of the opacity. The fact that 
relationship discounts only play minor roles in the more transparent U.S. syndicated lending 
market might be an indication of the latter. 
7.7 Contributions to practice 
Besides contributing new knowledge to the research community, Ph.D. theses often contribute 
valuable insights into professional practice. Therefore, I now comment on related practical 
contributions of my work. 
 Sourcebook for practitioners or new professionals in syndicated lending 
Other than source books such as Fight (2004) or Rhodes et al. (2004), as well as publications 
of the Loan Market Association, up-to-date literature that provides a comprehensive overview 
of syndicated loan price elements is scarce. Accordingly, this thesis, or a publication derived 
from it, could provide a “go-to” source for new or relatively inexperienced practitioners in the 
field of corporate syndicated lending, providing valuable support to them in becoming 
operationally ready to execute specific lending transactions. 
 Enhanced understanding of market opacity 
An in-depth understanding of the market’s opacity and its underlying forces is important for 
practitioners. My work explained that this opacity might carry both positive as well as 
negative effects on the syndicated lending market from a bank’s perspective and on the 
overall stability of the banking system. A richer understanding of this would enhance the 
awareness of practitioners in the field. 
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 New pricing measures to be applied by banks  
My newly established quantitative ex post total cost of borrowing framework provides a 
valuable tool for bank practitioners. The research revealed indications that even banks do not 
rigorously track the pay-off structures of granted syndicated loans and so might not exactly 
know what the yield of such a transaction might have been ex post. Respective time series 
analyses might not only lead to enhanced understanding of loan originators and banks in 
general. Banking-authority approved adjustments in ex ante RWA allocation frameworks 
could lead to more accuracy regarding the adequate mapping of risk in financiers’ balance 
sheets and could ultimately enhance the stability of the banking system overall. In addition, 
awareness of the factual yield of a syndicated loan ex post would allow banks to assess more 
correctly the relationship profitability. 
7.8 Personal reflection 
Conducting this research and writing this thesis over the last three years has led to some major 
personal benefits. My understanding and appreciation of these enhancements was facilitated 
by critical reflective thinking throughout the research, as prescribed by the reflective 
practitioner model of Schön (1983). 
A Ph.D. should demonstrate a researcher’s capabilities in conducting a comprehensive piece 
of empirical research of a to-date understudied topic. I recognised this as being a highly 
challenging, demanding process, characterised by uncertainty, personal pressure, and mostly 
hard and lonely work. Overcoming these challenges has shown me that large-scale projects 
can successfully be managed with a strong will, discipline, and open-mindedness regarding 
new themes and approaches. As an example of the latter, my new awareness of philosophical 
assumptions increased my creativity in choosing and combining certain research methods 
especially in the qualitative domain.  
The combination of professional work and experience in the field of research, as well as the 
parallel work on a scholarly level was exciting and fulfilling. The different viewing angles of 
theory and practice, and the reflective and open-minded combination of both in my view at 
the end, led to a higher quality academic work and one that enhanced my own understanding 
of the complex phenomena of syndicated lending, an enhancement that I can use to improve 
my daily work as a banking professional. I strongly recommend that both theory and practice 
should continuously be critically questioned and compared, so that each is enabled to benefit 
from the other.  
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In sum, conducting the Ph.D. “journey” was a very worthwhile experience that will have 
permanently changed and enhanced my approach towards both academic and professional 
topics within the sphere of my professional interests. 
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High market-to-book-ratio ↓
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reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
Borrower beta coefficient →
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Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
↑
Spread over 
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Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1990-2011 Gaul and Uysal (2013) 24
↑ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
↑ AISU U.S. 1986-2011 Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016) 15
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↑ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2008 Fang, Li, Xin, and Zhang (2016) 27
High cash flow ↓ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
High current ratio ↓ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
Low interest-coverage-ratio ↑
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reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
High EBITDA ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↓ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↓ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
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U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↓ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
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Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
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Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
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↑ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
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↑ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
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reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
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↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1990-2011 Gaul and Uysal (2013) 24
↑ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
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reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2008 Fang, Li, Xin, and Zhang (2016) 27
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reference rate
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Wasan, Vijayakumar, and Daniels 
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28
↑
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Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
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U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
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Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
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↓ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
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↓ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
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↓ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↓ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
High accrual quality ↓
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reference rate
U.S. 1991-2002
Wasan, Vijayakumar, and Daniels 
(2013)
28
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↓ AISD U.S. 1992-2008 Fang, Li, Xin, and Zhang (2016) 27
High leverage-ratio
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High stock-return volatility
High degree of tangible assets
Borrower related specifics
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↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2008 Fang, Li, Xin, and Zhang (2016) 27
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↓ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↓ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
↓ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↓ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
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Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
Public legal form (but listed on opaque segment) ↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
Private legal form & public bond market access ↓ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
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Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
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U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↓ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
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Capital markets access (in general) ↓
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Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
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Syndicated loan after equity IPO ↓ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
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U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1990-2011 Gaul and Uysal (2013) 24
↓
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Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↓ AISD Worldwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
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Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↑ AISD Worldwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
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↑ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
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October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
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U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
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↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
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Spread over 
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U.S. 1991-2002
Wasan, Vijayakumar, and Daniels 
(2013)
28
Utilities ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
High degree of ethical behaviour ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
High degree of ethical behaviour by borrower & 
lender
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↓ AISU U.S. 1986-2011 Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016) 15
↑ AISD U.S. 1986-2011 Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016) 15
↓ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
↓ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↓ AISD U.S. 1988-1999 Gottesmann and Roberts (2004) 39
↓ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↓ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
↓ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↓ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
Market capitalisation →
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
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Ownership concentration (high degree)
Borrower related specifics
Capital markets access (to public bond market)
Public legal form
Opaque
Age
Low draw probability of RCF
Old
Rating
Sector
Ethical behaviour
Legal form&ownership
Capital markets access
Size
Draw behaviour
Externally low (weak) rated
Externally rated
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↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
↑ AISU U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
→ TCB U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
Europe vs. U.S. (term loan) ↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↓ AISD U.S.; Europe; Asia 1998-2009 Champagne and Coggins (2012) 51
↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
→ AISD U.S.; Europe 1990-2011 Gaul and Uysal (2013) 24
Regional pricing differences
Europe vs. U.S. (revolving credit facilities)
The prizing puzzle
Europe vs. U.S.
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↑ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
Investment bank as lender for borrower after 
equity underwriting
↓ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
→
Spread over 
reference rate
France 1992-2006
Godlewski, Sanditov, and Burger-
Helmchen (2012)
52
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑ AISD Cross-country
1998-
November 
Houston, Itzkowitz, and Naranjo 
(2017)
35
Foreign (borrower has assets in lender country) ↓ AISD Cross-country
1998-
November 
Houston, Itzkowitz, and Naranjo 
(2017)
35
Foreign (in large financial system) ↑ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
Foreign (in small financial system) ↓ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
Large ↓ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
Well diversified credit portfolio ↓ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
Undercapitalised bank as lender for opaque 
borrower
→ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
"Strong" bank as lender for opaque borrower 
(in recession)
→ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
Undercapitalised bank as lender for opaque 
borrower (in a recession)
↑ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
High reputation in general (lead arrangers and 
participants)
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
France 1992-2006
Godlewski, Sanditov, and Burger-
Helmchen (2012)
52
↓ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe; Asia 1998-2009 Champagne and Coggins (2012) 51
↓ AISD Worldwide 1993-2006
Gadanecz, Kara, and Molyneux 
(2012)
56
→ AISD U.S.; Europe; Asia 1998-2009 Champagne and Coggins (2012) 51
→ AISD Worldwide 1993-2006
Gadanecz, Kara, and Molyneux 
(2012)
52
Reputable lead arranger for transparent 
borrower 
Reputable lead arranger for opaque borrower 
Lender related specifics
Type
Nationality
Financial information
Reputation
Investment bank
Lender and borrower of same nationality
High reputation of lead arranger
Foreign
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Amount increase option ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
Maturity extension option ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
Secondary market trading permitted ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↓ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
↓ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↓ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
France 1992-2006
Godlewski, Sanditov, and Burger-
Helmchen (2012)
52
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↓ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1990-2011 Gaul and Uysal (2013) 24
↓ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
Syndicated loan contractual features
Various options
Loan size
Large
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↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↑ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
↑ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↑ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↓ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↑ AISD U.S. 1988-1999 Gottesmann and Roberts (2004) 39
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
↑ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
↑ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↑ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
↑ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
↑ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
Tranched syndicated loan for average borrower ↑ AISD U.S. 1987-1999 Maskara (2010) 44
Tranched syndicated loan for risky borrower ↓ AISD U.S. 1987-1999 Maskara (2010) 44
High number of tranches ↑ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 44
↓ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↓ AISD U.S. 1987-1999 Maskara (2010) 44
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↓ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
↑ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↑ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↑ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2009
Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz 
(2017)
25
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
↑ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
↑ AISD U.S.; Canada 1996-2003 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) 32
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
Syndicated bridge term loan
Protection mechanisms
Syndicated loan contractual features
Appearance of guarantee(s)
Appearance of covenant(s)
Appearance of collateral
Tranching&loan types
Revolving credit facility
Syndicated term loan
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↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1991-2002
Wasan, Vijayakumar, and Daniels 
(2013)
28
↑ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
France 1992-2006
Godlewski, Sanditov, and Burger-
Helmchen (2012)
52
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
↓ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↓ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↓ AISD U.S. 1988-1999 Gottesmann and Roberts (2004) 39
→ AISD Europe 1995-2007 Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) 34
→
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
Long (revolving credit facilities) → AISD U.S. 1988-1999 Gottesmann and Roberts (2004) 39
Long (term loans) ↑ AISD U.S. 1988-1999 Gottesmann and Roberts (2004) 39
↓ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↓ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
Commercial paper back-up ↓ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
↓ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
Repayment ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Euro-area
1999-
October 2006
Barbosa and Ribeiro (2007) 38
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
↑ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
→
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
Working capital
Long
Syndicated loan contractual features
Acquisitions
Maturity
Uses of proceeds
Refinancing
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↑ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
Good solvency ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
↓ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
→ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
→
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
Trade balance →
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
High reserves to GDP ratio ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
High aggregate risk ↑
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
Low unemployment rate ↓ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
→ AISD Wordwide 1990-2011
Anagnostopoulou and Drakos 
(2016)
47
→
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
Degree of inflation 
High debt to GDP ratio 
Macroeconomic environment
Economic cycle
Financial information of borrower country
Recession in borrower country
High degree of GDP growth 
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Club deal ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country (excl. 
e.g., U.S.; Germany)
1991-2006 
(August)
Godlewski and Weill (2011) 42
↓ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
↓ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe 1992-2002 Carey and Nini (2007) 23
→
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
→
Spread over 
reference rate
Europe 1990-2008
Christodoulakis and Olupeka 
(2010)
22
Information asymmetries within in syndicate ↑ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
Relational distance (low degree of information 
flow between lenders)
↑ AISD U.S.
1990-August 
2010
Wu, Chang, Suardi, and Chang 
(2013)
53
Participant lender facing information 
asymmetries to borrower
↑ AISD Worldwide 1993-2006
Gadanecz, Kara, and Molyneux 
(2012)
56
High for transparent borrower ↓ AISD Worldwide 1993-2006
Gadanecz, Kara, and Molyneux 
(2012)
56
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↑ AISD Worldwide 1993-2006
Gadanecz, Kara, and Molyneux 
(2012)
56
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
↓ AISD U.S. 1993-2004 Ivashina (2009) 50
↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
Central ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
France 1992-2006
Godlewski, Sanditov, and Burger-
Helmchen (2012)
52
High ↓ AISD U.S.; Europe; Asia 1998-2009 Champagne and Coggins (2012) 51
↑ AISD U.S.; Europe; Asia 1998-2009 Champagne and Coggins (2012) 51
→
Spread over 
reference rate
France 1992-2006
Godlewski, Sanditov, and Burger-
Helmchen (2012)
52
Existence of identical previous syndicate whilst 
lending during 2008 financial crisis
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
Quality
Concentration
Syndicated loan history
Syndicate structure
Syndication mode
Number of lenders
Information asymmetries
High for opaque borrower
Retained lead share
Position within network
High
High in general 
High
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Borrower has past relationships with 
participants
↓ AISD Worldwide 1993-2006
Gadanecz, Kara, and Molyneux 
(2012)
56
Borrower has past relationships with entire 
syndicate
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
As lead bank (2008 financial crisis) ↓
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S.; Canada; Europe 2003-2008
Alexandre, Bouaiss, and Refait-
Alexandre (2014)
59
For bank dependent borrower in recession 
(undercapitalised bank)
↑ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
For bank dependent borrower in recession 
("healthy" bank)
→ AISD UK 1996-2005
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg 
(2013)
58
For bank dependent borrower in recession ↑
Spread over 
reference rate
U.S. 1987-2002 Santos and Winton (2008) 57
For borrower after bond IPO ↓ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
For borrower after equity IPO ↓ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
↑ AISD U.S. 1998-2003 Schenone (2010) 61
↓ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
For very large borrowers → AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↓ AISD U.S. 1987-2002 Hale and Santos (2009) 62
↓ AISD U.S. 1986-2003
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011)
55
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 2003-2007 Kim, Surroca, and Tribó (2014) 29
For borrower near equity or debt underwriting ↑ AISD U.S. 1992-2002
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 
(2009)
60
Lender-borrower relationship
Syndicated loan history
Appearance of relationship lender
For opaque borrowers
In general
Determinant
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o
n
Pricing 
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under study
Time 
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Reference
Consensus 
within extant 
literature
Detailed 
discussion 
in table
Secondary market trading for private legal 
form borrower
↑ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
Secondary market trading for public legal form 
borrower
→ AISD UK 1989-2007 Saunders and Steffen (2011) 63
Secondary market trading contractually 
permitted 
↓
Spread over 
reference rate
Cross-country 1990-2001
Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 
(2008)
49
Trading activity
Secondary market trading
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Appendix B: Interview invitation material 
 
 
 Interview Invitation Letter 
 
Title of Ph.D. Thesis:  
 
Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany: an Exploration of the Hidden Drivers 
 
Ph.D. Candidate: 
Name:  Daniel Schmidt 
Address: Zum Apothekerhof 6 
   60594 Frankfurt am Main 
   Germany 
Mobile:  + 49 175 5469782 
Email:  daniel.schdt@me.com   
 
 
1st and 2nd Supervisor: 
Name:  Prof Gerald Watts  Dr Sainey Faye  
   United Kingdom   United Kingdom 
Mobile:  + 44 7970650344  + 44 7984801991 
Email:  geraldwatts@me.com fayebiram@hotmail.com   
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Dear […], 
I am a research student (Doctor of Philosophy / Ph.D.) at the University of Gloucestershire 
and I am delighted to invite you to participate in an interview session on the above mentioned 
research topic.  
The overall interview will be scheduled for approximately 120 minutes, whereof the actual 
/main interview will take approximately 90 minutes. The interview will be conducted in a 
quiet location free from disturbances and can take place in a location selected by you. 
Otherwise, I can offer an appropriate location. 
The interview is planned to be audio-recorded. If you do not agree, there will be no audio-
recording, and I will take handwritten notes. In any case, you will receive the respective 
transcript for a final review and sign-off. You have the possibility to indicate “off the record 
information”, which will be deleted and won`t be a part of the analysis. The interview 
transcripts will be stored electronically. Your name as well as all kind of information in 
relation to the firm / institution you are working for will be anonymised and will not be 
published. Audio-records and transcription material will be destroyed after the final approval 
of the thesis by the respective examiners. This research project will result in a doctoral thesis 
(Ph.D.) and the findings might be presented at conferences and might be published entirely or 
in part (e.g., in journal articles).  
By taking part in this research project, you will support finance researchers/scientists as well 
as practitioners to enrich their understanding regarding Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in 
Germany.  
Upon request, I shall send you the finally approved thesis. There are no known risks for you 
participating in this study. 
Aim of this research: 
The aim of the research work is to explore and analyse the "hidden drivers" of banks’ pricing 
of syndicated loans to German corporate borrowers, thereby developing an enriched 
understanding of the elements and determinants of pricing and its underlying processes and 
decisions. 
Scope of this research: 
The research project focusses on German Corporate Borrowers and the respective pricing 
mechanisms in the primary market. Especially worth to mention is that Leveraged Buy Out as 
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well as Project Finance transactions are not included here. Further, the focus lies on 
Revolving Credit Facilities as well as Term Loans. Guarantee facilities are not a special focus. 
Background information: 
Bank lending environments are a crucial driver of economic prosperity and thus, an important 
field for research. However, the in-depth analysis of banks’ lending activities is shrouded with 
difficulties, as the debtor-creditor relationship is private and individually negotiated, which 
makes it impossible to get comprehensive access to individual loan specifications. Unlike data 
regarding fully disintermediated capital market instruments, such as corporate bonds or 
publicly traded equities, terms and conditions of bank loans in general are typically not in the 
public domain. An exception is the Syndicated Loan market for which public data is available 
to a certain extent. Various commercial information providers such as Dealogic Loanware or 
Thomson Reuter’s Loan Pricing Connector collect accessible data regarding syndicated loans 
and subsequently make these public. Thus, researchers have used these data samples to 
analyse market phenomena and various aspects (e.g., pricing) of Syndicated Lending. The 
majority of academic work on syndicated loan pricing – predominantly based on secondary 
data samples, analysed by means of quantitative methods – has been conducted by using US-
based samples. In comparison, studies on European loan pricing are smaller in number, and 
none of these specifically focus on pricing in the German corporate syndicated loan market. 
This appears somewhat surprising, because the German economy is more dependent on bank 
lending than the Anglo-Saxon countries, where capital markets tend to be more liquid, 
transparent, deeper and more integrated. It is possible that this disparity has its roots in the 
availability and quality of syndicated loan data in the public domain, which vary significantly 
between different capital markets. My hypothesis therefore is that - with respect to the 
German context - pricing data in the public domain are incomplete, and that it is thus 
supposable that other ‘hidden’ drivers and mechanisms of pricing exist. To meet the 
abovementioned research aim, it would be inappropriate to use solely quantitative approaches 
of recent – mainly US-based - sample studies. Therefore, your contribution to this research by 
means of interviews will help to explore and analyse the "hidden drivers" of banks’ pricing of 
syndicated loans to German corporate borrowers, thereby developing an enriched 
understanding of the elements and determinants of pricing and its underlying processes and 
decisions. 
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Interview format: 
Semi-structured in-depth interview 
Indicative timetable of interview: 
 
Overview of main interview topics:  
 Public data availability and quality with respect to the German Corporate Syndicated 
Loan Market 
 Determinants of the various pricing elements of Corporate Syndicated Loans in 
Germany 
 Prioritisation of the various pricing elements and the respective determinants from the 
lenders’ point of view 
 Process of making Syndicated Loan pricing offers to a German corporate 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
I conduct the research based on the guidelines of the University of Gloucestershire’s 
Handbook of Research Ethics. The research plan and design has been approved by the 
University, but the contents and opinions expressed in this research instrument are those of 
the researcher and in no way represent those of the University of Gloucestershire. 
Your participation in this interview is highly appreciated.  
Thank you very much. 
Daniel Schmidt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject Responsible Approximate duration (in minutes)
a) General personal introduction Interviewee and Daniel Schmidt 3
b) Introduction to research project Daniel Schmidt 5
c) Introduction to research design Daniel Schmidt 5
d) Introduction to interview process Daniel Schmidt 5
e) Signing of "Informed Consent Form" Interviewee   2
f) Interview Interviewee and Daniel Schmidt 90
g) Concluding discussion Interviewee and Daniel Schmidt 10
120Total
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Informed Consent Form 
Title of Ph.D. Thesis:  
Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany: an Exploration of the Hidden Drivers 
Ph.D. Candidate: Daniel Schmidt 
I confirm that I have received and read the invitation & information letter. Yes No 
I understand that I take part in a postgraduate research study (Ph.D.- project). Yes No 
I understand that I have the right to reject the participation in the research at any 
time & stage. 
Yes No 
I understand that the interview will be audio recorded and transcribed thereafter. Yes No 
I understand that I have the right to refuse the audio recording at any time & 
stage. 
Yes No 
I understand that my name and anything related to the institution / company I 
work for will be anonymised and confidentiality respected at all times. 
Yes No 
I understand that the research will result in a Ph.D. Thesis and that respective 
research findings might be presented at conferences and may be published in 
academic journals – full confidentiality will be respected at all times. 
Yes No 
I understand, that audio-records and transcription material will be destroyed after 
the final approval of the thesis by the respective examiners. 
Yes  No 
I understand that I can contact the researcher at any time to ask questions 
concerning the research. 
Yes No 
I would like to participate in this research. Yes No 
I would like to receive a summary of the research findings. Yes No 
 
Name: 
Job position: 
Years of experience in the syndicated loan business: 
Contact details: 
 
Date:        Signature: 
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Appendix C: Example (full-) interview transcription 
R  
How do you describe quantity and quality of publicly available information/data on the 
German Corporate syndicated loan market? 
I4  
There are public available databases, like Loan Connector, Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg, and 
Dealogic Loanware etc. Further, there are magazines, which announce the closing of 
transactions or potential closings in the future, which sometimes revert to rumours or press 
releases. This is interesting for us, because not all borrowers in the syndicated loan market are 
our clients. We are not participating in all deals, which come into the market. However, the 
substance of this information is not always reliable and often the information is weak. That 
means they are not detailed in terms of pricing, structure, composition of the syndicate etc. 
The content is often of only very limited additional value for us. 
R  
Do you see systematic differences between different corporate borrower groups/types in 
Germany?  
I4  
Whenever it comes to publicity, there is a standard wording in the mandate documents, which 
outlines if the borrower is fine to announce the loan after it has been signed. It is fully at the 
borrower’s discretion. Publicly listed companies are usually used to announce these kinds of 
instruments. For other clients it is often a clear no go, because it is e.g. a privately owned 
Mittelstand company, which does not like to disclose any information. This is also fine for us 
as a bank. A lot of transactions we are doing, are not going into these public databases at all, 
because we have a standard that we – for any kind of publicity – require the written consent of 
the borrower. This is often not given.  
R  
Is Germany special in that context? And if why? Why are corporates so reluctant to publish 
information, especially with view to pricing? 
I4  
This is a German speciality. First, we have the so-called “Bankgeheimnis” in Germany, which 
is something of very high value for our clients. Talking about financials and personal earnings 
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is not common and not liked, whereas in the US for instance, people are proud on declaring 
what value they have contributed. Therefore, this is something, which is very special in 
Germany. Opaqueness is important for them. We do not have this share culture here in 
Germany. We only have a limited number of publicly listed companies, where the 
transparency is quite high. Whenever you have a private company, you often do not find any 
information at all. In addition, it goes even further. We see the phenomenon that companies, 
who have corporate bonds outstanding rather choose a Schuldschein going forward, because 
this product is less transparent and you do not see on a daily basis the market risk perception 
via daily prices on Bloomberg. 
R  
How did this quantity and quality change over time? 
I4  
It changed a lot after the financial crisis. The announcement of loan details, the willingness to 
announce pricings has shrunk dramatically because the pricings went up. I mean each 
corporate before the financial crisis, proudly presented their very, small, tiny, little margins, 
that they negotiated with their bank group to demonstrate the market, what a perfect and 
strong credit they are, but during the crisis, pricings went up and nobody or hardly anybody 
had the interest to present these increased pricings to the public. Therefore, since then we 
have seen a lack of public pricings and this remains stable until now, due to the very tough 
competition in the market. Whenever you declare pricings, it is market intelligence, which 
you as a bank share with your competitors. There are banks who no longer push clients to 
allow them to publish their pricings. Banks often have an own interest to keep pricings 
unrevealed. For our specific institution, it is completely up to the customer. If it does not want 
to publish anything, we are fine with this. Of course, there are banks that are dependent on 
league table rankings and they have a strong interest that each deal goes into that so that they 
have a strong interest that the customer declares at least the deal public. That is not the case 
for our bank so much. Therefore, the second argument is of course you as a bank have an 
interest to have a decent stake in the league table rankings, because also your competitors 
show to their clients where they and we are standing. On the other hand, you – given the high 
competition in the market – have the argument to not declare this deal public, because you 
maybe show market potential to competitors, which in a refinancing situation makes your life 
more difficult. This is particularly the case for debut transactions in the rather small- to mid-
cap area. 
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R  
How does that situation with respect to public data affect the work of corporate loan 
originators in the German market? 
I4   
In a way that you need to manage to collect and use internal, private information as good as 
you can. It is the only source you have. You can also revert to other data’s like bond-, CDS 
spreads or Schuldschein yields for example. In addition, of course to your own deal pipeline; 
e.g. negotiations with other customers that you have. What these are willing to pay. Deals 
recently closed, or deals you are invited to participate. 
R  
How would be the situation without access to any kind of private information? 
I4  
It would not really be possible to price a loan in line with current market terms. However, you 
have of course your internal pricing models that are a pure institutional, or a pure private 
thing. That plays also an important role in pricings. However, if you get asked as a 
Syndication person, at what price you can place the risk or what is the best mix between 
placing the risk and winning the mandate in the first place, then you really have to revert to 
market standards and current pricings. But you also have the situation that there hardly is any 
clear market price because you could discuss on so many customers, are they comparable, or 
to what degree are they comparable to another recent deal? Therefore, you hardly have any 
perfect matching comparable for non-public corporate borrowers. It is thus also a matter of 
experience, feeling and negotiation ability of the originator. 
R  
What are ALL the pricing elements of a “common” corporate syndicated loan to a German 
borrower? For what specifically does each of these compensate the lender? 
I4  
You have two key elements. There is a fee component, which is more or less an upfront fee 
that is paid once the deal has been closed. Then you have running p.a. fees like margin and 
commitment fees. At the end, there is a market standard that banks are used to generate fee 
income, once they close such a transaction, but my impression is that a CFO or a Treasurer of 
the borrower considers the all in pricing for a syndicated loan. If you are having a high 
upfront fee and a low margin or vice versa is a matter of negotiation, but also subject to 
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market standards. I mean hardly any customer likes to pay upfront fees that is clear. 
Everybody also likes to have a low margin. You nowadays commonly find elements like 
utilisation fee concepts, which are an instrument to reduce the commitment fee on undrawn 
revolving facilities. That is good for customers. You have ticking fees in acquisition bridges. 
These are also special elements, which help the client as well as the banks to deliver an 
interesting structure and a low priced offer for this special credit, the client needs. 
R  
How do you prioritise these pricing elements form your banks’ point of view? 
I4  
Whenever the bank decides to join or to participate in a syndicated loan, it first looks at the 
economics of this particular credit. They do a calculation with their expected probability of 
drawings across the lifetime of the loan and often this business does not fulfil the profit 
requirements that we have or does not cover the costs plus the amount of profit we would like 
to earn. This is mostly driven by the RWA profitability of this loan. Secondly, there is a 
calculation, where the relationship manager who is responsible for this account summarise the 
additional income, which we generate with the client to make a strategy that you – across the 
lifetime of the loan – contribute benefit with this client to the bank. This is finally the number 
that is interesting for our investment board, so they judge on this number. Whenever the RWA 
profitability is not given and you do not earn additional money (cross-sell), then the likeliness 
that the deal goes through is low. 
R  
So you are saying that the customer as well as the bank and its various entities look rather on 
the all in pricing than on specific pricing elements?  
I4  
We as a bank are flexible on that. We have of course also risk officers who say, if I need to 
accept this risk, how does it pay out for the bank in total? Thus, also the risk officer needs and 
wants to make sure that the bank earns a decent income with this kind of risk. In addition, you 
have product units who need fee income. A decent fee stake, which is common in the market, 
should be an element that it works for all parties within the bank. 
R  
So the whole pricing package can be summarised as a compromise between all parties? 
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I4  
Yes. 
R  
What are the determinants of the various pricing elements? What is responsible for a 
particular pricing element to be high or low? 
I4  
If you have a customer that pays a low margin, then we talk about clients that usually have a 
very good rating. Therefore, rating is the first issue. Then the amount loaned is an issue. The 
size of the client is an issue. What revenues do you generate with this particular loan for the 
client? In addition, what additional income can you generate? As I said, the most important 
issue that influences the price is the rating, because the risk costs are very large factor in the 
overall calculation. In addition to that, you have to look at the structure of the loan. That 
means tenor, flexibility, drawing possibilities for RCFs, etc. All that together influences your 
costs of funding. That is the second part of the medal, which is also very important for 
pricing. It makes a significant difference whether the customer goes for a short-term loan or a 
long lasting revolver with all kind of flexibilities. 
R  
What specifically interests me is the bank-borrower-relationship component of syndicated 
lending in Germany. Can you please comment on that in relation to pricing? 
I4  
We define ourselves as a relationship bank. Therefore, our strategy is to grant loans, but earn 
money also with other bank products. Clients are usually willing to distribute other business 
in accordance to the respective credit stakes of the syndicate banks. Therefore, whenever you 
have a credit relationship, you are a financing partner of the client and you are then qualified 
to do additional business. An example is: if you have a highly leveraged company, you have a 
very thick package of credit documentation, because you would not give money out without 
any conditions. You need to have clear guidelines on what the client is allowed to do and how 
the credit terms are and so on. In the case, the client then likes to buy an interest rate or 
foreign exchange swap-derivative, you need credit lines in place for this kind of business. If 
you don`t know the credit risk behind this client, because you are not a lender and do not 
know the credit documentation, you hardly would find a bank that would offer just the pure 
derivative product. Out of this tradition, you have the situation, that you do this kind of swap 
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businesses etc. and other businesses like transaction banking only as a lending bank. You 
need credit lines also to know the credit matrix of the client, to get a feeling of the 
creditworthiness in constantly dealing with this risk. To sum it up, you have the tradition, that 
the bank who is engaged in the credit, who has committed to credit line and approved the 
name for a decent risk stake, is also qualifying then for additional cross-sell business that 
often needs additional risk participations. With Investment grade blue chip borrowers, you 
have the situation that everybody wants to have cross-sell business. On the other side, hardly 
anybody is interested in pure credit lending because of often very low pricings and shortfalls. 
Thus, the treasurers of these companies have the rule only to qualify banks for additional 
businesses once they have a credit relationship. My impression is that this additional business 
distribution is really calculated by the borrower in accordance with the stake of the bank in 
the loan. Companies have to try to be fair with that to have good relationships with their 
banks as well. They need to ensure their funding also in tough times. You have the situation 
that you can only have cross-sell – additional side business – once you have a credit 
relationship. That is for pricing a very relevant determinant. 
R  
Which role does competition and number of banks active in the syndicated loan business in 
Germany play? 
I4  
It is the situation where you have to have your calculations properly done. Banks’ internal 
controlling has to capture precisely, whether you have a fair share of cross sell and have 
additional fair income compensating for the credit related costs you have internally. So what 
we see in the market is that these kind of frequent issuers, blue chip companies are reducing 
their bank groups because the treasurer always says, “I cannot serve 25 banks with cross sell”. 
Thus, many clients have a common interest to reduce the bank group to a minimum. The bank 
then needs to provide a higher credit proportion but it is also awarded and profiting from 
higher amounts of crosssell. In addition, with a higher probability of being awarded crosssell 
of course. If a customer has a bond mandate to provide, he would not nominate 25 banks for 
this. There is a natural restriction in numbers of banks that could participate in that crosssell 
business. Therefore, we have seen smaller syndicates in these days. Banks are obviously 
willing to accept a greater shortfall at the beginning but then trade with a higher probability of 
generating additional business. 
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R  
How do you prioritise the various determinants of pricing from your banks’ point of view? 
I4  
First, you need to transport the customers’ requirements into a bank product. You need a bank 
product that says e.g. 5-year revolving credit facility with these and these options. Then you 
have the client, with his rating and then you can calculate what the costs for the bank are to 
providing x million in that loan. That is the first calculation that you have to make. Then you 
have the cross sell element, which I mentioned before. The question here is which shortfall 
you can accept. Then, third, you have the situation that you need to be competitive from a 
market perspective. You need to do your assessment, what other banks do, how they would 
price the deal and what price they would be able to accept internally to build a consortium. 
We are talking about syndicated loans. We need a price for a 600mn deal where we just take 
50mn so we need a consensus pricing. The particular special interests of a single bank are 
irrelevant. Given the opaqueness we have talked earlier about regarding public market data, it 
is a matter of experience and trust to your internal calculation instruments. Basically, what 
your credit portfolio manager says he would need. Thus, the most relevant issue is your own 
calculation plus the experience what the common market price would be, what the customer 
would expect as a price and what the customer would be willing to pay for the loan. 
R  
That is interesting and different to studies I have read. There they tend to believe, that market 
power is more at the bank side and the bank decides on if a loan gets granted or not. Can you 
comment? Are we in a buyers or sellers’ market? 
I4  
During my Bankausbildung, at school, you learned that you have so-called AGB (Allgemeine 
Geschäftsbedingungen). A customer would come to the bank and subject to the pre-defined 
conditions in the AGB, the customer pays a certain price. In the blue chip, commercial or 
corporate banking area, this is not the case. All prices are individually negotiated. You hardly 
have any standard pricings. It is simply a matter of negotiation at the end. If you have a bond 
mandate for example, you look at Bloomberg, look what comparable transactions you can 
find and then you have a yield curve where you pretty much obviously can say, ok within a 
short range that is the pricing for the client. It is easy to judge. As our product is more opaque 
given the lack of information available and given the various structures, many deals are 
specially structured and tailor-made. This has also pricing relevance. The opaqueness makes it 
Appendix C: Example (full-) interview transcription LV 
  Corporate Syndicated Loan Pricings in Germany 
really complicated.  
The point you did not bring is actually is that more and more customers are now having 
advisors on board. They more and more use financial advisors. I yesterday joined a meeting 
where a mid-cap company had an advisor who was collecting offers and selecting two lead 
banks out of these offers. Therefore, they try to somewhat generate transparency by having 
financial advisors, which are also standard in M&A deals in the leveraged loan market e.g.  
That is something important and a new trend in the corporate world to squeeze the best 
pricing. 
R  
How do syndicated loan originators set the pricing of a corporate syndicated loan for a 
German borrower? 
I4  
As we are dealing with rather big clients and are dealing with Syndicated Loans, which are 
having a relatively high volume, it is very relevant for us to be part of this financing, once this 
is a target customer of us. We in our team have the standard, that whenever we pitch for a 
transaction – when we are seeing a customer – we discuss the pricing package in our team and 
agree, as a team on the structure that we think is the best for the client. We use a form that is 
called pricing sheet. There we comment on the structure of the loan, the respective hold levels 
the consortium. Then we add comparable transactions, we add CDS and or bond spreads 
when we have them available, we determine the actual or the recent instruments of the client 
and in a discussion that is like a dry run for the pitch, we agree on the pricing that we as a 
bank recommend to the borrower. Our team does a recommendation, but the final internal 
price comes from the credit portfolio manager, who is in charge of signing of into the credit. 
We as Syndication people do not have any credit competences. We are just servicers, advising 
the credit department on this special market segment and instrument. This works well, 
because you have then the experience of all originators, sales persons that have seen other 
transactions or might have another opinion. It is always important to think about, how the 
client, usually the respective treasurer will think about our offer. He has maybe seen five to 
ten other banks before we pitch. Therefore, they have a very good view on their market 
standing at that time, which we as a single bank do not have. Therefore, we need to do our 
homework properly to get the best possible feeling where a potential market price could be. 
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R  
Are there differences between originator mentalities (e.g., the quantitative and the feeling 
person)? Can you comment on those phenomena? 
I4  
As I told you, we have a mix of doing calculations and feeling. I would say that feeling is 
80% of the game because sometimes you have very strong names or you have sometimes the 
situation, where deal constellations can be more competitive or less competitive and that is a 
relevant issue for pricing. Sometimes you have business models that hardly a bank touches. 
Therefore, you have higher placement risk, and you need a higher price. This does not go into 
a system and cannot be really calculated. 
R  
Anything I have forgotten, which is also important? 
I4  
Yes maybe. Other instruments. We see also the Schuldschein instrument as a competitive 
product to the Syndicated Loan. The treasurer is not doing a beauty contest only with credit 
people from various banks, but also with other product people. You compete also with other 
instruments like Schuldscheine. We have seen that prices in the Schuldschein market can be 
even more attractive than in the Syndicated Loan market. Given the very high liquidity in the 
market, the flooding with liquidity by the central bank, the very low interest rates, and the 
high liquidity in the market from institutional investors and from savings banks prices are also 
very thin in the Schuldschein market. These are game changers.  
In addition, the high regulation. Banks will struggle going forward to take huge and long-term 
credits and this will be more and more pricing relevant going forward. 
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Appendix E: Servicing- and 3rd party pricing elements 
Below, I display the discussions on the pricing element-group third-party expenses and 
servicing elements. As stressed in 5.3, non-bank parties, like external lawyers, are involved in 
syndicated lending with their work having to be compensated accordingly (Altunbas et al., 
2006b). As I conducted the study from the bank/lender perspective, and to omit brevity, I 
provide the related discussion in this Appendix E. 
Servicing elements 
A syndicated loan needs some kind of management during its lifetime and these management 
tasks are being compensated by the lender. 
Servicing per annum elements  
Facility agency fee 
I have provided definition of a facility agent and its respective tasks in section 2.4.7.3. The 
facility agency fee is the usually per annum paid compensation for these tasks. 
The following interviewee statement exemplifies this: 
I 13 The permanent servicing of a facility by the facility agent will have to be compensated. 
 
Security agency fee 
In the case that a synicated loan is secured, the security package needs to be managed over the 
lifetime of the loan. These tasks may include the ongoingly checking and documenting of the 
security and its current values. This is being compensated via a further per annum fee via a 
security agency fee. Often these tasks are combined with those of the usual facility agent. 
The following interviewee statement exemplifies this: 
I 18 This is similar to a facility agency fee, but only with a focus on secured transactions where the client—
for example, because of its rating—needs to put security in place and the agency has a need to also 
monitor, administrate, and continuously valuate the security over the lifetime of the facility. 
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Servicing upfront elements 
Transfer fee 
Transfer fees are compensation mostly for the facility agent, in the case of a secondary trade 
during the lifetime of a syndicated loan, which needs to be admistered. As the loan market is 
an “over-the-counter” market without automated trading processes, such as clearing, these 
might represent a quite significant workload. The following interviewee statement exemplifies 
this: 
I 3 Further, you may have pre-agreed fees for transfers. That again is a part of the servicing fees for the 
agent. 
 
3rd party elements 
I labelled the last fee elements 3rd party elements. These are also common in syndicated 
lending, but are not for the benefit of the lender(s), but rather are for third parties involved. 
These elements are mostly irregular or upfront payments. 
Advisory fee (non-bank related) 
In 5.3.2.2.3, I discussed bank-related advisory fees. However, it might also be possible that a 
third party, like a consultancy firm, executes these tasks. The follwing interviewee statement 
exemplifies this: 
I 16 This could be either bank and/or non-bank-related. It is not a fee solely paid for putting the concrete 
facility in place. It is more for the process beforehand e.g., if the client needs to have advice in his 
specific situation as to what kind of products are best for him. This could be a syndicated loan, a bond, 
or a Schuldschein for instance. Then the client is asking either bank or some kind of financial advisor 
for this financial advice on how to structure the whole financing package. 
 
Legal fee 
Especially in the negotiating and drafting phase of the facility agreement, external lawyers are 
retained to perform these tasks. It is common that both the lender(s) as well as the borrower 
itself are being advised by an external law firm. Although the structuring banks—mostly the 
documentation agent—mandates the bank to be represented by counsel, the borrower pays the 
bill for both its own attorneys and the bank’s attorneys. 
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The following interviewee statement exemplifies this: 
I 18 This is related to external legal firms. Banks receive their arrangement and other fees which are 
related to putting the facility in place and to coordinating and placing it. Legal fees are not for the 
internal legal departments of the banks, which are acting as arranger or something like that, but for 
external legal counsels like Allen&Overy, Freshfields, etc. These companies are assisting either the 
banks and / or the client to secure to put the facility agreement properly in place. These fees have all 
to be paid by the borrower, both for the borrower itself and for the lenders external legal firm. In 
practice, the respective documentation agent is asking a legal advisor to advice for the banks side but 
it is market since that the borrower pays theses fees. Legal fees also can occur not only for putting the 
facility in place in the first place, but also in case of a facility which is already running and the client 
is asking for an amendment. For this change in contract terms, external legal firms could also be 
involved. If it is a huge amendment banks are asking again for external legal advice, which the client 
also must pay for. 
 
Syndication platform fee 
In standard syndicated loan structuring and placement processes, many documents are shared 
within the Bookrunner group and later with the invited banks. Comittments as well as declines 
need to be put into a so-called order book. These processes are suppored by syndication 
platforms like “Intralinks” or “Debtdomain”, who are compensated by a fee. 
I 21 Most facilities are structured and syndicated in a way that the one, two or three banks who are 
actively arranging the facility are preparing an information package for banks to be invited and to 
give them the chance to have a look at term sheets and stuff like. To share all these documents and to 
run syndication books, it is standard to use one distribution platform nowadays. Market standard here 
is debt domain. The fee for this service usually must be paid by the client. 
 
 
 
